The NCA is certainly taking this seriously, but there's nothing I've seen that US Marines are being used to "sense and make sense," or be the "eyes and ears of the joint force," or act as JTACs or Stingray teams. The below article makes me think true national-level assets may be deployed to perform those missions.
Force Design, by being oriented to deny terrain, is ill-suited for strike operations (IMO). I guess an MLR could occupy Margarita Island and deny its use to bad actors, but not by force. Hostilities have already commenced, so there is a real (potential) need to perform a forcible entry.
CMCs Berger and Smith’s Force Debacle has put the Nation’s Once Reliable 911 Force in Readiness in a “Fecal Sandwich” ! I have no doubt Our Great Marines will Innovate Adapt and Overcome. It reminds me of the Corps’ readiness at the onset of the Korean War when Marine Reserve Infantry, awaiting boot camp, received their basic training while sailing to the war.
Sam … I recall the late Gen Barrow, in an Erskine Lecture Series presentation at the FBI Academy, remarking on moving his company from CLNC to the West coast by train (apparently, the last of such movements), and, observing he had Marines who had not gone through Boot Camp. Further, the last sentence of Fehrenbach’s book is applicable today, to wit: “The lesson of Korea is that it happened”. We should remember that.
Marines as a VBSS force makes perfect sense; however, in this case it is all about the authorities in which the vessels are being boarded. The Coasties are boarding these tankers under the authority of existing law enforcement sanctions against specific ships, not admiralty law (to my knowledge). If we wanted to change up the authorities for the boardings, then the Marines could and should be employed. If we want to split the difference, all we need is a single USCG officer to be assigned to the boarding team, assigned as the Maritime Intercept Officer onboard the LHD, and to order the boarding. Problem solved. It becomes Title 10 support to law enforcement operations. Navy - Marine Corps collaboration on boarding operations within the ARG is nothing new either. In the early 2000s we experimented with simultaneous fast rope / boat hook caving ladder boardings whereby the Marines would take the pilot house and the sailors would take the engine room. In theory it works, but we'd need much more time to give these teams time to work together, and I'd still only feel comfortable sending in the Marines for an opposed boarding. Likewise, a non-compliant boarding with part time sailors climbing up a caving ladder is dicey as hell.
When I was with 1st Force Reconnaissance Company in the early 90's, we spent an inordinate amount of time learning and practicing VBSS tactics and techniques. The CH-46 that crashed when attempting to land men on the USS Pecos in 1999 included some dear friends of mine. It reminds us that VBSS missions are dangerous and require constant practice to maintain proficiency.
sorry to read this, brother. I would say that the 46 is a curious platform to perform this mission. SEALs use 60s and little birds--I've seen Green Team practice this on my old ship. It was STUNNING. That being said, using the FROG or even a V-22 to perform this mission is insanity. Too big, too lacking in maneuver. The Frogs made for good VERTREP platforms, and that's where I'd leave it. TF 160 doesn't use the 47s when they are doing VBSS...
Grok:”### USMC Post-WWII (1945–1950) and Initial Korean War Response in *This Kind of War* by T.R. Fehrenbach
The book referenced is likely **This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History** (1963) by **T.R. Fehrenbach** This seminal work is widely regarded as one of the definitive accounts of the Korean War, emphasizing military, political, and societal lessons. Fehrenbach, a Korean War veteran himself, provides a critical and unflinching analysis.
#### Description of the USMC After WWII (1945–1950)
Fehrenbach portrays the postwar United States Marine Corps as a severely diminished and under-resourced institution, reflecting broader U.S. military demobilization under the Truman administration:
- **Rapid Demobilization and Shrinkage**: At the end of World War II, the USMC peaked at over 485,000 personnel with six divisions. By 1950, it had been gutted to around 74,000 Marines, organized into just two understrength divisions (1st and 2nd Marine Divisions) with limited supporting units. Many experienced veterans had been discharged, leaving a core of regulars diluted by reserves and new recruits.
