It always strikes this writer, that the image of the Corps held by many is one of very violent knuckle dragging miscreants that are best left at sea on ships or locked away on military bases away from the gentler souls and multitudes of the general public. In reality we have always been the thinking service, either by design or forces of the nature of national circumstance, the Corps has always had to “think” its way out of the many problems that it confronts at all times. As General Zinni points out, we also have been fortunate to have a lot of great thinkers that could also “conceptualize” and “execute” their great and facile thinking. Perhaps because we have to constantly justify our very need to exist we bring a special urgency to our thinking and execution. This writer recalls General Zinni at some point in the past saying that when he and many of his cohorts got back from the fight in Vietnam that if they ever got in a position of authority that “never again” would be one of the watch words for Marine Corps plans and operations. That very simple phrase has stuck with this very dumb 0302 from the first he heard it. In the movie BraveHeart William Wallace’s Uncle Argyle comes to fetch him after his father and older brother are killed. During a moment of review Uncle Argyle notices young Wallace’s interest in his broad sword. He instructs as he taps Wallace’s forehead with his index finger “first learn to this.” “Then I’ll teach you to how to use this.” Referencing his broad sword.
We are best when left to our own devices, and even when a former CMC strays into Alice and Wonderland territory (aka Force Design 2030) we manage to find ourselves back to the notion that we “seize, occupy and defend advanced naval bases.” The rest simply follows, as or unless otherwise directed.
We are the thinking service and as such extremely capable of extreme violence of action. General Zinni confirms this theme.
Not one word about 21st Century amphibious warfare, nothing about applying MWT to what MCCDC, MCWL, MCSC do. In Gen Zinnis dissertation on innovation there is nothing about maneuver warfare and innovation despite the work of Boyd disciple Jeff Sutherland using MWT saving a failed FBI technology project, despite Acolyte Chet Richards applying MWT to business. In His dissertation he talks of the thatch weave but not the greatest innovation of WWII, the Higgins Boat, and why after 20 years 1920-1040 USMC still couldnt get from ship to shore efficiently until a brilliant Lt named Victor came along at the last moment and showed them.
We say we want to listen to those with experience, but when it comes to those with capacity for military technological innovation we sell them down the river--Col Drew Cukor being the most recent, but Boyd was court marshaled four times, Burton had Pentagon Wars, we saw what happened to Col Mike Wyly, in 20 years of war several of us responsible for the greatest innovations of COIN were attacked, sidelined, pushed out the back door. The ACV is a land vehicle with very short range at sea. ACV/LCAC need to be urgently replaced using MWT not present in Quantico. This can be fixed. If USAF can do stealth, USMC can do high speed amphibs.
Name the greatest amphibious generals of the past 40 years and I will show a list of generals who gave us a Marine Corps that cannot do its main mission, amphibious warfare, against current threats.
Okay, if you had a wish list and priorities to fix these short comings what would the top 5 be? Top 10? Getting ideas on the table to hash it out is important. Aristotle wanted men to have dialog and debate. This a good place for it.
Spring 2013: MCG article (draft) sent to MCCDC CG. He sent it to every general in Quantico
Oct 2014: 10 guidelines included in an article originally titled "How to Build an EFV". Actual title softened by MCG ed to " Equipping the Force". Not one guideline was implemented.
2013-2017: physician, heal thyself, or, "lead, follow or get out of the way". So I chose to lead. I found companies with IP to build high speed, long range amphibs. Spent my own money. Briefed a retired (4star) gen and active duty 3star. Then the GS15s demanded all the IP while making it clear they had no intention to ever give a contract, so the companies on the team walked.
To this day everyone demands the IP first, so they can shoot it down or take it. I am not at liberty to share IP publicly, and I am done with that game. Every SES needs to be fired, GS15/14/13 need to be replaced with Major/Capt/1stLt. No civilian should ever write a fitrep on an officer. GCaptain John Konrad sez the same thing.
No general has provided leadership for 21st C Amphibious warfare, because if they had, we could already " land the landing force" 100 miles from the beachhead. Same for the SES, GS15/14/13. The first antiship missile in combat was 59 years ago, Styx sinking Israeli destroyer. I am done waiting.
