Hindsight can distort what was evolution and ascribe revolution. The Corps had been maneuver warfare centric through much of its history. Before Bill Lind burst on the scene the fundamentals of maneuver warfare were being exercised and executed by numerous units blessed with well educated and insightful leaders. Gen Wilson’s implementation of CAX’s at 29 Palms revitalized the use of maneuver and supporting arms integration. The acquisition of the Harrier and FARPs were maneuver warfare. The LAV was maneuver warfare driven. The development of the MV-22 was an endorsement of maneuver warfare. Those who were avid professional readers saw the fingerprints of maneuver warfare in Alexander the Great, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, RE Lee, Stewart, even Longstreet, MacArthur, Rommel, Guderian, Patton, Manstein etc. It was not revolutionary to the initiated. It needed polishing, reinforcement, implementation and customization. Col Wylie was one of many of the acolytes as demonstrated by his tours at TBS and AWS. Gen Gray became the intellectual leader and champion in that era. He refocused the Corps to its only reason for existing. Desert Storm/ Desert Shield was classic maneuver Gen Mattis became the most modern practitioner.
Times, demands, cultural shifts and priorities change focus. After 1992 the military spent many years preoccupied with insurgencies, nation building, cultural reforms, societal shifts, environmental issues , racial justice, integration of women and peripheral issues. The Corps got dragged into these quicksand issues as well. We shifted from fitness reports that reported on the concise character of the Marine reported on to the metrics associated with completing tasks. Command Screening became command selection and equity for peripheral MOSs icw a vast expansion of stovepipe MOS’s.
The conversations around the water cooler shifted to social justice, alcohol abuse, drug policy, sexual harassment and assault, an expansion of the role of women and policies that would make DoD the most LGBTQI supportive institution on earth. Promotions shift to those best versed in the issues of the day vice war fighting. Even combating an insurgency took a back seat to the futility of nation building.
Buzz words and phrases are the indicators of an institution’s focus. Esprit de Corps dropped out of the lexicon as did almost anything that dealt with the destruction of the enemy. We know what replaced it.
Leadership matters. The last 10 years has seen the Corps take a hard turn towards irrelevance with muddled thinking, paralysis through analysis and ill conceived change. Change is neither positive or negative. The right change inspires and improves. The wrong change destroys.
The clock is ticking for the Corps. The budget cycles are ruthless. I would welcome Bill Lind chiming in.
Again, the case has been made by real war fighters and brilliant analysts that FD2030 and divest to invest were mistakes, that our Corps has lost critical assets and has become incapable to perform its responsibilities under Title 10. Compass Points hasn't presented any cogent, competent counter arguments from anyone. Has CMC responded? Has SecNav? CNO? Anyone? Are we merely singing to ourselves in venues no one else attends? I have seen and heard nothing to suggest those now responsible intend to admit to errors, are taking corrective action, or feel in the least required to respond to the concerns expressed by those who have great commitment to our Corps? Can you provide any information on this, even an indication of what effect any of this is having?
Tom - Good point, but, I would ask if and when those offices you mentioned chimed in during the period of deconstruction? Just as a thought - don’t know for sure, but suspect - our salvation rest only partially with those in uniform. I can be convinced otherwise, but, believe our final main effort may reside outside DOD. Just a thought. Semper Fi!
Bud: I agree. The relevant House and Senate Commitees come to mind but they preferred, at least back in the old days, to be approached by Marines before butting in. I got a nice email reminding me that CP is a public forum and many things are best handled privately, which is of course, beyond cavil. I shall withdraw to my wee dram and imagine very serious people quietly and privately at work to rebuild our Corps.
Attending General Gray's funeral and interment was an incredible life event. He was a personal hero to me as a young Marine, and eventually became a personal acquaintance due to our common experience with SIGINT and 1st Radio Bn. It was also a bit like milling about during a Hall of Fame induction event, looking around at the men of renown who built the modern Corps. I can understand Bill's emotional response to what seems to be a decaying Corps, in light of having attended that event.
I would recommend a re-read of "The Attritionist Letters," which documents, in real time, the decline of the Warfighting philosophy while we fought a slow, methodical, precise, certain insurgency. It fooled everyone into thinking we were masters of the battlespace and could subjugate the nature of war.
It might be worth taking some comfort in history if you are concerned with the immediate decline and death of the Corps:
-For decades prior to WWII, the Corps was viewed nationally as the least desirable service for any young man to join. Our talent management was lacking, to say the least.
-We once had a drunk and a brawler for Commandant. Archibald Henderson corrected the course.
-We once had a Commandant known as a martinet and empty suit. We got a dramatic course correction.
-We once had a Commandant presiding over a Corps in chaos. Fat, drugged, and racially riven. We then embarked on a multi-decade course correction, culminating with General Gray's foundational innovations; momentum we have been riding, if not nurturing and expanding, for the last 30 years.
