A member of Congress, that knows something about the military, needs to call the Commandants bluff and ask to see a MLR. See the missiles, see the launchers...ask the hard questions about logistics and the support of Marines.
Problem is, it seems they are all intimidated by colored pieces of cloth stacked on the left side of a uniform or the 4 stars glittering.
I would hope and expect the senior retired Marine in Congress, Alaska’s Sen. Sullivan, to be the leader in questioning this “Ship of Fools”. Not sure where he is, but he or another Marine needs to step forward ASAP.
Don't know the current leadership of our CORPS, but it sounds like these "Leaders" are a bunch of Bks lawyers. They have all these ideas and "plans", but no way to implement them. All they did is cripple our ability to fight.....SAD
Reading the CPG, I don’t know if I should laugh or cry. All that is in place are words. There are NO weapons systems in place. There is no credible, and transparent wargaming of FD. We need some lawmakers with military background to do their job and make the MC leadership show them what they’ve done in the past 5 years. Leadership’s feet must be held to the proverbial fire!
I should’ve added. Where is the logistics plan to support the SIF? From what I’ve been reading, the MC planners are still “working” the plan. Sad state of affairs for our Corps!
Also, I don’t believe that I’ve ever seen or heard that the SIF has a T/O or T/E. I know that the Commandant says that the SIF is a CONCEPT not a physical entity, but a MAGTF is a concept that is backed by concrete units that have fixed T/Os and T/Es. As Gen McAbee stated after 5 years, “where’s the beef”?
So the marines are supposed to go the first island chain and set up defenses.
Ok
Which countries in that first island chain precisely are going to allow America to deploy the Marines to come and set up in their territory BEFORE a war kicks off and it's too late/difficult/impractical to get marines there?
None. Not one country in the first chain will allow it so therefore this whole idea is moot.
AIL’s comments are not even worthy of a response. AIL is clearly not reading Compass Points. He even introduces a new term: ex-officers. No need for further comment
Ex-officer has been in use in various media for years. It is not a new term. Compass Points is not the only place this issue is discussed or can be read about. To the extent Marines fail to discuss this outside military circles and only discuss it in inside terms they will fail to affect any change to FD2030 or any alternative path. Congress is who needs to be influenced, not just your fellow Marines.
Gen Smith became the acting CMC 15 months ago and a CPG should have followed literally the day he formally became the CMC in late September 2023. He had a major medical episode that made him unable to serve for many months. In the Corps I remember the second in command steps up to continue the mission. In this case the issuance of the CPG, which could have been modified later, languished for well over a year. Why? The Corps has been in a period of paralysis through analysis and divestment for five years.
Another, right on point, article Gary Anderson Col. (ret)
“Starting with the Navy, as this is written, we have only two aircraft carriers deployed globally, with both anchored in the Middle East for what could become a global crisis. Despite the chest pounding over the Chinese threat, the Navy’s Indo-Pacific presence is akin to the emperor without clothes.”
As usual for the FD2030 opponents the commenter bases his arguments on subjective judgements and provides almost no analysis based on reasoned arguments. His basis seems to be "that which was must be assumed to be what was right and that which has changed must be assumed to be wrong"
This of course in foolishness. Anyone who has made themselves aware of the USMCs force structure prior to FD2030 knows it was falling apart. It was reliant on and pretended 38+ amphibious ships existed when the Navy had no more than 32 and could never deploy more than about 28. It relied on an airwing of numbers and types of aircraft that were logistically difficult and expensive to support and heading toward impossible. It relied on an ancient dangerous AAV7 and a tank that was too heavy, logistically problematic, old, declining and which the USMC could not support without Army assistance. It ignored the fact the MSC fleet was falling apart . Those are just a few of the many problems that former leaders failed to deal with and left for recent commanders.
But yet those who oppose FD2030 offer no reasoned and numerically supported solutions to the force structure and resource problems the Corp was inevitably facing, they just provide resistance, reaction, dogma and at best (Vision 2035) amorphous concepts lacking resource analysis.
