The Commandant knows exactly where he is taking the Marine Corps. As ACMC, he was the most vocal - - and arguably, most eloquent - - advocate for Force Design 2030 and Talent Management 2030, even more so than General Berger. In his recently released FRAGO 01-2024, he unabashedly states, “I’ve had some time to reflect over the past few months and remain firmly committed to our current path.” Under his watch, we have already seen the 12th Marines redesignated the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment and the removal of school trained snipers from the infantry battalions.
Let no one be deceived by lofty talking points that tout the primacy of the infantry, the efficacy of combined arms, or the gold standard of the MAGTF. Today, only two amphibious ships are forward deployed worldwide with embarked Marines. Forward presence and crisis response have also become empty words.
The new Marine Corps has arrived. It is no longer a work in progress. It is an empty shell of its former self - - no armor, no bridging, insufficient cannon artillery, insufficient and poorly designed amphibious vehicles, virtually no assault breaching, no resiliency in infantry or aviation or logistics, and lacking adequate support in amphibious lift and maritime prepositioning. Divest to invest has been a colossal failure. Proven and essential capabilities needed to fight and win today have been discarded, while future, experimental capabilities remain little more than “pipe dreams.” The Landing Ship Medium (LSM) will likely never ply the waters of the Western Pacific; certainly not in the numbers (35) the Marines say are required to support the Stand-in Forces (SIF) concept. The anti-ship missiles being sought are subsonic, short range. They are inferior to other services’ capabilities and will certainly be ineffective and largely obsolete by the time they are fielded in number, if not already.
When Gen Berger became the CMC he did not know what type of Marine Corps he wanted. He knew he did not want the one we had. Tear it down, sell it off and in the meantime figure out what we want. The first part unfolded rapidly. Five years later a new one has not been created and is not on track to be created over the next five years. No one can even provide an end state on what this new Corps will be five years from now. No T/O, no T/E, no mission and no plan. It is a muddle around, experiment, review and make grandiose pronouncements.
I do not like sports analogies but from time to time they fit. We got rid of running backs, linebackers and the punter. We have no play book and no practice concepts. We are not sure that every player needs a helmet or shoulder pads. Most importantly, we do not know when we will play the next game or how many games there will be. Think this team will win a single game? Of course not. It won’t even score. Damn… maybe we can restructure it into the badminton team.
I love sports analogies; they often work. The personal irony is yours is very similar to an analog I used with a friend of mind 3 years ago. In my version, what we've done is the equivalent of saying we want more receivers since receiver heavy offense is the current fad, so we are going to redesignate the QB and O Linemen to be Wide Receivers and have them train exclusive as such. .
“Bierman pointed to Houthi rebel strikes on maritime vessels in the Red Sea as evidence of how adversaries can create choke points and countering such attacks, “is going to be the business of the Marine Corps.”
I posit that the Houthi strikes is not evidence of how an adversary can create choke points…in wartime. Sure the Houthi’s have created a bubble in which commercial shipping will not go, but a peer-to-peer adversary will be entering that bubble with combat ships, not commercial ships. A Marine “Stand-in-Force” lightly manned (platoon (Reinf)) and armed with, as Gen. McAbee stated, subsonic short-range missiles, and in small numbers at that, will not be able to be mission successful. Yes, they’ll fight like Marines, but if not casualties outright, will like the Japanese army in WW II, die-on-the vine.
Well I have to say that CP has definitely spinning my reading list in a lot of different directions. When I again read “How to Fight and Win the Single Naval Battle” I got interested in the reference FPT167, the bible for amphibious ops at the beginning of WW2. I am convinced that is where the 2030 Design Team should have started. I, in turn, got focused on another book, “Winning A Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War” by Norman Friedman. This book tells the story of War Gaming the Pacific War at the US Naval War College before WW2 (WW1 - 1934).
The first surprise was the Naval War College was part of the Chief of Naval Operations instead of the Navy’s school system. This fact put the new concepts of naval aviation warfare and amphibious warfare at the top of the priority list for doctrinal development and war plans.
Strategically the war games clarified that an offensive war plan (including seizing advanced bases) is the only way to fight and win a war in the Pacific with Japan. In order to secure SLOCs advanced bases would need to be seized. “The object of naval warfare, then and now, and very much in the war games, was to gain sea control by sweeping away the enemy’s challenges to free US use of the sea” (p.27).
