1. DoD. Simply too small and lacking strategic mobility to fight China at their back door. Mass can only be manipulated so far by technology. The tyranny of distance is real. Smaller forces do, across history, prevail but it is not the way to bet. China would certainly love to lure the US into a fight over Taiwan. I would suggest not walking into that ambush in our current, reduced state. We simply lack the mass to recover from even modest losses and we can be certain losses would be huge. We might think we are a heavyweight able to go 15 rounds. We are a middleweight unable to last 5 rounds. DoD needs to focus on the fight after the loss of Taiwan. It needs to prepare for that fight now.
I refuse to believe that China will attack Taiwan soon. As we continue to get weaker they can just wait. Why attack the adversary who is bleeding out? Taiwan might only be the cheese in the trap. Reunification is secondary. Defeating the US in the process is far more valuable.
2. The other part of this discussion is the now irrelevant Marine Corps. In the best of circumstances making the USMC potent enough to be involved in the fight in the South China Sea would require a rebuild taking years and probably not be an option until later in the conflict anyway. No amphibious assault into Tokyo Bay in 1942. Yet, it must be rebuilt if only to be available globally while a fight unfolds in the South China Sea. Surprisingly Russia, China, Iran and N Korea have never acted in a coordinated and synergistic way. There is no guarantee they will not in the future. Hence the rebuilt and modernized USMC with an offensive spirit must be available to secure the critical, global chokepoints.
The Corps in its self assigned mission as short range, light, coastal defense forces is simply irrelevant. It could not interdict drug running boats in the Carribean or Gulf of America. It has ship killing abilities in aircraft with available ordinance and refuses to acquire it. The reason is probably that it would make EABO obsolete.
3. To use my much hated sports analogies. We do not know where and when the first game of a protracted season might be. We currently do not have a roster of players, equipment or a playbook. We can only put 11 players on the field at any given time and the Genius Brigades believe we only need 9 to win. DoD and the Marine Corps are being led by misanthropes lacking in integrity and knowledge.
The PRC has played the long game and continues to do so. First as you said, Taiwan is the bait. The PRC would love to have the U.S. commit our military to a battle halfway around the world, with a fleet that has trouble putting even one ARG on station anywhere in the world. Once committed, the U.S. military is a one trick pony. We have little to no ability to continuously project power and most importantly logistically support them.
The Corps will have little to no role in a West Pac war. Where we will have, maybe the decisive role, is in our ability to threaten globally, PRC’s worldwide B&R infrastructure. For example the PRC still has a quasi-military presence in Panama. A MAGTF on either side of the canal will force the PRC to make a choice, do we (PRC) commit our nascent blue water navy halfway around the world in the U.S.’s backyard or do we sacrifice that facility. The same goes for the multiple facilities that the PRC has in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Arctic, etc. The PRC CURRENTLY has little ability to sail a true blue water navy. At some point the PRC will have to commit on our terms, or pull back to the first island chain, at which point the U.S. then has the ability, like we did in WW II, set the time and place of the next battle and the one after that.
If we use the Corps as intended in our strategic plans and not like the FD foolishness, the Corps has the ability to help the rest of the military perform their missions.
But hell what do I know, the Commandant doesn’t brook any discussion or dissent in the ranks, our off to the Ost Front.
Sir, If we start tomorrow, to rebuild the MAGTF 10 years, ships are the taking the longest. Manpower, air, ground 2028-2030 in place, waiting for a ship Sir
The only rational role in the short term for the Marine Corps would be to reinforce its air resources with more land deployable aircraft equipped with as many anti-ship missiles it can acquire, and as many C-130's it can buy new or get from the Air Force that has limited use for them and equip them with refueling kits on each wing and develop whatever hard power force of armor, infantry, and artillery that it can form in to battalion groups for contingency operations that can be flown in where they can be of value by the C-130 force.
Formally end FD2030 now, its the supreme cluster **** of bad strategy. Don't worry about grand strategy right away, just come to grips with the insanity of FD2030 and end it now.
PrSM can be fired from HIMARS. The Marines currently have 7 HIMARS batteries in the active force (42 launchers). PrSM increment two will hit a moving target (ship) at ranges out to 300 NM. Future increment will have increased range. I'm not sure if the Marines are buying PrSm increment two in the future or not.
Movement to or along the Ryukyu chain will be terminated by a small invasion force drawn from the two dozen PRC airborne and marine brigades on the mainland 90 miles away within a matter of hours. Luzon to Taiwan is 500nmi. PrSM would only be useful as a containerized system aboard warships, and that assumes a task force that can defend itself from counterattacks that should be assumed to come in strength.
The Army's MDTF have cruise missiles and the SM-6 that could get out that far against surface ships if it went maximum ballistic, and pre-authorized basing rights on Luzon. The Marines have no such weapons, once again FD2030 is a complete fiasco of incredibly poor planning by career surfers.
Finally I ask the hard question of Grok re Force Design and the destruction of the MEF Centric MAGTF with its multifaceted global, scaleable, agile MAGTFs. Grok lays it out, Your question cuts to the heart of a fierce debate within military circles about the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 (FD2030) and its implications—especially in a high-stakes scenario like a PRC invasion of Taiwan. You’re suggesting that FD2030’s shift to small, missile-centric units dismantled a proven, versatile Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)-based structure, potentially violating legal mandates and strategic logic for what might be negligible impact against China. Let’s unpack this, weaving in your legal and strategic critique, and assess whether it’s a “criminal and strategic mistake.”
---
### Background: What FD2030 Did
FD2030, spearheaded by General David Berger starting in 2019, reoriented the USMC from a globally deployable, multi-mission force to a lighter, maritime-focused one tailored for the Indo-Pacific and a PRC threat. Key moves:
- **Divestitures:** Eliminated all tanks (200+ M1A1s), cut artillery (e.g., from 21 to 5 cannon batteries), slashed infantry battalions (from 24 to 21), and reduced aviation assets (e.g., F-35s capped at 420).
- **New Focus:** Created Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs)—small, missile-armed units (e.g., NMESIS with Naval Strike Missiles)—for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) to deny sea control in contested littorals.
- **Logistics Shift:** Reduced reliance on Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) shipping, betting on distributed, austere resupply over fixed stocks.
This traded the MEF’s scalability—division-sized, 20,000+ Marines with organic air, ground, and logistics—for a leaner, specialized force of about 170,000 total personnel (down from historical peaks near 200,000).
---
### Legal Critique: 10 U.S. Code § 8063
You cite 10 U.S.C. § 8063, which defines the Marine Corps’ composition and missions. It mandates the USMC to:
- Be organized for “service with the fleet” in amphibious and land operations.
- Provide “combined arms” forces, including aviation, for expeditionary duty.
- Maintain a structure for “prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.”
**Argument for Violation:**
- FD2030’s tank divestment and artillery cuts arguably weaken “combined arms,” leaving the Corps reliant on external support (e.g., Army tanks or Navy fires) for sustained land combat—something the MEF could once handle solo.
- The focus on small MLRs over scalable MEFs might undermine “prompt and sustained combat” on land, especially in a massive invasion requiring mass, not just precision.
- Ditching MPF logistics could clash with “service with the fleet,” as prepositioned ships were a cornerstone of global reach and rapid response.
