Sadly, from the day is was unveiled Force Design 2030 (now force design) revealed significant flaws in its proponents training, education, and knowledge. From a myopically focused missions set that ignored both strategic and operational developments to the failure to consider ideas other than the pre-developed budget driven force structure, the proponents have moved rapidly forward with "divesting" the Marine Corps of critical capabilities such as amphibious shipping, tanks, bridging capabilities, important MOS', and most importantly of all--Marines.
Yes, the force design proponents have callously and recklessly cut our most precious resource--the Marines that fill our ranks and fight our wars. Tankers--out or to the Army and the same other MOS' casually cast aside or driven into the arms of one of the other services who will make use of their skills. What happened to taking care of our Marines? That used to include tactical and operational excellence/ Have we given that up? It would seem so.
The flawed operational concepts that surround force design 2030 are bad (If they really intended to defend islands then they might have chosen something like the Army's Multi-Domain Task Force chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11797.pdf a real successor to the Marine Defense Battalion. But they did not.) The Marine Corps of force design 2030 will not survive in the high threat environment of the South China Sea when faced with a dominant power with surface, air, and space surveillance, a power with peer level weapons and technology, and a willingness to use both numbers and technology in the fight.
If this could be blamed on a lack of experience or training it might forgivable but it is not. Those who participated in the invasion of Iraq know how valuable the resource thrown out by the force design 2030 advocates realize the Marine Corps is no longer capable of conducting such operations nor, apparently does the Navy/Marine Corps team have the capability to conduct NEOs--a bread a butter operation for the Navy/Marine Corps. The proponents of force design 2030 have spent more time attempting to discredit their critics than proving their concepts. It's time for major course correction while there is still a chance that missing and lost capabilities can be re-grown before our Marines have to pay the price for the flawed concept call force design 2030 meet a true test.
To Repeat! Force Design is an operational and strategic dead end. It invites defeat in detail. But even worse, renders the Marine Corps irrelevant because it offers virtually nothing to combatant commanders in a full spectrum war against a determined enemy.
The national defense desperately needs Marine Corps leadership and members of Congress to speak up and help rebuild Marine Corps capabilities to fight any foe, anywhere, and win. The American people deserve no less.
-- Geneal Boomer and General Conway, Real Clear Defense
Sam, The USMC has never offered a full spectrum war capability to Combatant
Commanders! We do battles, not wars. FD 2030 does no such thing as make Marines irrelevant. The nations doesn't need a USMC, it wants one to do what is asked of it, Not what is asked of the old guys.
Spectrums, ranges, continuums, and other linear delineations of war and warfare (operations) are a poor way of thinking about these topics. This approach usually ends up with academic and unproductive arguments about what elements should be on and not be on the line and then what separates those elements. A waste of intellectual energy. There is simply strategy, operational art (campaigns and major operations apply), and tactics. Operational art bridges the gap between the relative abstraction of strategy and the mechanics of tactics.
With that introduction Phil, let me say you are only partly correct. The way General Krulak first explained it was, Marines fight battles and the Army wins wars. He did not say Marines should not be able to fight with large, combined arms air-ground-logistics task forces. Look at recent history; in both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom Marines led one of two corps size forces. General Berger ensured the Corps can no longer field such a force.
No competent Marine Corps leader would ever promulgate an operational concept without first determining if and how to support that concept logistically. The Corps’ leaders have yet to figure that out for Force Design 2030 as the concept moves into its fifth year. If for no other reason than this (and there are many others) they demonstrated their incompetence.
Not much I can say about General Boomer and Conway’s exceptional article. General Smith’s bone headedness is concerning and why he didn’t call for a strategic review of 2030 Design when he became Commandant is remarkable.