- **Budget Cuts and Low Readiness**: Severe funding restrictions left equipment outdated, training minimal, and units skeletonized. The Corps struggled to maintain even basic operational capability. Fehrenbach highlights how unification debates (leading to the 1947 National Security Act) and inter-service rivalries threatened the Marines' very existence, with proposals to absorb them into the Army or reduce them to a minor naval police force.
- **Societal Context**: Fehrenbach critiques America's postwar "peacetime mentality"—a desire for quick demobilization, low taxes, and avoidance of military commitments—which left all U.S. forces unprepared for conflict. The USMC, despite its proud WWII legacy, was seen as an anachronism in an era favoring airpower and nuclear deterrence.
#### Marine Response to the Outbreak of the Korean War (June–July 1950)
When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, the USMC's response exemplified resilience and improvisation amid crisis:”……
- **Initial Mobilization**: The Corps was ordered to form and deploy a full brigade-strength force (the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade) to Korea extraordinarily quickly—within weeks—despite having no ready brigade on hand. Drawing from scattered units on the West Coast (primarily from the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton), augmented by reserves, the Brigade assembled around 6,500 Marines, including ground elements, aviation (Marine Aircraft Group 33), and support.”…..
- **Rapid Deployment as "Fire Brigade"**: The Brigade sailed from California in mid-July and arrived in theater by early August. It became the U.S. command's mobile reserve ("fire brigade") stabilizing the Pusan Perimeter against overwhelming North Korean advances. Fehrenbach describes their early actions (e.g., at Naktong Bulge) as critical in preventing collapse, with Marines demonstrating superior discipline, tactics, and close air support integration compared to poorly prepared Army units like Task Force Smith.
- **Broader Corps Effort**: The quick buildup validated the Marines' amphibious expertise and esprit de corps. By September, the full 1st Marine Division (reinforced to ~25,000) deployed for the Inchon landing, showcasing the Corps' ability to regenerate combat power under duress.
Fehrenbach uses this contrast—postwar neglect leading to near-disaster, redeemed by Marine professionalism—to argue a core thesis: Free societies must maintain ready professional forces, as unpreparedness invites aggression in "this kind of war" (limited, conventional conflicts). The USMC's story serves as a microcosm of America's broader wake-up call in Korea.
My friend a Marine C-130 pilot Vietnam War Veteran, who retired as a Delta Airlines Captain died of Agent Orange Linked disease and was interned at Ft Sam Houston National Cemetery near his Father In Laws gravesite. Grok:”**Lieutenant Colonel Fred F. Eubanks Jr., USMC** one of the approximately 1,563 Korean War Silver Star recipients.
He served across World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam, earning the **Silver Star** and **Purple Heart** for valor. During the Korean War, he was a lieutenant and commanded a **Sniper Platoon** (likely in the 1st or 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division) during the amphibious landing at **Inchon** on September 15, 1950—one of the war's pivotal operations.
Dedicated sniper platoons or groups were organized at the battalion level in the 1st Marine Division around that time, with scout-snipers supporting the assault waves. His leadership in that role aligns with the intense combat at Inchon, including actions on beaches and Wolmi-do Island.
Eubanks retired as a lieutenant colonel and passed away in 2008 at age 88. He is buried at Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery in San Antonio, Texas.
For more details, such as his full citation (if available publicly), check resources like the Military Times Hall of Valor database or submit a records request to the National Archives/National Personnel Records Center. The Home of Heroes site lists many Korean War USMC Silver Stars but may not have every citation digitized.” Force Disaster killed the US Marine Corps Snipers.
While I still regard our Corps as capable of conducting such a missions as these, I still must remain vigilant to call the current state of our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities to be very limited in scope and abilities at best...
FD2030 has ruined our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities to their pre 2019 state... Semper Fidelis!
The NCA is certainly taking this seriously, but there's nothing I've seen that US Marines are being used to "sense and make sense," or be the "eyes and ears of the joint force," or act as JTACs or Stingray teams. The below article makes me think true national-level assets may be deployed to perform those missions.
