I have very little faith in the current leadership of our Corps, which in itself is a very sad statement. I would be hard pressed to recommend enlisting to our young people and certanly not my family ( 4 MARINE Combat Veterans )
This was said many times during my tour..."we've been doing so much with so little for so long, that we are now qualified to do everything with nothing for ever"
The current leadership is apparently full of simple minded people who demand simplicity in their lives and the Corps. Why else would they rid the Corps of those “heavy”, tracked armored vehicles that require all that tedious training and time consuming maintenance; artillery and engineering assets, obviously, are too difficult to understand and employ.
They’ve left the Nation without adequate, immediate response to a variety of emergencies that were always the reason for our existence and were handled with the professionalism that the American people expect from the Marine Corps.
The long winded excuses and empty promises of things to come is embarrassing to those of us who can recognize the flaws in “force design”. Semper Fi
Exactly 💯... and despite the US Army MDTFs being stood up and functional, they still fail to replicate the total combat arms force capabilities of a MEU (SOC) pre FD2030 that features a total combined arms force that's forward deployed featuring immediate ground combat forces of reinforced infantry with artillery, armor, and close air support from rotary and fixed wing assets, naval gunfire support, and a capable logistics system with combat service support along with engineering capabilities to operate 24/7 and respond to any threat or crisis in every clime and place! VISION2035 is a must to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
When it came to laying personnel issues for our Corps, Jim Marsh was the man. These issues going before congress are not things that suddenly pop into the mind and a few briefing slides suffice. These are well researched and documented, with a bevy of experts available to brief staffers-well before the actual hearings. maybe we lost that capability in our haste to divest.
Grok: Corrected re USMC Reserve Component:**No tank units exist in the Marine Corps Reserve** (or active component) as of early 2026. Under Force Design 2030, the USMC fully divested of all tank battalions, including the reserve's 4th Tank Battalion (part of the 4th Marine Division). Deactivations began in 2020 (e.g., Alpha Company cased colors in July 2020), with the entire battalion inactivated by 2021 to shift resources toward lighter, more expeditionary capabilities like long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, and littoral operations. No tank units remain operational.
**Artillery units in the Marine Corps Reserve**: The reserve maintains artillery capability through the **14th Marine Regiment** (headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, under the 4th Marine Division). It consists of **three artillery battalions** (plus a headquarters battery), equipped primarily with M777 155mm towed howitzers. This reflects reductions under Force Design 2030 (cannon artillery batteries overall reduced across the Corps), but the reserve regiment persists as a key reinforcing element for division-level fire support.
**US Code requirement for a Division and Wing in the Reserve**:
No, **Title 10 U.S. Code does not require** a dedicated division or aircraft wing specifically in the Marine Corps Reserve. The relevant statute (10 U.S.C. § 8063 / formerly § 5063) mandates that the Marine Corps overall be organized with **not less than three combat divisions and three air wings** (plus other organic services). This applies to the total force structure and does not specify active vs. reserve components or mandate a fourth (reserve) division/wing. The 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing exist in the Marine Forces Reserve as a matter of policy and historical organization (reactivated in the 1960s to provide a reserve mirror-image capability), but they are not a statutory requirement—unlike the minimum three for the active force.
**Summary (no citations)**:
The Marine Corps Reserve (under the 4th Marine Division) has **no tank units** remaining, as all armor (including the former 4th Tank Battalion) was eliminated under Force Design 2030 by 2021 to prioritize lighter, distributed forces. Artillery persists with the **14th Marine Regiment** comprising **three battalions** (plus HQ battery) for towed howitzer support. US Code (Title 10) requires the Marine Corps to have at least three combat divisions and three air wings in total but does **not** mandate a separate division or wing in the Reserve—the 4th Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing are policy-based reserve elements, not a legal obligation. This structure supports augmentation/reinforcement of active forces while aligning with ongoing modernization.