I am reminded of incidents of Marine General Officers standing up to the institutional thinking. General Lejeune argued with French General Gourand and his concept of operations of breaking up the American 2nd Division for the attack on Blanc Mont. “General, if the 2nd Division is kept together as a unit and is allowed to attack on a narrow front. I am confident that it can take Blanc Mont Ridge by a single assault.” General Shoup, as Commandant, during the Cuban missile crisis attempted to bring some reality to the Joint Service Chiefs during the discussion of the Cuba invasion plan. The “Rock of Tarawa”, using overlays, first showed the Service Chiefs how large Cuba was in relation to the United States (the Cuba overlay stretched from New York City to Chicago). The final over lay, had a small red dot and when the Service Chiefs asked “what is that”? The “dot represents Tarawa” and it took 35,000 Marines and soldiers to take it in four days of combat with over 3100 casualties. Or when General Victor “Brute” Krulak dared to speak the hard truths about the escalation of the Viet Nam War to President Johnson. The President basically walked the General by the arm out of the Oval Office.
General Berger (and General Smith) could have maintained the Marine Corps leadership legacy of speaking truth to leaders and especially to political leaders with bad ideas. The 2030 Design is a bad idea based on a bad strategy.
It is puzzling that Commandant Smith still clings to FD. The amount of information coming from retired Commandants, generals, and field grade officers comprises many decades of experience. Yet, he continues to double down on this concept. Why? Does Commandant Smith not see that FD has eliminated the one mission that the Marine Corps provides this Nation that no other military force offers: a robust combined arms naval expeditionary force? The Marine Corps has been a naval expeditionary force since its existence, and a combined arms naval expeditionary force for over seventy years. A ready robust force, with armor, artillery, and breeching capabilities. The revamping of the Marine Corps has eliminated a crisis response force which is always ready and at sea. The Navy-Marine Corps team, has missed emergencies due to a lack of amphibious ships. And yet, now wants to pursue a dubious program of unproven light amphibious ships, which on paper appear mediocre at best. The Army with its bigger force and budget is standing up five Multi-Domain Task Forces, which are brigade sized organizations. Two of which are focused on the Indo-Asian area. Japan and the Philippines, which are within the Chinese weapon engagement zone (stand-in forces), are standing up their own ground based anti-shipping units. So why does Commandant Smith still want to duplicate what is already being developed, and at the same time eliminating a unique capability? He is creating a niche force while failing to look at the whole world situation. We have been told that in the event of an emergency, the Army will provide armored support to Marine units. Have any Army tank units been tasked with this mission yet? Are any Marine infantry units being trained with Army tank units to maintain tank-infantry competency? There are so many questions and no answers!
"The Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) remains our crown jewel, and our Amphibious Warfare Ships are the key enabler of our critical missions of campaigning and crisis response.
The ARG/MEU remains in high demand by Combatant Commanders, partners, and allies; our ARG/MEUs are powerful campaigning tools used to respond to crisis, build partner capacity, and prevent escalating events from turning into a larger conflict. Amphibious Warfare Ships enable our global, persistent presence – that presence has been the guarantor of peace and worldwide prosperity for the better part of the last century. More, the inherent mobility, flexibility and lethality of our amphibious forces enable them to hold potential adversaries atrisk globally – providing Combatant Commanders and National leadership with a wide range of tools to deter, respond to crisis, or fight and win. As such, we will continue to advocate for our Amphibious Warfare Ships, including a littoral shore-to-shore capability, that enable us to be present at the decisive moment." Frago 1-24
The Amphibious Fleet is not seaworthy, the ships are broken and there are not enough dry docks or maintainers to keep them afloat. Similarly the MEU’s can not to be sustained because the Marine Expeditionary Force that produces them are broken. The Divisions are crippled by MLRs no Regiments, the Air Wings are crippled by the Osprey grounding and the lack of King Stallions/or Other 53s, we have no tanks , not enough Artillery, Nor a FSSG to generate multiple MEUs . Bottom line CMC Smith is the Emperor with no clothes. He is Force Naked.
No one ask the USMC to adopt FD 2030 or just FD! Re your reference to “the Old Guys”. Do you mean Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Mahan?