Force Design, by being oriented to deny terrain, is ill-suited for strike operations (IMO). I guess an MLR could occupy Margarita Island and deny its use to bad actors, but not by force. Hostilities have already commenced, so there is a real (potential) need to perform a forcible entry.
https://www.twz.com/news-features/cv-22b-osprey-mc-130j-commando-ii-special-ops-aircraft-deploy-to-puerto-rico
CMCs Berger and Smith’s Force Debacle has put the Nation’s Once Reliable 911 Force in Readiness in a “Fecal Sandwich” ! I have no doubt Our Great Marines will Innovate Adapt and Overcome. It reminds me of the Corps’ readiness at the onset of the Korean War when Marine Reserve Infantry, awaiting boot camp, received their basic training while sailing to the war.
Sam … I recall the late Gen Barrow, in an Erskine Lecture Series presentation at the FBI Academy, remarking on moving his company from CLNC to the West coast by train (apparently, the last of such movements), and, observing he had Marines who had not gone through Boot Camp. Further, the last sentence of Fehrenbach’s book is applicable today, to wit: “The lesson of Korea is that it happened”. We should remember that.
Semper Fidelis, Hand Salute, Happy New Year. Thank you for primary source testimony. Fehrenbach, a legendary Texan, was a modern day Xenophon.
Marines as a VBSS force makes perfect sense; however, in this case it is all about the authorities in which the vessels are being boarded. The Coasties are boarding these tankers under the authority of existing law enforcement sanctions against specific ships, not admiralty law (to my knowledge). If we wanted to change up the authorities for the boardings, then the Marines could and should be employed. If we want to split the difference, all we need is a single USCG officer to be assigned to the boarding team, assigned as the Maritime Intercept Officer onboard the LHD, and to order the boarding. Problem solved. It becomes Title 10 support to law enforcement operations. Navy - Marine Corps collaboration on boarding operations within the ARG is nothing new either. In the early 2000s we experimented with simultaneous fast rope / boat hook caving ladder boardings whereby the Marines would take the pilot house and the sailors would take the engine room. In theory it works, but we'd need much more time to give these teams time to work together, and I'd still only feel comfortable sending in the Marines for an opposed boarding. Likewise, a non-compliant boarding with part time sailors climbing up a caving ladder is dicey as hell.
When I was with 1st Force Reconnaissance Company in the early 90's, we spent an inordinate amount of time learning and practicing VBSS tactics and techniques. The CH-46 that crashed when attempting to land men on the USS Pecos in 1999 included some dear friends of mine. It reminds us that VBSS missions are dangerous and require constant practice to maintain proficiency.
sorry to read this, brother. I would say that the 46 is a curious platform to perform this mission. SEALs use 60s and little birds--I've seen Green Team practice this on my old ship. It was STUNNING. That being said, using the FROG or even a V-22 to perform this mission is insanity. Too big, too lacking in maneuver. The Frogs made for good VERTREP platforms, and that's where I'd leave it. TF 160 doesn't use the 47s when they are doing VBSS...
Grok:”### USMC Post-WWII (1945–1950) and Initial Korean War Response in *This Kind of War* by T.R. Fehrenbach
The book referenced is likely **This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History** (1963) by **T.R. Fehrenbach** This seminal work is widely regarded as one of the definitive accounts of the Korean War, emphasizing military, political, and societal lessons. Fehrenbach, a Korean War veteran himself, provides a critical and unflinching analysis.
#### Description of the USMC After WWII (1945–1950)
Fehrenbach portrays the postwar United States Marine Corps as a severely diminished and under-resourced institution, reflecting broader U.S. military demobilization under the Truman administration:
- **Rapid Demobilization and Shrinkage**: At the end of World War II, the USMC peaked at over 485,000 personnel with six divisions. By 1950, it had been gutted to around 74,000 Marines, organized into just two understrength divisions (1st and 2nd Marine Divisions) with limited supporting units. Many experienced veterans had been discharged, leaving a core of regulars diluted by reserves and new recruits.