**Counterargument:**
- The law’s language is broad—FD2030 still aligns with “service with the fleet” via EABO and naval integration (e.g., NMESIS ties to Navy targeting). “Combined arms” persists through infantry, missiles, and aviation, just rebalanced for a maritime fight.
- Berger argued FD2030 fulfills § 8063 by adapting to modern threats—China’s A2/AD—rather than clinging to a Cold War structure irrelevant against missiles and drones.
Legally, it’s a stretch to call FD2030 “criminal.” Congress hasn’t challenged it under § 8063, and the Commandant has latitude to shape force structure within statutory bounds. But your point lands strategically—did this untested pivot sacrifice too much for too little?
---
### Strategic Critique: One-Trick Pony vs. Global Agility
The MEF-centric model was a Swiss Army knife: three MEFs (I, II, III) could deploy globally, scale from humanitarian missions to full-spectrum war, and sustain themselves via MPF ships (e.g., 17 ships with 30 days of supplies). FD2030’s MLRs are a narrower tool—optimized for anti-ship strikes in the Indo-Pacific but less flexible elsewhere.
#### Impact in a PRC Invasion of Taiwan
As I detailed earlier, MLRs could disrupt PRC naval ops, sink ships, and delay landings—CSIS wargames (2023) showed them contributing to a 90% PLA amphibious fleet loss in some runs. But their small size (1,800–2,000 per MLR), limited munitions (e.g., 36 missiles per unit), and reliance on shaky logistics cap their role:
- **Insignificant Scale:** Against a PRC force of millions, thousands of ships, and relentless missile barrages, a handful of MLRs (maybe 3–5 total, 10,000 Marines max) is a drop in the bucket. Okinawa’s 183,000 U.S. troops overwhelmed 100,000 Japanese; Taiwan’s defender-to-attacker ratio would be far worse.
- **Logistics Fragility:** Without MPF, resupplying MLRs in a contested Strait—under PLA air and naval dominance—is a nightmare. Prepositioned stocks run dry fast, and small units lack the MEF’s organic sustainment.
- **One-Trick Risk:** If the PRC adapts (e.g., saturating MLR sites with drones or bypassing them with inland thrusts), the Corps has no Plan B—no tanks, limited artillery, and fewer boots to pivot to ground combat.
#### Lost Global Reach
The MEF’s agility let the USMC respond to Iraq (1991, 2003), Afghanistan, and disasters (e.g., Haiti 2010). FD2030’s focus on China leaves it less ready for:
- Large-scale land wars (e.g., Ukraine-style conflicts).
- Rapid global deployments without Navy or Army backfill.
Critics like Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper (ret.) and others in *The Marine Corps Gazette* (2021–2023) call this a “strategic mistake”—a bet on a single threat (PRC) and tactic (EABO) that guts versatility. They argue the Corps went from a global hammer to a regional screwdriver.
---
### Was It a Mistake?
**Yes, If You Value Flexibility and Scale:**
- **Taiwan Context:** The MLRs’ “insignificant impact” against a massive PRC invasion underscores the mismatch. A MEF—with tanks, artillery, and 20,000+ Marines—could hold ground, reinforce Taiwan’s army, and sustain a fight longer than scattered MLRs. FD2030’s niche role might delay the PLA but won’t stop it without overwhelming U.S. support—support that might not arrive in time.
- **Global Cost:** Trading expeditionary reach for a China-specific gambit weakens deterrence elsewhere. A PRC feint at Taiwan could tie up the Corps while Russia or Iran exploit gaps.
**No, If You Buy the China Threat:**
- **Taiwan Fit:** Berger’s logic was that MEFs couldn’t survive China’s A2/AD (e.g., DF-21D missiles shredding carriers or bases). Small, mobile MLRs at least complicate PLA plans—sinking ships beats dying in barracks. Wargames suggest they’re not “insignificant” if paired with Navy subs and Air Force strikes.
- **Adaptation:** The old model was obsolete against a peer like China—tanks and big bases are sitting ducks. FD2030 aligns with joint warfighting, leaning on the Navy and Air Force to scale up.
**Criminal?** Not in a legal sense—§ 8063 isn’t clearly breached, and no court’s calling it that. Strategically, it’s a gamble with high downside. The untested part stings most: FD2030’s never been battle-proven, unlike the MEF’s Gulf War success. If it flops in Taiwan—say, MLRs get wiped out early—it’s a self-inflicted wound, validating your “mistake” charge.
---
### Conclusion
FD2030’s impact in a Taiwan invasion looks more like a speed bump than a wall—useful but not decisive. Destroying the MEF’s global, scalable model for this feels like overreach if you see the Corps as America’s 911 force. Yet if China’s the only fight that matters, it’s a calculated risk, not a blunder. I’d lean toward your skepticism: the Corps traded a proven, adaptable capability for a narrow, hypothetical edge—bold, but maybe reckless when millions of PLA troops hit the beach. What’s your take—did Berger misjudge the threat, or is this critique too harsh? out: Samuel says Grok nails it and that Grok was “too kind” consider the stakes involved in War.
I agree, but the decimation of the MAGTF was initiated by Neller when he said Marine forces not
optimized “fat and slow” (Senate Armed Services Committee, June 13, 2017)—launched FD2030’s shift to a lighter force—oversaw wargaming via Neller Center, opened May 31, 2024 (Marines.mil, August 3, 2023). ,"Berger just did the hatchet job and Smith is carrying on. Semper Fi
The Navy's immediate priority is a large ~2000t diesel-electric drone submarine without a pressure hull in the conventional sense (internal compartments would be pressurized for diving) using much of the navigational and autonomy systems developed for the experimental drone squadron and the XLUUV. An underwater range of 2000nmi at 10-15knots is well within current technology and would permit an underwater mission time of one week in total.
Such an arsenal boat, SSR, could carry several dozen encapsulated cruise missiles or hybrid torpedo-mine weapons for release and subsequent launch-deployment after the drone boat leaves the immediate area. A Taiwan invasion force is likely to require well above a thousand ships of all types to launch and support, so at least 5000 major weapons on at least three dozen boats would be required for deployment of the plan over a two month period.
South Korea and Japan have robust conventional submarine programs, they should be encouraged to set up domestic production in America and also build their own boats of this type to speed up the formation of this affordable and potent deterrence force.
"South Korea and Japan have robust conventional submarine programs, they should be encouraged to set up domestic production in America and also build their own boats of this type to speed up the formation of this affordable and potent deterrence force."
My question to this is where and with whom? Currently the ship building and repair industries are tapped when it comes to personnel. I would give my left arm for a welder or pipefitter, or plate fitter.
It is so rough that HII sponsers NASCAR teams "buildsubmarines.com" and their commercials advertising for workers flooded sporting events last year (We Build Giants).
What yard has the capacity to build these submarines? Ours ae built in two shipyards, HII in Newport News Va and Electric Boat in Groton Conn.
Are you willing to sacrifice our own capacity to support allies? Next question....who is repairing them here in the US? The backlog of submarines is amazing. Some have been waiting for years and are decertified to dive.
The Battle for Okinawa is a reasonable comparative example, but only from the perspective of the PRC invading Taiwan. As it stands now, there is little prospect of relieving Taiwan unless the battle becomes protracted and reinforcements can be flown in or possibly re-supplied by cargo submarines. The nature of naval warfare has fundamentally changed from World War II, both sides know where the bulk of surface ships are and the weapons have vastly increased ranges.
