Mark Cancian, with a long career in national defense, including three decades with the Marine Corps in war and peace, and now with CSIS, has written about FD 2030 many times. Writing this year in Breaking Defense, Cancian observed he did not yet see the prospect for “fundamental change.” See link below.
Breaking Defense (breakingdefense.com) June 14, 2022
Analyzing the Biggest Changes in the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 Update
Last month's update to the Marine Corps strategic guidance included many changes from the original document. Mark Cancian of CSIS goes in depth on what shifted, and why it matters.
By Mark Cancian
The March 2020 release of Force Design 2030 was billed as a new direction for the Marine Corps — one met almost immediately with backlash from retired officers. Last month, the Marines released an update to the document, with some notable changes. Having taken the time to compare the two documents, author Mark Cancian of CSIS offers up the following analysis of what changed and why in the last two years.
The Marine Corps’ recent update to its Force Design 2030 [PDF] arrives as the Corps’ intellectual civil war hits full volume. Ignoring the critics, the update continues FD 2030’s basic approach of building forces with reconnaissance and long-range precision strike capabilities for operations within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone and divesting capabilities regarded as unneeded or obsolete. But there are several areas where the update appears to at least acknowledge the critics’ concerns . . .
. . . The bottom line: as experiments and analysis continue, the Marine Corps will implement further modifications to FD 2030. However, the intellectual civil war will continue as the current commandant has signaled that, despite changes in the implementation details, he is committed to the new concept and will not change direction in any fundamental way.
Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Marine colonel now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Col Cancian’s comments correctly capture the minor adjustments that HQMC is considering. None of them resolve the fundamental flaws that that have characterized these ideas since 2019. But, the changes the CMC champions were piled onto previous mistakes. The Corps needs 24 infantry Bn’s. Those Bn’s have been repeatedly cut to “buy” new billets at the expense of infantrymen. The Infantry Bn should have 4 maneuver companies along with a robust Weapons Company and H&S company. The Rifle Squad should grow to 15 from 12 to accommodate the technology to include RPV’s at the squad level. The Corps made a huge mistake when it disbanded Marine Barracks and Sea going detachments both at a time when Terrorism makes ships and facilities more vulnerable than ever. The addition of CBRIRT was was wise and should be maintained. Administration remains the second largest MOS in the Marine Corps. That is unconscionable. The HQ’s are too numerous and too densely manned. The Corps is dispensing with MPS shipping. Beyond unwise. The contention that Large Amphibs were too vulnerable and then ask for them to be retained was a delusional negotiating tactic that was made worse with the small ferry boat concept. Tanks remain off the table, the artillery cuts were ludicrous and are still unjustifiable as are the cuts to air frames. The exclusive focus on one strategy in one theater is a Maginot Line mindset if there ever was one. War games are valuable but flawed. They are not the definitive way to “validate” anything.
In short, the wrong path embarked on in 2019 remains the wrong path. The sad truth is that the wrong things were done the wrong way, for the wrong reasons. No “tweaks” can rectify that.
Coriolanus
One of my main questions, and one I hope to see answered in the executive summaries of the war games due for release this month, is how the t/o&e for the war games was handled. So much experimentation on what a capability should look like (organization, LAW and other vessels, vehicles, logistics, etc) ex post facto of implementation naturally leads me and others to have doubts. I’ve been in enough good and bad simulations and war games to know that “wargaming” itself is not enough; getting setup right is half the battle, or it affects the outcome. (Edit: experimentation is valid in post implementation when it is refining capabilities and concepts…not continuing to determine what those should be)Right now, I see a plausibility gap between claims and reality. FD 2030 looks like some interesting ideas stitched together with a lot of “future development” fairy dust.