I was an M1A1 company commander in Desert Shield/Storm. We were opcon, 8th Marine Regiment and worked along with the Army's Tiger Brigade. I can tell you from personal experience that the 8th Marine regimental commander was very happy to have 14 M1A1 tanks at the pointy end of his spear and then as his regimental reserve, if needed (our flexibility). By the time we got to our final objective in Kuwait, all Iraqi armor and anti-armor capabilities had been cleared from the battlefield by a combination of air, artillery, armor and anti-armor (TOW) assets working together as a coordinated, combined arms team. We were the last ground based heavy anti-armor offense for the 8th Marines in contact. Tanks work in pairs as wing-men to maximize their protection, firepower and target acquisition. Three armored vehicles in a platoon does not seem optimal to me. Four per platoon seems a better choice. The anti-drone/anti-missile defenses now installed on tanks may not survive first contact and can likely be cleared off by enemy artillery or repeated drone attacks and there is no going back to the barn for repair under fire. Superior tactics and mobility are keys to successful employment of armor and its surviveablilty and that depends in large part on the skills and training of the armor company and its crews. You cannot now six years later, just add tanks and send them into harms way with inexperienced crews. The Marine Corps needs to renew its Combined Arms Exercises at 29 Palms if they are not doing so today. Tank crews will need schools and multiple live fire/maneuver training opportunities to be ready for combat. I can't tell you how educating it was for us to get hit by a pair of A4 Skyhawks laying down CS gas just before dawn on the last day of a CAX after no sleep to make me think about what I would do as a tanker if we did not have air superiority over the battlefield. Same can be said for attack by aerial drones.
Gentlemen at one time the Corps also had 155mm SP Artillery, 8 inch SP and 175mm SP Artillery.
Over a period of 50 years we have gotten lighter and lighter as the Navy reneged on Amphibious Shipping and MPS Squadrons. We have morphed into light infantry in small battalions with limited mobility and much of it is in helicopters. We are heading in the wrong direction.
My first artillery battery was 3rd 175mm Gun Battery, 1st Field Artillery Group at 29 Palms, Ca. The “Stumps” was the place to be as a 2nd Lt., if you wanted to learn the profession of field artillery. We had some great teachers, among them, then Maj. Jerry McAbee.
The M107 though having some disadvantages such as exposed crew, 2 rounds only on board, and a laying procedure that took great skill, it was a great gun that could “reach out and touch someone” (32,800 meters).
Sorry for the repeat fire missions. No modern force can maneuver without anti air capabilities to deal with drones. There are innumerable options popping up daily. The Corps would need to pick and hurry the hell up. Right now our trousers are around our ankles.
Let’s be under no illusions. The divestment as the Devil’s coup and the rebuild will not be easy, quick or cheap. Gen Berger knew that when he pulled the trigger. It will take leadership with moral courage to reverse this. Anyone see someone like that in the top 20 Generals in the Corps? Irrelevance keeps knocking at the door…
Semper Tanks. FYI - they still do CAX-ish things as ITX's etc. Not to mention, Steel Knight is still a major exercise now. But no, they don't have tanks participating.
Good to hear you echo the 'pipeline of training/experience problem'. The operations and logistics just works itself out, right?
This string on ARMOR is outstanding! CFROG & Doug Rape’, in particular, have some interesting insights worthy of exploring - at least IMHO. Once upon a time at 29 Palms, the Corps established the LAV Test Directorate to do just that: test the LAV to the Nth degree. Out of that came Cadillac-Gage LAV that has served us so well. Moreover, we worked the Marines very hard in field service - lots of it - I was there at the time & observed it from afar. In one PME opportunity for several Field Grade officers - a hands on class with an LAV & its crew - one Major asked the L/Cpl driver “how fast will it go?” The Marine replied: “Sir, the speedometer says 55, but I guarantee you it will do 70!” We had been using Condor Road as a test area - I believed the L/Cpl. My point? Why not repeat that exacting process again at 29 Palms? Why not have a test-competition with the various systems mentioned herein this string, and select the platform that meets our needs, AND, one that has add-on capacity for product improvements over time? We need the armored punch! Let’s do the testing with systems in existence, and get on with rebuilding the MAGTF. Offered as Food For Thought. Semper Fidelis!
Thank you. You reminded me of a story. There is a reason the USMC did not adopt the LAV 105. It is because it was thoroughly tested over a long period. I knew one of the 1802s who worked on the program at the end (he helped to shutter it). Although anecdotal, the gist was too many problems that resulted in additional weight that resulted in additional problems. The trade offs escalated and made the chase futile. I want to say among the stories Mitch related, one concerned the alarming tendency for the LAV to be laterally unstable when firing a certain amount or more off centerline, especially on sloping terrain. Another hard issue was the fact that frame life was a constant issue.
Anyone who understands history, the battlefield, recent technology and the developments in anti air and anti drone technology understands the need for tanks. Main Battle Tanks. Want a mix of light, medium and main battle tanks? That is worthy of examination. No tanks at all is pure stupidity. In the end you need more tanks rather than less.
Across the period of 1974-2000 I was not shy about advocating for an Armored Vehicle Regiment in the Marine Division. Three Infantry Regiments of two Bn’s each, one Artillery Regiment of five Bn’s, one Armored Vehicle Regiment of three Bn’s and one Amphibious Assault Regiment of two Bn’s. The Armored Regiment would consist of two tank Bns and one LAV Bn. I would add one Engineer Regiment of two Bn’s. Task organization makes all things possible….. you can’t task organize with what you do not have.
The Haynes Board in March 1976, advocated for a similar organization for armor, light armor, and infantry. Unfortunately, this organization was not implemented. For today though, what about an armored regiment of an MBT/Abrams bn and two bns of lighter/more expeditionary light tanks. All guns would be 120mm. I believe Soviet era Naval Infantry tank bns had a mix of PT-76 light tanks and T-62s MBTs.
Randy - I seem to recall the Haynes Board had input from the likes of retired Colonel Jerry Turly, who, if memory serves me right, was our observer in the ‘73 Yom Kippur War.
Thank you, Colonel. I learned of the Haynes Board from the book, Marines Under Armor, by Lt. Colonel Ken Estes. Other than that information, I have found very little about the Haynes Board. Here we are some 50 yrs later, still proving the importance of armor to the Marine Corps. I just read about Colonel Turley and he appears to be one of many heroes of the Corps. Thank you.
