The Compass Points post: FD 2030 - Are Marines Inventing the Edsel? which references Owen West’s expert article in War On the Rocks has generated feedback and questions.
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Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang?
By Owen West
https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/are-the-marines-inventing-the-edsel-or-the-mustang/
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One Compass Points reader commented:
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“I'd like to see one of the anti-Force Design critics respond to LtCol Cuomo's article in War on the Rocks:
If the goal is debate, this article requires honest engagement.”
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Compass Points appreciates feedback and welcomes the opportunity to reply to LtCol Cuomo’s engaging article in War on the Rocks. Compass Points is aware that after LtCol Cuomo’s article was published this past summer, the article received comments, feedback, and reply. War on the Rocks chose not to publish any substantial reply.
As requested, Compass Points is happy to post, in full, one reply to LtCol Cuomo below:
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Reply to Scott Cuomo re: "On-the-Ground Truth and Force Design 2030 Reconciliation: A Way Forward" War on the Rocks July 12, 2022
Lt Col John Kuntz (ret.) 8/01/2022
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LtCol Cuomo,
Thank you for your thoughtful article. I will leave it to you and Owen West, ("Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang" War on the Rocks May 27, 2022) to decide whether the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 is more like an Edsel or a Mustang. I think your article proposes, not a car, however, but a train. You basically say, the train is leaving the station and it is time for all to get on board. Even if the train is sitting on the tracks, there are reasons why many experienced Marine leaders are not buying a ticket, and not getting on board.
Allow me to begin by saying I respect you as a writer, as a thinker, and as a Marine leader. In the same way, the dozens of senior Marine leaders I know all have appropriate respect for our Commandant as a Marine, as a four star General Officer, and as the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Mutual respect is a good place to begin. It is the way Patrick Henry began his famous speech,
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No man thinks more highly than I do of the patriotism, as well as the abilities of the very worthy gentlemen who have just addressed the House. But different men often see the same subject in different lights: and, therefore, I hope it will not be thought disrespectful to those gentlemen if, entertaining as I do opinions of a character very opposite to theirs, I shall speak forth my sentiments freely and without reserve.
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In your article, you claim General Berger's 'detractors' are 'missing the bigger picture' about FD 2030. There are no General Berger detractors. There are detractors of FD 2030. The discussion is not some personal complaint about General Berger; it is about the manifold shortcomings of FD 2030 and related documents. As they say in the Godfather movies, it is not personal; it is business. The former Commandants and other four star Marine Corps Generals, with more than 1,000 years of experience, who have deep concerns about FD 2030, are the ones who designed, built, and led the 'bigger picture'. Do not fool yourself. They see the big picture clearly.
Some of your assertions, assumptions, and terms I found ill-chosen. You said a couple of times that FD 2030 came about, in part, because the Marine Corps was 'shocked' by the end of the desert wars, shocked by this, and shocked by that. Marines are not shocked. Ever. It is our business never to be shocked. If a Marine unit, moving to contact in the desert, is suddenly pulled out and given a mission in the Arctic, they would not be shocked. Marines would simply turn to and accomplish the new mission.
In fact, the debate about FD 2030 is about making sure we are not shocked by the future.
You said the Marine Corps sometimes uses, "the proverbial golden hammer for every nail." If by this you mean the Marine Corps is wasteful with money, it makes me wonder what Marine Corps you are talking about. Surely, you are not talking about the United States Marine Corps, the elite fighting force that as I was taught, "has done so much with so little for so long, that we now can do everything with nothing." Perhaps, a slight exaggeration.
You also use the term 'internecine' which means a destructive, bloody struggle, ruinous to both sides. The debate over FD 2030 is nothing of the sort. It is a debate by smart, strong-minded Marines who all care about our Corps. We are simply discussing how to get where we all want to go, a better, stronger, more capable Corps of Marines.
I also noticed your friendly insult toward opponents of FD 2030 - presumably retirees. You said, opponents of FD 2030 would have been in on the debate much earlier if only they could have figured out how to use an IPhone! Good jab. You are right. I can never seem to get any information about FD 2030 on my old AM radio!
Your little jab is an example of how in discussion and debate, Marines use language that is typically blunt, sometimes salty, and occasionally includes a friendly, colorful insult. It is all good, all part of the give and take of debate among colleagues. I hope neither you, nor anyone involved in the debate, would ever respond to blunt or even salty language by complaining, 'you hurt my feelings.' While feelings may have taken over large sections of civilian society, Marines must always remain focused, not on feelings, but on performance.
It is exactly performance where FD 2030 falls short.
FD 2030 cuts large hunks of air, armor, artillery, infantry, III MEF, and the rotation schedule for MEU's just to name a few performance issues. In early versions of FD 2030's Stand-In forces, these forces were to be inserted along the Pacific island chain with stealth and secrecy. More recently, it has been said that Stand-In forces would serve as a visible deterrent by occupying the island chain with open impunity, but still with no support, transportation, or logistics. These are serious performance issues.
Let us address one of these performance issues: the number of Marines in infantry battalions. In your article, you say any claim that FD 2030 calls for 41% fewer Marines in infantry battalions is not accurate. You ask, what are the real numbers?
