Let's focus on one sentence from FragO 01-24 highlighted in today's post: "With Force Design in place, we will continue our proud history as our Nation's expeditionary shock troops that can deliver combat power from sea to land - now with the additional capability to project power from land to sea."
How much combat power can today's Marine Corps deliver from "sea to land"? Not much! With 31 amphibious ships and 40% availability and only 7 MPS ships in two MPSRONS (down from 20 ships in 3 MPSRONs as late as 2018), the Marines would be hard pressed to globally source a MEB. And given the divestments in tanks, cannon artillery, assault breaching/bridging, etc.), the MEB would not have the combined arms capability (and probably training) needed to fight and win against most of our nation's adversaries.
And we "now" have the "additional capability to project power from land to sea." Really! I wonder if Greg "Pappy" Boyington would agree with that statement if he was still around? Since Marine aviation has always been able to project power from land to sea, I assume this gratuitous comment refers to the 14 Naval Strike Missile (subsonic with an unclassified range of 115 NM) batteries and the 3 TLAM (subsonic with an unclassified range of about 1,000 NM) batteries. This speed and range of these missiles make them increasingly obsolete against a peer or near peer competitor in the future.
Bottom line - - while the highlighted sentence in the FragO is technically correct, it is certainly misleading. The capabilities of today's operating forces (Navy and Marine Corps team) are a shell of their former selves
I previously posted a similar USMC document re pre Korea Readiness. 1950-1953
Growth. Let’s make tomorrow 30 days from D Day …
“Fast Facts on the Korean War 1950-1953
Growth
The Marine Corps emerged from the Korean War with the highest sustained peacetime strength in its history. The suddenness of the war, and General MacArthur's immediate request for Marines, had emphasized the importance of maintaining the Corps as a ready striking force. The fiscal year end strengths of the Marine Corps during the Korean War and immediate post-Armistice period were as follows:
Year
Officers
Enlisted
Total
1950
7,254
67,025
74,279
1951
15,150
177,770
192,920
1952
16,413
215,544
231,957
1953
18,731
230,488
249,219
1954
18,593
205,275
223,868
Aviation
Marine aviation activities in Korea were first in support of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter, and next with the Inchon landing by the 1st Marine Division. In both instances, squadrons of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing gave effective close air-support from carriers, and later from Kimpo Airfield. Following the collapse of North Korean resistance in early October 1950, Marines moved to the seaport town of Wonsan. During the latter part of November and early December 1950, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft supplied the division during its breakout from the Chosin Reservoir. During these operations, repeated airdrops were made and more than 5,000 casualties were evacuated. In addition, Marine and Navy aircraft provided outstanding close air support, which was vital for the withdrawal out of the reservoir. Between August 1950 and 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew more than 118,000 sorties, of which more than 39,500 were close air support missions. During the same period, Marine helicopter squadrons evacuated almost 10,000 personnel.
Reserves
In 1950 the Korean War saw the Marine Corps expand from 75,000 regulars to a force, by the end of the conflict in 1953, of 261,000 Marines, most of whom were Reserves. Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September 1950. Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent, and during the war, 48 percent of all 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Combat sorties were flown by Marine reservists. Between July 1950 and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and veterans, saw active duty in Korea.
Awards
At the conclusion of the Korean War in July 1953, a total of 42 Marines had been awarded the Nation's highest military award, the Medal of Honor; 26 of these awards were posthumous. In addition, 221 Navy Crosses, and more than 1,500 Silver Stars were awarded to Marines. Of the awards cited above, Marine reservists received 13 Medals of Honor, 50 Navy Crosses, and over 400 Silver Stars.
Casualties
The war in Korea had been a costly one. Total U.S. casualties during the war numbered approximately 136,000 killed, missing in action, and wounded. Marine Corps casualties from August 1950 July 1953 were as follows: (NOTE: The total under "DIED" includes killed-in-action, died of wounds, captured and died, and missing in action, presumed dead).