Grok:The **United States Marine Corps (USMC)** has an active-duty end strength hovering around **172,000 Marines** as of early 2026 (authorized/requested figures for FY2026 are approximately 172,300, with actual on-hand numbers slightly varying due to recruiting, retention, and operational factors; recent reports show it dipped to ~169,000–172,000 in late 2025/early 2026 tracking).
The USMC divides its active-duty force into two broad categories:
- **Operating Forces** (operational billets): These are the warfighting/forward-deployed elements that directly generate combat power. This includes Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), divisions, regiments, battalions, squadrons, logistics groups, and deployed/special operations units (e.g., MEUs afloat, forward-based forces in III MEF, MARSOC elements). These billets are the "tip of the spear" focused on readiness for expeditionary, amphibious, and contingency operations.
- Roughly **70–80%** of active-duty Marines serve in operational billets (a longstanding USMC norm, with the Corps prioritizing high operational tempo and forward presence). This equates to approximately **120,000–138,000 Marines** in operational roles, including ground combat (infantry, artillery, tanks/armor—though reduced under Force Design), aviation (squadrons and wings), logistics combat elements, and command elements in the three active MEFs (I MEF in California, II MEF in North Carolina, III MEF in Japan/Hawaii).
- **Supporting Establishment** (non-operational billets): These provide institutional support, training, recruiting, acquisition, headquarters functions, bases/installations, education, and sustainment. This includes HQMC (Headquarters Marine Corps), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM), Systems Command, Logistics Command, Recruiting Command, depots, schools, and administrative billets.
- This category comprises the remaining **20–30%** (approximately **34,000–52,000 Marines**), with the lower end of the range more common in recent leaner force designs. Key breakdowns within the supporting establishment include:
- **Headquarters and staff functions** (HQMC and major commands): A few thousand in policy, planning, manpower management (e.g., Manpower and Reserve Affairs/M&RA), and oversight.
- **Training and education** (schools, entry-level training like boot camp/Parris Island/San Diego, Officer Candidate School, MOS schools): Significant portion, often 10,000+ to support pipeline and professional military education.
- **Recruiting and accessions**: Several thousand recruiters and support staff.
- **Installations and base operations**: Marines assigned to base commands, security, facilities management.
- **Acquisition, logistics, and sustainment commands**: Engineers, supply, maintenance depots.
- **Other institutional roles**: Marine Band, ceremonial duties, and collateral/special duty assignments (e.g., drill instructors, recruiters as B-billets pulled from operational pools).
Exact breakdowns are tracked in internal HQMC systems like the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) and Authorized Strength Reports (ASR), but public HQMC reports (e.g., Force Design Updates from 2025, Talent Management Campaign Plans, and manpower MARADMINs) do not release granular public numbers for operational vs. supporting splits due to operational security and fluidity (billets shift with deployments, exercises, and Force Design 2030 implementation, which continues reducing legacy structure to fund new capabilities like littoral regiments and unmanned systems).
The Corps maintains a high ratio of operational-to-supporting Marines compared to other services, emphasizing "every Marine a rifleman" and expeditionary focus—even headquarters billets often rotate back to operating forces. For the most precise/current data, refer to official HQMC Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) releases or the latest Force Design Update (October 2025 version emphasizes ongoing implementation but no exact billet splits). If a specific FY2026 manpower report surfaces publicly, it would detail this further, but as of January 2026, the ~70–80% operational estimate holds based on doctrinal and budgetary patterns.
“If the Marine Corps is not getting attention from Congress today, it is because the Marine Corps is not out on the oceans of the world accomplishing enough great things.”
IMO the Corps IS getting the attention from Congress, but not in the way they envisioned. Congress is transactional, they look at “bang for the buck”, but with today’s Corps there’s no return on investment in the money that is being invested in today’s Corps. I think that the time is coming, and soon, that the Corps will find itself looking at a reduction in $, and end strength.
Thanks Gen. Berger and Gen. Smith, you’ve managed to set the Corps on a path to irrelevance in only 6 short years. Where do we get such men?