Glad you asked. Here are the real numbers:
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Plans Call for Fewer Marines in Infantry Battalions.
Three sources. Three numbers.
I. Based on information contained on page A-8 of the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, a US Marine Corps publication, we learned there was to be a reduction of 317 Marines in each infantry battalion. On a slide provided by General Berger in March 2022 we learned there was to be a reduction of 3 infantry battalions. With these numbers we have done the math and concluded, if fully implemented, the force structure changes would result in a 41.24% reduction of Marines (not just infantrymen) in infantry battalions. See the calculations below:
There were 24 battalions times 965 Marines equals 23,160 Marines
Cut three battalions times 965 equals - 2,895 ‘’
Reduce remaining battalions by 317 Marines times 21 battalions equals - 6,657 ‘’
Total 13,608 ‘’
This is a reduction of 9,552 Marines from infantry battalions or 41.24%
II. Based on information obtained from the Marine Corps on 13 July 2022, the original reduction was to be 251 Marines from each infantry battalion. On a slide provided by General Berger in March 2022 we learned there was to be a reduction of 3 infantry battalions. With these numbers we have done the math and concluded, if fully implemented, the force structure changes would result in a 34.77% reduction of Marines in infantry battalions. See the calculations below:
There were 24 battalions times 986 Marines equals 23,664 Marines
Cut three battalions times 986 equals - 2,958 ‘’
Reduce remaining battalions by 251 Marines times 21 battalions equals - 5,271 ‘’
Total 15,408 ‘’
This is a reduction of 8,229 Marines from infantry battalions or 34.77%
III. Based on additional information obtained from the Marine Corps on 13 July 2022, the revised reduction was to be 176 Marines from each infantry battalion. On a slide provided by General Berger in March 2022 we learned there was to be a reduction of 3 infantry battalions. With these numbers we have done the math and concluded, if fully implemented, the force structure changes will result in a 28.19% reduction of Marines in infantry battalions. See the calculations below:
There were 24 battalions times 986 Marines equals 23,664 Marines
Cut three battalions times 986 equals - 2,958 ‘’
Reduce remaining battalions by 176 Marines times 21 battalions equals - 3,696 ‘’
Total 17,010 ‘’
This is a reduction of 6,654 Marines from infantry battalions or 28.19%
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So basically, the FD 2030 reduction of Marines in infantry battalions is roughly 40%, 35%, or 30%. Hardly the low estimate of 10% you claim. Beyond that, for what reason would it be wise to discuss ANY reduction in the size of Marine infantry battalions? You say, one of the key changes of the modern battlefield is the increased capabilities of satellites, sensors, and drones that leave infantry on the ground with no where to hide. If that is true, this inability to hide may lead to greater causalities. If there are going to be greater casualties, we need bigger battalions, not smaller ones. Only bigger battalions have the numbers of Marines to withstand casualties and still press the fight. And if, as Voltaire said, God is on the side of the big battalions, the Marine Corps should remain on the same side. You say, "look beyond the numbers" but Marines in contact with the enemy cannot look anywhere else. They need Marines beside them.
The degradation in the numbers for air, artillery, and logistics are just as concerning.
You fearfully relate the news that some people want to get rid of the Marine Corps. This is undoubtedly true. It has always has been true. Marines, though, never run scared. After every period of conflict, the value of the Marine Corps has always been questioned. It has been said that Presidents Jefferson, Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower all had ideas, inclinations, or plans to get rid of the Marine Corps. We are always fighting for our survival. The Marine Corps has survived on both a special relationship with the American people, and on special performance in great challenges. Americans love the Marine Corps because they believe they can always count on the Marines even when they cannot count on anyone else.
It is not just the American people who depend on a large, always ready, multi-mission Marine Corps. It is also the Combatant Commanders. The Commandant provides trained and equipped Marines to the Combatant Commanders. As General Zinni said in his recent article, ("The Flawed Argument for Change" Marine Corps Gazette online July 2022),
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Through the years since, the Marine Forces Component Commands and the MEFs had to prove their ability to meet the challenging requirements placed upon them by COCOMs. In the war plans of CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and the U.S Forces Korea Command, Marine headquarters, including Service component commands, were given significant roles as combined corps level forces, joint task forces, and joint functional commands. The Corps still provided FMF to the Joint Force Maritime Component as well.
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Where is the approval, support, and strong advocacy for FD 2030 from the Combatant Commanders? Our Marine Corps is their Marine Corps. One senior Marine representative at a Combatant Command said he could get so little information from the Marine Corps about FD 2030 that he finally had to "give up on the Marine Corps."
Your article also talks about your work with Task Force 61/2. Sounds like very interesting duty. You note with justifiable pride that when Task Force 61/2 was in Europe you were able to get meals from our allies and buy commercial tickets home. Good for you and your Marines. Unfortunately, though, it is not the practice of the Marine Corps to expect meal service from our allies. And we should not base our unit transportation plans around Uber. With the power and capability of the MAGTF - Marine Air Ground Task Force, we provide for ourselves and often for our allies. We do not drain our allies. A MAGTF comes equipped with its own local transportation and with our Navy partners, we always have a ride home.
