Compass Points says, “Not so fast!” to many of the articles in the current issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. The December edition of the Maine Corps Gazette is dedicated to FD 2030. The Gazette includes several articles written in support of FD 2030, as well as several articles that raise concerns. Compass Post is featuring several of the articles that raise significant concerns about FD 2030. But to those articles that support FD 2030, Compass Points can only say one thing, “Not so fast!”
Force Design 2030 is no Sea Control Solution
Reply to Gazette article: "Winning Sea Control"
If the Nation needs a sea control solution in the Western Pacific - and we do - Force Design 2030 is no sea control solution.
The article, “Winning Sea Control: Transforming Naval Expeditionary Forces,” attempts to paint a good face on Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) and its companion concept, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). Unfortunately, there is not enough paint.
A reader of an article with “Winning Sea Control” in the title has a reasonable expectation that the concept of “sea control” would be defined in the article. After all, it is nice to know the destination. Unfortunately, that never happens, and instead the reader is led down a road discussing deterrence by denial strategies, and how EABO and proposed Marine Corps’ Stand-in-Forces (SIFs) might support them.
The article then follows with unsupported and unsupportable claims that SIFs are going to become a key part of sea denial and sea control. But not even the most eager rocketeers can accomplish that job.
Finally, the reader is led to another discussion of suggested force structure changes to support EABO. These changes include new maritime commando battalions and squadrons, designated EABO companies and batteries, within selected infantry and artillery battalions, and persistently deployed EABO capable MAGTFs. All these proposals fly in the face of claims by other EABO proponents that all Marine Corps forces are capable of EABO without requiring specially trained and dedicated forces. Does EABO need special units or not? In the end, it does not matter. Because FD 2030, EABO, and SIF’s can never contribute significantly to sea control.
First, the missing definition. Sea Control Operations are defined by the Department of Defense as,
the employment of forces to destroy enemy naval forces, suppress enemy sea commerce, protect vital sea lanes, and establish local military superiority in vital sea areas
EABO apparently makes the assumption that the US Navy’s largest forward deployed force, 7th Fleet, with between 50-70 submarines and ships operating in the Western Pacific daily, reinforced and supported by allied Navies, is incapable of successfully carrying out the tasks laid out under the sea control operations definition.
The article and EABO itself never asks if a few dozen ship-killing missiles, launched by land-based SIFs are of any significant use? In the absence of this discussion, EABO looks more like a procurement strategy than the component of a cohesive military strategy.
The discussion of EABO and sea control has even greater problems. Assuming the US and its allies ‘win’ the sea control fight, perhaps with some modest contribution from EABO SIFs, where does that lead? Sea Control is a means to an end, not an end state. What comes after the defense of the First Island Chain?
During World War II, in the very waters envisioned as the future naval battleground between the US and China, the US won sea control by crippling the Japanese Navy and commercial fleets. Despite this, and despite a complementary strategic air campaign that destroyed the Japanese industrial base, the US still planned for a massive invasion of the Japanese home islands to win the war. Obviously, the atomic bomb made the planned invasion unnecessary. The point is, sea control is a very important and difficult task, but it is just one critical step in defeating a Pacific enemy.
In the long years leading up to any US / China war, what military force is serving as the Nation’s 911, force-in-readiness? Without a doubt, that job will always need to be done. Who will answer the call, if the Marine Corps transforms itself into a narrow and static defensive force scattered along the island chain?
If in the future, the U.S. Navy is able to turn back an attack on Taiwan, what are the next steps? How does the conflict end on terms favorable to the US? What are the contributions of SIFs to this next phase of the conflict?
Army General William DePuy wrote that,
The most magnificent execution can rarely offset
the deadweight of a flawed concept.
Ultimately, the sea control article in the Gazette, cannot overcome the conceptual shortfalls of EABO and FD 2030. The concepts fail to provide a road to a clearly defined strategic end state.
The article ends with the Latin phrase for, “If you want peace, have the sea.” It would be more appropriate to end with, “If you want peace, have a comprehensive strategy that links ends, ways, and means.” Lacking this vital linkage, the debate about EABO and FD 2030 wanders the island chain, proposing radical changes simply in order to win a Beltway prize of “innovative.” Sea control? FD 2030, EABO, and SIF’s along the island chain are hardly the answer. The Marine Corps needs a new alternative if it is to remain relevant today, and grow more relevant tomorrow.
"Assuming the US and its allies ‘win’ the sea control fight, perhaps with some modest contribution from EABO SIFs, where does that lead? Sea Control is a means to an end, not an end state.". Well put, and captures why at times, the advocacy for FD 2030 seems to go in circles. (Q: why do we need FD 2030, EABOs, and SIF? A: because of the MPSR. Q: Aren't there other national assets and policies we should consider? A: that's why we need FD 2030.). At a certain point, it's like trying to talk about Brawndo("it's got electrolytes").
For what it's worth, the 4 horsemen still have the best definition of SIF:"The narrow tailoring of forces for a backwater role (Stand-in Forces) in the Western Pacific.". - 'The Marine Corps is Dangerously Close to Losing its Customs, Traditions and Warfighting Ethos' By James E. Livingston, Jay Vargas, Harvey Barnum, & Robert Modrzejewski.