Change is Hard, and No Less So in the Marine Corps - The imperative to modernize LtGen David J. Furness
Change is hard, but Weakness Harder.
Reply to Article: “Change is Hard”
Compass Points says, “Not so fast!” to many of the articles in the current issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. The December edition of the Maine Corps Gazette is dedicated to FD 2030. The Gazette includes several articles written in support of FD 2030, as well as several articles that raise concerns. Compass Post will feature several of the articles that raise significant concerns about FD 2030. But to those articles that support FD 2030, Compass Points can only say one thing, “Not so fast!”
The article, “Change is Hard, and No Less So in the Marine Corps,” expresses why the senior leadership believes the Marine Corps must transform to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, especially the growing threat from China. The article states, “We must change to remain the most ready when the Nation is least ready.” We agree. The Marine Corps must remain the most ready when the Nation is least ready. The question is how to do that? We all want the Marine Corps to be stronger now and in the future. What approach to change actually works?
Force Design 2030 moves the Marine Corps from a service focused on being ready to respond around the globe to a full spectrum of conflict and crisis, to a smaller force with a narrow focus on a single threat (China’s Navy) in a known location (Western Pacific). It moves the Marine Corps from a global offense force, to a defense force stuck along the island chain. The article’s central claim that Force Design 2030 “forces change where most needed, while maintaining sufficient capabilities to ensure the Service meets challenges of the present,” is simply false. The sad secret of Force Design 2030 is that it has made the Marine Corps weaker and less capable today than it was just a few years ago.
Everyone in favor of a stronger Marine Corps is in favor of change. The Marine Corps, arguably more than any other Service, has always transformed to meet the requirements of a changing world. The development of amphibious operations, close air support, helicopter envelopment, and maneuver warfare are some examples of innovations pioneered by Marines to enable the Corps to remain relevant. These changes were implemented after extensive experimentation and validation and without sacrificing other capabilities. These advances made the Marine Corps more capable and relevant—not less capable or relevant as does Force Design 2030.
Force Design 2030 was implemented absent critical experimentation and validation. It cannot be sound to begin an experiment by divesting force structure and equipment needed to fight and win today. So called ‘self-funding” is not a virtue, it is self destruction. The Marine Corps is clearly less capable as a global response force and a force in readiness today than it was in 2018. United States Marines can no longer claim their traditional role as the Nation’s premier 9-1-1 force.
The evidence is overwhelming. Among many examples are the 21 percent loss of Marines in infantry battalions, 100 percent loss of armor, 67 percent loss of direct support cannon artillery, 100 percent loss of bridging, and approximately 30 percent loss of aircraft. There are fewer amphibious ships and nearly a two-third reduction (already made or planned) of Maritime Prepositioning Forces ships, and large reductions in land-based prepositioning.
The Marine Corps’ “divest to invest” approach to transformation has created multiple year gaps where there will be insufficient means to field three robust division-wing-logistics teams. In fact, the Marine Corps would be unable to field a single traditional, warfighting MEF, without having to look elsewhere to source essential capabilities, including having to appeal to the U.S. Army for tanks and likely additional cannon artillery. This creates considerable risk to our national security.
There is a better way to transform the Marine Corps for tomorrow’s fight while preserving the capabilities needed to win today’s battles. A new approach requires new thinking and a new vision. In just a few days, in the online pages of the Marine Corps Gazette, a new approach will be outlined, Vision 2035.
Vision 2035 is an innovative alternative vision to meet future challenges, one that will retain the strengths of the Marine Air Ground Task Force and maintains infantry and combined arms as the central components of Marine operations. Vision 2035 will leverage innovation and technology to ensure the Marine Corps remains the Nation’s 9-1-1 force and retains, today, the capabilities necessary to fight and win across the spectrum of conflict, anywhere in the world. Vision 2035 is not narrowly focused on the confines of the Western Pacific. Vision 2035 keeps Marine forces on the offense, instead of stranding them on defense. Where Force Design 2030 is a threat-based approach focuses on one potential adversary. Vision 2035 is a concepts-based approach that meets the requirement for robust capabilities to meet global contingencies.
Vision 2035, will be posted online in the Marine Corps Gazette on Friday, December 2, 2022. Stay tuned.
“Change” is a magic and emotionally charged word. The need for change is constant. The key is that the change be the right change. Those who present flawed changes usually defend their poor choices by attacking their critics as “resistant to change”, antiquated and stuck in the past. If you cannot justify or explain your change you implement rapidly and insure there is no way to pass back across the burned bridges. Military professional courses repeatedly point out where the right change made the difference and where failure to change led to defeat. It is rare that the case studies focus on change that led to defeat. There is failure to adapt and there is failure that results from ill advised adaptation. Because “change” is not viewed as a double edged sword the connotations associated with change tend to be positive. So it is with EABO and FD 2030. Changes they are. The right changes they are not. They are flawed strategically, operationally and tactically. They are not supportable logistically. There has yet to be an exercise or simulation that would lead a professional, rational evaluation to conclude they could overcome the innumerable false assumptions and flawed solutions. A more reasonable approach might have been the creation of an additional Bn per Artillery Regiment to create the missile anti ship unit experimentation without creating the massive self mutilation the Corps embarked on the first day Gen Berger took office.
Cfrog, Organizations often make mistakes in their efforts to adapt. The unintended but totally predictable consequences can be savage. The best institutions know when to step back, access and reengage. That means setting aside egos which is not easy. In my short career I believe we made some big mistakes:
1. Reducing the infantry Bn to three rifle companies and reducing the size of the 81 mm Mortar Plt
2. Removing the Sea Going Detachments from Capitol Ships and closing Marine Barracks
3. Command Screening which became Command Selection for peripheral MOS’s
4. The Revised fitness report system implemented in 1992.
5. The TBS focus shifting from being Infantry centric and military skills being de emphasized
6. The never ending height and weight voodoo.
7. Unisex uniforms
8. The destruction of the club system
9. Micromanagement facilitated via risk management
10. The inability to field a follow on to the LVTP-7
11. The inability to craft a cogent fraternization policy.
12. Pushing women into the combat arms.
13. Failure to reform the Awards system
14. Failure to adjust the up or out system
15. Failure to reduce the number of Marines in Administration