I met Bill Lind at the beginning of my academic year at AWS. It was the same year that Maj Wyly took over the tactics instruction at AWS. I had read Bill’s Maneuver Warfare article (or two) in the MC Gazette before AWS but really did not understand what he was writing about. I “got it” when I spent a very long day in the AWS “bed room” listing to Col John Boyd give his “Patterns of Conflict” Presentation. The presentation was scheduled for 8 hours but it went long after dark. There was no naps in the AWS bed room that day. Col Boyd was a remarkable presenter and in the Patterns of Conflict Presentation he hammered away at his audience that day like an M60 machine gun complete with 8 round bursts with tracers. Most of the class left between 4:30 and 5:30 PM but a small group of us stayed until the end. If I remember correctly that was around 9 PM. It was during that presentation that I got what Bill Lind was talking about. The Patterns of Conflict was the basis for Maneuver Warfare. The next day Maj Wyly announced that he and Bill Lind were going to form the first AWS Maneuver Warfare Seminar for any interested student. I remember I didn’t get to Maj Wyly’s office until late in the day and fully expected he would tell me the seminar was full but to my surprise it was not. The ten or so seminar volunteers met in the evening once a week in Mr Lind living room in DC. Each week Bill gave the group a reading assignment and usually had an invited guest to discuss different aspects of Maneuver Warfare.
Bill’s teaching method was discussion and not lecture. One evening, for example, I remember Bill mentioning to us that “mission orders” are scary. Huh! What do you mean Mr Lind? He explained that we were trained to conduct attacks with check points, phase lines and boundaries. In other words, we were trained “How” to conduct an attack and not to use our initiative on a suddenly discovered opportunity. We also trained our subordinates to think in the same matter reporting all phase lines (Phase Line Red, Green and Blue, etc.) and check points (A, B, and C, etc.). The scary part is what happens when you receive a report location from a subordinate with no mention of phase lines and check points. It will make you wonder; what is he doing there? A major element to mission orders is trust and years later when I first read FMFM 1 “Warfighting” there is was: “trust is an essential trait among leaders – trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure.” I remember asking Col Boyd how to build trust within a unit. He stated by challenging training and getting to understand how your comrades think.
After AWS I was ordered to 1st MARDIV where I pick up a rifle company…best job I ever had. Interestingly it seemed that every time I tried to talk about Maneuver Warfare, I always had to first deal with the Bill Lind “ad hominem” attacks reactions. I got tired of wading through that luggage and decided to concentrate on training my rifle company giving the NCOs, squad leaders and platoon leaders training problems. I stopped mentioning Maneuver Warfare and just told everyone interested I was training my subordinate leaders to have the flexibility to spot tactical opportunities.
Another member of the seminar, (Bill Wood) received orders to 2nd MARDIV where he continued the seminar meeting once a week at the O’Club. One evening the Commanding General sat down or was invited to the table. Of course, General Gray was the Division Commander. The next day Bill Wood received a new assignment as the head of the 2nd MARDIV Maneuver Warfare Office. The rest is history, a good history and Marine Corps history.
Thanks for sharing this story, I have read a lot about John Boyd, Bill Lind and spoken to several Marines about the role they played in the development of Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine. A doctrine that spread from the USMC around the world, but this story gave me new insights into the 'how' and into what it might have been like to meet these guys in person. Thanks again.
Mark, very good question! BLUF, I am something of a Lind fan, and we need his - and others like him (in and out of uniform) - to weigh in on the critical condition of our beloved Corps. I am personally very much comforted by retired, but senior Marines - the Krulak’s, Zinni’s, Conway’s, Van Riper’s, Holcomb’s & McAbee’s of our world, among others not known to me - as well as Friends of the Corps in many fields of our civil sector, who are positioned to influence the reconstitution of our force. We need all well intentioned voices to chime in - Bill Lind can do that in spades. Mark, you just introduced a fertile topic for our consideration - let the discussions begin with Vigah! Semper Fidelis!
We (those of us likely to read this), know the problem and solution. The sad and, ultimately disastrous, thing is, that serving Marine officers apparently do not. Semper Fi
I think you gentlemen missed the mark...and Doug Rape, did you miss Fallujah, or Marjah AFG? To say "The last 10 years has seen the Corps take a hard turn towards irrelevance with muddled thinking, paralysis through analysis and ill conceived change." is absolutely ludicrous! Our current MC Warriors are just as good, even better, than when Livingston, Barnum or Zinnie were on Active service. I respect them both, Livingston was my Boss at MARFORRES when I was 3rd FORECON Co. Barnum was my Bn Cmdr at PISC. Gen Zinni was Striking 9th in Oki as I was a Company Cmdr/S3A in 3/3 in Oki (we personally talked briefly) just before DS/DS. Our MC today under CMC Gen Dave Berger and now Gen Eric Smith and their SIG analysis is on the right track related to NDS threats. They have seen and learned from Ukraine/Russia, and Israel/ Iranian surrogates conflicts, and actions by the Russian "International Grp" [previously Wagner Grp] in Africa, as well as Europe and China's malign influence in the SEA Indo-PACOM AOR. Tanks are no longer the fierce lions on the battle space. Ukrainian small tms and killer drones are wiping them out (at a margin of the cost to US taxpayer dollars to build them!!) They have terrible ROI in amphibious Ops.. i.e. 1 LCAC for 1 tank to come ashore is wasteful! Cyber, Space (OIE) stealth and speed are now essential. Our line Infantry units , the Raiders and Recon have more lethality (due to technology, stealth and speed) , fight and physical and mental toughness than we ever did! I have watched junior NCOs ,and SNCOs study, analyses and present Options to the 4star and Ambassador level, that previously under those retired officers only Maj