Force Design initially called for the divestment of 16 of the 21cannon artillery batteries in the active force. Subsequently, the plan was modified to divest 14 of the 21 batteries. This number has not been officially changed in any of the follow-on updates of Force Design.
I don’t know if the current number is 7 or 14 or something in between. Transparency has never a cornerstone of the Force Design debacle. None of this is surprising. It’s what happens when a Service bypasses a unified and disciplined combat development process and opts for a cabal of officers operating in secrecy to design a concept that will fundamentally change the Marine Corps. The vacillation between artillery requirements is not the result of a “campaign of learning.” It is the result of a “keystone cops” approach to transformation.
Instead of divesting cannon artillery, the Marine Corps should have modernized it. It’s not too late. The Marine Corps has 21 infantry battalions. These battalions are naked on any battlefield without close, continuous, accurate and all-weather artillery support. If you don’t believe me, please read Major General James Livingston’s and Colonel Jay Vargas’s article on the Battle of Dai Do: https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Livingston-Vargas-Aug22-WEB-REVISED-for-posting.pdf
The RPV, airborne, ground or at sea, is a tactical asset. Simply one tool in the items available to commanders at the right place, time and circumstance. It is not a replacement for artillery, tanks, helicopters, aircraft, torpedoes or mines.
Amateurs, writers and “ visionaries” love nothing better than the “ this changes everything” story line.
I deployed with a MAU that had an airborne RPV unit in 1986. If there was a problem it was the lack of any sense of urgency of the RD&A establishment in developing a plan for their appropriate inclusion. Professionals add capabilities before they destroy others. When the Corps decided to depart from its missions to embrace shore based, ship sinking missile units it did not add them to Artillery Regiments. It destroyed tanks, artillery, infantry, combat engineers, snipers, squadrons etc to form them up. No rational professional would do that. The initial response from experienced professionals was a stunned paralysis. Surely no leader would be so irresponsible, violate the law and act relative to appropriations in such a reckless matter. There was no leadership echelon about the Corps that did their job. Innumerable federal regulations and laws were violated without a peep. I still wonder how it happened.
On top of all of that, gross incompetence resulted in no operational units seven years later. It has been a dystopian tale that defies imagination. Eventually the light will come on. This catastrophic journey to the abyss will find a special chapter in history with innumerable questions. Institutional suicide.
Exactly 💯... and despite the US Army MDTFs being stood up and functional, they still fail to replicate the total combat arms force capabilities of a MEU (SOC) pre FD2030 that features a total combined arms force that's forward deployed featuring immediate ground combat forces of reinforced infantry with artillery, armor, and close air support from rotary and fixed wing assets, naval gunfire support, and a capable logistics system with combat service support along with engineering capabilities to operate 24/7 and respond to any threat or crisis in every clime and place!
This is true. No Army formation is comparable to a MEU. See Task Force Hawk in the Kosovo War for the problems of scaling up a combined force from separate elements.
But to be fair, having its own MEU is not the Army's primary job. Large-scale ground combat operations is.
And while I'm here and it was brought up, I've always assumed the MDTF is the Army's expression of not trusting the Air Force to divert deep strike assets for Army priorities. Fighting China in the First Island Chain was great camouflage for the capability, no? See also the long A-10 saga.
Instead of divestment of all tanks and 85% of cannon artillery, the Corps could have easily added the missile batteries to compliment artillery and configured the MEUs to sail without tanks if the mission dictated the lack of need or potential need for armor... also, the Corps could have transitioned to a lighter yet just as lethal tank to deal with the heaviness and logistics issue of the current M1A2 Abrams... FD2030 has ruined our Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
Perhaps the Commandant should READ MORE! U.S. Army opens new 155mm artillery shell facility in Kansas
NEWSARMYPRESS RELEASES
By
Emily Ryan Miller
Apr 14, 2026
(Photo by Eric Kowal)
Key Points
The U.S. Army and Day & Zimmermann opened a new 155mm M795 artillery shell facility in Parsons, Kansas, backed by a $36 million Army investment
At full capacity, the Parsons plant will produce 12,000 M795 projectiles monthly, supporting the Army's goal of 100,000 rounds per month nationwide
The U.S. Army and Day & Zimmermann have inaugurated a new artillery Load, Assemble, and Pack facility in Parsons, Kansas, dedicated to the production of 155mm M795 artillery projectiles.
The ribbon-cutting ceremony was hosted by Maj. Gen. John T. Reim, Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Agile Sustainment and Ammunition, marking what Army officials described as a critical step in expanding the nation’s artillery munitions production capacity.