The invasion of Taiwan will carry some risks, particularly well outside the battle zone among the planet's trading nations, which is why it awaits a major distraction elsewhere in the world so it can be carried out quickly with acceptable losses, in the interim they are preparing the Taiwanese with psychological warfare exercises.
Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $4.9 billion contract to deliver its long-range Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) to the US Army under Increment One.
The award follows a competitive solicitation process, with only one bid submitted. The contract comes after a successful live-fire exercise in mid-2024, where the PrSM engaged a moving maritime target using an autonomous multi-domain launcher. Do you think the Army might lend some to the Marine Corps to equip our skeleton NMSIS units? Not hardly…
The next fight will be a joint fight where the army will have its own missions for PrSM.
PrSM isn't the same as NSM. What you're asking is the equivalent to, "will a 155 btry lend a 105 btry thier HE?" No, because they are two different munitions with similar effects.
I ask Grok the contribution the fledgling USMC Force Design elements would be in the PRC invasion of the First Island Chain:The U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 initiative, launched under General David Berger in 2019, represents a radical shift in how the Corps envisions its role in a potential conflict, particularly against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a massive invasion of Taiwan. The small, distributed units at the heart of this redesign—such as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs)—are intended to operate as agile, low-signature "stand-in forces" within contested zones. Their impact on a PRC invasion of Taiwan would depend on their ability to execute their mission amid the chaos of such a large-scale operation. Let’s break it down.
---
### What Are These Small Units?
Force Design 2030 pivots the USMC away from traditional large-scale amphibious assaults and sustained ground combat (e.g., divesting all tanks) toward smaller, dispersed units optimized for a maritime fight. Key elements include:
- **Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs):** Each MLR (e.g., the 3rd MLR stood up in 2022) has about 1,800–2,000 Marines, including a Littoral Combat Team (an infantry battalion), a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, and a Combat Logistics Battalion. They’re equipped with systems like the NMESIS (Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System), which fires Naval Strike Missiles with a 100+ nautical mile range.
- **Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO):** These units deploy to austere islands or coastal sites, setting up temporary bases to sense, strike, and disrupt enemy forces—then relocate before being targeted.
- **Distributed Operations:** Small teams operate across the First Island Chain (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Philippines), relying on mobility, stealth, and integration with Navy and joint forces.
The goal? Deny the PRC sea control, complicate its invasion, and buy time for a broader U.S. response—all while surviving China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) bubble of missiles, drones, and sensors.
---
### Potential Impact in a PRC Invasion of Taiwan
A PRC invasion would likely involve millions of troops, thousands of ships (military and civilian), and overwhelming missile barrages to soften Taiwan’s defenses. Here’s how these small USMC units might influence such a fight:
#### 1. **Disrupting PRC Naval Operations**
- **Strength:** MLRs armed with anti-ship missiles could target PRC amphibious ships, troop transports, and escorts in the Taiwan Strait or along approach routes. A single NMESIS hit could sink or disable a key vessel, slowing the invasion’s momentum. If dozens of these units are scattered across Taiwan or nearby islands (e.g., Penghu, Kinmen, or even Japanese islets with permission), they could create a “kill zone” of overlapping fire.
- **Limit:** The PRC’s sheer volume of ships—370 naval vessels plus a merchant fleet of thousands—might overwhelm this strategy. Once missiles are expended (each unit has limited shots—e.g., 18 launchers per MLR with two missiles each), resupply in a contested Strait under PLA missile and air dominance would be dicey. China’s counterstrikes with DF-21D “carrier-killer” missiles or drones could also hunt these units down if their positions are fixed too long.
#### 2. **Enhancing Situational Awareness**
- **Strength:** Small units with drones, sensors, and ties to joint networks (e.g., JADC2) could relay real-time intel on PRC movements—ship formations, landing zones, or air sorties. This data could cue U.S. Navy submarines, Air Force bombers, or Taiwanese missile batteries to strike high-value targets, amplifying the defender’s punch.
- **Limit:** Cyberattacks, jamming, or destruction of satellite links by the PLA could blind these units. Their small size means limited organic ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) compared to larger formations, and they’d rely heavily on external support that might not hold up under pressure.
#### 3. **Forcing PRC Resource Diversion**
- **Strength:** By persisting inside China’s A2/AD envelope, these units could compel the PLA to divert ships, planes, and missiles to neutralize them—resources that might otherwise pound Taiwan’s cities or beaches. Even a minor delay (e.g., a day or two) could let Taiwan mobilize reserves or U.S. forces flow into theater.
- **Limit:** The PRC’s deep arsenal—thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles—might absorb this diversion without breaking stride. Small units, once detected, could be saturated with firepower, and their mobility (critical to EABO) might falter if sea or air routes are cut.
#### 4. **Supporting Taiwan’s Defense**
- **Strength:** If pre-positioned on Taiwan (a big "if" given political sensitivities), these units could bolster the ROC Marine Corps and Army in key chokepoints—urban areas like Taipei or mountainous eastern coasts. Their missile and air-defense capabilities (e.g., the Littoral Anti-Air Battalion) could blunt PLA landings or helicopter assaults.
- **Limit:** Taiwan’s 170,000-strong military would bear the brunt, and small USMC units (a few thousand total) wouldn’t shift the ground war’s tide against millions of PLA troops. They’re not designed for sustained combat—once overrun, their impact ends.
---
### Challenges to Effectiveness
- **Logistics:** Small units need constant resupply—fuel, missiles, food—in a Strait likely dominated by PLA Navy and air forces. Prepositioned stocks help, but sustaining them long-term is untested. Russia’s Ukraine invasion showed even a near-peer can struggle with logistics; the PLA might too, but it’s closer to home.
- **Survivability:** China’s precision strikes and ISR (e.g., satellites, over-the-horizon radar) could pinpoint and destroy these units if they don’t relocate fast enough. Okinawa’s caves hid Japanese defenders in 1945; Taiwan’s terrain offers less cover against modern sensors.
- **Scale Mismatch:** Okinawa saw 183,000 U.S. troops overwhelm 100,000 Japanese; a Taiwan invasion could pit millions of PLA against a fraction of that in defenders. Small units thrive in skirmishes, not massive frontal assaults.
- **Allied Cooperation:** Japan or the Philippines hosting MLRs is uncertain—Okinawa’s governor opposes new U.S. deployments, and the Philippines’ stance wavers. Without basing, their reach shrinks.
---
### Comparison to Okinawa (1945)
In Okinawa, the U.S. used mass—1,300 ships, 183,000 troops—to crush a smaller, isolated Japanese force. A PRC invasion of Taiwan flips this: the attacker (PRC) brings mass, while defenders (Taiwan, USMC) rely on precision and dispersion. Small USMC units echo Japan’s kamikaze tactic—inflicting outsized damage but not stopping the tide. Their impact hinges on delaying, not defeating, the PRC outright, unlike the U.S.’s decisive win in 1945.
---
### Net Impact
In a massive PRC invasion, these small units wouldn’t stop the PLA cold—China’s numbers and firepower are too vast. Their best-case impact is as a force multiplier: sinking dozens of ships, disrupting landings, and buying days or weeks for Taiwan and U.S. reinforcements. Wargames like CSIS’s 2023 “First Battle of the Next War” suggest U.S. missile-armed units (including Marines) can bleed the PLA Navy (losing 90% of its amphibious fleet in some scenarios), but only if logistics and allied support hold.