As the game’s participants (Nimitz, Spruance, Halsey, Fletcher, etc.) discovered problems and developed lessons learned on aircraft carries and amphibious warfare. They also recognized the need for a modern fleet organization. The book reminds readers that ships ordered in 1940 (before Pearl Harbor) started arriving in 1942-1943.
A very significate difference between the pre-WW2 War Games and now, the pre-WW2 games focused on winning a war by learning the best way to employ the new technology and building the best doctrine. Winning the war was the tail wagging the dog not the technology.
We now have a Marine Corps that is also spinning in many different directions, primarily based on new technologies. We have three MLRs to support a defensive strategy. We have a “Raider Regiment” supporting SOCCOM. We are developing A2/AD missiles when the counter technology (Arleigh-Burke Destroyers and Iron Dome) has proved to be an effective counter to missiles and drones. I also don’t think we have a good handle on how drone technology is going to win wars, especially considering how to counter drone swarms. We don’t have the amphibious ships to support a single Combatant Commander with a continuous on station MEU. The Commandant is considering the US Navy’s surveillance mission when the Navy has towed SOSUS units and a new P8 surveillance aircraft. We have forsaken the MAGTF concept, the military “Swiss army knife” for contingency operations, to trade, tanks, artillery tubes, airlift, combat aircraft for experimentation with a defensive strategy.
The Commandant and the US Martine Corps has many issues that are not going to get fixed unless they start to FOCUS on our amphibious warfare instincts.
What is this “light infantry” nonsense? There is nothing “light” about a Marine Air/Ground Task Force. Obviously it may be configured, but to limit the Corps to light infantry is idiotic. It’s like the Navy to returning to sails…Man the yardarms boys. Semper Fi
It appears the Commandant wants to have his cake and eat it too. He wants to have a Marine Corps which is focused and reorganized to sink enemy ships, and yet in his FRAGO 01-2024, he also wants to be a "naval expeditionary force that fights from the sea as a task-organized combined arms air-ground task force." Using the war in Ukraine as an example, he commented on Ukrainian ground forces or specialized forces destroying Russian ships. However, the Ukrainian military did not destroy one of their organizations to acquire this capability. Additionally, if the Marine Corps is to be focused on destroying enemy ships (Chinese), how can it also be organized to be a robust combined arms naval air-ground task force? If you eliminate the "combined arms" aspect (artillery, heavy engineers, and tanks) of the naval expeditionary force, how can it still be a combined arms force? This thinking is contradictory. His divest to invest has eliminated the combined arms expeditionary capability. Its as if the Commandant wants to have his missile force and then throw a bone to those of us who disagree with him on a combined arms force. Does the Commandant not realize he is throwing away the main contribution the Marine Corps provides this Nation and no other military force possesses: a robust combined arms naval expeditionary force? Let the Army have this mission. They have the money and organization to do it. They are already performing this task.
We witness the flag officers in all branches devolve into mealy mouthed semi politicians, semi diplomats, semi military officers, semi semis. They have no core values, lost somewhere along the way in 25-30 plus year career much of it spent in joint commands, or liaison here or abroad, or better yet, “schools”:of every kind, Kennedy School, Fletcher School, MBA schools, masters of the universe schools, schools for learning how to balance a tea cup,on their knee or water down their drinks at the myriad of soirée’s they just have to attend. How can any group focus on the realties of our military if they are busy running to the next fad. As previously mentioned General Smith did not look well in the very brief television appearance he made to thank the civilians that saved his life. But, even if General Smith took the high road and retired, the next in line and the one after that have proved they are devoid of doing much. The US military is a shambles we all know it, the Corps only slightly less so, the technical side can be cured, time and money prevail. But the moral rot, the careerism, well that needs to be extricated root and branch.
By the way, the great slush of spring melt in eastern Ukraine is over, the ground is drying out. Tank weather and ergo tank season is upon the conflict. We will all witness the effectiveness of combined arms deployment in the coming weeks and months as Russian Federation forces move further west and south. The hell with sand tables and war games it is real and it is happening. Didn’t say it would be easy, but we will see the brutal use of mass, maneuver and speed this summer. Imagine if the Russians had a MAGTF capability of merit. How long would it take before they opened another front at the southern regions on the Black Sea? Not long and the mere threat of an amphibious operation would complicate the conflict well beyond where it is today.
The American people are inherently wise, they may not need a Marine Corps, but they want one. They are owed a damn good one.
