Compass Points – A New Video
Video & Comments Expand the Discussion
Compass Points appreciates how the discussion about the best way forward for the Marine Corps is always expanding. One person writes an article, others study it, comment on it, and pass it along. Post by post, reader by reader, day by day, the discussion expands. From the broad Marine Corps community, to the larger national security community, including think tanks, academia, and policy advisors, and finally to policy staff and principals in the Pentagon and on the Hill. It takes everyone participating, everyone creating, everyone contributing their own insights, in their own way.
Here are four examples. Compass Points commends everyone for helping move the discussion forward.
Just today, a video was posted on Youtube by ‘From Military.’ The title of the video is "The Marine Corps' Misguided Plan: The Flaws of Force Design 2030" and it lasts 3 minutes and 36 seconds. Thanks ‘From Military’ for your great idea and great video!
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Plus, here are three recent Compass Points comments that showcase the experience and insights of Compass Points readers. Many thanks!
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J. D. commented on Compass Points – Tearing Into T&E 2030.
1. We have a current avenue for technical expertise and longevity in billet. It is called the GS employee. So much more can be said, but really, that's enough. 2. How did the writers of TM2030, especially the writers of that vignette, square the scenario with MCDP 6? This scenario, which flies in the face of combat common sense, really corrupts the credibility of the entire document. In Iraq and Afghanistan, battalions in remote firebases would frequently have UAS in direct support, especially during Troops-in-Contact situations. The UAS controller/monitor, back at the Regimental or higher CP would be looking at the video screen and issuing recommendations to the unit in contact. They would direct units here, there and everywhere, expecting immediate response. It became clear that they had lost their spatial orientation and their ability to link time, space, and the physical capabilities of the unit on the ground. This phenomenon is what the TM2030 vignette will do to commanders.
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G.I. commented on Compass Points - A New Defense of FD 2030.
Regarding "Proceedings Myth: FD2030 changes the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy and ethos" it is worth noting the original iteration of FD2030 (dated March 2020) did NOT reference or make mention of the Corps’ bedrock maneuver warfare warfighting doctrine, and philosophy. Nor did the annual update of FD 2030 dated April 2021(the second iteration of FD2030), make any reference or mention to the Corps' warfighting doctrine of maneuver warfare. It was NOT until the publication of the FD2030 annual update of May 2022 (the third iteration of FD2030) did the words maneuver warfare even appear in FD2030. Sadly the Marine Corps has not only abandoned maneuver warfare but gives up the ghost of being the Nation’s combined arms Force-in-Readiness.
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B.W. commented on Compass Points - Save Marine Aviation.
The fact Gen. Amos, Gen. Dake and Gen. Knutsen are speaking as one is very significant. As a combat veteran flying both the UH-34D and the A-4E it needs to be noted that it isn't just the aircraft being divested by FD 2030. Experienced Marines in highly technical skills that are needed to maintain and fly aircraft are also being divested. These Marines are the soul of USMC Air. It is the soul of Marine Corps Aviation that is being swept away for unproven, untested, unapproved, unmanned air, unmanned surface and unmanned subsurface equipment, and missiles; none of which are suitable for the decisive, battlefield close combat that has characterized Marine Corps Aviation since its birth on May 22, 1912.
There's a logical explanation to this insanity, but you probably won't like it.
The irony here is that we would all agree in improving the following: use /integration of unmanned systems, improving / adapting a linked (fusion) picture, improving the kill chain / sensor - shooter chain, experimenting with organization and employment of legacy and novel systems, and improving the systems we use to manage the people we lead. FD 2030 was presented as the only way to do those things coupled to the assumption that we had to jettison essential capability now to reach a future end state that is, at best, years away, if not improbable. (At least we can market to prospective new recruits that the USMC is pursuing anti-submarine capabilities..."Can you drive a torpedo? Would you like to? Sign here next to o-p-e-n....")