Sadly, from the day is was unveiled Force Design 2030 (now force design) revealed significant flaws in its proponents training, education, and knowledge. From a myopically focused missions set that ignored both strategic and operational developments to the failure to consider ideas other than the pre-developed budget driven force structure, the proponents have moved rapidly forward with "divesting" the Marine Corps of critical capabilities such as amphibious shipping, tanks, bridging capabilities, important MOS', and most importantly of all--Marines.
Yes, the force design proponents have callously and recklessly cut our most precious resource--the Marines that fill our ranks and fight our wars. Tankers--out or to the Army and the same other MOS' casually cast aside or driven into the arms of one of the other services who will make use of their skills. What happened to taking care of our Marines? That used to include tactical and operational excellence/ Have we given that up? It would seem so.
The flawed operational concepts that surround force design 2030 are bad (If they really intended to defend islands then they might have chosen something like the Army's Multi-Domain Task Force chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11797.pdf a real successor to the Marine Defense Battalion. But they did not.) The Marine Corps of force design 2030 will not survive in the high threat environment of the South China Sea when faced with a dominant power with surface, air, and space surveillance, a power with peer level weapons and technology, and a willingness to use both numbers and technology in the fight.
If this could be blamed on a lack of experience or training it might forgivable but it is not. Those who participated in the invasion of Iraq know how valuable the resource thrown out by the force design 2030 advocates realize the Marine Corps is no longer capable of conducting such operations nor, apparently does the Navy/Marine Corps team have the capability to conduct NEOs--a bread a butter operation for the Navy/Marine Corps. The proponents of force design 2030 have spent more time attempting to discredit their critics than proving their concepts. It's time for major course correction while there is still a chance that missing and lost capabilities can be re-grown before our Marines have to pay the price for the flawed concept call force design 2030 meet a true test.
To Repeat! Force Design is an operational and strategic dead end. It invites defeat in detail. But even worse, renders the Marine Corps irrelevant because it offers virtually nothing to combatant commanders in a full spectrum war against a determined enemy.
The national defense desperately needs Marine Corps leadership and members of Congress to speak up and help rebuild Marine Corps capabilities to fight any foe, anywhere, and win. The American people deserve no less.
-- Geneal Boomer and General Conway, Real Clear Defense
Sam, The USMC has never offered a full spectrum war capability to Combatant
Commanders! We do battles, not wars. FD 2030 does no such thing as make Marines irrelevant. The nations doesn't need a USMC, it wants one to do what is asked of it, Not what is asked of the old guys.
Spectrums, ranges, continuums, and other linear delineations of war and warfare (operations) are a poor way of thinking about these topics. This approach usually ends up with academic and unproductive arguments about what elements should be on and not be on the line and then what separates those elements. A waste of intellectual energy. There is simply strategy, operational art (campaigns and major operations apply), and tactics. Operational art bridges the gap between the relative abstraction of strategy and the mechanics of tactics.
With that introduction Phil, let me say you are only partly correct. The way General Krulak first explained it was, Marines fight battles and the Army wins wars. He did not say Marines should not be able to fight with large, combined arms air-ground-logistics task forces. Look at recent history; in both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom Marines led one of two corps size forces. General Berger ensured the Corps can no longer field such a force.
No competent Marine Corps leader would ever promulgate an operational concept without first determining if and how to support that concept logistically. The Corps’ leaders have yet to figure that out for Force Design 2030 as the concept moves into its fifth year. If for no other reason than this (and there are many others) they demonstrated their incompetence.
Not much I can say about General Boomer and Conway’s exceptional article. General Smith’s bone headedness is concerning and why he didn’t call for a strategic review of 2030 Design when he became Commandant is remarkable.
