FD 2030 - Regression, Not Progress
The Marine Corps must remain a general purpose, force-in-readiness
Writing in The National Interest,
Generals Sheehan and Zinni illustrate the dangers of FD 2030
(excerpt and link below)
The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 is Regression, Not Progress
The National Interest
May 19, 2022
It has been suggested that the Marine Corps somehow “walked away” from its naval roots during its long commitment to fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a myth. (It is worth remembering that Operation Enduring Freedom began with the sea-based operations of naval Task Force 58 under then-Brig. Gen. James Mattis against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.) Even though committed to sustained operations ashore, the Marine Corps continued to maintain its regular MEU deployments throughout those war years. In fact, combatant commander requests for MEUs have exceeded the Navy’s ability to provide the necessary amphibious shipping. As a result, the Marine Corps responded by forming three crisis-response Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs) to meet the demand, one each for Central, Southern and African Commands.
So, no, the Marine Corps has not walked away from its naval roots but continues to perform its mission as a naval force-in-readiness.
This is not an argument for the status quo. Advances in precision weaponry certainly have increased the challenges of deploying and employing military forces in high-end warfare. But instead of inventing a new mission, the Marine Corps should be looking to develop the capabilities that will allow it to continue to perform its force-in-readiness mission on the changing battlefield . . . .
. . . Maintaining a service’s independence indeed should be a priority for any service chief. Subordinating that service to another service that is ambivalent about supporting it is an odd way to go about it. The commandant’s vision hardly cements the Corps’ unique characteristics, which are its capabilities as a general-purpose force-in-readiness. It is true that the commandant’s vision seeks to prepare the Marine Corps for the contingency of a war with China in the Western Pacific, but committing the Marine Corps to a specific, unlikely conflict at the expense of the ability to meet a wide variety of other, more likely contingencies is a bad bet.
Jack Sheehan served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; and Anthony Zinni is a former combatant commander of U.S. Central Command. Both are retired Marine generals.