The Commandant knows exactly where he is taking the Marine Corps. As ACMC, he was the most vocal - - and arguably, most eloquent - - advocate for Force Design 2030 and Talent Management 2030, even more so than General Berger. In his recently released FRAGO 01-2024, he unabashedly states, “I’ve had some time to reflect over the past few months and remain firmly committed to our current path.” Under his watch, we have already seen the 12th Marines redesignated the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment and the removal of school trained snipers from the infantry battalions.
Let no one be deceived by lofty talking points that tout the primacy of the infantry, the efficacy of combined arms, or the gold standard of the MAGTF. Today, only two amphibious ships are forward deployed worldwide with embarked Marines. Forward presence and crisis response have also become empty words.
The new Marine Corps has arrived. It is no longer a work in progress. It is an empty shell of its former self - - no armor, no bridging, insufficient cannon artillery, insufficient and poorly designed amphibious vehicles, virtually no assault breaching, no resiliency in infantry or aviation or logistics, and lacking adequate support in amphibious lift and maritime prepositioning. Divest to invest has been a colossal failure. Proven and essential capabilities needed to fight and win today have been discarded, while future, experimental capabilities remain little more than “pipe dreams.” The Landing Ship Medium (LSM) will likely never ply the waters of the Western Pacific; certainly not in the numbers (35) the Marines say are required to support the Stand-in Forces (SIF) concept. The anti-ship missiles being sought are subsonic, short range. They are inferior to other services’ capabilities and will certainly be ineffective and largely obsolete by the time they are fielded in number, if not already.
Spot on…..!
When Gen Berger became the CMC he did not know what type of Marine Corps he wanted. He knew he did not want the one we had. Tear it down, sell it off and in the meantime figure out what we want. The first part unfolded rapidly. Five years later a new one has not been created and is not on track to be created over the next five years. No one can even provide an end state on what this new Corps will be five years from now. No T/O, no T/E, no mission and no plan. It is a muddle around, experiment, review and make grandiose pronouncements.
I do not like sports analogies but from time to time they fit. We got rid of running backs, linebackers and the punter. We have no play book and no practice concepts. We are not sure that every player needs a helmet or shoulder pads. Most importantly, we do not know when we will play the next game or how many games there will be. Think this team will win a single game? Of course not. It won’t even score. Damn… maybe we can restructure it into the badminton team.
I love sports analogies; they often work. The personal irony is yours is very similar to an analog I used with a friend of mind 3 years ago. In my version, what we've done is the equivalent of saying we want more receivers since receiver heavy offense is the current fad, so we are going to redesignate the QB and O Linemen to be Wide Receivers and have them train exclusive as such. .
Cfrog, I can think of plenty that are applicable. They are just easier for the average citizen to grasp.
On Target!
“Bierman pointed to Houthi rebel strikes on maritime vessels in the Red Sea as evidence of how adversaries can create choke points and countering such attacks, “is going to be the business of the Marine Corps.”
I posit that the Houthi strikes is not evidence of how an adversary can create choke points…in wartime. Sure the Houthi’s have created a bubble in which commercial shipping will not go, but a peer-to-peer adversary will be entering that bubble with combat ships, not commercial ships. A Marine “Stand-in-Force” lightly manned (platoon (Reinf)) and armed with, as Gen. McAbee stated, subsonic short-range missiles, and in small numbers at that, will not be able to be mission successful. Yes, they’ll fight like Marines, but if not casualties outright, will like the Japanese army in WW II, die-on-the vine.
“Want a new idea, read an old book”
Well I have to say that CP has definitely spinning my reading list in a lot of different directions. When I again read “How to Fight and Win the Single Naval Battle” I got interested in the reference FPT167, the bible for amphibious ops at the beginning of WW2. I am convinced that is where the 2030 Design Team should have started. I, in turn, got focused on another book, “Winning A Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War” by Norman Friedman. This book tells the story of War Gaming the Pacific War at the US Naval War College before WW2 (WW1 - 1934).
The first surprise was the Naval War College was part of the Chief of Naval Operations instead of the Navy’s school system. This fact put the new concepts of naval aviation warfare and amphibious warfare at the top of the priority list for doctrinal development and war plans.
Strategically the war games clarified that an offensive war plan (including seizing advanced bases) is the only way to fight and win a war in the Pacific with Japan. In order to secure SLOCs advanced bases would need to be seized. “The object of naval warfare, then and now, and very much in the war games, was to gain sea control by sweeping away the enemy’s challenges to free US use of the sea” (p.27).