You quote General Wolters saying he wants Marines who can 'shoot, move, and communicate'. Of course he does. Everyone does. The whole question is does FD 2030 increase our ability to supply fully capable Marine units or does it degrade our abilities?
What will replace all the Marine Corps capabilities and units that are reduced or eliminated by FD 2030? Big drones? Little drones? Drones of all types? Drones are a powerful new weapon of war. We have not begun to understand the full potential of drones. For example, we have today, right now, quad drones that can lift more than 500 pounds. That means the drone could lift a combat loaded Marine. An entire Marine squad could fly themselves into battle. Amazing.
But does that mean drones can replace aviation? You are quick to talk about the weakness of tanks and the cost of aviation. But there are no invulnerable weapons. No perfect weapons. All weapons have strengths and flaws. If the Army M1A2 and the new M1A3 - the most capable tank every created - are so vulnerable, how will Army tanks be able to support Marine infantry? Won't those tanks all be destroyed? And if tanks are vulnerable, what about drones? Drones have virtually no defense. Brand new anti-drone defenses under development today will sweep defenseless drones from the skies. At that point, tanks on the ground and aviation in the air will look like a good deal. Even expensive aviation will look like a good deal next to ground based missiles which are comparatively immobile and prohibitively expensive.
Armor and air from one source are not the same as armor and air from another source. Army armor is not the same as Marine armor. Not just because the Army might have the MIA2 and M1A3, while the Marines might have a new, much lighter, tank. If we shrink infantry battalions and depend on Army armor and Air Force planes, we will have given away a powerful strength of Marine forces: Marines talking to Marines, a Marine on foot talking to Marine artillery, Marine armor, and Marine air. It is a powerful combination that has won victory after victory. Why would we even think about throwing away our "whole package" Marine Corps?
The supporters of FD 2030 place great importance on vision and theory, and much less importance on real world, proven, capabilities. A stark example of the difference between theory and practice, which pervades so much of the discussion of FD 2030, is your criticism of Marine aviators who, you say, used expensive F-35B's to bomb a Taliban factory. You argue the Marine aviators should have, instead, used, 'a well balanced force with a deep tool set [and] the optimal answer to each situation.'
That probably makes perfect sense in power-point world. It might happen like this:
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"Sir, we have a tasker to take out a Taliban factory."
"What do we have available?"
"All we have left are the F-35B's"
"Those things are expensive. Tell you what, send a flash message to HQMC tell them we need immediately a 'well balanced force with a deep tool set with the optimal answer to each situation.'"
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The problems with FD 2030 are real world problems. As John Schmitt said in his recent article, ("The Marine Corps' Latest Idea For Countering China Has Major Problems" Task and Purpose July 7, 2022)
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"Sustainment and other support to distributed stand-in detachments present a potentially invalidating challenge. Stand-in forces are expected to sustain themselves tactically through the local economy, which might be possible for some necessities but certainly not for ammunition and replacement parts. Casualty treatment and evacuation will be problematic, as will equipment maintenance and repair above the most basic level. Inter-acting with the local economy will produce a signature all its own - not one detectable by radar but a signature clearly detectable to human intelligence."
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Marines can almost always agree on principles. We all want a better, more capable Marine Corps. The question is. how to get there? Our current Commandant will leave active duty next summer. But his love for the Corps will never dim. As a retiree, he will continue to work toward a Marine Corps that is better than we are now. That is what all Marines want. That is what all Marines, active, reserve, and retired, must continually work toward. It is the struggle of constant discussion and debate that allows us to discover the way forward.
I said at the beginning that in your article, your overall suggestion for "FD 2030 reconciliation" seems to be, 'the train is leaving the station, it is time to get on board'. The problem is, if we get onboard and the train is headed in the wrong direction, it just takes us further and further away from where we should be going. FD 2030 is headed in the wrong direction. There may be some chance for FD 2030 'reconstruction', but there is very little chance for FD 2030 'reconciliation'. That is not personal. It is business. Marine Corps business.
Lt.Col Kuntz is experienced in the process, problems, and potential of organizational change in the Marine Corps. He helped stand up the Marine Corps University and was the principal author of one of the Marine Corps' original orders on the Concept Based Requirements system. He was onboard the platform Wimbrown VII in the Northern Persian Gulf during the U.S. Special Operations Command's very first tactical operation Ernest Will / Prime Chance. Later, he led a special unit attached to 4th Reconnaissance Battalion until recalled to active duty after 9/11. His first published military article, 'Are You Ready to Disobey' was later included in the anthology, 'On the Corps: USMC Wisdom.'
I note that there should be 27 active duty Rifle Bn’s and 9 Reserve Rifle Bn’s. The cuts are far deeper if you start from where we should be and not where we are. 12 Rifle Regiments. Any other starting point is purposely deceptive and dishonest. But, deception has been the coin of the realm for over three years now.
Yes, I am very curious why "War On the Rocks" did not publish any commentaries on LtCol. Cuomo's lengthy treatise. So much for open candid debate?