What are the real lessons from the fighting in Ukraine? Some senior active-duty Marines were quick to interpret early reports from the war in Ukraine to validate FD 2030. They seemed particularly eager to use vignettes from the war to justify the decision to jettison tanks from the Marine Corps toolbox of capabilities and cut cannon artillery by 67%.
Wise leaders, however, know that first reports are almost always wrong. They keep their powder dry until additional facts materialize.
In their article, published at The Hill (link below), Lieutenant Generals Newbold and Knutson have carefully evaluated the seven plus months of data now available. Their deeper analysis has found the real lessons from the fighting in Ukraine. Chief among the findings: a combined-arms team is essential.
Their analysis of the facts provides a much deeper understanding of the need for the traditional broad range of Marine Corps capabilities. The article refutes the initial pronouncements from those who wanted to use Ukraine as justification for stripping the Marine Corps of necessary capabilities.
The Hill (thehill.com) 10/05/2022
Opinion - National Security
The Ukraine war has taught us this: A combined-arms team is essential
By Barry Knutson and Gregory Newbold
. . . “Only a fool learns from his own mistakes. The wise man learns from the mistakes of others,” goes the epigram often attributed to Otto von Bismarck. The foibles of the Russians against Ukraine are producing lessons better learned vicariously. Preeminent among them is, in fact, a lesson relearned: When you don’t possess and operate a fully combined-arms force, you gamble at war. Not smart.
Retired Lt. Gen. Barry Knutson served as a Marine aviator and commanded at every operational level including as CG, I Marine Expeditionary Force. He retired after serving as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
Retired Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold served as a Marine infantry officer and commanded units from platoon through the 1st Marine Division. He retired after serving as Director of Operations (J-3) of the Joint Staff.
Perhaps the Ukrainians read this: "8-1. While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender's ability to occupy his positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare his defenses. Preparations end only when the defender retrogrades or begins to fight. The defender can study the ground and select defensive positions that mass the effects of his fires on likely approaches. He combines natural and manmade obstacles to canalize the attacking force into his engagement areas (EAs). He can coordinate and rehearse his defensive plan while gaining intimate familiarity with the terrain. The defender does not wait passively to be attacked. He aggressively seeks ways of attriting and weakening attacking enemy forces before the initiation of close combat. He maneuvers to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage and attacks him at every opportunity, using his direct and indirect fires. The fires include the effects of offensive information operations and joint assets, such as close air support. The static and mobile elements of his defense combine to deprive the enemy of the initiative. He contains the enemy while seeking every opportunity to transition to the offense." Source: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90/ch8.htm
The authors think that tanks and artillery are necessary to execute combined arms. Surely not.