Generals Zinni, Krulak and Conway have reinforced the point that the Marine Corps cannot follow the path of the WWII Japanese Special land Forces hunkered down in relatively marginal sized units living in caves with unpredictable supply and reinforcement. The real-time laboratory that has shown the traditional Marine Corps Air-Ground Team to be the viable warfighting organization is the Ukraine. Artillery, air power, support from the sea, drones, HIMARS, hypersonic missiles, and cyber support is the team for the next fight. Although it has been 55 years since I sat in a muddy foxhole in Vietnam and called in 105 and 155 artillery fire, I doubt that if we were configured in the Force Design organization, and a company of VC were 200 yards from overrunning my position that I would be able to call in missiles danger close. Get rational members of Congress to review this Force Design, reallocate the money to rebuild the Marine Corps and amphibious shipping, and let's get on with the job of keeping America safe.
Hard to support a MAGTF with ships like the BOXER! 10 DAY TURN AROUND, hardly out of territorial water. Sad, as we try to talk power projection,SecNav can’t row past sight of the shore.
Nice and on target! My favorite part is the SecNav pearl clutching about stock buybacks by the shipyards, as a deflection from the problem, without saying a peep about exactly what the shipyards aren't doing. If the Navy has a case that publicly traded shipyards are a problem, they need to clearly make that case. Without details, it's just chaff to obfuscate the issue. The companies have to manage their budgets so they can be in business. I'm as big a proponent of responsible use of taxpayers money, but here, it's a 'but what about the children?' throw away line. From the article: "“We’re making a $15 billion investment over the course of the next five years, money that’s taxpayers’ money, and at the same time, many of these shipyards are actually making stock buyback programs where they’re buying back stocks to the tune of $4 billion and upwards of that,” he continued. “That’s unforgiveable. We need them to invest in their own shipyards just as much as the American taxpayer is investing in the budget to get these production lines back up” and delivering on time.".
Let's focus on one sentence from FragO 01-24 highlighted in today's post: "With Force Design in place, we will continue our proud history as our Nation's expeditionary shock troops that can deliver combat power from sea to land - now with the additional capability to project power from land to sea."
How much combat power can today's Marine Corps deliver from "sea to land"? Not much! With 31 amphibious ships and 40% availability and only 7 MPS ships in two MPSRONS (down from 20 ships in 3 MPSRONs as late as 2018), the Marines would be hard pressed to globally source a MEB. And given the divestments in tanks, cannon artillery, assault breaching/bridging, etc.), the MEB would not have the combined arms capability (and probably training) needed to fight and win against most of our nation's adversaries.
And we "now" have the "additional capability to project power from land to sea." Really! I wonder if Greg "Pappy" Boyington would agree with that statement if he was still around? Since Marine aviation has always been able to project power from land to sea, I assume this gratuitous comment refers to the 14 Naval Strike Missile (subsonic with an unclassified range of 115 NM) batteries and the 3 TLAM (subsonic with an unclassified range of about 1,000 NM) batteries. This speed and range of these missiles make them increasingly obsolete against a peer or near peer competitor in the future.
Bottom line - - while the highlighted sentence in the FragO is technically correct, it is certainly misleading. The capabilities of today's operating forces (Navy and Marine Corps team) are a shell of their former selves
I previously posted a similar USMC document re pre Korea Readiness. 1950-1953
Growth. Let’s make tomorrow 30 days from D Day …
“Fast Facts on the Korean War 1950-1953
Growth
The Marine Corps emerged from the Korean War with the highest sustained peacetime strength in its history. The suddenness of the war, and General MacArthur's immediate request for Marines, had emphasized the importance of maintaining the Corps as a ready striking force. The fiscal year end strengths of the Marine Corps during the Korean War and immediate post-Armistice period were as follows:
Year
Officers
Enlisted
Total
1950
7,254
67,025
74,279
1951
15,150
177,770
192,920
1952
16,413
215,544
231,957
1953
18,731
230,488
249,219
1954
18,593
205,275
223,868
Aviation
Marine aviation activities in Korea were first in support of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter, and next with the Inchon landing by the 1st Marine Division. In both instances, squadrons of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing gave effective close air-support from carriers, and later from Kimpo Airfield. Following the collapse of North Korean resistance in early October 1950, Marines moved to the seaport town of Wonsan. During the latter part of November and early December 1950, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft supplied the division during its breakout from the Chosin Reservoir. During these operations, repeated airdrops were made and more than 5,000 casualties were evacuated. In addition, Marine and Navy aircraft provided outstanding close air support, which was vital for the withdrawal out of the reservoir. Between August 1950 and 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew more than 118,000 sorties, of which more than 39,500 were close air support missions. During the same period, Marine helicopter squadrons evacuated almost 10,000 personnel.