The new plant represents a $36 million Army investment in non-recurring engineering and production establishment activities. At full operational capacity, the Parsons facility will be capable of producing 12,000 M795 projectiles per month. That output feeds directly into the Army’s broader goal of scaling 155mm production across the defense industrial base to 100,000 rounds per month — a target that reflects the urgency with which the service is approaching munitions capacity after years of drawdown and under-investment in domestic shell manufacturing. …
Something still to be said for a dumb piece of iron that can operate day/night in inclement weather with illum, smoke, terrifying HE, WP or more precision munitions simply by chambering a called for projo from the front. Yep, we have to adapt to the circumstances in the modern battlefield, but that has been true war thru the ages. Lanyard yankers, CSMO!
Instead of divestment of all tanks and 85% of cannon artillery, the Corps could have easily added the missile batteries to compliment artillery and configured the MEUs to sail without tanks if the mission dictated the lack of need or potential need for armor... also, the Corps could have transitioned to a lighter yet just as lethal tank to deal with the heaviness and logistics issue of the current M1A2 Abrams... FD2030 has ruined our Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
Force Disaster is AN EXAMPLE OF INSTANT PARADIGM PARALYSIS! IT COMPOUNDS IN STUPID DAILY! IT CONTINUES TO GET THE SAME FAILED RESULTS BECAUSE IT MAKES THE SAME FAILED MISTAKE AGAIN AND AGAIN! IT IS THE USMC EDITION OF THE 1993 MOVIE “GROUND HOG DAY”!
Instead of divestment of all tanks and 85% of cannon artillery, the Corps could have easily added the missile batteries to compliment artillery and configured the MEUs to sail without tanks if the mission dictated the lack of need or potential need for armor... also, the Corps could have transitioned to a lighter yet just as lethal tank to deal with the heaviness and logistics issue of the current M1A2 Abrams... FD2030 has ruined our Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
Force Design initially called for the divestment of 16 of the 21cannon artillery batteries in the active force. Subsequently, the plan was modified to divest 14 of the 21 batteries. This number has not been officially changed in any of the follow-on updates of Force Design.
However, according to a recent article in the Field Artillery Journal, the Marine Corps retains 14 cannon artillery batteries in the active force. Only 7 have been divested. See: https://www.fieldartillery.org/news/marine-artillery-in-transition-between-legacy-and-force-design
I don’t know if the current number is 7 or 14 or something in between. Transparency has never a cornerstone of the Force Design debacle. None of this is surprising. It’s what happens when a Service bypasses a unified and disciplined combat development process and opts for a cabal of officers operating in secrecy to design a concept that will fundamentally change the Marine Corps. The vacillation between artillery requirements is not the result of a “campaign of learning.” It is the result of a “keystone cops” approach to transformation.
Instead of divesting cannon artillery, the Marine Corps should have modernized it. It’s not too late. The Marine Corps has 21 infantry battalions. These battalions are naked on any battlefield without close, continuous, accurate and all-weather artillery support. If you don’t believe me, please read Major General James Livingston’s and Colonel Jay Vargas’s article on the Battle of Dai Do: https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Livingston-Vargas-Aug22-WEB-REVISED-for-posting.pdf
CMC OBFUSCATES, HIDES the TRUTH ABOUT FORCE DISASTER…FROM the US CONGRESS, DOW, SECDEF, and AMERICAN TAXPAYERS. IT IS AND ACT OF DECEPTION.
The RPV, airborne, ground or at sea, is a tactical asset. Simply one tool in the items available to commanders at the right place, time and circumstance. It is not a replacement for artillery, tanks, helicopters, aircraft, torpedoes or mines.
Amateurs, writers and “ visionaries” love nothing better than the “ this changes everything” story line.
I deployed with a MAU that had an airborne RPV unit in 1986. If there was a problem it was the lack of any sense of urgency of the RD&A establishment in developing a plan for their appropriate inclusion. Professionals add capabilities before they destroy others. When the Corps decided to depart from its missions to embrace shore based, ship sinking missile units it did not add them to Artillery Regiments. It destroyed tanks, artillery, infantry, combat engineers, snipers, squadrons etc to form them up. No rational professional would do that. The initial response from experienced professionals was a stunned paralysis. Surely no leader would be so irresponsible, violate the law and act relative to appropriations in such a reckless matter. There was no leadership echelon about the Corps that did their job. Innumerable federal regulations and laws were violated without a peep. I still wonder how it happened.
On top of all of that, gross incompetence resulted in no operational units seven years later. It has been a dystopian tale that defies imagination. Eventually the light will come on. This catastrophic journey to the abyss will find a special chapter in history with innumerable questions. Institutional suicide.