They, the GS##, do whatever they want anyway, we all saw the insubordination as evidenced last week from the DoN GS15 in the OMG sting, I saw it as evidenced in the 2007 UUNS audit and the 2008 MRAP DoDIG investigation and in 2017 regarding high speed amphib presentations. We saw false charges brought against Col Drew Cukor over Project Maven. The officers who use MWT to innovate always get attacked. We get zero leadership from anyone in USMC in the area of MWT applied to technology.
I have been offering my services directly to Mr. Trump, Mr. Hegseth, Cao. USMC must be saved from the outside now.
I taught a course on John Boyd and his theories for many years. And I have spent a great deal of time going through his papers in the Marine Corps Archives. I have never seen anything about one court martial let alone four. Please provide the source for this information so I can update my files.
Honest discussion requires steel-manning an argument, not looking for something tangential to criticize with passive-aggressive sarcastic question designed to tell Compass Points something like "Hussar6 is stupid." But, okay, since you chose to ignore the substance and deal with side points...
...Let's see, there's the comment in the prologue of "Boyd" where Pierre Sprey is quoted as saying "Not many people are defined by the courts-marial and investigation they faced." There's the claim of burning the building as an enlisted man, stealing mainframe time, wiping the stick around the cockpit to cause hydraulic failure, was their a fourth serious investigation or "attempted" court marshal? I don't know and I don't care. I am willing admit to an overstatement only if you address the SUBSTANCE of what I wrote.
General van Riper, here's a suggested steel-man response to my comments:
"Col Thaddeus Jankowski, TJ, the one bit is probably an overstatement, but you are directionally correct. There was the rather substantial comment Sprey made at John Boyd's funeral about a career characterized by and investigations/attempted courts marshal, at least three, but it wasn't four actual courts marshal. The broader point and the most useful point for discussion: my generation of maneuverists failed to apply maneuver warfare to technology, that is, to MCCDC/MCWL/MCWL. One of my general officer colleagues described MCWL as "playing with toys", we are the ones who allowed the AAAV/EFV program to go on and on in the 1980s, and 1990s, and 2000s. And yes, USAF can do stealth technology but apparently we, all of us together, we who love the Marine Corps have not been able to do amphibious technology. I understand you, Col Jankowski, forced MCCDC to write MCO 3900.17 URGENT NEEDS PROCESS, the first-ever more formal application of MWT to technology, the first-ever rulebook for technological maneuver like a FRAGO in the 5-paragraph order or Crisis Action Plan in MCPP. I agree-USMC cannot do amphibious warfare with the very short-range ACV and the soft LCAC. That is as serious a problem as FD(2030). Good points! I will go find your article about how to build an EFV, with the title, "Equipping the Force" in Oct 2014, and consider these ideas further. In fact, I will talk to General Krulak and we will move heaven and earth to get you an appointment with Hung Cao ASAP."
My friend I am with you on you on basic goal, that is, to ensure the Marine Corps does what Title 10 of the US Code requires it to do in advancing amphibious operations capabilities. Where we part company is what appears to be an underlying belief that senior leaders don't wake up in the morning with the full intent of making the Corps better. They often don't get things right but it is not because they don't care or that they don't have the experience and intelligence to advance the art and science of amphibious operations. Some problems are truly intractable and don't lend themselves to simple solutions. The challenge of replaceingthe P-7 began before General Kelly became Commandant; he. reset the program in a deliberate way. In the end it was a stretch too far for industry. Though it was Systems Command's responsibility--by law--as CG MCCDC I watched every step of the early development of the EFV and saw no deficiencies. I came to two conclusions as the project was failing--what the Corps was asking of industry was beyond its capabilities or the developer did not put its best engineers on the project. General Amos asked me in retirement to attend the meeting in which he made the decision to cancel the EFV and pursue a wheeled solution. Examining the information in front of him I would have made the same decision.
MCCDC and MCWL got off track seven years ago and the blame for that rests squarely on the 38th Commandant. MCWL was never tmeant o "play with toys"--it was to test concepts that MCCDC developed, which means looking at all aspects of DOTMLPF, not just a material solution.
I was at the birth of the Corps' maneuver warfare movement and spent countless hours with John Boyd, and General Gray so I know more than the average bear about what the philosophy entails. Have you spelled out exactly how you would have used that philosophy and approach to come to a different end with the EFV then my generation and its immediate successors did?