Reserves
In 1950 the Korean War saw the Marine Corps expand from 75,000 regulars to a force, by the end of the conflict in 1953, of 261,000 Marines, most of whom were Reserves. Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September 1950. Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent, and during the war, 48 percent of all 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Combat sorties were flown by Marine reservists. Between July 1950 and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and veterans, saw active duty in Korea.
Awards
At the conclusion of the Korean War in July 1953, a total of 42 Marines had been awarded the Nation's highest military award, the Medal of Honor; 26 of these awards were posthumous. In addition, 221 Navy Crosses, and more than 1,500 Silver Stars were awarded to Marines. Of the awards cited above, Marine reservists received 13 Medals of Honor, 50 Navy Crosses, and over 400 Silver Stars.
Casualties
The war in Korea had been a costly one. Total U.S. casualties during the war numbered approximately 136,000 killed, missing in action, and wounded. Marine Corps casualties from August 1950 July 1953 were as follows: (NOTE: The total under "DIED" includes killed-in-action, died of wounds, captured and died, and missing in action, presumed dead).
Died
Wounded
Total
4,506
26,038
30,544
Reference Branch
USMC History Division
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Generals Zinni, Krulak and Conway have reinforced the point that the Marine Corps cannot follow the path of the WWII Japanese Special land Forces hunkered down in relatively marginal sized units living in caves with unpredictable supply and reinforcement. The real-time laboratory that has shown the traditional Marine Corps Air-Ground Team to be the viable warfighting organization is the Ukraine. Artillery, air power, support from the sea, drones, HIMARS, hypersonic missiles, and cyber support is the team for the next fight. Although it has been 55 years since I sat in a muddy foxhole in Vietnam and called in 105 and 155 artillery fire, I doubt that if we were configured in the Force Design organization, and a company of VC were 200 yards from overrunning my position that I would be able to call in missiles danger close. Get rational members of Congress to review this Force Design, reallocate the money to rebuild the Marine Corps and amphibious shipping, and let's get on with the job of keeping America safe.
Hard to support a MAGTF with ships like the BOXER! 10 DAY TURN AROUND, hardly out of territorial water. Sad, as we try to talk power projection,SecNav can’t row past sight of the shore.
SECNAV....Bah, Bah, Bah...with four years of the excuse we will do a study....but no action.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/04/16/navy-senators-argue-over-who-is-to-blame-for-a-too-small-fleet/
Nice and on target! My favorite part is the SecNav pearl clutching about stock buybacks by the shipyards, as a deflection from the problem, without saying a peep about exactly what the shipyards aren't doing. If the Navy has a case that publicly traded shipyards are a problem, they need to clearly make that case. Without details, it's just chaff to obfuscate the issue. The companies have to manage their budgets so they can be in business. I'm as big a proponent of responsible use of taxpayers money, but here, it's a 'but what about the children?' throw away line. From the article: "“We’re making a $15 billion investment over the course of the next five years, money that’s taxpayers’ money, and at the same time, many of these shipyards are actually making stock buyback programs where they’re buying back stocks to the tune of $4 billion and upwards of that,” he continued. “That’s unforgiveable. We need them to invest in their own shipyards just as much as the American taxpayer is investing in the budget to get these production lines back up” and delivering on time.".