or LtCols would even be allowed do. The Current MC "troop" is a great fighter and Warrior. We have not lost any Warrior ethos or mentality either, try rolling with them in BJJ or Boxing like I do 3X a week!. I talk to them every day, they are itching for a fight to show just how good they are! Our real issue, and the one Lind, Zinni, Livingston, Barnum and any other Sr retired GO/FO needs to focus on is the political, leftist, mambie-pambie "wokeness" pronoun focus across the Services mandated by the current SecDef Austin and POTUS and his VP Harris, (Ms. "Woke" herself!) That mentality, and its leftist social experiment will ruin all our services, never mind the USMC. Also they need to look at the US Navy Fleet and our Ship building capability which is a critical issue. The Chinese SMF and its A2AD capabilities will destroy the Fleet and the ARG/MEU (or MEB) before it ever gets into the AOR. We will never be able to do a passive (non contested environment) like KSA Jubial MPSRON offload for DS/DS again (I was lead company in TF Taro and took them over to KSA port of Jubail in 91) ... the enemy has learned and will not let us build up combat power before we strike! We don't want to ever do Tarawa, IWO or even Midway again. The fleet will be decimated (see the numerous current Sr level UNCLASS wargames that show that explicit outcome related to Taiwan!) So gentlemen put your focus to influence congress and the US shipbuilding capabilities... we need NSS (and NSAv) and LPVs (think Cartel mini-subs on a bigger scale). We need the Fleet to have a "Cloak of invisibility" ( yes your grand kids "Harry Potter movies!) China has a like type technology already. We need an" Iron Dome" technology for the fleet in our Composite Warfare strategy, because China, Russia and Iran are sharing A2AD technology and giving it to non-state actors (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc) and the Fleet is no longer safe as it sits today! Our Corps is learning, i.e., Cyber, Space, Drones, OIE, IW, ( yes UW, CT, FID etc) and CNSO are all going in the right directions... and not just for China! Gen Eric Smith (Ret), a true Warfighter and great friend (we were Co Commanders in 3rd Marines/ DS/DS and Recon I&Is together) said it best when he said words to the effect "This isn't about just China, this is how we can win against any foe, Russia, VEOs, nonstate actors etc" always ready to discuss based on our current real world threats and malign influence situations... not just theory!!
Spiritus Invictus, SemperFi, Essayons
M2
Michael McCusker
LtCol USMC (Ret)
USSOCOM J51VEO
MARFORSOC G7ex (contractor)
Looking for the next opportunity (job) to help a company or Command succeed!
What you miss in your argument is the fact it is not just those of us who retired some time ago who see fatal flaws in Force Design 2030; there are a large number of recently retired three and four-star Marine generals who are in the same camp as we are. And there are many active duty officers who reach out to us routinely voicing their concerns about the course on which the present and past CMC have placed the Corps.
My own analysis is that those who are true Force Design believers are in a sense victims of 20 years of fighting an insurgency. Those of us who fought main force Viet Cong units, and the North Vietnamese Army’s forces, as well as insurgents have a much different view of war. It is one where mass and maneuver count and precision fires are important but not central to battles and engagements. We know that it is the proper employment of combined arms that wins battles and campaigns as it has for more than 100 years.
Generals Krulak, Zinni, Sheehan, I, and others have seen what it’s like to face a determined enemy that fights in large formations where cannon artillery and close air support are vital with large numbers of munitions the order of the day. In my first fire fight as a rifle company commander, I called for over 300 rounds of artillery and three air strikes in a little over an hour. All of those I mention had similar experiences, all were seriously wounded during the Vietnam War and spent weeks in the hospital; thus, our view of war is different than many currently serving officers—not better or worse—just different. However, it represents a type of war that has existed for millennia and there is no evidence it is going away.
I have listened to the hype surrounding new technologies for more than 60 years and found it to be a siren song. Napoleon was correct, big battalions and artillery win wars, all else is and remains peripheral.
General Van Riper, the “true believers” in FD2030 just won’t let it go. It’s a bit like watching someone with an addiction, they know their gambling, drugs or alcohol are killing and ruining their and the lives around them, but they just can’t give over, admit their ill and work toward recovery. What I learned at TBS and 6th IOC class (Nov/Dec 1978) was in part “never again” and damn it don’t do this and don’t do that, and how do we know? Because we got the hell shot out of us and we learned how to survive and thrive in a very very difficult constant combat environment. Organic Battalion combined arms, the 60mm mortar aka the Company Commandsrs hip pocket artillery, etc., etc. Those lessons carried with me into the FMF 3/2 and instructor training at the then ITS and later ALL through a civilian career. To this day I don’t just take a walk in the forest or down a street without some assessemt of the ground around me. What would I do if? A large part of this mind set is again OUR ethos, our unwillingness to compromise our values and way of doing business. One of the critical currencies of Chowder Society II is the work being done to undercover the failure of FD2030 and propose doable workable solutions. This angers the DC cocktail circuit. They fear the “lean and hungry” and pursue the end of a meaningful Marine Corps. So be it. “America doesn’t need a Marine Corps , but it wants one.”
The sad fact is that Marine infantry is essentially naked and alone on today's battlefield. Most will not have artillery support. None we will have tank, bridging, or in-stride breaching support. Most will have limited CIF and CAS support. Relying on another service to provide this support is a fool's errand. Unless properly supported, infantry - - no matter how good the individual Marine - - will be unable to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. We know this from past battles. Sending Marine infantry into combat without robust and resilient combined arms support is criminal.