It always strikes this writer, that the image of the Corps held by many is one of very violent knuckle dragging miscreants that are best left at sea on ships or locked away on military bases away from the gentler souls and multitudes of the general public. In reality we have always been the thinking service, either by design or forces of the nature of national circumstance, the Corps has always had to “think” its way out of the many problems that it confronts at all times. As General Zinni points out, we also have been fortunate to have a lot of great thinkers that could also “conceptualize” and “execute” their great and facile thinking. Perhaps because we have to constantly justify our very need to exist we bring a special urgency to our thinking and execution. This writer recalls General Zinni at some point in the past saying that when he and many of his cohorts got back from the fight in Vietnam that if they ever got in a position of authority that “never again” would be one of the watch words for Marine Corps plans and operations. That very simple phrase has stuck with this very dumb 0302 from the first he heard it. In the movie BraveHeart William Wallace’s Uncle Argyle comes to fetch him after his father and older brother are killed. During a moment of review Uncle Argyle notices young Wallace’s interest in his broad sword. He instructs as he taps Wallace’s forehead with his index finger “first learn to this.” “Then I’ll teach you to how to use this.” Referencing his broad sword.
We are best when left to our own devices, and even when a former CMC strays into Alice and Wonderland territory (aka Force Design 2030) we manage to find ourselves back to the notion that we “seize, occupy and defend advanced naval bases.” The rest simply follows, as or unless otherwise directed.
We are the thinking service and as such extremely capable of extreme violence of action. General Zinni confirms this theme.
Not one word about 21st Century amphibious warfare, nothing about applying MWT to what MCCDC, MCWL, MCSC do. In Gen Zinnis dissertation on innovation there is nothing about maneuver warfare and innovation despite the work of Boyd disciple Jeff Sutherland using MWT saving a failed FBI technology project, despite Acolyte Chet Richards applying MWT to business. In His dissertation he talks of the thatch weave but not the greatest innovation of WWII, the Higgins Boat, and why after 20 years 1920-1040 USMC still couldnt get from ship to shore efficiently until a brilliant Lt named Victor came along at the last moment and showed them.
We say we want to listen to those with experience, but when it comes to those with capacity for military technological innovation we sell them down the river--Col Drew Cukor being the most recent, but Boyd was court marshaled four times, Burton had Pentagon Wars, we saw what happened to Col Mike Wyly, in 20 years of war several of us responsible for the greatest innovations of COIN were attacked, sidelined, pushed out the back door. The ACV is a land vehicle with very short range at sea. ACV/LCAC need to be urgently replaced using MWT not present in Quantico. This can be fixed. If USAF can do stealth, USMC can do high speed amphibs.
Name the greatest amphibious generals of the past 40 years and I will show a list of generals who gave us a Marine Corps that cannot do its main mission, amphibious warfare, against current threats.
Okay, if you had a wish list and priorities to fix these short comings what would the top 5 be? Top 10? Getting ideas on the table to hash it out is important. Aristotle wanted men to have dialog and debate. This a good place for it.
I have been giving suggestions for 15 years.
2010: spoke at the Boyd Conf in Quantico
Spring 2013: MCG article (draft) sent to MCCDC CG. He sent it to every general in Quantico
Oct 2014: 10 guidelines included in an article originally titled "How to Build an EFV". Actual title softened by MCG ed to " Equipping the Force". Not one guideline was implemented.
2013-2017: physician, heal thyself, or, "lead, follow or get out of the way". So I chose to lead. I found companies with IP to build high speed, long range amphibs. Spent my own money. Briefed a retired (4star) gen and active duty 3star. Then the GS15s demanded all the IP while making it clear they had no intention to ever give a contract, so the companies on the team walked.
To this day everyone demands the IP first, so they can shoot it down or take it. I am not at liberty to share IP publicly, and I am done with that game. Every SES needs to be fired, GS15/14/13 need to be replaced with Major/Capt/1stLt. No civilian should ever write a fitrep on an officer. GCaptain John Konrad sez the same thing.
No general has provided leadership for 21st C Amphibious warfare, because if they had, we could already " land the landing force" 100 miles from the beachhead. Same for the SES, GS15/14/13. The first antiship missile in combat was 59 years ago, Styx sinking Israeli destroyer. I am done waiting.