In all seriousness, I find it interesting that at one point fromt he '50s into the '60s+, the USMC had wheeled scouts, tankettes (Ontos), M103s, and MBTs. Plus a bunch of recoiless rifles and battlefield tactical rockets (Honest John). Not to mention the crazy mortar and artillery diversity....(edit - have to add the M67 Zippo!)
1) Please note that the last USMC Tank Bn T/O & E used a 4 Tank Platoon and a 2 Tank HdQtrs Section for the Company and Battalion. We stressed the wingman concept; I suspect that is still viable today, with a little tweak here and there. Would be worth some tinkering with the application across the spectrum of operating environments. Teaming could still be platoon / section. Some experimentation with splitting sections could be done, but it is optimum (it's the same for the vehicles as the buddy team concept. Single vic/tiger teaming should not be a choice, but a necessity driven by METT-T+.
2) The K21 might be worth evaluating not as a candidate, but as a test bed for weight and crew size versus capability and maintainability. I'd like to see the durability of the frame and Cockerill turret tested. A system that can't be trained with for fear of early/excessive wear is counter productive and a ticket for frequent unplanned Service Life Extension Programs to bandaid the thing back together, which usually leads to more weight. Some nations use systems more because they look the part, not really because it is a great system that endures robust training...the tank version of a barbecue gun (barbecue gun is the fancy gun you show your friends at a barbecue, but don't shoot very much) Speaking of which...
3) Weight #1: Pursuing large main gun in low weight platforms is a trail to the valley of maintenance and tears. The 105 doesn't make this better...it just means a lot less punch in the payload. The vehicle will still be stressed and the light wheeled platforms just aren't good for this. At the 25 (+/-) ton range and less, the autocannons are generally better. Less weight, more ammo, less stress on the platform, very flexible. This is especially true in light of the relative lack of protection at that weight. There is a threshold of 'better/worse' and 28 tons is under it.
4) Weight #2: the perfect USMC tank is 0 tons, fits in a cargo pocket, invulnerable, requires 1 gallon of sunflower oil for 1000 mile range, and can be operated by 1 and a half Marines. That said, I would suggest the Sherman Easy Eight tank gives a good model for a balance of capability and weight that we could use as the 'fit' box for a modern globally relevant tank. The 35 to 45 ton range is reasonable when looked at for global fit for a large gun vehicle. It still provides sufficient frame life/durability/room to grow as new concepts and technology emerges. It doesn't overload bridge capacity across the globe as much. The chassis will be strong enough and durable to support recovery vehicles and bridge launchers if necessary.
Not to mention, there is the question of cope cages / hedgehog bristles being a possible need, which means more weight.
5) Heresy: one modern off the shelf version of the Easy Eight is the Modern Bradley. yes, it doesn't have a large gun, but it has room for various larger autocannons, not to mention already having tried and true 25mm and 30mm (high velocity). Brads are extensively developed, mobile, and capable. Protection and crew survivability are very good for the class. Variants are already built out. Yeah, they are a little tall for my tastes, but ti fits the box.
6) Air mobility: The Bradley and the Abrams are both C-17/C-5 transportable. (The Abrams, as used by the USMC, was already over the shore capable and could ford fairly easily. Unfortunately, I am not sure of the USN's current status on the reinforced LCMs we needed for the Abrams). The thing with air mobility: if you want something to fit in a C-130 and/or be Helo Sling loadable, you are going to have to give up a lot (not to mention if Air Delivery is on the table). There is a reason the Sheridan and related tankettes had troubled personal lives...they were a schizophrenic platform tied to an insensitive user. At a certain point, one realizes the logic of the old jeep with the 106 recoilless on it. You either voluntarily give up on a requirement (firepower, maneuverability, protection, durability) sufficiently, or reality will do it for you. Better to face the trade off up front for what you are attempting to do. (The Ontos, while cool and well used....was a bit of a Platypus that came with a limp. I don't think the trade offs made resulted in a great platform. It was at it's best matched with a tank anyway. And yes, 1 vehicle / 6 gun volley is cool, no argument there).
7) Don't forget, the heavier armored fighting vehicle is the best Combined Arms Maneuver platform.
I have more thoughts on the matter, but this is already a novel on CP's time.
Well, I would assume it would take time again for battle planners to learn to integrate armor and the logistics to support it into their plans. The 8th Marines S4 told me that our M1A1 company consumed the entire regiment's fuel allocation in one day. Lesson learned in battle I guess.
Haha...even in the best of times, educating the infantry being supported on the fact that two belts of 7.62 and fuel for 4 HMMVWS would not be adequate Class III and V resupply for a tank platoon was a constant. (though, yucks aside, I did find that prior coordination usually ensured the right resupply. A few units I worked with had CO's and -3s that were all over the log piece of tank support. Unfortunately, the example given is from an early experience with an Inf Bn on a MCCRE. Despite thorough coordination with the -4, they still sent me a HMMVW with a fuel bladder on it. Then, when I said "hey, this is what I was talking about. I told you our standard resupply and you said good to go"....I told them I was not going to spin up the guys at my battalion on short notice; this is your MCCRE and it's on you. You can go to Division and get a fueler or at least own it and tell them you need to ask for help. Of course, instead of going to Division et al, they called direct over to my parent battalion who got spun up on a late and very short notice resupply. I kne wit all, because of course I was covering the resupply through back channels in case the Inf Bn fumbled it again. My friend, who was also the MT Maint O / CWO4 gave me a rash of good natured sht: "I thought you were taking care of the logistics?". Of course, we still drained that little HMMVW refueler for what it was worth. I think it was crying when the tanks were done with it.
I’d say the Korean tank has some potential. The cv90-120 is going to be to heavy tobhave any advantage as a light tank. I still advocate for Centsuro 2 weather in 105 or 120mm as we should be able to work up some parts commonality between it and the ACV. Japan and Taiwan also have similar wheeled tank guns at a good weight.
Wheeled tanks are great for road trips and the motorpool. Say, everywhere except in rough terrain and actual combat. You are talking about an overloaded recce vehicle. The Centauro is cool, but durability to allow training and decent service life is (?). CV90-120 weight class is fine for a light tank.
