Not So Fast!
Reply to “The Case for Change”
Compass Points says, “Not so fast!” to many of the articles in the current issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. The December edition of the Maine Corps Gazette is dedicated to FD 2030. The Gazette includes several articles written in support of FD 2030, as well as several articles that raise concerns. Compass Post will feature several of the articles that raise significant concerns about FD 2030. But to those articles that support FD 2030, Compass Points can only say one thing, “Not so fast!”
In the article, “The Case for Change,” the author essentially argues the Marine Corps must fundamentally change for three overriding reasons:
First, the proliferation of long range precision munitions, and advances in sensors, have shifted the balance between the offense and the defense, rendering maneuver and offensive operations all but impossible.
Second, the Marine Corps needs to shift its primary focus, from the broader uncertainties of global threats, to the narrow certainties of a single threat in a known location: China’s Navy in the Western Pacific.
Third, the Marine Corps must divest its heavy, legacy systems, such as tanks and cannon artillery, to self-fund newer, more lethal technologies.
Not so fast, “Case for Change.” All three of your premises should be rejected.
First, to accept the argument that maneuver is no longer possible, is to argue the Marine Corps can no longer respond quickly and effectively to global crises and contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. This is not true. The Marine Corps for many decades has been a flexible, capable, mobile force which can respond quickly around the globe. Combatant Commanders will require the same 911 Marine Corps today, and in the decades ahead.
Yes, precision munitions are a challenge. The history of war, however, makes clear that for every new capability, a counter capability is always developed to counter the new challenge, and make it ineffective or manageable. The task of prevailing against a new precision strike capability, while daunting, is no more daunting than responding to submarines, helicopters, or daylight precision bombing. If properly pursued, innovation and technology can significantly mitigate or overcome any military problem. After the allied debacle at Gallipoli, experts said there was no future for amphibious operations, but the Marine Corps proved the experts wrong.
Second, retooling much of the Marine Corps to focus only on anti-ship operations in the Western Pacific is a mistake. Anti-ship operations in the Western Pacific are a mission better performed by other services, with other capabilities. For example, Navy attack submarines and Air Force long range bombers. They are prepared to accomplish the mission better and with exponentially less risk, than small, scattered groups of Marines ever can.
Plus, when the Marine Corps focuses too narrowly on one area of the globe, it limits the flexibility of Marine Corps forces to rapidly respond to crises and contingencies elsewhere. The Marine Corps is not being transformed into a more relevant force for operations outside the Western Pacific. The lack of armor, insufficient cannon artillery, no assault bridging, dramatic reductions in helicopter and fixed-wing aviation, and insufficient sustainment are making Marine forces increasingly irrelevant for most Combatant Commander missions.
Third, despite assertions otherwise, the Marine Corps is clearly less capable to serve as a global response force and a force in readiness today than it was in 2018. The divestiture of capabilities needed today to self-fund future unproven capabilities has created gaps in combat readiness that threaten national defense. The evidence is overwhelming. Among many examples are the 21 percent loss of Marines in infantry battalions, 100 percent loss of armor, 67 percent loss of direct support cannon artillery, 100 percent loss of bridging, and approximately 30 percent loss of aircraft. There are fewer amphibious ships and nearly a two-third reduction (already made or planned) of Maritime Prepositioning Forces ships, and large reductions in land-based prepositioning. The Marine Corps is currently unable to field a single traditional, warfighting MEF without globally sourcing essential capabilities and appealing to the U.S. Army for tanks and likely for additional cannon artillery. This creates considerable risk to our national security.
Instead of making, “The Case for Change” the Gazette article reveals the many dangers of FD 2030. To any plan that makes the Marine Corps less capable, there is only one answer, “Not so fast!”
Yes cfrog. Reader dependent. Fox vs CNN/MSNBC. The CMC article said his considerations were precision strike, gray zone and maritime campaigning. Compass Points comment said CMC considerations were precision strike, global to single threat and divesting of tanks & cannon arty for new technology. Different considerations. Why? On the future force. FSPG. FSSG to MLG. Grow the Force to 202K. FSRG. Budget Control Act REDUX. Force 2025. FD 2030. That's a lot of major force changes in a little more than a decade. There will be more. Per new CMCs and per the MCO on Total Force Structure. Internal debate is good but my take on THE USMC Story was geared towards the diminishing "friends of the Corps" we have in Congress, DoD and beyond. ONE USMC message outside the Marine Corps will garner the support for "a stronger Marine Corps."
I read Gen Berger's "Case for Change" article and walked away with an appreciation for his considerations for change with the rise of the precision strike regime, gray zone strategies and the imperative of maritime campaigning yet Compass Points addresses the CMC stated reasons for change as the proliferation of long range precision munitions, shifting focus from global threats to a single threat and divesting of tanks to fund newer, lethal technologies. Maybe I need a new pair of readers ... but the stated reasons are different. I did like the reference to the December Issue of the Marine Corps Gazette where Chuck Chiarotti and his MCA staff lay out in black and white arguments, counterarguments and constructive criticism to FD 2030. Great job MCA! Lastly, when we transition from the 116th to the 117th Congress in January we are likely to lose 5 veteran voices with the number of former Marines going from 17 to 15. To best advocate for a well funded and "stronger Marine Corps" we need to present ONE future Marine Corps to Congress! Just sayin' ...