They, the GS##, do whatever they want anyway, we all saw the insubordination as evidenced last week from the DoN GS15 in the OMG sting, I saw it as evidenced in the 2007 UUNS audit and the 2008 MRAP DoDIG investigation and in 2017 regarding high speed amphib presentations. We saw false charges brought against Col Drew Cukor over Project Maven. The officers who use MWT to innovate always get attacked. We get zero leadership from anyone in USMC in the area of MWT applied to technology.
I have been offering my services directly to Mr. Trump, Mr. Hegseth, Cao. USMC must be saved from the outside now.
I taught a course on John Boyd and his theories for many years. And I have spent a great deal of time going through his papers in the Marine Corps Archives. I have never seen anything about one court martial let alone four. Please provide the source for this information so I can update my files.
General,
Honest discussion requires steel-manning an argument, not looking for something tangential to criticize with passive-aggressive sarcastic question designed to tell Compass Points something like "Hussar6 is stupid." But, okay, since you chose to ignore the substance and deal with side points...
...Let's see, there's the comment in the prologue of "Boyd" where Pierre Sprey is quoted as saying "Not many people are defined by the courts-marial and investigation they faced." There's the claim of burning the building as an enlisted man, stealing mainframe time, wiping the stick around the cockpit to cause hydraulic failure, was their a fourth serious investigation or "attempted" court marshal? I don't know and I don't care. I am willing admit to an overstatement only if you address the SUBSTANCE of what I wrote.
General van Riper, here's a suggested steel-man response to my comments:
"Col Thaddeus Jankowski, TJ, the one bit is probably an overstatement, but you are directionally correct. There was the rather substantial comment Sprey made at John Boyd's funeral about a career characterized by and investigations/attempted courts marshal, at least three, but it wasn't four actual courts marshal. The broader point and the most useful point for discussion: my generation of maneuverists failed to apply maneuver warfare to technology, that is, to MCCDC/MCWL/MCWL. One of my general officer colleagues described MCWL as "playing with toys", we are the ones who allowed the AAAV/EFV program to go on and on in the 1980s, and 1990s, and 2000s. And yes, USAF can do stealth technology but apparently we, all of us together, we who love the Marine Corps have not been able to do amphibious technology. I understand you, Col Jankowski, forced MCCDC to write MCO 3900.17 URGENT NEEDS PROCESS, the first-ever more formal application of MWT to technology, the first-ever rulebook for technological maneuver like a FRAGO in the 5-paragraph order or Crisis Action Plan in MCPP. I agree-USMC cannot do amphibious warfare with the very short-range ACV and the soft LCAC. That is as serious a problem as FD(2030). Good points! I will go find your article about how to build an EFV, with the title, "Equipping the Force" in Oct 2014, and consider these ideas further. In fact, I will talk to General Krulak and we will move heaven and earth to get you an appointment with Hung Cao ASAP."
My friend I am with you on you on basic goal, that is, to ensure the Marine Corps does what Title 10 of the US Code requires it to do in advancing amphibious operations capabilities. Where we part company is what appears to be an underlying belief that senior leaders don't wake up in the morning with the full intent of making the Corps better. They often don't get things right but it is not because they don't care or that they don't have the experience and intelligence to advance the art and science of amphibious operations. Some problems are truly intractable and don't lend themselves to simple solutions. The challenge of replaceingthe P-7 began before General Kelly became Commandant; he. reset the program in a deliberate way. In the end it was a stretch too far for industry. Though it was Systems Command's responsibility--by law--as CG MCCDC I watched every step of the early development of the EFV and saw no deficiencies. I came to two conclusions as the project was failing--what the Corps was asking of industry was beyond its capabilities or the developer did not put its best engineers on the project. General Amos asked me in retirement to attend the meeting in which he made the decision to cancel the EFV and pursue a wheeled solution. Examining the information in front of him I would have made the same decision.
MCCDC and MCWL got off track seven years ago and the blame for that rests squarely on the 38th Commandant. MCWL was never tmeant o "play with toys"--it was to test concepts that MCCDC developed, which means looking at all aspects of DOTMLPF, not just a material solution.
I was at the birth of the Corps' maneuver warfare movement and spent countless hours with John Boyd, and General Gray so I know more than the average bear about what the philosophy entails. Have you spelled out exactly how you would have used that philosophy and approach to come to a different end with the EFV then my generation and its immediate successors did?