LCU 1700 can carry two M1's by design. LCU 2000 can carry 5 M1s. LCACs and SSCs...well, you might squeeze two 35 ton platforms on depending on load distribution. We can already get 4 LAVs, a bunch of JLTVs, or a gaggle of RAZRs on LCACs. Why pursue the weight limit to the extent that we get the same limits in performance and capability as other sub 30 ton light vehicles? It puts the system on the same schizophrenic path as airborne armor that tries to do it all. There is a mobility, firepower, protection, reliability threshold in the 20-30 ton range where I suspect the 4 part performance difference per pound really doesn't change to neccessarily make the weight increase worthwhile. Locking into 25-28 ton vehicle usually produces a vehicle with the problems of a 30+ ton vehicle married to the capability of a 20 +/- ton vehicle. It's usually the physics of making a rugged frame, sufficient to tolerate large Main Gun firing and mobility stress, carrying sufficient protection to make a difference in relative armor level verus lighter vehicles, in a package that has sufficient mobility/speed and range.
Fair enough. I will just add I have not seen a modular armor system worth a toss. It's a bad solution that briefs well in concept. Why not modular weapon, modular powerpack, modular chassis, etc.? It's because they don't brief as well as lego armor, but are just as silly. The protection should be designed in and the chassis/powertrain built to support it from the start. Screens/cages/ERA/Applique/ etc is going to happen anyway....better to start at the full protection and go from there.
The Bullfrog and drone system has huge potential for anti drone protection. Could be ideal for tanks, trucks and other units. My take from reading this exceptional thread is that a lot of experience wants tanks on the battlefield.
I am currently reading the book Victory to Defeat by Richard Dannatt and Dr. Robert Lyman. The book encompasses WWI and WWII aa well as some of the present day in Europe and Ukraine. The reason I bring this book up is that before WWII, the British Army considered bringing in a light tank that could move at almost 40 miles per hour and then another heavier tank that moved about as fast as a man could walk. The British Army, missed an opportunity. They only orderd the slowest moving tanks. While the hostilities of WWII, were under way. I hope that the American Marine Corps, does not make the mistake of waiting until some nation like China, decides to try to take on the United States Militarily. Before it decides to do something. I think the Ideal consideration would be a light tank that can move quickly and then a heavier one for protecting troops.
The Leo 1 was small, fast, lightly armored because the desire was to focus on lower weight and to prioritize the weight under that limit for mobility over protection. Not that wasn't armored; but the armor was secondary. If you've ever seen the port in the side of the Leo 1 classic turret to toss shells out of, you see how thin the armor is. It was thinner than a CV90/30 turret.
When it comes to armor and AAVs, it seems that this new crop of officers can’t seem to get anything right. What happened in the intervening years since the Corps magnificent performance in Desert Storm? Whatever occurred has to be corrected or they’ll continue to muddle on.
Desert Storm? That was pretty good. Me being parochial, but you may want to look at I MEF in the kickoff of '03. Especially 5th RCT. As a battalion TF under 5th RCT, 2d Tanks (3 Tank Cos and one Infantry Co aka F 2/5) executed the longest continuous night attack in USMC history. A lot of other magnificent stories. Yes, we most certainly stood on the shoulders of giants who came before us. As an aside one of the unsung incredible stories was the entire MEF rolling CEOI schedules mid stride on the suspected compromise of some comm equipment. Ops continued unimpeded.
If the current CMC and the Acolytes of FDFuzzy Wuzzy are not working feverishly to recover the armor needed and designed for the modern battle space than the Hell with retirement they need to be charged with dereliction of duty. There are so many great ideas and concepts mentioned here today that it is clear that armor can be returned to the Corps in relatively short order. Let’s hope we can get some real traction and when this current commandant irons his last pair of skivvies and heads to retirement we get someone occupying the oldest standing structure in Washington, DC who understands the phrase “combined arms.” He doesn’t even have to know how to spell it, just employ it!
What about the recently cancelled M10 Booker? It is lighter than an Abrams, and probably more lightly armored than desirable, but it is well armed and has the advantage of already being developed.
The Albatross....marginal even when the M8 before it was being considered. Kind of like 4 cylinder Mustang II....all the wrong trade offs and not worth the weight to capability. (yes, I know someone is going to chime in and say they loved their 4 banger Mustang II). Also, resurrecting the 105mm for the US Logistics Chain in 2026 just doesn't make sense. Yes, I know there is probably some still in the back corner of the war stocks from the Stryker 1128 and mothballed M1s/M60s. Kind of like a police department buying .40 in 2026 when all your current pistol(s) and ammo is 9mm. Not to mention the 105 has drastically reduced payload compared to 120mm, and the smaller auto guns are more flexible for the weight.
The M1A1, for all it's benefits, is not capable of destroying drone swarms and is a huge consumer of fuel and other logistics as well. In a modern conflict with a peer enemy that has modern isr, those logistics trains will be stressed to the extreme. You could load a canister round to take a swarm of drones, but that is like using a glock 19 to swat a fly out of the air. It works, but it's excessive. Adding drone jammers to the tank only increases more weight. Politically, main battle tanks look like an invasion. Marine armor traditionally was used more in an infantry support role, and not in a tank on tank role like the Army. Marine tankers typically took on technicals, infantry in defilade, bunkers, apcs, and older ifvs and tanks- NOT modern enemy mbts. Furthermore, consider how the USMC deploys. Space is at a premium on ship, and the USMC must maintain it's mobility if it wants to rapidly respond to short-notice contingencies in an expeditionary manner.
Imagine a vehicle that can provide fire support to the infantry, destroy tanks, and counter enemy aerial threats in one platform, while being both tactically and strategically mobile via USMC C130 airlift and having a stream fording capability, modular modern armor packages, and a low signature? The modern USMC needs a vehicle that does not rely solely on it's armor for protection at the cost of increased weight (and everything else) like the Abrams. The cv90120 is not capable of combating drones, it does not carry as much ammo on board as a vehicle armed with an autocannon would, it is too heavy to be airlifted via USMC assets, and it's gun barrel is quite long for urban environments. In addition, the USMC does not need an IFV when we already have the ACV. The Booker is also not a good idea because it's 105mm cannon also cannot handle drone swarms, there is no mention of drones jammers or ai and sensor shooter network integration to assist in tracking fast moving drone swarms, and it is too heavy to be airlifted via organic USMC assets. We need something that doesn't currently exist. We are going to have to change the way we think about tanks and what we want and need from such a platform- even a light tank may not do for the direction the modern USMC needs to go in.