Until this critic as well as all those ex-officers in Chowder 2 stop whistling past the graveyard in regards to the prior failing force structure they allowed to develop and continue to start with the assumption that all was well except for some minor tweeks and patches they will not be taken seriously in regards to the USMC's future structure. Hence why they are failing to gain traction.
AI L., As I read your words I thought this does not sound like any Marine I ever served with. Your words are defeatist and don't represent the Corps I served in for many years. In that Corps (pre-Berger/Smith) Marines tackled problems that prevented it from fulfilling its Title 10, USC mission; they did not go looking for a mission that the other Services were handling well. And they certainly were not interested in being part of an organization that favored the defense. No they were real Marines, fix bayonets and take the hill was their mindset. You may have earned the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor but I wouldn't want you in a fighting position next to me! I wear my Purple Heart Medal proudly and hold those with a defeatist outlook in great disdain.
2. I commend you for your attitude, your service in combat and your sacrifice.
3. Once a Marine becomes Commandant, his days of combat leadership are over and he is not in the combat chain of command. His job becomes to prepare a force to conduct the missions given to the USMC based on realistic parameters.
4. He should build a force that leaves as few organic problems to be solved as possible; there will always be needs, but he must prioritize getting to the fight. A force that cant get to the fight, cant fulfill its mission.
5. The USMC is not capable of filling gaps or solving problems that are Navy problems. It is the junior member of the Dept. of the Navy. If the Navy can't build and operate ships then they don't exist for the USMC to use. Pretending otherwise leads to failure. But yet since Gen. Conway lead the USMC and tacitly agreed to a 31 ship amphibious force, until Commander Neller, leadership pretended the Navy was going to build and operate 38+ large amphibious ships. It never did, Congress never funded them, or made the Navy do it. Today as proven several times recently, the Navy is not even capable of keeping 3 ARGs deployed and in tact. That's all of 9 amphibious ships. That problem didn't develop just in the last 5 years or even the last 10, it has been ongoing for 30 years and its not one Marines can overcome through pure will. Humans cant swim far enough.
6. Marines don't leave those large ships to operate on land without connectors, but yet 30 years after the USMC identified need to replace the AAV7 its still dependent on the undependable AAV7 and wont have sufficient ACVs for years. In addition once on land those first wave Marines have to be supported. For that they rely on LCU1600 and the LCAC.
Here is the reality: given the numbers of large amphibious ships the Navy will have going forward and their well deck capacities, the entire amphibious fleet will have a capacity of somewhere around 50 connectors in a mix between LCAC and LCU. That's it about 50 logistical surface connectors at best if every navy amphibious ship can sail and be put in a single theater. None of these 3 surface connectors or large ships to operate them will be available in a theater in sufficient numbers, given the Navy's fleet composition, to constitute an amphibious landing force with the depth to withstand attrition from peer or even second tier adversary systems ranging from off the shelf UAVs to ASBMs. Not even close.
7. "....service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." That is the primary Title 10 directive to the USMC in law from the national command. In title 10 everything else is either in addition to that or supports it. Naval bases and a naval campaign. The recent National Defense Strategies prioritize China and West Pac. How does one do that in West Pac against China if the Navy is not capable of supporting the effort to do so from the sea? There's only one answer: you are already there so the Navy doesn't have to land you to do it. Which is at the core of FD2030. Is it a perfect plan. Hell no. But its a whole lot better than pretending the Navy can get you there or the Air Force can make up the difference. Marines prepared and conditioned to face the enemy in theater can figure out how to defeat the enemy. Marines waiting for a ship in Hawaii, or sunk on the bottom of the ocean off Okinawa can't. They are defeated by default.
8. That's just the beginning, but the best illustration of the reasons why USMC force structure had to substantially change. Its not defeatist, its realism. The USMC can no longer assume the Navy can do things it can't nor assume it can prioritize missions above its primary directive in title 10 nor assume it will have the deep uncontested logistics stream it has had since the USSR collapsed. Not when even the Houthis can interdict shipping with ballistic missiles and tie down an entire CBG doing it.