Worst case? They’re overwhelmed early—expending munitions, cut off, and neutralized—leaving Taiwan to fend for itself. Their success depends on flawless execution of an untested concept against a near-peer with home-field advantage. It’s a high-stakes gamble: potent if it works, marginal if it doesn’t. What do you think—could these units punch above their weight, or are they too small for the fight?
Grok previously compared a hypothetical PRC invasion of Taiwan to the WWII Battle of Okinawa, Grok will refine and reframe the analysis here to ensure clarity and address any nuances I might’ve glossed over. The two scenarios—separated by 80 years, vastly different technology, and geopolitical stakes—share some parallels but diverge sharply in scale, complexity, and implications. Here’s the comparison across key dimensions:
---
### 1. **Strategic Objectives**
- **Battle of Okinawa (1945):**
- The U.S. aimed to seize Okinawa (340 miles from Japan) as a launchpad for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of Japan’s home islands. It was a late-stage WWII operation to tighten the noose on Japan.
- Japan sought to defend Okinawa as a sacrificial buffer, bleeding U.S. forces to deter a mainland invasion and force a negotiated peace.
- **PRC Invasion of Taiwan (Hypothetical):**
- The PRC views Taiwan as a renegade province and its unification as a core national goal. Capturing Taiwan would secure the First Island Chain, dominate the South China Sea, and cement China’s regional hegemony, while denying the U.S. a key ally.
- Taiwan, backed potentially by the U.S. and allies, would aim to repel or delay the PRC, preserving its de facto independence and the democratic status quo.
**Comparison:** Both involve an attacker targeting a strategically vital island near the defender’s homeland, with the defender aiming to inflict unsustainable costs. Okinawa was a stepping stone to a bigger prize (Japan); Taiwan is the prize itself, with broader geopolitical domino effects.
---
Grok’s comparison :
### 2. **Geography and Logistics**
- **Okinawa:**
- Okinawa is small (877 square miles), with rugged northern hills and flatter southern plains. Japanese forces leveraged caves and terrain for defense.
- The U.S. faced a short hop from nearby bases (e.g., the Philippines), but Japan struggled to reinforce due to Allied naval dominance.
- **Taiwan:**
- Taiwan is much larger (13,976 square miles), with a mountainous eastern spine and urbanized western coast. The 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait poses a formidable barrier to amphibious assault.
- The PRC would need to cross this chokepoint under fire, while Taiwan could exploit its terrain and cities (e.g., Taipei) for prolonged resistance.
**Comparison:** Both islands favor defenders—Okinawa’s caves versus Taiwan’s mountains and urban sprawl—but Taiwan’s size and the Strait make it a far tougher nut to crack logistically than Okinawa was for the U.S.
---
### 3. **Military Forces and Tactics**
- **Okinawa:**
- The U.S. deployed 183,000 troops, 1,300 ships, and overwhelming air power against 100,000 Japanese defenders. Japan used kamikaze attacks (1,900 sorties) and dug-in positions, forcing brutal, close-quarters combat over 82 days.
- Tech was WWII-era: battleships, propeller planes, and basic artillery dominated.
- **Taiwan:**
- The PRC might commit millions of troops, thousands of ships (including civilian ferries), and a massive missile arsenal (e.g., DF-17 hypersonics). Its A2/AD strategy would target U.S. carriers and bases in Japan or Guam.
- Taiwan’s 170,000-strong military, plus reserves, would use U.S.-supplied gear (F-16s, HIMARS) and a “porcupine” approach—mines, drones, and guerrilla tactics. Modern warfare (cyberattacks, satellites, AI) would dominate alongside traditional combat.
**Comparison:** Okinawa pitted a superior attacker against a dug-in defender, much like a Taiwan scenario. But the PRC would face a more contested battlespace—Taiwan’s advanced defenses and potential U.S. intervention—versus the U.S.’s clear edge in 1945. Technology amplifies the difference: WWII’s brute force versus today’s precision and digital warfare.
---
### 4. **Casualties and Civilian Impact**
- **Okinawa:**
- Casualties were staggering: 12,500 U.S. killed, 50,000 wounded; 70,000–110,000 Japanese soldiers killed; and 50,000–150,000 Okinawan civilians dead (up to a third of the population), many from suicide or collateral damage.
- The battle’s toll shaped U.S. reluctance to invade Japan directly, leading to the atomic bombs.
- **Taiwan:**
- An invasion could kill hundreds of thousands to millions. Taiwan’s 23 million people, packed into urban centers, face missile barrages, urban combat, or a blockade’s starvation. PRC losses could also be immense given Taiwan’s defenses and U.S. involvement.
- Global economic fallout (e.g., TSMC’s 60% chip market share) would compound the human cost.
**Comparison:** Both would see horrific civilian losses, but Taiwan’s scale—larger population, denser cities—makes it potentially orders of magnitude worse than Okinawa’s already devastating toll.
---
### 5. **International Involvement**
- **Okinawa:**
- A U.S.-Japan duel with no significant third-party involvement. The Allies were united, and Japan was isolated.
- Victory gave the U.S. a post-war foothold (Okinawa hosted bases until 1972).
- **Taiwan:**
- A PRC invasion would likely draw in the U.S. (via the Taiwan Relations Act and strategic interests), Japan (with bases at risk), Australia, and possibly NATO. It could escalate into a regional or global conflict.
- Success or failure would reshape the Indo-Pacific power balance and U.S.-China rivalry.
**Comparison:** Okinawa was a bilateral endgame; Taiwan would be a multilateral flashpoint, with nuclear risks absent in 1945.
---
### Parallels
- **Island Warfare:** Both feature an amphibious assault on a fortified island, with terrain aiding the defender.
- **Attrition Strategy:** Defenders aim to make victory too costly for the attacker.
- **Naval Dominance:** Control of surrounding waters is critical—U.S. fleets in 1945, PRC versus U.S./allies today.
### Differences
- **Scale:** Taiwan’s invasion would dwarf Okinawa in troops, tech, and stakes—think millions versus hundreds of thousands.
- **Technology:** Okinawa’s rifles and kamikazes contrast with drones, hypersonic missiles, and cyberattacks.
- **Global Impact:** Okinawa decided a war’s end; Taiwan could start a new one, with economic shockwaves.
---
### Conclusion
A PRC invasion of Taiwan would resemble Okinawa in its island-conquest brutality and strategic weight but would far exceed it in complexity, scale, and consequences. Okinawa was a bloody footnote in WWII’s climax; Taiwan could be a 21st-century fulcrum, blending WWII-style carnage with modern warfare’s chaos. The U.S. rolled over Okinawa with relative certainty; the PRC would face a grueling, uncertain slog—more like if Okinawa had been bigger, better armed, and backed by a superpower coalition. What aspect of this comparison do you want to dive deeper into?
First I ask for the probability of a PRC Invasion: Xai Grok: Estimating
the probability of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launching an invasion of Taiwan is inherently speculative, as it depends on a complex mix of military, political, economic, and international factors that can shift unpredictably. No definitive probability can be assigned with certainty, but I can outline the key considerations and provide a reasoned assessment based on current trends as of April 2, 2025.