I propose a wheeled, 6x6 fire support vehicle that is armed with a 40mm cannon that fires airbursting HEDP and APFSDS, as well as a coaxial 7.62, roof mounted m240/ m2a1/ mk19/ mk47 in a RWS, atgms, modular armor packages (NERA, RPG netting- NOT cages or slat armor, spaced composite plates over vulnerable areas like a frontal glacis plate, next generation multi-spectrum signature reducing armor panels that decrease a vehicles visual and IR signature, and maybe even turret chains!) that can be added or removed in the field, river crossing capability, c130 air lift capability via a hard weight cap, ai integration, drone jammers, modern targeting and hunter-killer engagement capability, sensor-shooter network integration, on-board reconnaissance drone launch and recovery capability via a SkyDio drone, Grunt phone, rear egress hatch, front mounted powerpack engine for added protection without extra weight, aggressively sloped armor, APS, an aluminum hull, a low profile, a hydropenumatic suspension system that can raise or lower the run-flat tires as well as a central tire inflation system, fire suppression systems, nbc protection, and a rear egress hatch like the merkava or namer. Smart thermal routing can redirect heat down and away from the vehicle. A hybrid electric engine can also increase the range of such a vehicle, meaning it does not need to be tied to it's logistics tail as much as the Abrams did because it can go farther on one tank of gas. In addition, the newer hybrid engines are quieter than the older turbine engines on their own, and they can be made quieter via noise baffles in the engine compartment that dampen the vehicles' acoustic signature. You can even have mounts on the side of the vehicle to quickly roll and unroll camouflage netting to further reduce the vehicle's signature. Space on the rear deck behind the turret could even be used for 1 litter casualty. The vehicle should also have an electric winch for recovery.
Yes, a 40mm autocannon is not as powerful as a 120mm cannon is, but it fires faster, can store more ammo on board, is better at combating drone swarms, is short enough to traverse between buildings, has growth potential for the future to take on the threats the USMC is most likely to face, and the onboard atgms, fires, and cas can handle what the autocannon can't. Wheels may not always be as reliable as tracks, but they are quieter, easier to swap, more fuel efficient, and lighter than tracks. An aluminum hull does not provide as much protection as the steel composite armor of the Abrams does, but is much lighter, cheaper, and the modular armor packages I mentioned plus APS, ai integration, a lower profile/ reduced signature, and being part of a sensor shooter network help to make up for the lack of sheer armor. Avoiding being detected while sensing and striking the enemy first is going to have to take priority in future Marine mobile protected firepower vehicles versus armor to defeat all threats.
I would like to see such a vehicle paired up with CAAT Platoons mounted on ULTV's with javelins and drones, being highly mobile, stealthy, and plugged into a greater sensor shooter network that can take data from the up and coming ARV, AI, and other MAGTF nodes, call for fire via long range highly responsive fires platforms like HIMARS or Marine CAS, and rapidly displace to another location via it's tactical and strategic mobility.
The C-130 requirement really makes it mission impossible. Look at the ARV program. That won't fit a C-130 with the 30mm gun, not combat weight. The ACV is also not taking a ride in a C-130. Some things will still be arriving from the sea. We also need a high elevating gun. Isn't that what they are trying to do with the 50mm gun being developed?
An aluminum hull, plus 6x6 wheeled configuration and removable armor packages help reduce weight. Ideally, I would like for such a vehicle to be air transportable via C-130J at a bare minimum, as that would be huge for an MPF platform to arrive rapidly by air on unprepared, austere runways. This would be perfect for a battlefield like the Pacific, or expeditionary operations the USMC often faces. The proposed 50mm cannon from the OMFV program is incredibly powerful and has a longer range, but you cannot carry as much ammo on board a 6x6. A 30mm cannon may have more ammo than a 40mm, but now it has less growth potential to handle future armored threats than a 40mm could. I would like to stick with the 6x6 over an 8x8 due to a lighter weight for better mobility, smaller signature, greater fuel efficiency, and cheaper overall cost.
In addition, if we ever upgraded the C-130J with the MC-130J water landing capability and if the vehicle I proposed could transit calm sea states, you could land the C130 in water, and have the vehicle "swim" to shore without needing to land on the ground if it is denied or otherwise inaccessible. I don't think the vehicle I mentioned could handle rough sea states, but calm sea states may be possible. Same thing with airlift, slinging this thing under a CH53K (again, in it's most base armor configuration) would be nice to have, but it may be too far of a stretch. At a bare minimum though, any new "tank" we adopt should be able to be carried by C130. It needs to be mobile, the lack of mobility with the Abrams is not suitable for the modern USMC on a modern battlefield.
The HIMARS, upcoming ARV, LAV-25, and the M8 AGS can fit in a c130. You're telling me a 6x6 with a 40mm cannon with modular armor that is removable could not, and is not possible in the near future with technological improvements either? The Abrams, Booker, CV90120, and Centauro II definetely cannot fit in a C130 either.
Why not also ask for it to weigh 10 tons and fold up into a cargo pocket? In all seriousness, to start with, I think you vastly underestimate the weight you've engineered into this thing, in addition to a laundry list of conflicting requirements. The only thing not on the list, is an ice maker.