…and Mike is back with his same arguments. Mike is that a “rice bowl” you have your arms wrapped around? I respect Mike’s opinions but CP needs some different arguments. The Marine Corps “hard turn towards” the 2030 Design is not “ludicrous”. However, what is ludicrous is trading MAGTF combat power for “lethality” and “experimentation”. I once listen to General Smith state that giving up tanks was an easy decision because the Javalin out ranged tanks. Doesn’t 155 tube artillery out range both? By giving up combat power you are giving up flexibility and adaptability. One of the major points of “Warfighting” (and winning), taught by Col Boyd, Bill Lind, Col Wyly and General Grey, is the need to adapt to an ever changing situations. The MAGTF organization and combat power offers the tremendous adaptability and flexibility. We have heard on CP from experienced combat commanders they want their FULL tool bag in hand. A good example is the MEU operation that took down Grenada in the 1980s. Mike keeps mentioning Iwo and Tarawa but what about Tinian? Remember we starved to death far more Japanese soldiers then we killed in WW2 bypassing islands. If you add in the Japanese soldiers on troop ships and barges sunk attempting to reinforce an island…WOW! Take a look at the campaign to isolate and bypass Rabaul with its 100,000 soldiers, over 500 combat aircraft, over 100 tanks and a cave complex of over 300 miles. Mike is concerned about A2/AD but what combat commander is going to let an enemy shoot A2/AD missiles at amphibs and carriers. A2/AD missiles can be taken out on the ground or in the air. Yes, we need to get better at anti-missile defense but we have recognized the issue and the other services are working on it. The 2030 Design has the MC working on land based anti-ship missiles and not A2AD. The best anti-ship defense is another ship or an aircraft attack (thinking F35 here). In the 50s the US built a global cold war bomber defense with Nike missile sites for every major city in US, Europe, Japan and Taiwan. When the enemy switch to rockets and so did we with a MAD Strategy where our missiles could strike anywhere on the globe. We also understand Mike's Marine Corps experiences. They are very similar to our own regarding assignments and General Gray (…and Bill Lind). I also would not want to trade experience arguments with the Chowder 2 crew. Semper Fi Brother
Interesting points all, Mike, and certainly contribute to the professionalism of the discussion here. I would offer that the discussion surrounding insurgency-induced degeneration of maneuver thinking is the one that we were having around tray-rats in both places you mentioned, and our conversations were directly reflected in contemporary writings such as the "Attritionist Letters." We cheered when that series came out, because we saw it happening in the way our increasingly programmed and techno-focused training and warfighting solutions were the shiny objects that those in Quantico followed, often motivated by money and status in the beltway. The running joke was that the Corps was like Risky Business, with the adults deployed and the teenagers in Quantico running amok.
Minus the cultural observations, your argument surrounding ROI and working smarter, not harder against the threats of the future is an ageless one. The supporting effort vs. main effort goes back as far as Douhet, Carlson vs. Edson, through Vietnam, Grenada, Iraq, Afghanistan. I heard it often in recon circles...Marines honestly perplexed at why the big stubborn Marine Corps wouldn't reorganize itself to look more like commandos or recon. It turns out those Marines' frustrations won the day in 2019. It remains to be seen if they will be right.
My old boss at the Div, in the midst of FD2030's rollout, said that if we were on SCS islands first like FD2030 intends, the Chinese would come and try to kick us off. If not, we would have to kick them off. That is the nature of war.
Honestly, I haven't seen an ODA, MSOT, or similar non-combined arms special ops organization that can take or hold terrain like that. Al Gray may have referred to Marines as commandos, but his combined arms procurement (LAV) and employment (MEU) were not designed in pursuit of the certainty-dependent, technology-reliant, methodical, precision forces that define the ideas of "commandos" today.
Occurred to me to go find to a paragraph I wrote some time ago:
H. R. McMaster outlined the tendencies of DOD doctrinal drift after the 1991 Gulf War. He described the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) "Vampire", a DOD movement that refuses to die and repeatedly arises to infect US strategic thought with leap-ahead visions of cheap, precise, and complete solutions to uncertainty. Tied to this was McMaster's second phenomenon known as the "Zero-dark thirty" phenomenon. Rooted in General Norman Schwarzkopf's Desert Storm strategy of "cutting the head off the snake," it is a methodology that mistakes the targeting of enemy command and control (C2) systems as a main-effort strategy in itself. The RMA Vampire and the Zero-dark thirty phenomenon have combined to produce a DOD enamored with information dominance today. The continuing movement is premised on eliminating uncertainty and friction, manifested in the idea that centralized intelligence collection and analysis, driving precision targeting, is key to eliminating enemy C2 and breaking his will.