Exactly 💯... and despite the US Army MDTFs being stood up and functional, they still fail to replicate the total combat arms force capabilities of a MEU (SOC) pre FD2030 that features a total combined arms force that's forward deployed featuring immediate ground combat forces of reinforced infantry with artillery, armor, and close air support from rotary and fixed wing assets, naval gunfire support, and a capable logistics system with combat service support along with engineering capabilities to operate 24/7 and respond to any threat or crisis in every clime and place!
This is true. No Army formation is comparable to a MEU. See Task Force Hawk in the Kosovo War for the problems of scaling up a combined force from separate elements.
But to be fair, having its own MEU is not the Army's primary job. Large-scale ground combat operations is.
And while I'm here and it was brought up, I've always assumed the MDTF is the Army's expression of not trusting the Air Force to divert deep strike assets for Army priorities. Fighting China in the First Island Chain was great camouflage for the capability, no? See also the long A-10 saga.
Good points 👉 Semper Fi sir 👏
Spot on!
Yes, the search for the silver bullet "wonder weapon" that will make victory simple is always dangled before us. But never works out.
Instead of divestment of all tanks and 85% of cannon artillery, the Corps could have easily added the missile batteries to compliment artillery and configured the MEUs to sail without tanks if the mission dictated the lack of need or potential need for armor... also, the Corps could have transitioned to a lighter yet just as lethal tank to deal with the heaviness and logistics issue of the current M1A2 Abrams... FD2030 has ruined our Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
Absolutely! Drones are additive! Use the IDF as a model!
Perhaps the Commandant should READ MORE! U.S. Army opens new 155mm artillery shell facility in Kansas
NEWSARMYPRESS RELEASES
By
Emily Ryan Miller
Apr 14, 2026
(Photo by Eric Kowal)
Key Points
The U.S. Army and Day & Zimmermann opened a new 155mm M795 artillery shell facility in Parsons, Kansas, backed by a $36 million Army investment
At full capacity, the Parsons plant will produce 12,000 M795 projectiles monthly, supporting the Army's goal of 100,000 rounds per month nationwide
The U.S. Army and Day & Zimmermann have inaugurated a new artillery Load, Assemble, and Pack facility in Parsons, Kansas, dedicated to the production of 155mm M795 artillery projectiles.
The ribbon-cutting ceremony was hosted by Maj. Gen. John T. Reim, Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Agile Sustainment and Ammunition, marking what Army officials described as a critical step in expanding the nation’s artillery munitions production capacity.
The new plant represents a $36 million Army investment in non-recurring engineering and production establishment activities. At full operational capacity, the Parsons facility will be capable of producing 12,000 M795 projectiles per month. That output feeds directly into the Army’s broader goal of scaling 155mm production across the defense industrial base to 100,000 rounds per month — a target that reflects the urgency with which the service is approaching munitions capacity after years of drawdown and under-investment in domestic shell manufacturing. …
Something still to be said for a dumb piece of iron that can operate day/night in inclement weather with illum, smoke, terrifying HE, WP or more precision munitions simply by chambering a called for projo from the front. Yep, we have to adapt to the circumstances in the modern battlefield, but that has been true war thru the ages. Lanyard yankers, CSMO!
Shoot. Move. Communicate. King of Battle!!!
Instead of divestment of all tanks and 85% of cannon artillery, the Corps could have easily added the missile batteries to compliment artillery and configured the MEUs to sail without tanks if the mission dictated the lack of need or potential need for armor... also, the Corps could have transitioned to a lighter yet just as lethal tank to deal with the heaviness and logistics issue of the current M1A2 Abrams... FD2030 has ruined our Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
Force Disaster is AN EXAMPLE OF INSTANT PARADIGM PARALYSIS! IT COMPOUNDS IN STUPID DAILY! IT CONTINUES TO GET THE SAME FAILED RESULTS BECAUSE IT MAKES THE SAME FAILED MISTAKE AGAIN AND AGAIN! IT IS THE USMC EDITION OF THE 1993 MOVIE “GROUND HOG DAY”!
Instead of divestment of all tanks and 85% of cannon artillery, the Corps could have easily added the missile batteries to compliment artillery and configured the MEUs to sail without tanks if the mission dictated the lack of need or potential need for armor... also, the Corps could have transitioned to a lighter yet just as lethal tank to deal with the heaviness and logistics issue of the current M1A2 Abrams... FD2030 has ruined our Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
And consider that suicide drones got a big push during the shell shortage.
Combined arms is not dead. But it is expanded.