I was an M1A1 company commander in Desert Shield/Storm. We were opcon, 8th Marine Regiment and worked along with the Army's Tiger Brigade. I can tell you from personal experience that the 8th Marine regimental commander was very happy to have 14 M1A1 tanks at the pointy end of his spear and then as his regimental reserve, if needed (our flexibility). By the time we got to our final objective in Kuwait, all Iraqi armor and anti-armor capabilities had been cleared from the battlefield by a combination of air, artillery, armor and anti-armor (TOW) assets working together as a coordinated, combined arms team. We were the last ground based heavy anti-armor offense for the 8th Marines in contact. Tanks work in pairs as wing-men to maximize their protection, firepower and target acquisition. Three armored vehicles in a platoon does not seem optimal to me. Four per platoon seems a better choice. The anti-drone/anti-missile defenses now installed on tanks may not survive first contact and can likely be cleared off by enemy artillery or repeated drone attacks and there is no going back to the barn for repair under fire. Superior tactics and mobility are keys to successful employment of armor and its surviveablilty and that depends in large part on the skills and training of the armor company and its crews. You cannot now six years later, just add tanks and send them into harms way with inexperienced crews. The Marine Corps needs to renew its Combined Arms Exercises at 29 Palms if they are not doing so today. Tank crews will need schools and multiple live fire/maneuver training opportunities to be ready for combat. I can't tell you how educating it was for us to get hit by a pair of A4 Skyhawks laying down CS gas just before dawn on the last day of a CAX after no sleep to make me think about what I would do as a tanker if we did not have air superiority over the battlefield. Same can be said for attack by aerial drones.
Gentlemen at one time the Corps also had 155mm SP Artillery, 8 inch SP and 175mm SP Artillery.
Over a period of 50 years we have gotten lighter and lighter as the Navy reneged on Amphibious Shipping and MPS Squadrons. We have morphed into light infantry in small battalions with limited mobility and much of it is in helicopters. We are heading in the wrong direction.
My first artillery battery was 3rd 175mm Gun Battery, 1st Field Artillery Group at 29 Palms, Ca. The “Stumps” was the place to be as a 2nd Lt., if you wanted to learn the profession of field artillery. We had some great teachers, among them, then Maj. Jerry McAbee.
The M107 though having some disadvantages such as exposed crew, 2 rounds only on board, and a laying procedure that took great skill, it was a great gun that could “reach out and touch someone” (32,800 meters).
Sorry for the repeat fire missions. No modern force can maneuver without anti air capabilities to deal with drones. There are innumerable options popping up daily. The Corps would need to pick and hurry the hell up. Right now our trousers are around our ankles.
Let’s be under no illusions. The divestment as the Devil’s coup and the rebuild will not be easy, quick or cheap. Gen Berger knew that when he pulled the trigger. It will take leadership with moral courage to reverse this. Anyone see someone like that in the top 20 Generals in the Corps? Irrelevance keeps knocking at the door…
Semper Tanks. FYI - they still do CAX-ish things as ITX's etc. Not to mention, Steel Knight is still a major exercise now. But no, they don't have tanks participating.
Good to hear you echo the 'pipeline of training/experience problem'. The operations and logistics just works itself out, right?
Greg, fully agree. Personally I like the 5 tank platoon with the heavy section/light section tactical options.
Amen!
This string on ARMOR is outstanding! CFROG & Doug Rape’, in particular, have some interesting insights worthy of exploring - at least IMHO. Once upon a time at 29 Palms, the Corps established the LAV Test Directorate to do just that: test the LAV to the Nth degree. Out of that came Cadillac-Gage LAV that has served us so well. Moreover, we worked the Marines very hard in field service - lots of it - I was there at the time & observed it from afar. In one PME opportunity for several Field Grade officers - a hands on class with an LAV & its crew - one Major asked the L/Cpl driver “how fast will it go?” The Marine replied: “Sir, the speedometer says 55, but I guarantee you it will do 70!” We had been using Condor Road as a test area - I believed the L/Cpl. My point? Why not repeat that exacting process again at 29 Palms? Why not have a test-competition with the various systems mentioned herein this string, and select the platform that meets our needs, AND, one that has add-on capacity for product improvements over time? We need the armored punch! Let’s do the testing with systems in existence, and get on with rebuilding the MAGTF. Offered as Food For Thought. Semper Fidelis!
Thank you. You reminded me of a story. There is a reason the USMC did not adopt the LAV 105. It is because it was thoroughly tested over a long period. I knew one of the 1802s who worked on the program at the end (he helped to shutter it). Although anecdotal, the gist was too many problems that resulted in additional weight that resulted in additional problems. The trade offs escalated and made the chase futile. I want to say among the stories Mitch related, one concerned the alarming tendency for the LAV to be laterally unstable when firing a certain amount or more off centerline, especially on sloping terrain. Another hard issue was the fact that frame life was a constant issue.
I believe this is very similar to why the Army's Stryker 105 was not very successful.
Anyone who understands history, the battlefield, recent technology and the developments in anti air and anti drone technology understands the need for tanks. Main Battle Tanks. Want a mix of light, medium and main battle tanks? That is worthy of examination. No tanks at all is pure stupidity. In the end you need more tanks rather than less.
Across the period of 1974-2000 I was not shy about advocating for an Armored Vehicle Regiment in the Marine Division. Three Infantry Regiments of two Bn’s each, one Artillery Regiment of five Bn’s, one Armored Vehicle Regiment of three Bn’s and one Amphibious Assault Regiment of two Bn’s. The Armored Regiment would consist of two tank Bns and one LAV Bn. I would add one Engineer Regiment of two Bn’s. Task organization makes all things possible….. you can’t task organize with what you do not have.
The Haynes Board in March 1976, advocated for a similar organization for armor, light armor, and infantry. Unfortunately, this organization was not implemented. For today though, what about an armored regiment of an MBT/Abrams bn and two bns of lighter/more expeditionary light tanks. All guns would be 120mm. I believe Soviet era Naval Infantry tank bns had a mix of PT-76 light tanks and T-62s MBTs.
Randy - I seem to recall the Haynes Board had input from the likes of retired Colonel Jerry Turly, who, if memory serves me right, was our observer in the ‘73 Yom Kippur War.
Thank you, Colonel. I learned of the Haynes Board from the book, Marines Under Armor, by Lt. Colonel Ken Estes. Other than that information, I have found very little about the Haynes Board. Here we are some 50 yrs later, still proving the importance of armor to the Marine Corps. I just read about Colonel Turley and he appears to be one of many heroes of the Corps. Thank you.
Naturally, the CO should have been an 1802 ;)
In all seriousness, I find it interesting that at one point fromt he '50s into the '60s+, the USMC had wheeled scouts, tankettes (Ontos), M103s, and MBTs. Plus a bunch of recoiless rifles and battlefield tactical rockets (Honest John). Not to mention the crazy mortar and artillery diversity....(edit - have to add the M67 Zippo!)