Hindsight can distort what was evolution and ascribe revolution. The Corps had been maneuver warfare centric through much of its history. Before Bill Lind burst on the scene the fundamentals of maneuver warfare were being exercised and executed by numerous units blessed with well educated and insightful leaders. Gen Wilson’s implementation of CAX’s at 29 Palms revitalized the use of maneuver and supporting arms integration. The acquisition of the Harrier and FARPs were maneuver warfare. The LAV was maneuver warfare driven. The development of the MV-22 was an endorsement of maneuver warfare. Those who were avid professional readers saw the fingerprints of maneuver warfare in Alexander the Great, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, RE Lee, Stewart, even Longstreet, MacArthur, Rommel, Guderian, Patton, Manstein etc. It was not revolutionary to the initiated. It needed polishing, reinforcement, implementation and customization. Col Wylie was one of many of the acolytes as demonstrated by his tours at TBS and AWS. Gen Gray became the intellectual leader and champion in that era. He refocused the Corps to its only reason for existing. Desert Storm/ Desert Shield was classic maneuver Gen Mattis became the most modern practitioner.
Times, demands, cultural shifts and priorities change focus. After 1992 the military spent many years preoccupied with insurgencies, nation building, cultural reforms, societal shifts, environmental issues , racial justice, integration of women and peripheral issues. The Corps got dragged into these quicksand issues as well. We shifted from fitness reports that reported on the concise character of the Marine reported on to the metrics associated with completing tasks. Command Screening became command selection and equity for peripheral MOSs icw a vast expansion of stovepipe MOS’s.
The conversations around the water cooler shifted to social justice, alcohol abuse, drug policy, sexual harassment and assault, an expansion of the role of women and policies that would make DoD the most LGBTQI supportive institution on earth. Promotions shift to those best versed in the issues of the day vice war fighting. Even combating an insurgency took a back seat to the futility of nation building.
Buzz words and phrases are the indicators of an institution’s focus. Esprit de Corps dropped out of the lexicon as did almost anything that dealt with the destruction of the enemy. We know what replaced it.
Leadership matters. The last 10 years has seen the Corps take a hard turn towards irrelevance with muddled thinking, paralysis through analysis and ill conceived change. Change is neither positive or negative. The right change inspires and improves. The wrong change destroys.
The clock is ticking for the Corps. The budget cycles are ruthless. I would welcome Bill Lind chiming in.
World and domestic events
Best damn synopsis I’ve read about the state of our Marine Corps! Perfect!
Amen!
I gotta add my Amen to Doug R. comment.
Again, the case has been made by real war fighters and brilliant analysts that FD2030 and divest to invest were mistakes, that our Corps has lost critical assets and has become incapable to perform its responsibilities under Title 10. Compass Points hasn't presented any cogent, competent counter arguments from anyone. Has CMC responded? Has SecNav? CNO? Anyone? Are we merely singing to ourselves in venues no one else attends? I have seen and heard nothing to suggest those now responsible intend to admit to errors, are taking corrective action, or feel in the least required to respond to the concerns expressed by those who have great commitment to our Corps? Can you provide any information on this, even an indication of what effect any of this is having?
Semper Fidelis,
Tom Eagen
Tom - Good point, but, I would ask if and when those offices you mentioned chimed in during the period of deconstruction? Just as a thought - don’t know for sure, but suspect - our salvation rest only partially with those in uniform. I can be convinced otherwise, but, believe our final main effort may reside outside DOD. Just a thought. Semper Fi!
Bud: I agree. The relevant House and Senate Commitees come to mind but they preferred, at least back in the old days, to be approached by Marines before butting in. I got a nice email reminding me that CP is a public forum and many things are best handled privately, which is of course, beyond cavil. I shall withdraw to my wee dram and imagine very serious people quietly and privately at work to rebuild our Corps.
S/F, Tom
Tom - Oh! No!! Don’t retire to your wee dram … stay in the fight & enjoy many drams! Semper Fidelis!
Attending General Gray's funeral and interment was an incredible life event. He was a personal hero to me as a young Marine, and eventually became a personal acquaintance due to our common experience with SIGINT and 1st Radio Bn. It was also a bit like milling about during a Hall of Fame induction event, looking around at the men of renown who built the modern Corps. I can understand Bill's emotional response to what seems to be a decaying Corps, in light of having attended that event.
I would recommend a re-read of "The Attritionist Letters," which documents, in real time, the decline of the Warfighting philosophy while we fought a slow, methodical, precise, certain insurgency. It fooled everyone into thinking we were masters of the battlespace and could subjugate the nature of war.
It might be worth taking some comfort in history if you are concerned with the immediate decline and death of the Corps:
-For decades prior to WWII, the Corps was viewed nationally as the least desirable service for any young man to join. Our talent management was lacking, to say the least.
-We once had a drunk and a brawler for Commandant. Archibald Henderson corrected the course.
-We once had a Commandant known as a martinet and empty suit. We got a dramatic course correction.
-We once had a Commandant presiding over a Corps in chaos. Fat, drugged, and racially riven. We then embarked on a multi-decade course correction, culminating with General Gray's foundational innovations; momentum we have been riding, if not nurturing and expanding, for the last 30 years.
This too shall pass.