9. Keep in mind, we are discussing just 1/3 of USMC forces which will be built to the MLR structure for the Pacific.
Sir, you state very many correct facts regarding the lack of Navy/MSC amphibious lift, but you’re working the wrong end of the problem. You don’t ever modify the organization that’s been given a mission (Title 10) because another component organization can’t meet their Title 10 mission. You fix the root cause.
Also I should note that what Corps leadership is doing, IMO, a violation of 10 U.S. Code § 8063 - United States Marine Corps: composition; functions.
Section 8063 states “…shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.” As the Commandant foresees the future force structure there will not be 3 combat divisions. Are you aware that III MEF has a HQ element but NO maneuver or support regiments? No ability to project combat power, even if the Navy had the shipping. That it is short a division.
I should also note that Section 8063 clearly states, “…and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.” There are numerous other missions that the President has ordered the Corps to conduct, NEO, peacekeeping, “soft” power projection, etc.
In one of your posts you stated that the Corps had obsolete, too large or difficult to maintain equipment. Some of your examples may be partially true such as the M-1 tank, but one example doesn’t prove the statement. Yes, the F-35 may prove a challenge to maintain at FARPs but initially, so was the AV-8. The one thing you’ve glossed over, whether by omission or commission, is why the castration of the MAGTF of tubed artillery, engineering units, the removal of Scout/Snipers, the reduction in the size of infantry battalions, etc.?
These “old farts” you so summarily dismiss are the rails that keep the Corps moving forward in the right direction.
Ah yes, the bad ole days when the Navy and the Marine Corps were falling apart - - when the first two questions asked by the NSC during a crisis were: where are the carriers and where are the Marines.
I supposed you have been in every NSC meeting during a crisis the last 3 decades or more so you have first hand knowledge that the entire group of 15 more or less said in unison "where are the Marines?"
Citing legends will not get the change you want. Facts, numbers and a plan might do it.
A member of Congress, that knows something about the military, needs to call the Commandants bluff and ask to see a MLR. See the missiles, see the launchers...ask the hard questions about logistics and the support of Marines.
Problem is, it seems they are all intimidated by colored pieces of cloth stacked on the left side of a uniform or the 4 stars glittering.
I would hope and expect the senior retired Marine in Congress, Alaska’s Sen. Sullivan, to be the leader in questioning this “Ship of Fools”. Not sure where he is, but he or another Marine needs to step forward ASAP.
Don't know the current leadership of our CORPS, but it sounds like these "Leaders" are a bunch of Bks lawyers. They have all these ideas and "plans", but no way to implement them. All they did is cripple our ability to fight.....SAD
Reading the CPG, I don’t know if I should laugh or cry. All that is in place are words. There are NO weapons systems in place. There is no credible, and transparent wargaming of FD. We need some lawmakers with military background to do their job and make the MC leadership show them what they’ve done in the past 5 years. Leadership’s feet must be held to the proverbial fire!
I should’ve added. Where is the logistics plan to support the SIF? From what I’ve been reading, the MC planners are still “working” the plan. Sad state of affairs for our Corps!
Sadly, there is more work being done to "spin" a solution to the logistics problem than to find a solution to the problem.
Also, I don’t believe that I’ve ever seen or heard that the SIF has a T/O or T/E. I know that the Commandant says that the SIF is a CONCEPT not a physical entity, but a MAGTF is a concept that is backed by concrete units that have fixed T/Os and T/Es. As Gen McAbee stated after 5 years, “where’s the beef”?
All CMC said is political speak, say a lot without saying anything.
So the marines are supposed to go the first island chain and set up defenses.
Ok
Which countries in that first island chain precisely are going to allow America to deploy the Marines to come and set up in their territory BEFORE a war kicks off and it's too late/difficult/impractical to get marines there?
None. Not one country in the first chain will allow it so therefore this whole idea is moot.
