Vision 2035 - What is the Issue?
Is the Issue the Noisy Fire Alarm?
Ever since the first appearance of FD 2030, it has attracted significant questions, concerns, and critiques. FD 2030 and its companion documents are controversial. To be clear, they are not controversial in intent. All Marines want to improve the Marine Corps. FD 2030 is controversial because of what it does to Marine Corps capabilities.
Now, some supporters of FD 2030 have started to say the real issue is not FD 2030; the real issue is the critics. Supporters of FD 2030 say the issue is the authors who keep publishing opinion pieces about the dangers of FD 2030. Supporters say the real issue is Compass Points, or the membership of the Chowder II Society, or the alternative way forward for the Marine Corps, Vision 2035.
But none of these is the real issue.
The real issue with FD 2030 is Marines scattered along the island chain without support, protection, resupply, or evacuation.
The real issue is infantry battalions with too few Marines.
The real issue is air wings without enough aircraft.
The real issue is only one major military force in the world surrendering their tanks, the USMC.
The real issue is Marines in combat calling for artillery but unable to get the necessary time-on-target fires, long duration prep fires, or high volume final protective fires.
The real issue is combatant commanders expecting fully equipped and capable Marine forces, but getting something less.
The real issue is abandoning the Single Battle concept, deep, close, and rear, to focus only on the deep battle.
The real issue is giving away amphibious ships.
The real issue is the dismantling of the Maritime Prepositioning Force.
The real issue is a rushed concept issued without the combat development process, without independent analysis, and without experimentation.
The real issue is retreating to a philosophy of defense, instead of staying in the attack.
For all these reasons, and many more, there are experienced Marines with substantial concerns about FD 2030. Those with substantial concerns about FD 2030 are not the issue. The real issue is FD 2030.
When a terrible fire breaks out, and someone pulls the fire alarm, the issue is not the fire alarm. The real issue is the fire.
The Strategic Model: Want a New Idea Read an Old Book
As the US Marine Corps reorganizes by trading combat power for lethality, you have to question if the Marine Corps leadership is ignoring its’ own “Amphibious Instincts” . The Marine leadership must also recognize that any war with China will be a global war. A subject discussed in England in the Seven Years War (1756 – 1763) by Julian S. Corbett.
Historians have labeled the Seven Years War as the first global war with the main adversaries of Great Britain v France and their associated allies.
Britain understood the risks of fighting France’s large and very good land army. They also understood the challenges France Navy presented to their SLOC (Sea lines of Communications) and the competing interest of both counties' colonial economic holdings. They concluded that “Direct attack is impossible, but operations upon their communications and by diversions are both open…”
England’s strategy not only focused on maintaining its superiority at sea but also recognized that wars cannot be concluded upon the sea.
England’s strategy emphasized a joint strategy where “soldiers must make themselves, as far as possible, judges of sea operations, and seaman judges of land operations…” or in other words it was an amphibious strategy.
This strategy emphasized boldness and flexibility with offensive amphibious raids on mainland France. These raids tied up thousands of French troops relieving pressure on Prussia, England’s hard- pressed ally.
England’s operations also emphasized attacking where they knew they could win. Their North American campaign first captured the entry ports and forts of the St Laurence seaway, in order to lay siege and capture Montreal.
When Spain entered the war on France’s side, British expeditions were involved in the defense of Portugal. The British would also attack and capture Havana, Cuba.
In 1762 a British expeditionary force from Madras, India capture Manila.
England also recognized in this war that the best and most efficient way to secure a SLOC is to control the ports vs control the area in between. They accomplished this with blockades and offensive amphibious operations. In addition, England’s win can be contributed to keeping the enemy on the defense. China has apparently picked up on this strategy and they continue to expand their influence on world ports.
"The real issue is retreating to a philosophy of defense, instead of staying in the attack"....."We’re not accustomed to occupying defensive positions. It’s destructive to morale."—LtGen H. M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, Iwo Jima, 1945,