tl:dr...this is a good thing, needs to focus on broad drone proficiency as the payoff for Squads section and the proficient use of sUAS/FPV at the lowest levels (I have heard rumors that the MCADT is over-centralizing small drones at the cutting edge).
cfrog, thanks for the link and great heads up. The post was a good read. The first reaction to this CP Post was how the Super Squad competition back in the late 1970’s took off, at LeJeune a great pair of leaders took on the effort to create the Squad Leaders School. It was devised to train squad leaders and to support the Super Squad competition. Both served in 3/2 with me, I went to ITC which quickly morphed into ITS. (Now School of Infantry) they did a lot in the early days by the seat of their pants, but it was exciting times and it empathized small unit decentralized tactics and leadership. This drone competition ought to generate a lot opportunity to learn how to employ and or defend against drones on the battle field. Agree, the more we let the young Marines get after this effort the better. The head shed’s will do their best to try and control it, if left to their own devices the Marines will get a handle on it fast. A larger hope would be that as devastating an effect on war fighting as drones seem to present, it would seem logical that larger EW/ECW technical solutions to support a set of tactics evolve and solve the larger tactical problems such as we see these weapons have projected onto the conflict in Ukraine. (For both sides) We have the sad advantage of a meat grinder of a laboratory in real time over there. Let’s hope there are a lot of lessons learned in coming weeks and months and fast.
Thanks. I think we have historical examples in the early history of manned aviation combat, crossed over with the smartphone revolution. The manned aviation progression is known, we are seeing with unmanned aircraft. The smartphone expansion shows parallels to the democratization of air power, in that it enables much greater capability, previous unavailable, at a very low level. Think historical progression of super computers, mini computers (mainframes), micro computers, personal computers, smartphones. We have incredible computing power in smartphones....and we still have data centers and super computers. It's the tiering of these capabilities that is 'revolutionary' though I hate to say it. sUAS/FPV is a great C^2 tool and a capability leap over the 60mm mortar and 40mm grenade, though they are not obsolete. We will see Air Defense and EW follow this democratization a well. I remember hitting the fleet in the very late '80s and getting my face rubbed deep in Comms/EW TTPs (not the acronym we used) to counter Soviet lead doctrine. It's tougher now with software defined antennae, etc. This is why I am convinced the emerging capabilities are 'additive' in the way wireless communications were, not replacements.
You articulated what I was thinking and trying to say! It is said that the smartphones today have as much computing capability as the computers used in the original space shuttles of the early 1980’s. So it all make sense. Again let’s hope they let the young Marines with some savvy have at it. Then the Corps can reap the benefit across the whole of the Corps not just a small subset of units here or there.
Sorry, but totally off topic. The Gazette and MCA, along with the CMC, are having a writing contest on what should the future MEU look like in 2035. Submissions should be in before August 31. I wonder if the Commandant is having second thoughts about divestment and is looking for a way out. He's looking to the troops for answers.
This is what General Al Gray created MCCDC to do, but Generals Berger and Smith emasculated the command and circumvented its analytical power in developing Force Design 2030. It is no surprise then that Smith reaches outside of MCCDC to answer a most basic question. He has yet to grasp that in the past the MEF was the Corps "jewel" from which MEBs, MEUs, and SPMAGTFs were drawn.
Why the RESTRICTION of "Reimagine the MEU within a THREE_SHIP ARG structure.". Why restrict the number of ships? Why not allow the opportunity that enhances the ARG's Navy and Marine Corps Team, or the ability to build MAGTFs from MEUs, to MEBs and MEFs. At first, I thought this was a good idea, but I am worried it is going to turn into a case of "Unlawful Command Influence". S/F
Well, instead of a comment, a link to a post. https://cfrog.substack.com/p/sometimes-they-get-it-right
tl:dr...this is a good thing, needs to focus on broad drone proficiency as the payoff for Squads section and the proficient use of sUAS/FPV at the lowest levels (I have heard rumors that the MCADT is over-centralizing small drones at the cutting edge).
cfrog, thanks for the link and great heads up. The post was a good read. The first reaction to this CP Post was how the Super Squad competition back in the late 1970’s took off, at LeJeune a great pair of leaders took on the effort to create the Squad Leaders School. It was devised to train squad leaders and to support the Super Squad competition. Both served in 3/2 with me, I went to ITC which quickly morphed into ITS. (Now School of Infantry) they did a lot in the early days by the seat of their pants, but it was exciting times and it empathized small unit decentralized tactics and leadership. This drone competition ought to generate a lot opportunity to learn how to employ and or defend against drones on the battle field. Agree, the more we let the young Marines get after this effort the better. The head shed’s will do their best to try and control it, if left to their own devices the Marines will get a handle on it fast. A larger hope would be that as devastating an effect on war fighting as drones seem to present, it would seem logical that larger EW/ECW technical solutions to support a set of tactics evolve and solve the larger tactical problems such as we see these weapons have projected onto the conflict in Ukraine. (For both sides) We have the sad advantage of a meat grinder of a laboratory in real time over there. Let’s hope there are a lot of lessons learned in coming weeks and months and fast.
Thanks. I think we have historical examples in the early history of manned aviation combat, crossed over with the smartphone revolution. The manned aviation progression is known, we are seeing with unmanned aircraft. The smartphone expansion shows parallels to the democratization of air power, in that it enables much greater capability, previous unavailable, at a very low level. Think historical progression of super computers, mini computers (mainframes), micro computers, personal computers, smartphones. We have incredible computing power in smartphones....and we still have data centers and super computers. It's the tiering of these capabilities that is 'revolutionary' though I hate to say it. sUAS/FPV is a great C^2 tool and a capability leap over the 60mm mortar and 40mm grenade, though they are not obsolete. We will see Air Defense and EW follow this democratization a well. I remember hitting the fleet in the very late '80s and getting my face rubbed deep in Comms/EW TTPs (not the acronym we used) to counter Soviet lead doctrine. It's tougher now with software defined antennae, etc. This is why I am convinced the emerging capabilities are 'additive' in the way wireless communications were, not replacements.
You articulated what I was thinking and trying to say! It is said that the smartphones today have as much computing capability as the computers used in the original space shuttles of the early 1980’s. So it all make sense. Again let’s hope they let the young Marines with some savvy have at it. Then the Corps can reap the benefit across the whole of the Corps not just a small subset of units here or there.
Sorry, but totally off topic. The Gazette and MCA, along with the CMC, are having a writing contest on what should the future MEU look like in 2035. Submissions should be in before August 31. I wonder if the Commandant is having second thoughts about divestment and is looking for a way out. He's looking to the troops for answers.
This is what General Al Gray created MCCDC to do, but Generals Berger and Smith emasculated the command and circumvented its analytical power in developing Force Design 2030. It is no surprise then that Smith reaches outside of MCCDC to answer a most basic question. He has yet to grasp that in the past the MEF was the Corps "jewel" from which MEBs, MEUs, and SPMAGTFs were drawn.
Just looked at the MEU 2035 writing contest: https://www.facebook.com/marinecorpsassociation/posts/-calling-all-marine-thinkers-future-force-visionaries-the-commandants-rapid-resp/1091289526367168/
Why the RESTRICTION of "Reimagine the MEU within a THREE_SHIP ARG structure.". Why restrict the number of ships? Why not allow the opportunity that enhances the ARG's Navy and Marine Corps Team, or the ability to build MAGTFs from MEUs, to MEBs and MEFs. At first, I thought this was a good idea, but I am worried it is going to turn into a case of "Unlawful Command Influence". S/F
Exactly, General. I would have thought they would have learned that in OCS or TBS.