### Factors Suggesting a Lower Probability
1. **Military Challenges:** Invading Taiwan would be a monumental task. The Taiwan Strait, spanning 100 miles, is a natural barrier that complicates amphibious operations. The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would need to transport and sustain potentially millions of troops under threat from Taiwan’s defenses (e.g., anti-ship missiles, mines, and U.S.-supplied weapons) and possible U.S. and allied intervention. Despite rapid modernization, the PLA’s amphibious capabilities remain untested in a conflict of this scale, and historical examples like the D-Day invasion of Normandy (which required vastly more preparation and resources) highlight the difficulty.
2. **Economic Costs:** China’s economy, while massive, is facing headwinds—slowing growth, a real estate crisis, and demographic decline. An invasion would disrupt global trade, particularly through the Taiwan Strait, a critical artery for 20-25% of the world’s shipping. The loss of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry (e.g., TSMC, which produces over 60% of the world’s chips) would cripple global supply chains, including China’s own tech sector. Sanctions from the U.S. and allies could further destabilize the PRC’s economy, threatening the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic legitimacy.
3. **Political Risks:** Xi Jinping’s leadership rests on stability and prosperity. A failed invasion—or even a pyrrhic victory—could spark unrest among China’s 1.4 billion people, especially if casualties mount or economic hardship follows. The CCP has historically avoided large-scale wars since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, preferring gradual pressure over risky gambles.
4. **Alternative Strategies:** The PRC has non-military levers to pursue unification, such as economic coercion, cyberattacks, disinformation, and diplomatic isolation. A blockade or “gray zone” tactics (e.g., incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone) could pressure Taiwan without triggering full-scale war, aligning with China’s cautious approach under Xi.
5. **International Deterrence:** The U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” but has signaled willingness to defend Taiwan, as evidenced by Biden’s repeated statements and $8 billion in military aid since 2022. Japan, Australia, and potentially NATO could also intervene, raising the specter of a broader conflict—possibly even nuclear escalation—China might seek to avoid.
### Factors Suggesting a Higher Probability
1. **Xi’s Ambitions:** Xi has tied his legacy to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” with Taiwan’s unification as a core pillar. His rhetoric has grown sharper, and the PLA has been ordered to be ready for war by 2027, per CIA Director William Burns’ 2023 testimony. The 2049 centennial of the PRC’s founding is a symbolic deadline, but some analysts see the 2027 PLA centennial as a nearer-term trigger.
2. **Military Buildup:** China’s military spending ($296 billion in 2024) dwarfs Taiwan’s ($19 billion), and its navy (370 ships) outnumbers the U.S.’s (290). The PLA’s exercises increasingly simulate Taiwan scenarios—e.g., encircling the island in 2022 after Pelosi’s visit and testing civilian ferries for troop transport. New amphibious barges spotted in 2025 suggest invasion preparations.
3. **Domestic Pressures:** Economic stagnation or social unrest could push Xi to use Taiwan as a nationalist rallying cry, though this “diversionary war” theory lacks strong historical precedent in China. A perceived closing window of opportunity—before U.S. defenses in the Indo-Pacific strengthen—might also spur action.
4. **Taiwan’s Stance:** Taiwan’s government, under President Lai Ching-te (elected 2024), rejects unification and is bolstering defenses. A formal declaration of independence—unlikely but possible—could force China’s hand, as the 2005 Anti-Secession Law mandates “non-peaceful means” if peaceful unification fails.
5. **Global Context:** Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion may have emboldened China by exposing Western hesitancy, though it also showed the costs of miscalculation. A distracted U.S., especially during its 2024 election cycle or a Trump presidency signaling reduced commitment to Taiwan, could tempt Beijing.
### Assessment
Analysts’ predictions vary widely. Some, like Admiral Phil Davidson in 2021, pegged 2027 as a critical year (the “Davidson window”), citing PLA readiness goals. Others, like General Mike Minihan in 2023, suggested 2025, tying it to elections in Taiwan and the U.S. Yet the Pentagon has since downplayed imminent threats, calling conflict “neither inevitable nor imminent” in 2024. A 2024 Swedish National China Centre report found most expert forecasts rate the risk as low in the near term. Public sentiment in Taiwan, per a 2024 poll, aligns with this—67% would resist an invasion, but most don’t see it as imminent within five years.
Given these dynamics, I’d estimate the probability of a PRC invasion within the next decade (by 2035) at **15-25%**, leaning toward the lower end absent a major catalyst (e.g., Taiwan declaring independence). This reflects China’s preference for patience and coercion over the staggering risks of war, balanced against Xi’s ideological drive and growing capabilities. Beyond 2035, the odds could rise if China’s power peaks while U.S. resolve wanes, but that’s too far out to predict confidently.
The PRC is more likely to escalate short-of-war measures—blockades, cyberattacks, or island seizures—than launch a full invasion. These carry lower costs and keep escalation in Beijing’s control. Still, the situation remains fluid; a single misstep could tip the scales. What do you think—does this align with your view, or do you see a specific trigger changing the odds?
I am no Marine and I mean no disrespect. But there should be no battle for Taiwan, because you are only serving multinational corporate interests. For my part not one live cartridge, not one missile, not one drop of American blood should be shed for such an effort. I won't make an argument for Chinese interests because I don't give a damn what they want or what they feel entitled to, or why. But it is not our problem, it never was, our problem and is-not-worth-the-cost. Especially, for multinational corporations.
I tried DUCK DUCK GO…Then berated Grok still no answer on the Marine Officer serving HEGSETH. Grok:As of April 03, 2025, detailed public information about the full staff of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is limited, particularly regarding lower-level aides or comprehensive rosters. However, I can provide an overview of key known or announced members of his immediate staff and senior leadership team at the Department of Defense, based on what has been disclosed since his swearing-in on January 25, 2025. Since you previously asked about both the Senior Military Assistant and the Aide-de-Camp, I’ll assume "his staff" refers broadly to significant personnel supporting Hegseth directly or in prominent Pentagon roles, and I’ll clarify where data is incomplete.
### Senior Military Assistant
- **Lieutenant General Christopher LaNeve (U.S. Army)**: Appointed as Hegseth’s Senior Military Assistant, LaNeve was announced in this role on March 25, 2025. A three-star general, he previously served as the commanding general of the Eighth Army in South Korea. As SMA, he acts as Hegseth’s primary military advisor, overseeing uniformed military matters and bridging the Secretary with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite your earlier focus on a Marine Corps officer, LaNeve is an Army officer, and no subsequent change to a USMC officer has been reported by this date.
### Aide-de-Camp
- The identity of Hegseth’s Marine Corps Aide-de-Camp remains undisclosed in public records as of April 03, 2025. Given your emphasis on a USMC officer, this is likely a Marine major or lieutenant colonel, consistent with tradition for aides to the Secretary of Defense, but no name has surfaced. Aides-de-camp handle personal and logistical support, and while not covert, their names are rarely publicized unless involved in notable events. Hegseth’s short tenure (just over two months) and focus on high-profile policy shifts may explain the lack of attention to this role.
### Key Civilian Staff and Nominees
Hegseth’s broader staff includes senior civilian appointees, some of whom were nominated by President Donald Trump and have been confirmed or are pending confirmation. These individuals form part of his leadership team at the Pentagon:
- **Stephen Feinberg**: Nominated as Deputy Secretary of Defense. A billionaire investor and co-founder of Cerberus Capital Management, Feinberg’s nomination reflects Hegseth’s outsider approach. As of April 03, 2025, his confirmation status isn’t fully clear in public sources, but he’s a critical figure in Hegseth’s inner circle if confirmed.