I met Bill Lind at the beginning of my academic year at AWS. It was the same year that Maj Wyly took over the tactics instruction at AWS. I had read Bill’s Maneuver Warfare article (or two) in the MC Gazette before AWS but really did not understand what he was writing about. I “got it” when I spent a very long day in the AWS “bed room” listing to Col John Boyd give his “Patterns of Conflict” Presentation. The presentation was scheduled for 8 hours but it went long after dark. There was no naps in the AWS bed room that day. Col Boyd was a remarkable presenter and in the Patterns of Conflict Presentation he hammered away at his audience that day like an M60 machine gun complete with 8 round bursts with tracers. Most of the class left between 4:30 and 5:30 PM but a small group of us stayed until the end. If I remember correctly that was around 9 PM. It was during that presentation that I got what Bill Lind was talking about. The Patterns of Conflict was the basis for Maneuver Warfare. The next day Maj Wyly announced that he and Bill Lind were going to form the first AWS Maneuver Warfare Seminar for any interested student. I remember I didn’t get to Maj Wyly’s office until late in the day and fully expected he would tell me the seminar was full but to my surprise it was not. The ten or so seminar volunteers met in the evening once a week in Mr Lind living room in DC. Each week Bill gave the group a reading assignment and usually had an invited guest to discuss different aspects of Maneuver Warfare.
Bill’s teaching method was discussion and not lecture. One evening, for example, I remember Bill mentioning to us that “mission orders” are scary. Huh! What do you mean Mr Lind? He explained that we were trained to conduct attacks with check points, phase lines and boundaries. In other words, we were trained “How” to conduct an attack and not to use our initiative on a suddenly discovered opportunity. We also trained our subordinates to think in the same matter reporting all phase lines (Phase Line Red, Green and Blue, etc.) and check points (A, B, and C, etc.). The scary part is what happens when you receive a report location from a subordinate with no mention of phase lines and check points. It will make you wonder; what is he doing there? A major element to mission orders is trust and years later when I first read FMFM 1 “Warfighting” there is was: “trust is an essential trait among leaders – trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure.” I remember asking Col Boyd how to build trust within a unit. He stated by challenging training and getting to understand how your comrades think.
After AWS I was ordered to 1st MARDIV where I pick up a rifle company…best job I ever had. Interestingly it seemed that every time I tried to talk about Maneuver Warfare, I always had to first deal with the Bill Lind “ad hominem” attacks reactions. I got tired of wading through that luggage and decided to concentrate on training my rifle company giving the NCOs, squad leaders and platoon leaders training problems. I stopped mentioning Maneuver Warfare and just told everyone interested I was training my subordinate leaders to have the flexibility to spot tactical opportunities.
Another member of the seminar, (Bill Wood) received orders to 2nd MARDIV where he continued the seminar meeting once a week at the O’Club. One evening the Commanding General sat down or was invited to the table. Of course, General Gray was the Division Commander. The next day Bill Wood received a new assignment as the head of the 2nd MARDIV Maneuver Warfare Office. The rest is history, a good history and Marine Corps history.
Thanks for sharing this story, I have read a lot about John Boyd, Bill Lind and spoken to several Marines about the role they played in the development of Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine. A doctrine that spread from the USMC around the world, but this story gave me new insights into the 'how' and into what it might have been like to meet these guys in person. Thanks again.
Mark, very good question! BLUF, I am something of a Lind fan, and we need his - and others like him (in and out of uniform) - to weigh in on the critical condition of our beloved Corps. I am personally very much comforted by retired, but senior Marines - the Krulak’s, Zinni’s, Conway’s, Van Riper’s, Holcomb’s & McAbee’s of our world, among others not known to me - as well as Friends of the Corps in many fields of our civil sector, who are positioned to influence the reconstitution of our force. We need all well intentioned voices to chime in - Bill Lind can do that in spades. Mark, you just introduced a fertile topic for our consideration - let the discussions begin with Vigah! Semper Fidelis!
We (those of us likely to read this), know the problem and solution. The sad and, ultimately disastrous, thing is, that serving Marine officers apparently do not. Semper Fi
There may be some truth to that.
Two incredibly powerful messages. But is current Marine Corps leadership listening, and more importantly, taking action to right our listing ship.
No. They insist on doubling down on their efforts to make the Corps, our Corps, a one trick pony incapable of broad-spectrum combat operations.
Literally just posted a note about this.
Should we expect ad hominem attacks on Lind or points about the issues he points out?