AIL’s comments are not even worthy of a response. AIL is clearly not reading Compass Points. He even introduces a new term: ex-officers. No need for further comment
Ex-officer has been in use in various media for years. It is not a new term. Compass Points is not the only place this issue is discussed or can be read about. To the extent Marines fail to discuss this outside military circles and only discuss it in inside terms they will fail to affect any change to FD2030 or any alternative path. Congress is who needs to be influenced, not just your fellow Marines.
Gen Smith became the acting CMC 15 months ago and a CPG should have followed literally the day he formally became the CMC in late September 2023. He had a major medical episode that made him unable to serve for many months. In the Corps I remember the second in command steps up to continue the mission. In this case the issuance of the CPG, which could have been modified later, languished for well over a year. Why? The Corps has been in a period of paralysis through analysis and divestment for five years.
Another, right on point, article Gary Anderson Col. (ret)
“Starting with the Navy, as this is written, we have only two aircraft carriers deployed globally, with both anchored in the Middle East for what could become a global crisis. Despite the chest pounding over the Chinese threat, the Navy’s Indo-Pacific presence is akin to the emperor without clothes.”
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/05/military_reform_reversing_the_decline_1056296.html
As usual for the FD2030 opponents the commenter bases his arguments on subjective judgements and provides almost no analysis based on reasoned arguments. His basis seems to be "that which was must be assumed to be what was right and that which has changed must be assumed to be wrong"
This of course in foolishness. Anyone who has made themselves aware of the USMCs force structure prior to FD2030 knows it was falling apart. It was reliant on and pretended 38+ amphibious ships existed when the Navy had no more than 32 and could never deploy more than about 28. It relied on an airwing of numbers and types of aircraft that were logistically difficult and expensive to support and heading toward impossible. It relied on an ancient dangerous AAV7 and a tank that was too heavy, logistically problematic, old, declining and which the USMC could not support without Army assistance. It ignored the fact the MSC fleet was falling apart . Those are just a few of the many problems that former leaders failed to deal with and left for recent commanders.
But yet those who oppose FD2030 offer no reasoned and numerically supported solutions to the force structure and resource problems the Corp was inevitably facing, they just provide resistance, reaction, dogma and at best (Vision 2035) amorphous concepts lacking resource analysis.
Until this critic as well as all those ex-officers in Chowder 2 stop whistling past the graveyard in regards to the prior failing force structure they allowed to develop and continue to start with the assumption that all was well except for some minor tweeks and patches they will not be taken seriously in regards to the USMC's future structure. Hence why they are failing to gain traction.
AI L., As I read your words I thought this does not sound like any Marine I ever served with. Your words are defeatist and don't represent the Corps I served in for many years. In that Corps (pre-Berger/Smith) Marines tackled problems that prevented it from fulfilling its Title 10, USC mission; they did not go looking for a mission that the other Services were handling well. And they certainly were not interested in being part of an organization that favored the defense. No they were real Marines, fix bayonets and take the hill was their mindset. You may have earned the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor but I wouldn't want you in a fighting position next to me! I wear my Purple Heart Medal proudly and hold those with a defeatist outlook in great disdain.
1. Never was a Marine.
2. I commend you for your attitude, your service in combat and your sacrifice.
3. Once a Marine becomes Commandant, his days of combat leadership are over and he is not in the combat chain of command. His job becomes to prepare a force to conduct the missions given to the USMC based on realistic parameters.
4. He should build a force that leaves as few organic problems to be solved as possible; there will always be needs, but he must prioritize getting to the fight. A force that cant get to the fight, cant fulfill its mission.
5. The USMC is not capable of filling gaps or solving problems that are Navy problems. It is the junior member of the Dept. of the Navy. If the Navy can't build and operate ships then they don't exist for the USMC to use. Pretending otherwise leads to failure. But yet since Gen. Conway lead the USMC and tacitly agreed to a 31 ship amphibious force, until Commander Neller, leadership pretended the Navy was going to build and operate 38+ large amphibious ships. It never did, Congress never funded them, or made the Navy do it. Today as proven several times recently, the Navy is not even capable of keeping 3 ARGs deployed and in tact. That's all of 9 amphibious ships. That problem didn't develop just in the last 5 years or even the last 10, it has been ongoing for 30 years and its not one Marines can overcome through pure will. Humans cant swim far enough.