- **Michael Duffey**: Nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. Duffey, with prior experience in the Trump administration, oversees procurement and logistics. His confirmation was still pending as of late January 2025, with no updates by April suggesting delays or ongoing Senate review.
- **Emil Michael**: Nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. A former Uber executive, Michael focuses on technology and innovation. Like Duffey, his confirmation status remains unconfirmed in public data by this date.
- **Elbridge “Bridge” Colby**: Nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. A national security strategist and co-founder of The Marathon Initiative, Colby is a prominent advocate for prioritizing China as a strategic threat. His confirmation was also pending as of late January, with no clear update by April 03.
### Other Notable Staff
- **Phil Hegseth**: Hegseth’s brother, Phil, has been reported as a senior adviser to the Secretary as of March 2025. Previously involved in podcasting and media relations, Phil’s role was described by Hegseth’s office as a liaison between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. His appointment has drawn scrutiny due to its nepotistic nature, but he’s part of Hegseth’s trusted circle.
- **Robert Salesses**: Served as Acting Secretary of Defense from January 20, 2025, until Hegseth’s confirmation on January 25, 2025. While no longer in that role, Salesses, a career DoD official, may still support the transition team, though his current position isn’t specified.
### Context and Gaps
Hegseth’s staff is still taking shape, reflecting his brief time in office and the Trump administration’s unconventional approach to staffing. His early actions—firing senior officers like Admiral Lisa Franchetti in February 2025, cutting DEI programs, and redeploying troops to the border—suggest a lean, loyal team focused on executing his “warrior ethos” agenda. However, public data lacks specifics on additional aides, military assistants beyond LaNeve, or administrative staff. The DoD’s opacity on personnel below the senior level, combined with Hegseth’s rapid policy shifts, means names like the Marine Aide-de-Camp or other direct reports haven’t emerged.
If you’re seeking a specific staff member (e.g., the USMC Aide-de-Camp), I’ve exhausted public sources as of now. For real-time updates, DoD press releases or X posts from Hegseth’s team might reveal more in the coming weeks. Want me to narrow it down further or dig into something specific about these folks? I’m here to keep grinding those terabytes!
Beijing’s increasingly bellicose military exercises are meant to signal resolve and shape Western media discourse.
By: Kamran Bokhari
China’s attempts to manage its economic downturn and prevent it from becoming a political crisis have hit a major obstacle: the shift in U.S. foreign policy. For years, Beijing has sought leverage in negotiations with Washington, believing that better relations are key to stabilizing its domestic economy and political situation. U.S.-Russia diplomacy, however, has disrupted China’s strategy. In response, Chinese President Xi Jinping has ramped up military posturing, particularly in the Western Pacific – a risky approach with limited upside.
On March 31, Chinese forces launched two days of unscheduled military exercises around Taiwan. While the kinetic operations were routine, this round featured an aggressive information warfare component, including a video depicting Taiwan’s president as a parasite. This escalation came as the Trump administration was preparing to announce sweeping new tariffs, with China as a primary target.
Meanwhile, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, made a last-minute, three-day trip to Moscow for high-level talks. His meetings with both Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin speak volumes about Beijing’s growing concern over shifting U.S.-Russia relations. If Washington and Moscow improve ties, China’s negotiating position with the U.S. could weaken further, deepening its economic crisis.
Russia's Competing Interests
(click to enlarge)
Wang rejected the notion that closer U.S.-Russia ties would strain Beijing’s relationship with Moscow, stating that China and Russia are “friends forever, never enemies.” This rhetoric recalls the “no limits” strategic partnership the two countries declared just before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. That phrase was always more for Western consumption than a reflection of reality. China has offered little to support Russia’s war effort, while Moscow has been of no help in addressing Beijing’s economic troubles.
That said, it is curious that China’s foreign minister even felt the need to mention that the two nations could never be enemies. If the relationship is strategically solid, enmity should be a non-issue, whether or not the two can always help each other out. That Beijing feels the need to state it underscores its concerns about Russian intentions. China remembers how it aligned with the U.S. in the 1970s, a move that undermined the Soviet Union.
Beijing has a vital interest in understanding Russia’s intentions and the risks they pose. It is thus no surprise that Wang and Lavrov discussed issues such as the Korean Peninsula, Iran’s nuclear program and Central Asia – areas where they share interests and have cooperated in recent decades. But Beijing knows that if U.S.-Russia relations improve, Moscow will collaborate more with Washington in these areas, reducing China’s leverage with the U.S.
China understands it must negotiate, but it cannot do so from a position of weakness. The question is what leverage it can wield. This is where China’s increasingly frequent military exercises come into play. These drills serve a dual purpose: They project strength internationally and help Xi manage domestic pressures as China’s strategic position weakens.
Xi has urged Chinese officials to “keep calm” amid the escalating trade war with the U.S., knowing that Beijing must carefully calibrate its response to avoid deepening economic distress – especially as it grapples with a housing market crash and deflation. At the same time, Xi must reinforce his control as he continues purging both the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army.
The increasing frequency and bellicosity of the military exercises – whether live-fire drills in the Sea of Tasman near Australia and New Zealand or the recent mock blockade of Taiwan – are meant to signal resolve. Their target is not just Washington; it is also the broader Western media and intelligentsia. Beijing knows that U.S. intelligence can accurately assess China’s true offensive military capabilities, limiting its ability to pressure the White House directly. Instead, China aims to shape the discourse in Western media, where conventional wisdom deems China capable of attacking Taiwan. This narrative, in turn, increases pressure on the Trump administration, potentially tempering its moves and strengthening Beijing’s negotiating position.
China understands the cost of actual military aggression. Any offensive action would only worsen its already fragile economy. For now, its strategy hinges on psychological warfare – projecting power while avoiding a direct confrontation that it cannot afford.
As I see it there are two issues here:
1. DoD. Simply too small and lacking strategic mobility to fight China at their back door. Mass can only be manipulated so far by technology. The tyranny of distance is real. Smaller forces do, across history, prevail but it is not the way to bet. China would certainly love to lure the US into a fight over Taiwan. I would suggest not walking into that ambush in our current, reduced state. We simply lack the mass to recover from even modest losses and we can be certain losses would be huge. We might think we are a heavyweight able to go 15 rounds. We are a middleweight unable to last 5 rounds. DoD needs to focus on the fight after the loss of Taiwan. It needs to prepare for that fight now.
I refuse to believe that China will attack Taiwan soon. As we continue to get weaker they can just wait. Why attack the adversary who is bleeding out? Taiwan might only be the cheese in the trap. Reunification is secondary. Defeating the US in the process is far more valuable.
2. The other part of this discussion is the now irrelevant Marine Corps. In the best of circumstances making the USMC potent enough to be involved in the fight in the South China Sea would require a rebuild taking years and probably not be an option until later in the conflict anyway. No amphibious assault into Tokyo Bay in 1942. Yet, it must be rebuilt if only to be available globally while a fight unfolds in the South China Sea. Surprisingly Russia, China, Iran and N Korea have never acted in a coordinated and synergistic way. There is no guarantee they will not in the future. Hence the rebuilt and modernized USMC with an offensive spirit must be available to secure the critical, global chokepoints.