Typo. Each Infantry Regiment with three Bn’s with four rifle companies each.
BZ! Keep Up The Fire!
A few points.
1) Please note that the last USMC Tank Bn T/O & E used a 4 Tank Platoon and a 2 Tank HdQtrs Section for the Company and Battalion. We stressed the wingman concept; I suspect that is still viable today, with a little tweak here and there. Would be worth some tinkering with the application across the spectrum of operating environments. Teaming could still be platoon / section. Some experimentation with splitting sections could be done, but it is optimum (it's the same for the vehicles as the buddy team concept. Single vic/tiger teaming should not be a choice, but a necessity driven by METT-T+.
2) The K21 might be worth evaluating not as a candidate, but as a test bed for weight and crew size versus capability and maintainability. I'd like to see the durability of the frame and Cockerill turret tested. A system that can't be trained with for fear of early/excessive wear is counter productive and a ticket for frequent unplanned Service Life Extension Programs to bandaid the thing back together, which usually leads to more weight. Some nations use systems more because they look the part, not really because it is a great system that endures robust training...the tank version of a barbecue gun (barbecue gun is the fancy gun you show your friends at a barbecue, but don't shoot very much) Speaking of which...
3) Weight #1: Pursuing large main gun in low weight platforms is a trail to the valley of maintenance and tears. The 105 doesn't make this better...it just means a lot less punch in the payload. The vehicle will still be stressed and the light wheeled platforms just aren't good for this. At the 25 (+/-) ton range and less, the autocannons are generally better. Less weight, more ammo, less stress on the platform, very flexible. This is especially true in light of the relative lack of protection at that weight. There is a threshold of 'better/worse' and 28 tons is under it.
4) Weight #2: the perfect USMC tank is 0 tons, fits in a cargo pocket, invulnerable, requires 1 gallon of sunflower oil for 1000 mile range, and can be operated by 1 and a half Marines. That said, I would suggest the Sherman Easy Eight tank gives a good model for a balance of capability and weight that we could use as the 'fit' box for a modern globally relevant tank. The 35 to 45 ton range is reasonable when looked at for global fit for a large gun vehicle. It still provides sufficient frame life/durability/room to grow as new concepts and technology emerges. It doesn't overload bridge capacity across the globe as much. The chassis will be strong enough and durable to support recovery vehicles and bridge launchers if necessary.
Not to mention, there is the question of cope cages / hedgehog bristles being a possible need, which means more weight.
5) Heresy: one modern off the shelf version of the Easy Eight is the Modern Bradley. yes, it doesn't have a large gun, but it has room for various larger autocannons, not to mention already having tried and true 25mm and 30mm (high velocity). Brads are extensively developed, mobile, and capable. Protection and crew survivability are very good for the class. Variants are already built out. Yeah, they are a little tall for my tastes, but ti fits the box.
6) Air mobility: The Bradley and the Abrams are both C-17/C-5 transportable. (The Abrams, as used by the USMC, was already over the shore capable and could ford fairly easily. Unfortunately, I am not sure of the USN's current status on the reinforced LCMs we needed for the Abrams). The thing with air mobility: if you want something to fit in a C-130 and/or be Helo Sling loadable, you are going to have to give up a lot (not to mention if Air Delivery is on the table). There is a reason the Sheridan and related tankettes had troubled personal lives...they were a schizophrenic platform tied to an insensitive user. At a certain point, one realizes the logic of the old jeep with the 106 recoilless on it. You either voluntarily give up on a requirement (firepower, maneuverability, protection, durability) sufficiently, or reality will do it for you. Better to face the trade off up front for what you are attempting to do. (The Ontos, while cool and well used....was a bit of a Platypus that came with a limp. I don't think the trade offs made resulted in a great platform. It was at it's best matched with a tank anyway. And yes, 1 vehicle / 6 gun volley is cool, no argument there).
7) Don't forget, the heavier armored fighting vehicle is the best Combined Arms Maneuver platform.
I have more thoughts on the matter, but this is already a novel on CP's time.
Well, I would assume it would take time again for battle planners to learn to integrate armor and the logistics to support it into their plans. The 8th Marines S4 told me that our M1A1 company consumed the entire regiment's fuel allocation in one day. Lesson learned in battle I guess.
Haha...even in the best of times, educating the infantry being supported on the fact that two belts of 7.62 and fuel for 4 HMMVWS would not be adequate Class III and V resupply for a tank platoon was a constant. (though, yucks aside, I did find that prior coordination usually ensured the right resupply. A few units I worked with had CO's and -3s that were all over the log piece of tank support. Unfortunately, the example given is from an early experience with an Inf Bn on a MCCRE. Despite thorough coordination with the -4, they still sent me a HMMVW with a fuel bladder on it. Then, when I said "hey, this is what I was talking about. I told you our standard resupply and you said good to go"....I told them I was not going to spin up the guys at my battalion on short notice; this is your MCCRE and it's on you. You can go to Division and get a fueler or at least own it and tell them you need to ask for help. Of course, instead of going to Division et al, they called direct over to my parent battalion who got spun up on a late and very short notice resupply. I kne wit all, because of course I was covering the resupply through back channels in case the Inf Bn fumbled it again. My friend, who was also the MT Maint O / CWO4 gave me a rash of good natured sht: "I thought you were taking care of the logistics?". Of course, we still drained that little HMMVW refueler for what it was worth. I think it was crying when the tanks were done with it.
I’d say the Korean tank has some potential. The cv90-120 is going to be to heavy tobhave any advantage as a light tank. I still advocate for Centsuro 2 weather in 105 or 120mm as we should be able to work up some parts commonality between it and the ACV. Japan and Taiwan also have similar wheeled tank guns at a good weight.
Wheeled tanks are great for road trips and the motorpool. Say, everywhere except in rough terrain and actual combat. You are talking about an overloaded recce vehicle. The Centauro is cool, but durability to allow training and decent service life is (?). CV90-120 weight class is fine for a light tank.
I am looking for 2 vehicles per LCAC, 2 per C-17 for certain, and at least 3 on an LCU, space not weight limited.
