The irony here is that we would all agree in improving the following: use /integration of unmanned systems, improving / adapting a linked (fusion) picture, improving the kill chain / sensor - shooter chain, experimenting with organization and employment of legacy and novel systems, and improving the systems we use to manage the people we lead. FD 2030 was presented as the only way to do those things coupled to the assumption that we had to jettison essential capability now to reach a future end state that is, at best, years away, if not improbable. (At least we can market to prospective new recruits that the USMC is pursuing anti-submarine capabilities..."Can you drive a torpedo? Would you like to? Sign here next to o-p-e-n....")
There's a logical explanation to this insanity, but you probably won't like it.
The irony here is that we would all agree in improving the following: use /integration of unmanned systems, improving / adapting a linked (fusion) picture, improving the kill chain / sensor - shooter chain, experimenting with organization and employment of legacy and novel systems, and improving the systems we use to manage the people we lead. FD 2030 was presented as the only way to do those things coupled to the assumption that we had to jettison essential capability now to reach a future end state that is, at best, years away, if not improbable. (At least we can market to prospective new recruits that the USMC is pursuing anti-submarine capabilities..."Can you drive a torpedo? Would you like to? Sign here next to o-p-e-n....")