Compass Points – CMC CPG - Intent
Wading into the Guidance
September 12, 2024
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The Commandant recently issued the Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) which provides his personal, broad review of the Marine Corps highlighting issues, challenges, and opportunities.
Nearly at the beginning of the new CPG, the Commandant sets a clear expectation that the CPG is to be read and discussed throughout the Marine Corps, "I expect all Marines to read this Planning Guidance and leaders to discuss its key concepts with their Marines."
It is good to hear the Commandant wants robust discussion about the CPG. In fact, not only does the Commandant call for discussion at the beginning of the CPG, when he reaches the conclusion, he once again calls for robust CPG feedback: "Sergeant Major Ruiz and I look forward to hearing your feedback, and we expect and need your bottom-up refinements to this top-down guidance."
Marines are not shy and already Marines on active duty and veteran Marines are wading into the CPG page by page. Compass Points has begun receiving detailed, insightful, and often pointed CPG comments and analysis. If the Commandant and the Sergeant Major "look forward to hearing your feedback" they should subscribe to Compass Points and benefit from the wisdom and experience of Compass Points readers.
The CPG is divided into 25 sections from INTENT to CONCLUSION.
Readers are encouraged to read the CPG and provide comments on one or more of the 25 sections. Below are comments and analysis of the first CPG Section: INTENT.
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39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance
August 2024
Sec 1. INTENT - Comment & Analysis
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CPG -- Marines, after a year serving as your Commandant and visiting with Marines in every corner of our Corps, I remain confident that we are on the right track as a Service.
Comment & Analysis -
There are large numbers of active-duty and retired Marines who feel exactly the opposite, a situation unlike any seen in the past. The Commandant may not be fully aware of this but those who monitor Marine related web sites and email groups see the disgruntled comments every day—they number in the thousands. He does not have the support of many serving Marines or many hundreds of former and retired Marines. Some of the Corps’ most revered warfighters – including the only two MEF commanders who have fought a corps level offensive operation since World War II, its four living officer recipients of the Medal of Honor, and its most noted thinkers such as the late General Al Gray and General “Tony” Zinni -- have stated unequivocally that our Corps is being led in the wrong direction. The Commandant’s confidence is unwarranted.
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CPG -- Force Design remains a righteous journey, and we are in perhaps the most difficult phase - implementation.
Comment & Analysis -
‘Righteous’ is a term usually associated with scripture, not in regard to warfighting documents or associated writings. One has to question its use here. There is nothing righteous about a journey that removes the capabilities that enable Marines to fight as a combined arms team. Nothing! There is nothing righteous in turning a Corps with a tactical and operationally offensive mindset into one whose primary focus will be missile forces on the defense while stationed along the First Island Chain. Nothing! The journey can more accurately be defined as a foolish one that has and will continue to undermine US national security.
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CPG -- Our aggressive approach made truly significant strides in a few short years.
Comment & Analysis -
These significant strides have gutted the three Marine Expeditionary Forces and eliminated balanced, resilient, and ready to fight Marine Expeditionary Brigades by taking away the very weapons and systems needed to conduct close and rear battles; all done in the misguided belief that the deep battle is the only one that counts and as many historical failures demonstrate, the deep battle alone has never been a war winning approach to military operations.
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CPG -- Force Design, to include Talent Management, Training and Education, Installations and Logistics, Project Eagle, and Barracks 2030, involves many key efforts which are still in motion.
Comment & Analysis -
No competent military leader would implement an operating concept before he had created the means to logistically support that concept. Force Design 2030 and its offspring, Force Design, have been the Corps operating concepts for nearing five years and to date there is virtually no means to logistically support their central idea, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and the employment of Stand-in Forces.
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CPG -- I won’t sugarcoat it – there are many challenges we still face to stay ahead of the changing character of war.
Comment & Analysis -
Marine leaders have repeatedly turned to this rationale, the changing character of war, to justify their unwise divestiture of weapons and equipment and radical restructuring of organizations. However, the well-schooled professional is justified in believing these leaders use the term with little knowledge of its origins or true meaning. In other words, it is simply their weak attempt to demonstrate an awareness of military theory.
The greatest military theoretician of all time, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote of the immutable nature of war—its chaos, friction, and uncertainty—and of its chameleon-like attributes that “slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” Note the qualifying words, “slightly adapts.” Expressed another way, most of war’s characteristics are enduring. The late strategist, Colin S. Gray was one of, if not, the first to call attention to the difference between the nature and character of war when less informed pundits claimed after Operation Desert Storm that the nature of war had changed.
