Compass Points asks, should we subtract or add?
Reply to Colonel Art Corbett’s Marine Corps Gazette article:
“Stand-In Forces - Disrupting the Current Struggle for Dominance”
Compass Points has concerns about many of the articles in the December issue of the Marine Corps Gazette.
The December edition of the Maine Corps Gazette is dedicated to FD 2030. The Gazette includes several articles written in support of FD 2030, as well as several articles that raise concerns. Compass Post will feature several of the articles that raise significant concerns about FD 2030. If the article, “Stand-In Forces” supports FD 2030, Compass Points disagrees, but, perhaps, the article does not support the approach of FD 2030. It is all about adding versus subtracting.
Every school child wrestling with algebra for the very first time, knows they must keep in mind, PEMDAS, the mathematical order of operations. To successfully solve problems, they must be solved in the correct order. Perhaps PEMDAS applies to FD 2030. One of the rules of PEMDAS is that addition must come before subtraction.
Applying PEMDAS to FD 2030’s ‘Stand-In Forces” means that the Marine Corps should have never subtracted before adding. The Marine Corps should have never subtracted critical Marine Corps capabilities to acquire Stand-In Forces. Instead, if Stand-In Forces have value, then Stand-In Forces should have been added to robust Marine capabilities.
When considering Stand-In Forces, subtracting before adding is a big mistake.
Compass Points joins so many throughout the Marine Corps in saluting the author of the article in the December Gazette, “Stand-In Forces - Disrupting the current struggle for dominance”
The late Colonel Art Corbett is an officer greatly admired by Compass Points. His contributions to our Corps are well-known. He was often out front and original in his thinking about tactical and operational problems and in several cases technical problems as well. This was certainty the case when he stood up and led the 500-Marine Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force in 1996. Colonel Corbett produced several original and important concepts as director of future warfighting at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The Marine Corps University recognizes his positive influence on our Corps in an annual award to a student whose paper reflects innovation and creativity.
Colonel Corbett understood the need for robust Marine Corps forces able to respond rapidly to crises and contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. There is no evidence he would have favored a “divest to invest” approach. He wanted to add to existing, though improved, capabilities. Colonel Corbett began his quote below with a key word:
Adding stand-in engagements to the tactical mix will cause the enemy to hazard expensive offensive platforms against a lethal and dense mix of inexpensive, risk worthy, defensive platforms, and payloads—imposing disproportionate cost and asymmetric risk to enemy forces designed to strike against large signature standoff ships and infrastructure. [Italics in original.]
“Adding” instead of subtracting is the same argument made by a different author in an August 2022, Marine Corps Times article,
“Here’s how the Marine Corps should have approached stand-in forces.” In the days leading up to World War II, “. . . Marine Corps, Commandant Maj. Gen. Thomas Holcomb asked Congress for additional funds to stand up new defense battalions ...” General Holcomb did not cut force structure or divest weapons to create these new units, instead, he asked for additional funds. This is what the Corps of today should have done. Add. Do not subtract.
Colonel Corbett goes on to discuss tactics used by the Vietcong. Colonel Corbett suggests, “A portion of future U.S. forces could follow the Vietnamese example by making a virtue of proximity, [and] stealth . . .” indicating he did not foresee a stripping of the rest of the Corps’ operational capabilities to secure resources for such forces. [Italics added.]
Compass Points does disagree with Colonel Corbett to the extent he advocates for the Marine Corps to embrace a tactical defense in the Pacific theater. Hunkering down on defense is not the Marine Corps - not now, not ever. The Corps’ reason for existence is to carry the fight to our nation’s enemies as a combined arms force ready to engage in tough close-in battles.
Compass Points likes to believe that in his Gazette article, “Stand-In Forces,” Colonel Corbett was making the point that instead of subtracting needed capabilities from the Marine Corps to acquire Stand-In Forces, the opposite should have been done. Stand-In Forces should have been added to robust Marine capabilities. If that was Colonel Corbett’s thinking, it is just another good idea in Colonel Corbett’s long and productive career. God speed Colonel Corbett. Somewhere, now, you are discussing operational concepts with St. Peter.