6. Marines don't leave those large ships to operate on land without connectors, but yet 30 years after the USMC identified need to replace the AAV7 its still dependent on the undependable AAV7 and wont have sufficient ACVs for years. In addition once on land those first wave Marines have to be supported. For that they rely on LCU1600 and the LCAC.
Here is the reality: given the numbers of large amphibious ships the Navy will have going forward and their well deck capacities, the entire amphibious fleet will have a capacity of somewhere around 50 connectors in a mix between LCAC and LCU. That's it about 50 logistical surface connectors at best if every navy amphibious ship can sail and be put in a single theater. None of these 3 surface connectors or large ships to operate them will be available in a theater in sufficient numbers, given the Navy's fleet composition, to constitute an amphibious landing force with the depth to withstand attrition from peer or even second tier adversary systems ranging from off the shelf UAVs to ASBMs. Not even close.
7. "....service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." That is the primary Title 10 directive to the USMC in law from the national command. In title 10 everything else is either in addition to that or supports it. Naval bases and a naval campaign. The recent National Defense Strategies prioritize China and West Pac. How does one do that in West Pac against China if the Navy is not capable of supporting the effort to do so from the sea? There's only one answer: you are already there so the Navy doesn't have to land you to do it. Which is at the core of FD2030. Is it a perfect plan. Hell no. But its a whole lot better than pretending the Navy can get you there or the Air Force can make up the difference. Marines prepared and conditioned to face the enemy in theater can figure out how to defeat the enemy. Marines waiting for a ship in Hawaii, or sunk on the bottom of the ocean off Okinawa can't. They are defeated by default.
8. That's just the beginning, but the best illustration of the reasons why USMC force structure had to substantially change. Its not defeatist, its realism. The USMC can no longer assume the Navy can do things it can't nor assume it can prioritize missions above its primary directive in title 10 nor assume it will have the deep uncontested logistics stream it has had since the USSR collapsed. Not when even the Houthis can interdict shipping with ballistic missiles and tie down an entire CBG doing it.
9. Keep in mind, we are discussing just 1/3 of USMC forces which will be built to the MLR structure for the Pacific.
Sir, you state very many correct facts regarding the lack of Navy/MSC amphibious lift, but you’re working the wrong end of the problem. You don’t ever modify the organization that’s been given a mission (Title 10) because another component organization can’t meet their Title 10 mission. You fix the root cause.
Also I should note that what Corps leadership is doing, IMO, a violation of 10 U.S. Code § 8063 - United States Marine Corps: composition; functions.
Section 8063 states “…shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.” As the Commandant foresees the future force structure there will not be 3 combat divisions. Are you aware that III MEF has a HQ element but NO maneuver or support regiments? No ability to project combat power, even if the Navy had the shipping. That it is short a division.
I should also note that Section 8063 clearly states, “…and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.” There are numerous other missions that the President has ordered the Corps to conduct, NEO, peacekeeping, “soft” power projection, etc.
In one of your posts you stated that the Corps had obsolete, too large or difficult to maintain equipment. Some of your examples may be partially true such as the M-1 tank, but one example doesn’t prove the statement. Yes, the F-35 may prove a challenge to maintain at FARPs but initially, so was the AV-8. The one thing you’ve glossed over, whether by omission or commission, is why the castration of the MAGTF of tubed artillery, engineering units, the removal of Scout/Snipers, the reduction in the size of infantry battalions, etc.?
These “old farts” you so summarily dismiss are the rails that keep the Corps moving forward in the right direction.
Semper Fi!
Ah yes, the bad ole days when the Navy and the Marine Corps were falling apart - - when the first two questions asked by the NSC during a crisis were: where are the carriers and where are the Marines.
I supposed you have been in every NSC meeting during a crisis the last 3 decades or more so you have first hand knowledge that the entire group of 15 more or less said in unison "where are the Marines?"
Citing legends will not get the change you want. Facts, numbers and a plan might do it.