- **Budget Cuts and Low Readiness**: Severe funding restrictions left equipment outdated, training minimal, and units skeletonized. The Corps struggled to maintain even basic operational capability. Fehrenbach highlights how unification debates (leading to the 1947 National Security Act) and inter-service rivalries threatened the Marines' very existence, with proposals to absorb them into the Army or reduce them to a minor naval police force.
- **Societal Context**: Fehrenbach critiques America's postwar "peacetime mentality"—a desire for quick demobilization, low taxes, and avoidance of military commitments—which left all U.S. forces unprepared for conflict. The USMC, despite its proud WWII legacy, was seen as an anachronism in an era favoring airpower and nuclear deterrence.
#### Marine Response to the Outbreak of the Korean War (June–July 1950)
When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, the USMC's response exemplified resilience and improvisation amid crisis:”……
- **Initial Mobilization**: The Corps was ordered to form and deploy a full brigade-strength force (the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade) to Korea extraordinarily quickly—within weeks—despite having no ready brigade on hand. Drawing from scattered units on the West Coast (primarily from the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton), augmented by reserves, the Brigade assembled around 6,500 Marines, including ground elements, aviation (Marine Aircraft Group 33), and support.”…..
- **Rapid Deployment as "Fire Brigade"**: The Brigade sailed from California in mid-July and arrived in theater by early August. It became the U.S. command's mobile reserve ("fire brigade") stabilizing the Pusan Perimeter against overwhelming North Korean advances. Fehrenbach describes their early actions (e.g., at Naktong Bulge) as critical in preventing collapse, with Marines demonstrating superior discipline, tactics, and close air support integration compared to poorly prepared Army units like Task Force Smith.
- **Broader Corps Effort**: The quick buildup validated the Marines' amphibious expertise and esprit de corps. By September, the full 1st Marine Division (reinforced to ~25,000) deployed for the Inchon landing, showcasing the Corps' ability to regenerate combat power under duress.
Fehrenbach uses this contrast—postwar neglect leading to near-disaster, redeemed by Marine professionalism—to argue a core thesis: Free societies must maintain ready professional forces, as unpreparedness invites aggression in "this kind of war" (limited, conventional conflicts). The USMC's story serves as a microcosm of America's broader wake-up call in Korea.
Amen … in detail!
My friend a Marine C-130 pilot Vietnam War Veteran, who retired as a Delta Airlines Captain died of Agent Orange Linked disease and was interned at Ft Sam Houston National Cemetery near his Father In Laws gravesite. Grok:”**Lieutenant Colonel Fred F. Eubanks Jr., USMC** one of the approximately 1,563 Korean War Silver Star recipients.
He served across World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam, earning the **Silver Star** and **Purple Heart** for valor. During the Korean War, he was a lieutenant and commanded a **Sniper Platoon** (likely in the 1st or 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division) during the amphibious landing at **Inchon** on September 15, 1950—one of the war's pivotal operations.
Dedicated sniper platoons or groups were organized at the battalion level in the 1st Marine Division around that time, with scout-snipers supporting the assault waves. His leadership in that role aligns with the intense combat at Inchon, including actions on beaches and Wolmi-do Island.
Eubanks retired as a lieutenant colonel and passed away in 2008 at age 88. He is buried at Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery in San Antonio, Texas.
For more details, such as his full citation (if available publicly), check resources like the Military Times Hall of Valor database or submit a records request to the National Archives/National Personnel Records Center. The Home of Heroes site lists many Korean War USMC Silver Stars but may not have every citation digitized.” Force Disaster killed the US Marine Corps Snipers.
While I still regard our Corps as capable of conducting such a missions as these, I still must remain vigilant to call the current state of our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities to be very limited in scope and abilities at best...
FD2030 has ruined our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities to their pre 2019 state... Semper Fidelis!