It is doubtful any of those leaders touting their version of the changing character of war recognize its similarity with the “military revolution debate” that began in 1956 and remains a topic of discussion today. The ongoing debate stems from a paper presented by Michael Roberts at The Queen’s University of Belfast in January 1955.
An experienced and highly regarded student of the profession of arms, John Schmitt, has observed that what we are actually seeing in the Ukrainian-Russian War is the changing face of war. By this he means, the tactics and technologies that initially appeared to be changing everything have largely been countered or neutralized over time. This has certainly been the case with loitering munitions, some precision munitions, and to a lesser degree, rockets and missiles. With this construct, war’s nature is immutable, its character is enduring, and its face is constantly changing.
Any assertion that a supposed changing character of war necessitates the radical divestitures and structural conversions of Force Design 2030 is patently false.
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CPG -- Force Design remains our strategic priority and we cannot slow down.
Comment & Analysis -
Which of the several elements of Force Design constitute its priority? Organizational changes? Acquisition of weapons and equipment? Training? Is it possible to have a “Campaign of Learning,” which indicates the Corps has questions about Force Design, and at the same time, move ahead rapidly with changes? No, the two are incompatible. The Corps needs to do more than slow down; it needs to develop a new operating concept that matches the realities of today’s security environment.
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CPG -- My intent with this Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) is to provide all Marines with the strategic direction for the Marine Corps. This document is necessarily broad, and I will issue directive guidance to the Deputy Commandants and Commanding Generals when necessary. Force Design remains our aim point, and this guidance focuses on specific challenges requiring near-term action. Some items will take time to realize, but we must lay the groundwork now.
Comment & Analysis -
Why is it that the Commandant must issue broad guidance for the implementation of a concept that is four-and-a-half years old? If this new CPG is “necessarily broad” what is its “aim point” other than the title “Force Design”? Why is the Corps still laying the groundwork of a four-plus years old operating concept? Why wasn’t that groundwork laid in 2020 or 2021? This train wreck, and that is what it is, results from the Corps’ senior leaders circumventing the Corps’ well-tested combat development process.
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CPG -- My priorities remain: (1) Balancing Crisis Response and Modernization, (2) Naval Integration and Organic Mobility, (3) Quality of Life, (4) Recruit, Make, and Retain Marines; and (5) Maximize the Potential of our Reserves. These priorities drive my decisions as Commandant and are woven throughout the document. My Planning Guidance provides the context for us to achieve those priorities so we can fight and win today and set conditions to win in the future.
Comment & Analysis -
Most authorities would tell the Commandant that if you have five priorities, you don’t actually have a priority. Do officers at HQMC, MCCDC, and T&E know the priorities of the priorities? What exactly is the “context” the Commandant asserts he has provided and that he claims will enable Marines to: (1) fight and win today and (2) set conditions to win in the future”?
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CPG -- Discipline and Core Values are up front on purpose – they are our ethical foundation and define who we are as Marines. We must protect our Marine Corps culture and Naval heritage at all costs. I expect all Marines to read this Planning Guidance and leaders to discuss its key concepts with their Marines. Most of all, I want you to know that Sergeant Major Ruiz and I are proud of you, we are thankful for what you do, and recognize that none of our progress is possible without you.
Comment & Analysis -
The Commandant concludes the INTENT section with a call for wide dissemination and discussion. Marines may find it challenging to discuss the concepts in this CPG because too much of the document is vague, incoherent, and poorly written. The good news is, Marines are always willing to stand up and speak out to help improve the Marine Corps.
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Compass Points is glad the Commandant concludes the CPG by saying: "Sergeant Major Ruiz and I look forward to hearing your feedback, and we expect and need your bottom-up refinements to this top-down guidance." Compass Points appreciates all readers wading into the CPG and providing feedback. Over the next several weeks, Compass Points will continue to collate reader comments and analysis of the CPG so the Commandant will receive the robust discussion and feedback he is seeking.
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Marines
A member of Congress, that knows something about the military, needs to call the Commandants bluff and ask to see a MLR. See the missiles, see the launchers...ask the hard questions about logistics and the support of Marines.
Problem is, it seems they are all intimidated by colored pieces of cloth stacked on the left side of a uniform or the 4 stars glittering.
Don't know the current leadership of our CORPS, but it sounds like these "Leaders" are a bunch of Bks lawyers. They have all these ideas and "plans", but no way to implement them. All they did is cripple our ability to fight.....SAD