https://substack.com/@markjmcgrath/note/c-66109739?r=lje96&utm_medium=ios&utm_source=notes-share-action
I think you gentlemen missed the mark...and Doug Rape, did you miss Fallujah, or Marjah AFG? To say "The last 10 years has seen the Corps take a hard turn towards irrelevance with muddled thinking, paralysis through analysis and ill conceived change." is absolutely ludicrous! Our current MC Warriors are just as good, even better, than when Livingston, Barnum or Zinnie were on Active service. I respect them both, Livingston was my Boss at MARFORRES when I was 3rd FORECON Co. Barnum was my Bn Cmdr at PISC. Gen Zinni was Striking 9th in Oki as I was a Company Cmdr/S3A in 3/3 in Oki (we personally talked briefly) just before DS/DS. Our MC today under CMC Gen Dave Berger and now Gen Eric Smith and their SIG analysis is on the right track related to NDS threats. They have seen and learned from Ukraine/Russia, and Israel/ Iranian surrogates conflicts, and actions by the Russian "International Grp" [previously Wagner Grp] in Africa, as well as Europe and China's malign influence in the SEA Indo-PACOM AOR. Tanks are no longer the fierce lions on the battle space. Ukrainian small tms and killer drones are wiping them out (at a margin of the cost to US taxpayer dollars to build them!!) They have terrible ROI in amphibious Ops.. i.e. 1 LCAC for 1 tank to come ashore is wasteful! Cyber, Space (OIE) stealth and speed are now essential. Our line Infantry units , the Raiders and Recon have more lethality (due to technology, stealth and speed) , fight and physical and mental toughness than we ever did! I have watched junior NCOs ,and SNCOs study, analyses and present Options to the 4star and Ambassador level, that previously under those retired officers only Maj or LtCols would even be allowed do. The Current MC "troop" is a great fighter and Warrior. We have not lost any Warrior ethos or mentality either, try rolling with them in BJJ or Boxing like I do 3X a week!. I talk to them every day, they are itching for a fight to show just how good they are! Our real issue, and the one Lind, Zinni, Livingston, Barnum and any other Sr retired GO/FO needs to focus on is the political, leftist, mambie-pambie "wokeness" pronoun focus across the Services mandated by the current SecDef Austin and POTUS and his VP Harris, (Ms. "Woke" herself!) That mentality, and its leftist social experiment will ruin all our services, never mind the USMC. Also they need to look at the US Navy Fleet and our Ship building capability which is a critical issue. The Chinese SMF and its A2AD capabilities will destroy the Fleet and the ARG/MEU (or MEB) before it ever gets into the AOR. We will never be able to do a passive (non contested environment) like KSA Jubial MPSRON offload for DS/DS again (I was lead company in TF Taro and took them over to KSA port of Jubail in 91) ... the enemy has learned and will not let us build up combat power before we strike! We don't want to ever do Tarawa, IWO or even Midway again. The fleet will be decimated (see the numerous current Sr level UNCLASS wargames that show that explicit outcome related to Taiwan!) So gentlemen put your focus to influence congress and the US shipbuilding capabilities... we need NSS (and NSAv) and LPVs (think Cartel mini-subs on a bigger scale). We need the Fleet to have a "Cloak of invisibility" ( yes your grand kids "Harry Potter movies!) China has a like type technology already. We need an" Iron Dome" technology for the fleet in our Composite Warfare strategy, because China, Russia and Iran are sharing A2AD technology and giving it to non-state actors (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc) and the Fleet is no longer safe as it sits today! Our Corps is learning, i.e., Cyber, Space, Drones, OIE, IW, ( yes UW, CT, FID etc) and CNSO are all going in the right directions... and not just for China! Gen Eric Smith (Ret), a true Warfighter and great friend (we were Co Commanders in 3rd Marines/ DS/DS and Recon I&Is together) said it best when he said words to the effect "This isn't about just China, this is how we can win against any foe, Russia, VEOs, nonstate actors etc" always ready to discuss based on our current real world threats and malign influence situations... not just theory!!
Spiritus Invictus, SemperFi, Essayons
M2
Michael McCusker
LtCol USMC (Ret)
USSOCOM J51VEO
MARFORSOC G7ex (contractor)
Looking for the next opportunity (job) to help a company or Command succeed!
Mike,
What you miss in your argument is the fact it is not just those of us who retired some time ago who see fatal flaws in Force Design 2030; there are a large number of recently retired three and four-star Marine generals who are in the same camp as we are. And there are many active duty officers who reach out to us routinely voicing their concerns about the course on which the present and past CMC have placed the Corps.
My own analysis is that those who are true Force Design believers are in a sense victims of 20 years of fighting an insurgency. Those of us who fought main force Viet Cong units, and the North Vietnamese Army’s forces, as well as insurgents have a much different view of war. It is one where mass and maneuver count and precision fires are important but not central to battles and engagements. We know that it is the proper employment of combined arms that wins battles and campaigns as it has for more than 100 years.
Generals Krulak, Zinni, Sheehan, I, and others have seen what it’s like to face a determined enemy that fights in large formations where cannon artillery and close air support are vital with large numbers of munitions the order of the day. In my first fire fight as a rifle company commander, I called for over 300 rounds of artillery and three air strikes in a little over an hour. All of those I mention had similar experiences, all were seriously wounded during the Vietnam War and spent weeks in the hospital; thus, our view of war is different than many currently serving officers—not better or worse—just different. However, it represents a type of war that has existed for millennia and there is no evidence it is going away.
I have listened to the hype surrounding new technologies for more than 60 years and found it to be a siren song. Napoleon was correct, big battalions and artillery win wars, all else is and remains peripheral.
Semper Fi!
“Rip” Van Riper
General Van Riper, the “true believers” in FD2030 just won’t let it go. It’s a bit like watching someone with an addiction, they know their gambling, drugs or alcohol are killing and ruining their and the lives around them, but they just can’t give over, admit their ill and work toward recovery. What I learned at TBS and 6th IOC class (Nov/Dec 1978) was in part “never again” and damn it don’t do this and don’t do that, and how do we know? Because we got the hell shot out of us and we learned how to survive and thrive in a very very difficult constant combat environment. Organic Battalion combined arms, the 60mm mortar aka the Company Commandsrs hip pocket artillery, etc., etc. Those lessons carried with me into the FMF 3/2 and instructor training at the then ITS and later ALL through a civilian career. To this day I don’t just take a walk in the forest or down a street without some assessemt of the ground around me. What would I do if? A large part of this mind set is again OUR ethos, our unwillingness to compromise our values and way of doing business. One of the critical currencies of Chowder Society II is the work being done to undercover the failure of FD2030 and propose doable workable solutions. This angers the DC cocktail circuit. They fear the “lean and hungry” and pursue the end of a meaningful Marine Corps. So be it. “America doesn’t need a Marine Corps , but it wants one.”