LCU 1700 can carry two M1's by design. LCU 2000 can carry 5 M1s. LCACs and SSCs...well, you might squeeze two 35 ton platforms on depending on load distribution. We can already get 4 LAVs, a bunch of JLTVs, or a gaggle of RAZRs on LCACs. Why pursue the weight limit to the extent that we get the same limits in performance and capability as other sub 30 ton light vehicles? It puts the system on the same schizophrenic path as airborne armor that tries to do it all. There is a mobility, firepower, protection, reliability threshold in the 20-30 ton range where I suspect the 4 part performance difference per pound really doesn't change to neccessarily make the weight increase worthwhile. Locking into 25-28 ton vehicle usually produces a vehicle with the problems of a 30+ ton vehicle married to the capability of a 20 +/- ton vehicle. It's usually the physics of making a rugged frame, sufficient to tolerate large Main Gun firing and mobility stress, carrying sufficient protection to make a difference in relative armor level verus lighter vehicles, in a package that has sufficient mobility/speed and range.
Well, I like dealing in metric tonnes to fit it into our alliance system. 68 metric tonnes is an SSC full load so 34 tonnes for 2 at the limit.
Japanese C-2 Capacity: 32 t limited to +2.5g ; 36 t limited to +2.25g ; maximum payload 37.6 t
Atlas A400: 37 tonnes but the ramp can only take a 32 tonne vehicle.
C-17 77519kg so split in 2 its 38,759.5kg
Sure seems like a 32 tonne base vehicle with additional modular armor would be handy.
Fair enough. I will just add I have not seen a modular armor system worth a toss. It's a bad solution that briefs well in concept. Why not modular weapon, modular powerpack, modular chassis, etc.? It's because they don't brief as well as lego armor, but are just as silly. The protection should be designed in and the chassis/powertrain built to support it from the start. Screens/cages/ERA/Applique/ etc is going to happen anyway....better to start at the full protection and go from there.
Box is your textbook example on modular and it ends up being a behemoth.
The Bullfrog and drone system has huge potential for anti drone protection. Could be ideal for tanks, trucks and other units. My take from reading this exceptional thread is that a lot of experience wants tanks on the battlefield.
I am currently reading the book Victory to Defeat by Richard Dannatt and Dr. Robert Lyman. The book encompasses WWI and WWII aa well as some of the present day in Europe and Ukraine. The reason I bring this book up is that before WWII, the British Army considered bringing in a light tank that could move at almost 40 miles per hour and then another heavier tank that moved about as fast as a man could walk. The British Army, missed an opportunity. They only orderd the slowest moving tanks. While the hostilities of WWII, were under way. I hope that the American Marine Corps, does not make the mistake of waiting until some nation like China, decides to try to take on the United States Militarily. Before it decides to do something. I think the Ideal consideration would be a light tank that can move quickly and then a heavier one for protecting troops.
The Leo 1 was small, fast, lightly armored because the desire was to focus on lower weight and to prioritize the weight under that limit for mobility over protection. Not that wasn't armored; but the armor was secondary. If you've ever seen the port in the side of the Leo 1 classic turret to toss shells out of, you see how thin the armor is. It was thinner than a CV90/30 turret.
When it comes to armor and AAVs, it seems that this new crop of officers can’t seem to get anything right. What happened in the intervening years since the Corps magnificent performance in Desert Storm? Whatever occurred has to be corrected or they’ll continue to muddle on.
Desert Storm? That was pretty good. Me being parochial, but you may want to look at I MEF in the kickoff of '03. Especially 5th RCT. As a battalion TF under 5th RCT, 2d Tanks (3 Tank Cos and one Infantry Co aka F 2/5) executed the longest continuous night attack in USMC history. A lot of other magnificent stories. Yes, we most certainly stood on the shoulders of giants who came before us. As an aside one of the unsung incredible stories was the entire MEF rolling CEOI schedules mid stride on the suspected compromise of some comm equipment. Ops continued unimpeded.
If the current CMC and the Acolytes of FDFuzzy Wuzzy are not working feverishly to recover the armor needed and designed for the modern battle space than the Hell with retirement they need to be charged with dereliction of duty. There are so many great ideas and concepts mentioned here today that it is clear that armor can be returned to the Corps in relatively short order. Let’s hope we can get some real traction and when this current commandant irons his last pair of skivvies and heads to retirement we get someone occupying the oldest standing structure in Washington, DC who understands the phrase “combined arms.” He doesn’t even have to know how to spell it, just employ it!
What about the recently cancelled M10 Booker? It is lighter than an Abrams, and probably more lightly armored than desirable, but it is well armed and has the advantage of already being developed.
The Albatross....marginal even when the M8 before it was being considered. Kind of like 4 cylinder Mustang II....all the wrong trade offs and not worth the weight to capability. (yes, I know someone is going to chime in and say they loved their 4 banger Mustang II). Also, resurrecting the 105mm for the US Logistics Chain in 2026 just doesn't make sense. Yes, I know there is probably some still in the back corner of the war stocks from the Stryker 1128 and mothballed M1s/M60s. Kind of like a police department buying .40 in 2026 when all your current pistol(s) and ammo is 9mm. Not to mention the 105 has drastically reduced payload compared to 120mm, and the smaller auto guns are more flexible for the weight.
usually would not post my own link in CP, but it's relevant: https://cfrog.substack.com/p/the-albatross-and-the-armor-from?r=l7yth
Fair enough... I just know they need a tank, fast. And I appreciate the link.
Being Aluminum concerns me. Otherwise, it sounds worthwhile!
Which one?
The M1A1, for all it's benefits, is not capable of destroying drone swarms and is a huge consumer of fuel and other logistics as well. In a modern conflict with a peer enemy that has modern isr, those logistics trains will be stressed to the extreme. You could load a canister round to take a swarm of drones, but that is like using a glock 19 to swat a fly out of the air. It works, but it's excessive. Adding drone jammers to the tank only increases more weight. Politically, main battle tanks look like an invasion. Marine armor traditionally was used more in an infantry support role, and not in a tank on tank role like the Army. Marine tankers typically took on technicals, infantry in defilade, bunkers, apcs, and older ifvs and tanks- NOT modern enemy mbts. Furthermore, consider how the USMC deploys. Space is at a premium on ship, and the USMC must maintain it's mobility if it wants to rapidly respond to short-notice contingencies in an expeditionary manner.