The Corps in its self assigned mission as short range, light, coastal defense forces is simply irrelevant. It could not interdict drug running boats in the Carribean or Gulf of America. It has ship killing abilities in aircraft with available ordinance and refuses to acquire it. The reason is probably that it would make EABO obsolete.
3. To use my much hated sports analogies. We do not know where and when the first game of a protracted season might be. We currently do not have a roster of players, equipment or a playbook. We can only put 11 players on the field at any given time and the Genius Brigades believe we only need 9 to win. DoD and the Marine Corps are being led by misanthropes lacking in integrity and knowledge.
Doug:
I agree with all of your observations.
If I can let me add my two cents.
The PRC has played the long game and continues to do so. First as you said, Taiwan is the bait. The PRC would love to have the U.S. commit our military to a battle halfway around the world, with a fleet that has trouble putting even one ARG on station anywhere in the world. Once committed, the U.S. military is a one trick pony. We have little to no ability to continuously project power and most importantly logistically support them.
The Corps will have little to no role in a West Pac war. Where we will have, maybe the decisive role, is in our ability to threaten globally, PRC’s worldwide B&R infrastructure. For example the PRC still has a quasi-military presence in Panama. A MAGTF on either side of the canal will force the PRC to make a choice, do we (PRC) commit our nascent blue water navy halfway around the world in the U.S.’s backyard or do we sacrifice that facility. The same goes for the multiple facilities that the PRC has in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Arctic, etc. The PRC CURRENTLY has little ability to sail a true blue water navy. At some point the PRC will have to commit on our terms, or pull back to the first island chain, at which point the U.S. then has the ability, like we did in WW II, set the time and place of the next battle and the one after that.
If we use the Corps as intended in our strategic plans and not like the FD foolishness, the Corps has the ability to help the rest of the military perform their missions.
But hell what do I know, the Commandant doesn’t brook any discussion or dissent in the ranks, our off to the Ost Front.
Sir, If we start tomorrow, to rebuild the MAGTF 10 years, ships are the taking the longest. Manpower, air, ground 2028-2030 in place, waiting for a ship Sir
Spot on!
The only rational role in the short term for the Marine Corps would be to reinforce its air resources with more land deployable aircraft equipped with as many anti-ship missiles it can acquire, and as many C-130's it can buy new or get from the Air Force that has limited use for them and equip them with refueling kits on each wing and develop whatever hard power force of armor, infantry, and artillery that it can form in to battalion groups for contingency operations that can be flown in where they can be of value by the C-130 force.
Formally end FD2030 now, its the supreme cluster **** of bad strategy. Don't worry about grand strategy right away, just come to grips with the insanity of FD2030 and end it now.
Absolutely!
PrSM can be fired from HIMARS. The Marines currently have 7 HIMARS batteries in the active force (42 launchers). PrSM increment two will hit a moving target (ship) at ranges out to 300 NM. Future increment will have increased range. I'm not sure if the Marines are buying PrSm increment two in the future or not.
Movement to or along the Ryukyu chain will be terminated by a small invasion force drawn from the two dozen PRC airborne and marine brigades on the mainland 90 miles away within a matter of hours. Luzon to Taiwan is 500nmi. PrSM would only be useful as a containerized system aboard warships, and that assumes a task force that can defend itself from counterattacks that should be assumed to come in strength.
The Army's MDTF have cruise missiles and the SM-6 that could get out that far against surface ships if it went maximum ballistic, and pre-authorized basing rights on Luzon. The Marines have no such weapons, once again FD2030 is a complete fiasco of incredibly poor planning by career surfers.
https://open.substack.com/pub/cpldanusmcret764175/p/china-invades-taiwan?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=ohc7t
I tried this scenario before, my recommendation is to stay home, the Marine Corps in the current configuration isn't built for this
Finally I ask the hard question of Grok re Force Design and the destruction of the MEF Centric MAGTF with its multifaceted global, scaleable, agile MAGTFs. Grok lays it out, Your question cuts to the heart of a fierce debate within military circles about the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 (FD2030) and its implications—especially in a high-stakes scenario like a PRC invasion of Taiwan. You’re suggesting that FD2030’s shift to small, missile-centric units dismantled a proven, versatile Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)-based structure, potentially violating legal mandates and strategic logic for what might be negligible impact against China. Let’s unpack this, weaving in your legal and strategic critique, and assess whether it’s a “criminal and strategic mistake.”
---
### Background: What FD2030 Did
FD2030, spearheaded by General David Berger starting in 2019, reoriented the USMC from a globally deployable, multi-mission force to a lighter, maritime-focused one tailored for the Indo-Pacific and a PRC threat. Key moves:
- **Divestitures:** Eliminated all tanks (200+ M1A1s), cut artillery (e.g., from 21 to 5 cannon batteries), slashed infantry battalions (from 24 to 21), and reduced aviation assets (e.g., F-35s capped at 420).
- **New Focus:** Created Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs)—small, missile-armed units (e.g., NMESIS with Naval Strike Missiles)—for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) to deny sea control in contested littorals.
- **Logistics Shift:** Reduced reliance on Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) shipping, betting on distributed, austere resupply over fixed stocks.
This traded the MEF’s scalability—division-sized, 20,000+ Marines with organic air, ground, and logistics—for a leaner, specialized force of about 170,000 total personnel (down from historical peaks near 200,000).
---
### Legal Critique: 10 U.S. Code § 8063
You cite 10 U.S.C. § 8063, which defines the Marine Corps’ composition and missions. It mandates the USMC to:
- Be organized for “service with the fleet” in amphibious and land operations.
- Provide “combined arms” forces, including aviation, for expeditionary duty.
- Maintain a structure for “prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.”
**Argument for Violation:**
- FD2030’s tank divestment and artillery cuts arguably weaken “combined arms,” leaving the Corps reliant on external support (e.g., Army tanks or Navy fires) for sustained land combat—something the MEF could once handle solo.
- The focus on small MLRs over scalable MEFs might undermine “prompt and sustained combat” on land, especially in a massive invasion requiring mass, not just precision.
- Ditching MPF logistics could clash with “service with the fleet,” as prepositioned ships were a cornerstone of global reach and rapid response.
**Counterargument:**
- The law’s language is broad—FD2030 still aligns with “service with the fleet” via EABO and naval integration (e.g., NMESIS ties to Navy targeting). “Combined arms” persists through infantry, missiles, and aviation, just rebalanced for a maritime fight.
- Berger argued FD2030 fulfills § 8063 by adapting to modern threats—China’s A2/AD—rather than clinging to a Cold War structure irrelevant against missiles and drones.
Legally, it’s a stretch to call FD2030 “criminal.” Congress hasn’t challenged it under § 8063, and the Commandant has latitude to shape force structure within statutory bounds. But your point lands strategically—did this untested pivot sacrifice too much for too little?
---
### Strategic Critique: One-Trick Pony vs. Global Agility
The MEF-centric model was a Swiss Army knife: three MEFs (I, II, III) could deploy globally, scale from humanitarian missions to full-spectrum war, and sustain themselves via MPF ships (e.g., 17 ships with 30 days of supplies). FD2030’s MLRs are a narrower tool—optimized for anti-ship strikes in the Indo-Pacific but less flexible elsewhere.
