FD 2030 - Can the L.A.W. Survive China?
The Ugly Truth is the Light Amphibious Warship is Extremely Vulnerable
Major General Jenkins’ superb article exposes a fatal weakness of FD 2030’s Stand-in Forces (SIF) concept, which is the SIF’s almost totally reliance on the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) for deployment, repositioning, and sustainment. Without the LAW, the SIF will essentially “wither and die on the vine.”
The article questions the survivability of the LAW, citing deficiencies in speed, ship size, and armament. Just as importantly, Maj. Gen. Jenkins makes a powerful argument that the ship will be unable to avoid detection by China’s intelligence network, which makes the LAW immediately susceptible to targeting and attack.
Given the ship’s vulnerability to surface and missile attack and lack of survivability features, the ship’s crew and embarked Marines are sailing in harm’s way at unacceptable risk.
The author makes two other points that should reverberate within the halls of Congress and the Department of Defense: (1) the lead ship will not reach the fleet until 2029, with follow on ships arriving so slowly that an operational capability to minimally move and sustain Marine Corps Stand-in Forces will not be achieved until the mid-2030s or beyond, and (2) the cost of each ship, already prohibitively high, will almost certainly continue to rise as survivability and other issues are addressed by the U.S. Navy. That will mean few ships constructed and fewer ships available for Marines. See the link below.
The Hill (thehill.com) November 2, 2022
Opinion - National Security
The ugly truth: Can the light amphibious warship survive war with China?
By Harry W. Jenkins
. . . To make a bad situation even more dire, China’s navy recently introduced a new class of Type 055A guided missile corvettes, 72 of which operate along the First Island Chain. It would be virtually impossible for the LAW to avoid being detected, attacked and most likely destroyed by the Chinese military under these circumstances . . . .
. . . The question of the LAW’s utility to help deter China’s aggression, or enable Marine Corps units to sink Chinese ships, has not been answered. It needs to be thoroughly analyzed beyond the level of war games to ensure that the concept is sound before any significant funding is allocated to the LAW program.
Harry W. Jenkins, a retired major general, served for 34 years in the Marine Corps. He was the commanding general, 4th MEB, and commander of Task Force 158 during Desert Storm, which included a landing force of 17,000 Marines in 32 amphibious ships. He later served as the first director of the Expeditionary Warfare Division on the OPNAV staff, where he was resource sponsor for all amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, and requirements for Navy SEALS.
Regarding the LAW; is there any open source information about what was used as the placeholder to fill the mission of the LAW / Amphibs / connectors / CSS conduit in the discussion / wargaming process that lead to implementation of FD 2030?