Imagine a vehicle that can provide fire support to the infantry, destroy tanks, and counter enemy aerial threats in one platform, while being both tactically and strategically mobile via USMC C130 airlift and having a stream fording capability, modular modern armor packages, and a low signature? The modern USMC needs a vehicle that does not rely solely on it's armor for protection at the cost of increased weight (and everything else) like the Abrams. The cv90120 is not capable of combating drones, it does not carry as much ammo on board as a vehicle armed with an autocannon would, it is too heavy to be airlifted via USMC assets, and it's gun barrel is quite long for urban environments. In addition, the USMC does not need an IFV when we already have the ACV. The Booker is also not a good idea because it's 105mm cannon also cannot handle drone swarms, there is no mention of drones jammers or ai and sensor shooter network integration to assist in tracking fast moving drone swarms, and it is too heavy to be airlifted via organic USMC assets. We need something that doesn't currently exist. We are going to have to change the way we think about tanks and what we want and need from such a platform- even a light tank may not do for the direction the modern USMC needs to go in.
I propose a wheeled, 6x6 fire support vehicle that is armed with a 40mm cannon that fires airbursting HEDP and APFSDS, as well as a coaxial 7.62, roof mounted m240/ m2a1/ mk19/ mk47 in a RWS, atgms, modular armor packages (NERA, RPG netting- NOT cages or slat armor, spaced composite plates over vulnerable areas like a frontal glacis plate, next generation multi-spectrum signature reducing armor panels that decrease a vehicles visual and IR signature, and maybe even turret chains!) that can be added or removed in the field, river crossing capability, c130 air lift capability via a hard weight cap, ai integration, drone jammers, modern targeting and hunter-killer engagement capability, sensor-shooter network integration, on-board reconnaissance drone launch and recovery capability via a SkyDio drone, Grunt phone, rear egress hatch, front mounted powerpack engine for added protection without extra weight, aggressively sloped armor, APS, an aluminum hull, a low profile, a hydropenumatic suspension system that can raise or lower the run-flat tires as well as a central tire inflation system, fire suppression systems, nbc protection, and a rear egress hatch like the merkava or namer. Smart thermal routing can redirect heat down and away from the vehicle. A hybrid electric engine can also increase the range of such a vehicle, meaning it does not need to be tied to it's logistics tail as much as the Abrams did because it can go farther on one tank of gas. In addition, the newer hybrid engines are quieter than the older turbine engines on their own, and they can be made quieter via noise baffles in the engine compartment that dampen the vehicles' acoustic signature. You can even have mounts on the side of the vehicle to quickly roll and unroll camouflage netting to further reduce the vehicle's signature. Space on the rear deck behind the turret could even be used for 1 litter casualty. The vehicle should also have an electric winch for recovery.
Yes, a 40mm autocannon is not as powerful as a 120mm cannon is, but it fires faster, can store more ammo on board, is better at combating drone swarms, is short enough to traverse between buildings, has growth potential for the future to take on the threats the USMC is most likely to face, and the onboard atgms, fires, and cas can handle what the autocannon can't. Wheels may not always be as reliable as tracks, but they are quieter, easier to swap, more fuel efficient, and lighter than tracks. An aluminum hull does not provide as much protection as the steel composite armor of the Abrams does, but is much lighter, cheaper, and the modular armor packages I mentioned plus APS, ai integration, a lower profile/ reduced signature, and being part of a sensor shooter network help to make up for the lack of sheer armor. Avoiding being detected while sensing and striking the enemy first is going to have to take priority in future Marine mobile protected firepower vehicles versus armor to defeat all threats.
I would like to see such a vehicle paired up with CAAT Platoons mounted on ULTV's with javelins and drones, being highly mobile, stealthy, and plugged into a greater sensor shooter network that can take data from the up and coming ARV, AI, and other MAGTF nodes, call for fire via long range highly responsive fires platforms like HIMARS or Marine CAS, and rapidly displace to another location via it's tactical and strategic mobility.
The C-130 requirement really makes it mission impossible. Look at the ARV program. That won't fit a C-130 with the 30mm gun, not combat weight. The ACV is also not taking a ride in a C-130. Some things will still be arriving from the sea. We also need a high elevating gun. Isn't that what they are trying to do with the 50mm gun being developed?
An aluminum hull, plus 6x6 wheeled configuration and removable armor packages help reduce weight. Ideally, I would like for such a vehicle to be air transportable via C-130J at a bare minimum, as that would be huge for an MPF platform to arrive rapidly by air on unprepared, austere runways. This would be perfect for a battlefield like the Pacific, or expeditionary operations the USMC often faces. The proposed 50mm cannon from the OMFV program is incredibly powerful and has a longer range, but you cannot carry as much ammo on board a 6x6. A 30mm cannon may have more ammo than a 40mm, but now it has less growth potential to handle future armored threats than a 40mm could. I would like to stick with the 6x6 over an 8x8 due to a lighter weight for better mobility, smaller signature, greater fuel efficiency, and cheaper overall cost.
In addition, if we ever upgraded the C-130J with the MC-130J water landing capability and if the vehicle I proposed could transit calm sea states, you could land the C130 in water, and have the vehicle "swim" to shore without needing to land on the ground if it is denied or otherwise inaccessible. I don't think the vehicle I mentioned could handle rough sea states, but calm sea states may be possible. Same thing with airlift, slinging this thing under a CH53K (again, in it's most base armor configuration) would be nice to have, but it may be too far of a stretch. At a bare minimum though, any new "tank" we adopt should be able to be carried by C130. It needs to be mobile, the lack of mobility with the Abrams is not suitable for the modern USMC on a modern battlefield.
If you think you can launch a vehicle from ramp to water from a seaplane, you haven't been paying attention.
The HIMARS, upcoming ARV, LAV-25, and the M8 AGS can fit in a c130. You're telling me a 6x6 with a 40mm cannon with modular armor that is removable could not, and is not possible in the near future with technological improvements either? The Abrams, Booker, CV90120, and Centauro II definetely cannot fit in a C130 either.
Sir, this is a Wendy's, not WarThunder.
Why not also ask for it to weigh 10 tons and fold up into a cargo pocket? In all seriousness, to start with, I think you vastly underestimate the weight you've engineered into this thing, in addition to a laundry list of conflicting requirements. The only thing not on the list, is an ice maker.