I have very little faith in the current leadership of our Corps, which in itself is a very sad statement. I would be hard pressed to recommend enlisting to our young people and certanly not my family ( 4 MARINE Combat Veterans )
This was said many times during my tour..."we've been doing so much with so little for so long, that we are now qualified to do everything with nothing for ever"
Semper Fi 🫡
The current leadership is apparently full of simple minded people who demand simplicity in their lives and the Corps. Why else would they rid the Corps of those “heavy”, tracked armored vehicles that require all that tedious training and time consuming maintenance; artillery and engineering assets, obviously, are too difficult to understand and employ.
They’ve left the Nation without adequate, immediate response to a variety of emergencies that were always the reason for our existence and were handled with the professionalism that the American people expect from the Marine Corps.
The long winded excuses and empty promises of things to come is embarrassing to those of us who can recognize the flaws in “force design”. Semper Fi
Exactly 💯... and despite the US Army MDTFs being stood up and functional, they still fail to replicate the total combat arms force capabilities of a MEU (SOC) pre FD2030 that features a total combined arms force that's forward deployed featuring immediate ground combat forces of reinforced infantry with artillery, armor, and close air support from rotary and fixed wing assets, naval gunfire support, and a capable logistics system with combat service support along with engineering capabilities to operate 24/7 and respond to any threat or crisis in every clime and place! VISION2035 is a must to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
When it came to laying personnel issues for our Corps, Jim Marsh was the man. These issues going before congress are not things that suddenly pop into the mind and a few briefing slides suffice. These are well researched and documented, with a bevy of experts available to brief staffers-well before the actual hearings. maybe we lost that capability in our haste to divest.
Grok: Corrected re USMC Reserve Component:**No tank units exist in the Marine Corps Reserve** (or active component) as of early 2026. Under Force Design 2030, the USMC fully divested of all tank battalions, including the reserve's 4th Tank Battalion (part of the 4th Marine Division). Deactivations began in 2020 (e.g., Alpha Company cased colors in July 2020), with the entire battalion inactivated by 2021 to shift resources toward lighter, more expeditionary capabilities like long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, and littoral operations. No tank units remain operational.
**Artillery units in the Marine Corps Reserve**: The reserve maintains artillery capability through the **14th Marine Regiment** (headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, under the 4th Marine Division). It consists of **three artillery battalions** (plus a headquarters battery), equipped primarily with M777 155mm towed howitzers. This reflects reductions under Force Design 2030 (cannon artillery batteries overall reduced across the Corps), but the reserve regiment persists as a key reinforcing element for division-level fire support.
**US Code requirement for a Division and Wing in the Reserve**:
No, **Title 10 U.S. Code does not require** a dedicated division or aircraft wing specifically in the Marine Corps Reserve. The relevant statute (10 U.S.C. § 8063 / formerly § 5063) mandates that the Marine Corps overall be organized with **not less than three combat divisions and three air wings** (plus other organic services). This applies to the total force structure and does not specify active vs. reserve components or mandate a fourth (reserve) division/wing. The 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing exist in the Marine Forces Reserve as a matter of policy and historical organization (reactivated in the 1960s to provide a reserve mirror-image capability), but they are not a statutory requirement—unlike the minimum three for the active force.
**Summary (no citations)**:
The Marine Corps Reserve (under the 4th Marine Division) has **no tank units** remaining, as all armor (including the former 4th Tank Battalion) was eliminated under Force Design 2030 by 2021 to prioritize lighter, distributed forces. Artillery persists with the **14th Marine Regiment** comprising **three battalions** (plus HQ battery) for towed howitzer support. US Code (Title 10) requires the Marine Corps to have at least three combat divisions and three air wings in total but does **not** mandate a separate division or wing in the Reserve—the 4th Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing are policy-based reserve elements, not a legal obligation. This structure supports augmentation/reinforcement of active forces while aligning with ongoing modernization.
Grok:The **United States Marine Corps (USMC)** has an active-duty end strength hovering around **172,000 Marines** as of early 2026 (authorized/requested figures for FY2026 are approximately 172,300, with actual on-hand numbers slightly varying due to recruiting, retention, and operational factors; recent reports show it dipped to ~169,000–172,000 in late 2025/early 2026 tracking).
