Vision 2035 – A Better Way Forward
Time to put the Combat Development Process to Work
In their article in the National Interest, Generals Krulak and Zinni outline Vision 2035, a better way forward for the Marine Corps. They provide a vision, the start of a discussion about the future of the Marine Corps. Vision 2035 proposes a broadly capable force that can quickly arrive worldwide at a conflict or crisis and take offensive action immediately.
Vision 2035 is the first step in a proven process - - the Marine Corps Combat Development Process - - that will lead to the development of validated capabilities and requirements for global response in the age of precision munitions.
Vision 2035 does not assume to know the capabilities and requirements needed to confront the threats of an increasingly uncertain world. Rather, it is the first step in a process that will lead to an operating concept or concepts that will spawn the development of the necessary doctrine, force structure, training and education, equipment, facilities, and support to ensure the Marine Corps remains the Nation’s premier 9-1-1 force.
The key to a better way forward for the Marine Corps is the Combat Development Process. By skipping large portions of the process, Force Design 2030 missed the opportunity to develop into a mature and useful concept. For example, the Combat Development Process would have exposed the logistics problems in Force Design 2030. Instead, it was long after the ‘divest to invest’ approach was underway before the logistics problems were widely evaluated. Now, Force Design 2030 must find logistics solutions to the Stand-in-Forces, solutions that should have been developed much earlier.
The Combat Development Process is critical. It begins with a scenario, a vision of how the future might look, then proceeds to a concept or multiple concepts. The initial concepts lead to gap analysis, experimentation, and then the requirements that build a new force design. The future capabilities of a stronger Marine Corps are a product of the rigor of the Combat Development Process. There is no substitute or shortcut.
It is past time for the Marine Corps to develop a mature operating concept, one tested and vetted through the Combat Development Process, that responds with a maneuver based solution to the challenges of the future. Vision 2035 is the start of that discussion. We invite our readers to help us begin the process by providing comments and recommendations about Vision 2035. Broad input can lead to revisions, which in turn will result in a better vision.
National Interest (nationalinterest.org) December 14, 2022
Vision 2035: Global Response in the Age of Precision Munitions
Unlike Force Design 2030, Vision 2035 is a roadmap for a better way forward for the U.S. Marine Corps.
By Charles Krulak and Anthony Zinni
. . . Retain Our Offensive Orientation. Maneuver warfare will remain our doctrinal approach to warfighting, whether sea-based or ashore. While continuing to embrace the three main elements of combat power—maneuver, fires (lethal and nonlethal) and information—we will continue to focus on maneuver, enabled by combined fires and information, as the dominant regime on the battlefield. Marine forces will continue to be defined as balanced air-ground-logistics task forces with appropriately sized command elements, specializing in combined arms and maneuver warfare to retain the initiative and defeat our adversaries with minimal casualties to ourselves. Our focus is on the “single battle,” an integrated deep, close, and rear fight in which each phase complements and supports the other. A balanced MAGTF must possess the capabilities (especially long-range precision fires) to shape the deep battle and the robust indirect fires needed to win the close and rear fight. Tactical aviation, rockets, and missiles are essential for shaping. Marine infantry, properly supported by fires—especially close air support and cannon artillery fires—and information, are dominant in the close and rear fight. Marine infantry is no less important today than in past wars and is an essential component for conducting decisive operations . . .
General Charles Krulak USMC (Ret) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as Commandant of the Marine Corps.
General Anthony Zinni USMC (Ret) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as Commander, United States Central Command.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vision-2035-global-response-age-precision-munitions-205995
As I read both the messaging/narrative of FD2030, as well as the content of the C-II society, it seems pretty clear that the problem statements and assumptions are fundamentally different. If I may:
FD2030: The threat is singular, focused, and future warfare will never be like it was. We won't be called to do what we did in the 70's/80's/90's. We must overhaul.
C-II society: The threat is multi-faceted, and while elements will gradually change, the dangerous globe we know will remain a challenge to national security. If we're not ready, then who will go?
An element of the discussion might be some of the assumptions that began this process. When the fervor was most concentrated. A couple starting assumptions that defined the kickoff, and may provide clarity through the current messaging effort.
-The Marine Corps brand has been in decline since we dogmatically clung to efficacy of amphibious operations during the Korean conflict.
-Every CMC since has perpetuated this fool's errand to drive capability development.
-We've been transplanted as a force-in-readiness by the Army, who adopted a naval identity, and by the special operations global network. The MAGTF has been relegated to HA/DR.
-The overwhelming majority of defense experts and think tanks do not believe the expeditionary force-in-readiness model is relevant or viable in the future fight.
-This CMC has the opportunity to establish himself alongside Wilson and Russell as one of the most influential in recent history.
As far as messaging goes, it might be useful to collect data that either buttresses or refutes those assumptions. From the philosophical cheap-seats, however, I do think the assumption that "The world was one way. Then FD2030 came. And the world was changed forever." is a flawed one.
The commandant undertook force design because he believed the Marine Corps could not provide what the joint force required, primarily in competition but also in conflict. The product of FD2030 aims to contribute to the joint force mission in conflict against a peer adversary and is designed to deter peer adversaries in the competition phase more that anything else. It seems the commandant thinks the Marine Corps should assume a greater role in competition and less of a role in conflict in the context of a near peer. He stated in his memo to secdef back in 2021 (paraphrasing here) “the expeditionary force mission is to deter conflict not to win battles.” Don’t take my word for it take his, winning battles is not at the root of force design. Not saying it’s wrong or right but there is plenty of confusion on genesis of FD2030. No question the corps of today is weaker in certain areas and stronger in others as a result. I believe in the concept but I think we could have integrated certain technologies and supported the joint force just the same, and had a little more flexibility with the force of three years ago.