Compass Points - More Marines
More Marines on More Ships
Compass Points - More Marines
More Marines on More Ships
September 17, 2025
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US Marines are a uniquely flexible force that can arrive quickly at the scene of any global crisis to assist, deter, strike, or fight. Two former Marine Corps Commandants want to help the US get more Marines on more ships around the globe.
With the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operations Capable, currently in the Caribbean, there is a growing recognition that the US needs more Marines on more ships around the globe. If the 22nd MEU had not been ordered into the Caribbean, it is likely the 22nd would have been sent somewhere in the Mediterranean or Persian Gulf. With the 22nd MEU in the Caribbean, there is no Amphibious Ready Group - Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Middle East.
When there are no Marines in a region, US policy makers have fewer options in a crisis. More Marines on more ships give the US more options. If the Navy could supply more amphibious ships immediately, then there could be more Marines on more amphibious ships on the seas today. Unfortunately, the shortage of Navy amphibious ships will not be solved quickly.
The only way to get more Marines on more ships around the world today is not to wait for new ships to be built, but to make better use of the Navy ships that are on the oceans today.
In their article, "Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security" authors, Marines, and former Marine Corps Commandants, Charles Krulak & James Conway, propose putting Marines on Navy aircraft carriers.
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The Services can either continue to accept the breaks in coverage and the associated risks to national security or look “outside the box” for an expedient to mitigate the risk. A stopgap option for dealing with the current emergency is deploying task-organized Marine units on aircraft carriers and other ships accompanying the carrier that have helicopter landing platforms. At times, even non-traditional ships with helicopter landing platforms could be used to partially fill voids created by the intermittent coverage of forward deployed ARGs/MEUs and CVBGs. This is not a replacement for the ARG and its traditionally embarked MEU. It is a temporary response to a national security problem until amphibious shipping can regain its footing. Again, this proposal only provides an interim improvement until the problems with amphibious shipping are fixed.
-- Charles Krulak & James Conway, "Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security"
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The authors explain that the Marines on carriers would not be a part of the carrier crew but would be a separate force prepared for use in a range of operations.
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This concept is different than simply putting Marines back aboard Navy ships as part of the crew, as was the case with the traditional Marine Detachments aboard carriers, cruisers, and some tenders. Those detachments were assigned shipboard duties such as protecting special weapons and running the ship’s brig. The concept we are proposing would instead task-organize Marines for a capability set, train them to a standard prior to deployment, and focus them on the mission throughout the deployment. While not nearly as large as a 2,000-man MEU, nor with all the capabilities of a MEU, our force would be a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) with capabilities tailored to the mission.
Real world examples of operational deficiencies created by gaps in forward deployed ARGs/MEUs are not hard to spot. One of the best and most recent examples was the hostilities in the Middle East. For most of the time, there was no ARG/MEU in the Eastern Mediterranean, North Arabian Sea, or the Persian Gulf. But there were carriers and other Navy ships in the area. Would it not have been prudent to have a Marine capability deployed on these ships to respond to contingencies such as a limited NEO, rapid reinforcement of an embassy or consulate, rescue of a downed pilot, limited raid against a high value target, or other mission?
-- Charles Krulak & James Conway, "Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security"
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With Marines onboard every Carrier Strike Group, the US would have more options in every crisis.
Compass Points salutes authors and Marines, Charles Krulak & James Conway for their insightful article that proposes placing Marines on deployed carriers, and thanks them also for their continuing service to Corps and Country. General Charles (Chuck) Krulak (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps. General James (Jim) Conway (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Many thanks!
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Real Clear Defense - 09/17/2025
Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security
By Charles Krulak & James Conway
General Charles (Chuck) Krulak (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
General James (Jim) Conway (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Generals Krulak & Conway are spot on in their assessment. Marines come from the sea … we should never have left the ships in the first place. Get our “Sea Legs” back, remain engaged abroad in other theaters beyond the Western Hemisphere, and, OBTW, I hope we are pitching this in PME settings at Quantico, Leavenworth, Carlisle, Maxwell, Newport, NDU, CSIS, and in any other “think-tank” where we can speak! Let history temper our judgment! Semper Fidelis!
Let’s clear up one point up front. Marines on Aircraft Carriers were FMF “ B” billets and organized as reinforced Rifle Platoons with the requisite weapons and ammunition. Everyone of the Marines in my Detachment of 78 enlisted and two officers were infantry Marines. While they did guard special weapons and run Brigs they were prepared to repel boarders or go ashore as might be needed to reinforce an embassy or ashore facility. Benghazi could certainly have benefitted from reinforcement by a ship’s detachment.
That said, a Marine Detachment on ships could still report to the Commanding Officer of that ship and be operationally detached as higher HQ determine. I would certainly suggest upgrading its weapons, equipment and size and would have Marines attend Sea School after Infantry Training Bn. Sea School would be expanded from its previous training objectives to include ship board combat and boarding other ships and the ability to call close air.
Assuming a Detachment of 160 on 20 ships we are talking about 3200 Marines and a staff at a reborn Sea School. Let’s assume a total of 3350 Marines from a Corps of over 160,000. About 2.2%.
We are missing a true global capability. I am not surprised. I made these exact points in the 1980’s, 45 years ago.