The sad fact is that Marine infantry is essentially naked and alone on today's battlefield. Most will not have artillery support. None we will have tank, bridging, or in-stride breaching support. Most will have limited CIF and CAS support. Relying on another service to provide this support is a fool's errand. Unless properly supported, infantry - - no matter how good the individual Marine - - will be unable to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. We know this from past battles. Sending Marine infantry into combat without robust and resilient combined arms support is criminal.
…and Mike is back with his same arguments. Mike is that a “rice bowl” you have your arms wrapped around? I respect Mike’s opinions but CP needs some different arguments. The Marine Corps “hard turn towards” the 2030 Design is not “ludicrous”. However, what is ludicrous is trading MAGTF combat power for “lethality” and “experimentation”. I once listen to General Smith state that giving up tanks was an easy decision because the Javalin out ranged tanks. Doesn’t 155 tube artillery out range both? By giving up combat power you are giving up flexibility and adaptability. One of the major points of “Warfighting” (and winning), taught by Col Boyd, Bill Lind, Col Wyly and General Grey, is the need to adapt to an ever changing situations. The MAGTF organization and combat power offers the tremendous adaptability and flexibility. We have heard on CP from experienced combat commanders they want their FULL tool bag in hand. A good example is the MEU operation that took down Grenada in the 1980s. Mike keeps mentioning Iwo and Tarawa but what about Tinian? Remember we starved to death far more Japanese soldiers then we killed in WW2 bypassing islands. If you add in the Japanese soldiers on troop ships and barges sunk attempting to reinforce an island…WOW! Take a look at the campaign to isolate and bypass Rabaul with its 100,000 soldiers, over 500 combat aircraft, over 100 tanks and a cave complex of over 300 miles. Mike is concerned about A2/AD but what combat commander is going to let an enemy shoot A2/AD missiles at amphibs and carriers. A2/AD missiles can be taken out on the ground or in the air. Yes, we need to get better at anti-missile defense but we have recognized the issue and the other services are working on it. The 2030 Design has the MC working on land based anti-ship missiles and not A2AD. The best anti-ship defense is another ship or an aircraft attack (thinking F35 here). In the 50s the US built a global cold war bomber defense with Nike missile sites for every major city in US, Europe, Japan and Taiwan. When the enemy switch to rockets and so did we with a MAD Strategy where our missiles could strike anywhere on the globe. We also understand Mike's Marine Corps experiences. They are very similar to our own regarding assignments and General Gray (…and Bill Lind). I also would not want to trade experience arguments with the Chowder 2 crew. Semper Fi Brother
Interesting points all, Mike, and certainly contribute to the professionalism of the discussion here. I would offer that the discussion surrounding insurgency-induced degeneration of maneuver thinking is the one that we were having around tray-rats in both places you mentioned, and our conversations were directly reflected in contemporary writings such as the "Attritionist Letters." We cheered when that series came out, because we saw it happening in the way our increasingly programmed and techno-focused training and warfighting solutions were the shiny objects that those in Quantico followed, often motivated by money and status in the beltway. The running joke was that the Corps was like Risky Business, with the adults deployed and the teenagers in Quantico running amok.
Minus the cultural observations, your argument surrounding ROI and working smarter, not harder against the threats of the future is an ageless one. The supporting effort vs. main effort goes back as far as Douhet, Carlson vs. Edson, through Vietnam, Grenada, Iraq, Afghanistan. I heard it often in recon circles...Marines honestly perplexed at why the big stubborn Marine Corps wouldn't reorganize itself to look more like commandos or recon. It turns out those Marines' frustrations won the day in 2019. It remains to be seen if they will be right.
My old boss at the Div, in the midst of FD2030's rollout, said that if we were on SCS islands first like FD2030 intends, the Chinese would come and try to kick us off. If not, we would have to kick them off. That is the nature of war.
Honestly, I haven't seen an ODA, MSOT, or similar non-combined arms special ops organization that can take or hold terrain like that. Al Gray may have referred to Marines as commandos, but his combined arms procurement (LAV) and employment (MEU) were not designed in pursuit of the certainty-dependent, technology-reliant, methodical, precision forces that define the ideas of "commandos" today.
Occurred to me to go find to a paragraph I wrote some time ago:
H. R. McMaster outlined the tendencies of DOD doctrinal drift after the 1991 Gulf War. He described the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) "Vampire", a DOD movement that refuses to die and repeatedly arises to infect US strategic thought with leap-ahead visions of cheap, precise, and complete solutions to uncertainty. Tied to this was McMaster's second phenomenon known as the "Zero-dark thirty" phenomenon. Rooted in General Norman Schwarzkopf's Desert Storm strategy of "cutting the head off the snake," it is a methodology that mistakes the targeting of enemy command and control (C2) systems as a main-effort strategy in itself. The RMA Vampire and the Zero-dark thirty phenomenon have combined to produce a DOD enamored with information dominance today. The continuing movement is premised on eliminating uncertainty and friction, manifested in the idea that centralized intelligence collection and analysis, driving precision targeting, is key to eliminating enemy C2 and breaking his will.