As the game’s participants (Nimitz, Spruance, Halsey, Fletcher, etc.) discovered problems and developed lessons learned on aircraft carries and amphibious warfare. They also recognized the need for a modern fleet organization. The book reminds readers that ships ordered in 1940 (before Pearl Harbor) started arriving in 1942-1943.
A very significate difference between the pre-WW2 War Games and now, the pre-WW2 games focused on winning a war by learning the best way to employ the new technology and building the best doctrine. Winning the war was the tail wagging the dog not the technology.
We now have a Marine Corps that is also spinning in many different directions, primarily based on new technologies. We have three MLRs to support a defensive strategy. We have a “Raider Regiment” supporting SOCCOM. We are developing A2/AD missiles when the counter technology (Arleigh-Burke Destroyers and Iron Dome) has proved to be an effective counter to missiles and drones. I also don’t think we have a good handle on how drone technology is going to win wars, especially considering how to counter drone swarms. We don’t have the amphibious ships to support a single Combatant Commander with a continuous on station MEU. The Commandant is considering the US Navy’s surveillance mission when the Navy has towed SOSUS units and a new P8 surveillance aircraft. We have forsaken the MAGTF concept, the military “Swiss army knife” for contingency operations, to trade, tanks, artillery tubes, airlift, combat aircraft for experimentation with a defensive strategy.
The Commandant and the US Martine Corps has many issues that are not going to get fixed unless they start to FOCUS on our amphibious warfare instincts.
Semper Fi
What is this “light infantry” nonsense? There is nothing “light” about a Marine Air/Ground Task Force. Obviously it may be configured, but to limit the Corps to light infantry is idiotic. It’s like the Navy to returning to sails…Man the yardarms boys. Semper Fi
It appears the Commandant wants to have his cake and eat it too. He wants to have a Marine Corps which is focused and reorganized to sink enemy ships, and yet in his FRAGO 01-2024, he also wants to be a "naval expeditionary force that fights from the sea as a task-organized combined arms air-ground task force." Using the war in Ukraine as an example, he commented on Ukrainian ground forces or specialized forces destroying Russian ships. However, the Ukrainian military did not destroy one of their organizations to acquire this capability. Additionally, if the Marine Corps is to be focused on destroying enemy ships (Chinese), how can it also be organized to be a robust combined arms naval air-ground task force? If you eliminate the "combined arms" aspect (artillery, heavy engineers, and tanks) of the naval expeditionary force, how can it still be a combined arms force? This thinking is contradictory. His divest to invest has eliminated the combined arms expeditionary capability. Its as if the Commandant wants to have his missile force and then throw a bone to those of us who disagree with him on a combined arms force. Does the Commandant not realize he is throwing away the main contribution the Marine Corps provides this Nation and no other military force possesses: a robust combined arms naval expeditionary force? Let the Army have this mission. They have the money and organization to do it. They are already performing this task.
The CMC and his Lieutenants have created a “Crisis of Confusion “! It is like the old joke, “Who is on first”!
Agree.
We witness the flag officers in all branches devolve into mealy mouthed semi politicians, semi diplomats, semi military officers, semi semis. They have no core values, lost somewhere along the way in 25-30 plus year career much of it spent in joint commands, or liaison here or abroad, or better yet, “schools”:of every kind, Kennedy School, Fletcher School, MBA schools, masters of the universe schools, schools for learning how to balance a tea cup,on their knee or water down their drinks at the myriad of soirée’s they just have to attend. How can any group focus on the realties of our military if they are busy running to the next fad. As previously mentioned General Smith did not look well in the very brief television appearance he made to thank the civilians that saved his life. But, even if General Smith took the high road and retired, the next in line and the one after that have proved they are devoid of doing much. The US military is a shambles we all know it, the Corps only slightly less so, the technical side can be cured, time and money prevail. But the moral rot, the careerism, well that needs to be extricated root and branch.
By the way, the great slush of spring melt in eastern Ukraine is over, the ground is drying out. Tank weather and ergo tank season is upon the conflict. We will all witness the effectiveness of combined arms deployment in the coming weeks and months as Russian Federation forces move further west and south. The hell with sand tables and war games it is real and it is happening. Didn’t say it would be easy, but we will see the brutal use of mass, maneuver and speed this summer. Imagine if the Russians had a MAGTF capability of merit. How long would it take before they opened another front at the southern regions on the Black Sea? Not long and the mere threat of an amphibious operation would complicate the conflict well beyond where it is today.
The American people are inherently wise, they may not need a Marine Corps, but they want one. They are owed a damn good one.