I am reminded of incidents of Marine General Officers standing up to the institutional thinking. General Lejeune argued with French General Gourand and his concept of operations of breaking up the American 2nd Division for the attack on Blanc Mont. “General, if the 2nd Division is kept together as a unit and is allowed to attack on a narrow front. I am confident that it can take Blanc Mont Ridge by a single assault.” General Shoup, as Commandant, during the Cuban missile crisis attempted to bring some reality to the Joint Service Chiefs during the discussion of the Cuba invasion plan. The “Rock of Tarawa”, using overlays, first showed the Service Chiefs how large Cuba was in relation to the United States (the Cuba overlay stretched from New York City to Chicago). The final over lay, had a small red dot and when the Service Chiefs asked “what is that”? The “dot represents Tarawa” and it took 35,000 Marines and soldiers to take it in four days of combat with over 3100 casualties. Or when General Victor “Brute” Krulak dared to speak the hard truths about the escalation of the Viet Nam War to President Johnson. The President basically walked the General by the arm out of the Oval Office.
General Berger (and General Smith) could have maintained the Marine Corps leadership legacy of speaking truth to leaders and especially to political leaders with bad ideas. The 2030 Design is a bad idea based on a bad strategy.
It is puzzling that Commandant Smith still clings to FD. The amount of information coming from retired Commandants, generals, and field grade officers comprises many decades of experience. Yet, he continues to double down on this concept. Why? Does Commandant Smith not see that FD has eliminated the one mission that the Marine Corps provides this Nation that no other military force offers: a robust combined arms naval expeditionary force? The Marine Corps has been a naval expeditionary force since its existence, and a combined arms naval expeditionary force for over seventy years. A ready robust force, with armor, artillery, and breeching capabilities. The revamping of the Marine Corps has eliminated a crisis response force which is always ready and at sea. The Navy-Marine Corps team, has missed emergencies due to a lack of amphibious ships. And yet, now wants to pursue a dubious program of unproven light amphibious ships, which on paper appear mediocre at best. The Army with its bigger force and budget is standing up five Multi-Domain Task Forces, which are brigade sized organizations. Two of which are focused on the Indo-Asian area. Japan and the Philippines, which are within the Chinese weapon engagement zone (stand-in forces), are standing up their own ground based anti-shipping units. So why does Commandant Smith still want to duplicate what is already being developed, and at the same time eliminating a unique capability? He is creating a niche force while failing to look at the whole world situation. We have been told that in the event of an emergency, the Army will provide armored support to Marine units. Have any Army tank units been tasked with this mission yet? Are any Marine infantry units being trained with Army tank units to maintain tank-infantry competency? There are so many questions and no answers!
Generals Boomer & Conway call balls & strikes in this one. Hard hitting & to the point. Well done, Marines.
I shared this on X and conducted my own bombardment with this quote in numerous other locations.
"The Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) remains our crown jewel, and our Amphibious Warfare Ships are the key enabler of our critical missions of campaigning and crisis response.
The ARG/MEU remains in high demand by Combatant Commanders, partners, and allies; our ARG/MEUs are powerful campaigning tools used to respond to crisis, build partner capacity, and prevent escalating events from turning into a larger conflict. Amphibious Warfare Ships enable our global, persistent presence – that presence has been the guarantor of peace and worldwide prosperity for the better part of the last century. More, the inherent mobility, flexibility and lethality of our amphibious forces enable them to hold potential adversaries atrisk globally – providing Combatant Commanders and National leadership with a wide range of tools to deter, respond to crisis, or fight and win. As such, we will continue to advocate for our Amphibious Warfare Ships, including a littoral shore-to-shore capability, that enable us to be present at the decisive moment." Frago 1-24
The Amphibious Fleet is not seaworthy, the ships are broken and there are not enough dry docks or maintainers to keep them afloat. Similarly the MEU’s can not to be sustained because the Marine Expeditionary Force that produces them are broken. The Divisions are crippled by MLRs no Regiments, the Air Wings are crippled by the Osprey grounding and the lack of King Stallions/or Other 53s, we have no tanks , not enough Artillery, Nor a FSSG to generate multiple MEUs . Bottom line CMC Smith is the Emperor with no clothes. He is Force Naked.
No one ask the USMC to adopt FD 2030 or just FD! Re your reference to “the Old Guys”. Do you mean Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Mahan?