The USMC divides its active-duty force into two broad categories:
- **Operating Forces** (operational billets): These are the warfighting/forward-deployed elements that directly generate combat power. This includes Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), divisions, regiments, battalions, squadrons, logistics groups, and deployed/special operations units (e.g., MEUs afloat, forward-based forces in III MEF, MARSOC elements). These billets are the "tip of the spear" focused on readiness for expeditionary, amphibious, and contingency operations.
- Roughly **70–80%** of active-duty Marines serve in operational billets (a longstanding USMC norm, with the Corps prioritizing high operational tempo and forward presence). This equates to approximately **120,000–138,000 Marines** in operational roles, including ground combat (infantry, artillery, tanks/armor—though reduced under Force Design), aviation (squadrons and wings), logistics combat elements, and command elements in the three active MEFs (I MEF in California, II MEF in North Carolina, III MEF in Japan/Hawaii).
- **Supporting Establishment** (non-operational billets): These provide institutional support, training, recruiting, acquisition, headquarters functions, bases/installations, education, and sustainment. This includes HQMC (Headquarters Marine Corps), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM), Systems Command, Logistics Command, Recruiting Command, depots, schools, and administrative billets.
- This category comprises the remaining **20–30%** (approximately **34,000–52,000 Marines**), with the lower end of the range more common in recent leaner force designs. Key breakdowns within the supporting establishment include:
- **Headquarters and staff functions** (HQMC and major commands): A few thousand in policy, planning, manpower management (e.g., Manpower and Reserve Affairs/M&RA), and oversight.
- **Training and education** (schools, entry-level training like boot camp/Parris Island/San Diego, Officer Candidate School, MOS schools): Significant portion, often 10,000+ to support pipeline and professional military education.
- **Recruiting and accessions**: Several thousand recruiters and support staff.
- **Installations and base operations**: Marines assigned to base commands, security, facilities management.
- **Acquisition, logistics, and sustainment commands**: Engineers, supply, maintenance depots.
- **Other institutional roles**: Marine Band, ceremonial duties, and collateral/special duty assignments (e.g., drill instructors, recruiters as B-billets pulled from operational pools).
Exact breakdowns are tracked in internal HQMC systems like the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) and Authorized Strength Reports (ASR), but public HQMC reports (e.g., Force Design Updates from 2025, Talent Management Campaign Plans, and manpower MARADMINs) do not release granular public numbers for operational vs. supporting splits due to operational security and fluidity (billets shift with deployments, exercises, and Force Design 2030 implementation, which continues reducing legacy structure to fund new capabilities like littoral regiments and unmanned systems).
The Corps maintains a high ratio of operational-to-supporting Marines compared to other services, emphasizing "every Marine a rifleman" and expeditionary focus—even headquarters billets often rotate back to operating forces. For the most precise/current data, refer to official HQMC Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) releases or the latest Force Design Update (October 2025 version emphasizes ongoing implementation but no exact billet splits). If a specific FY2026 manpower report surfaces publicly, it would detail this further, but as of January 2026, the ~70–80% operational estimate holds based on doctrinal and budgetary patterns.
If really need to save money, we could eliminate FMF bands, get rid of Boot Leave, and stop issuing Dress Blues in Boot Camp. That's a decent start.
“If the Marine Corps is not getting attention from Congress today, it is because the Marine Corps is not out on the oceans of the world accomplishing enough great things.”
IMO the Corps IS getting the attention from Congress, but not in the way they envisioned. Congress is transactional, they look at “bang for the buck”, but with today’s Corps there’s no return on investment in the money that is being invested in today’s Corps. I think that the time is coming, and soon, that the Corps will find itself looking at a reduction in $, and end strength.
Thanks Gen. Berger and Gen. Smith, you’ve managed to set the Corps on a path to irrelevance in only 6 short years. Where do we get such men?