#### Impact in a PRC Invasion of Taiwan
As I detailed earlier, MLRs could disrupt PRC naval ops, sink ships, and delay landings—CSIS wargames (2023) showed them contributing to a 90% PLA amphibious fleet loss in some runs. But their small size (1,800–2,000 per MLR), limited munitions (e.g., 36 missiles per unit), and reliance on shaky logistics cap their role:
- **Insignificant Scale:** Against a PRC force of millions, thousands of ships, and relentless missile barrages, a handful of MLRs (maybe 3–5 total, 10,000 Marines max) is a drop in the bucket. Okinawa’s 183,000 U.S. troops overwhelmed 100,000 Japanese; Taiwan’s defender-to-attacker ratio would be far worse.
- **Logistics Fragility:** Without MPF, resupplying MLRs in a contested Strait—under PLA air and naval dominance—is a nightmare. Prepositioned stocks run dry fast, and small units lack the MEF’s organic sustainment.
- **One-Trick Risk:** If the PRC adapts (e.g., saturating MLR sites with drones or bypassing them with inland thrusts), the Corps has no Plan B—no tanks, limited artillery, and fewer boots to pivot to ground combat.
#### Lost Global Reach
The MEF’s agility let the USMC respond to Iraq (1991, 2003), Afghanistan, and disasters (e.g., Haiti 2010). FD2030’s focus on China leaves it less ready for:
- Large-scale land wars (e.g., Ukraine-style conflicts).
- Rapid global deployments without Navy or Army backfill.
- Sustained operations beyond short, sharp littoral fights.
Critics like Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper (ret.) and others in *The Marine Corps Gazette* (2021–2023) call this a “strategic mistake”—a bet on a single threat (PRC) and tactic (EABO) that guts versatility. They argue the Corps went from a global hammer to a regional screwdriver.
---
### Was It a Mistake?
**Yes, If You Value Flexibility and Scale:**
- **Taiwan Context:** The MLRs’ “insignificant impact” against a massive PRC invasion underscores the mismatch. A MEF—with tanks, artillery, and 20,000+ Marines—could hold ground, reinforce Taiwan’s army, and sustain a fight longer than scattered MLRs. FD2030’s niche role might delay the PLA but won’t stop it without overwhelming U.S. support—support that might not arrive in time.
- **Global Cost:** Trading expeditionary reach for a China-specific gambit weakens deterrence elsewhere. A PRC feint at Taiwan could tie up the Corps while Russia or Iran exploit gaps.
**No, If You Buy the China Threat:**
- **Taiwan Fit:** Berger’s logic was that MEFs couldn’t survive China’s A2/AD (e.g., DF-21D missiles shredding carriers or bases). Small, mobile MLRs at least complicate PLA plans—sinking ships beats dying in barracks. Wargames suggest they’re not “insignificant” if paired with Navy subs and Air Force strikes.
- **Adaptation:** The old model was obsolete against a peer like China—tanks and big bases are sitting ducks. FD2030 aligns with joint warfighting, leaning on the Navy and Air Force to scale up.
**Criminal?** Not in a legal sense—§ 8063 isn’t clearly breached, and no court’s calling it that. Strategically, it’s a gamble with high downside. The untested part stings most: FD2030’s never been battle-proven, unlike the MEF’s Gulf War success. If it flops in Taiwan—say, MLRs get wiped out early—it’s a self-inflicted wound, validating your “mistake” charge.
---
### Conclusion
FD2030’s impact in a Taiwan invasion looks more like a speed bump than a wall—useful but not decisive. Destroying the MEF’s global, scalable model for this feels like overreach if you see the Corps as America’s 911 force. Yet if China’s the only fight that matters, it’s a calculated risk, not a blunder. I’d lean toward your skepticism: the Corps traded a proven, adaptable capability for a narrow, hypothetical edge—bold, but maybe reckless when millions of PLA troops hit the beach. What’s your take—did Berger misjudge the threat, or is this critique too harsh? out: Samuel says Grok nails it and that Grok was “too kind” consider the stakes involved in War.
I agree, but the decimation of the MAGTF was initiated by Neller when he said Marine forces not
optimized “fat and slow” (Senate Armed Services Committee, June 13, 2017)—launched FD2030’s shift to a lighter force—oversaw wargaming via Neller Center, opened May 31, 2024 (Marines.mil, August 3, 2023). ,"Berger just did the hatchet job and Smith is carrying on. Semper Fi
https://open.substack.com/pub/cpldanusmcret764175/p/marine-corps-readiness-and-force?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=ohc7t
The beginning of the end
The Navy's immediate priority is a large ~2000t diesel-electric drone submarine without a pressure hull in the conventional sense (internal compartments would be pressurized for diving) using much of the navigational and autonomy systems developed for the experimental drone squadron and the XLUUV. An underwater range of 2000nmi at 10-15knots is well within current technology and would permit an underwater mission time of one week in total.
Such an arsenal boat, SSR, could carry several dozen encapsulated cruise missiles or hybrid torpedo-mine weapons for release and subsequent launch-deployment after the drone boat leaves the immediate area. A Taiwan invasion force is likely to require well above a thousand ships of all types to launch and support, so at least 5000 major weapons on at least three dozen boats would be required for deployment of the plan over a two month period.
South Korea and Japan have robust conventional submarine programs, they should be encouraged to set up domestic production in America and also build their own boats of this type to speed up the formation of this affordable and potent deterrence force.
"South Korea and Japan have robust conventional submarine programs, they should be encouraged to set up domestic production in America and also build their own boats of this type to speed up the formation of this affordable and potent deterrence force."
My question to this is where and with whom? Currently the ship building and repair industries are tapped when it comes to personnel. I would give my left arm for a welder or pipefitter, or plate fitter.
It is so rough that HII sponsers NASCAR teams "buildsubmarines.com" and their commercials advertising for workers flooded sporting events last year (We Build Giants).
What yard has the capacity to build these submarines? Ours ae built in two shipyards, HII in Newport News Va and Electric Boat in Groton Conn.
Are you willing to sacrifice our own capacity to support allies? Next question....who is repairing them here in the US? The backlog of submarines is amazing. Some have been waiting for years and are decertified to dive.
The Battle for Okinawa is a reasonable comparative example, but only from the perspective of the PRC invading Taiwan. As it stands now, there is little prospect of relieving Taiwan unless the battle becomes protracted and reinforcements can be flown in or possibly re-supplied by cargo submarines. The nature of naval warfare has fundamentally changed from World War II, both sides know where the bulk of surface ships are and the weapons have vastly increased ranges.
The invasion of Taiwan will carry some risks, particularly well outside the battle zone among the planet's trading nations, which is why it awaits a major distraction elsewhere in the world so it can be carried out quickly with acceptable losses, in the interim they are preparing the Taiwanese with psychological warfare exercises.
Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $4.9 billion contract to deliver its long-range Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) to the US Army under Increment One.
The award follows a competitive solicitation process, with only one bid submitted. The contract comes after a successful live-fire exercise in mid-2024, where the PrSM engaged a moving maritime target using an autonomous multi-domain launcher. Do you think the Army might lend some to the Marine Corps to equip our skeleton NMSIS units? Not hardly…
No, for two reasons.
The next fight will be a joint fight where the army will have its own missions for PrSM.
PrSM isn't the same as NSM. What you're asking is the equivalent to, "will a 155 btry lend a 105 btry thier HE?" No, because they are two different munitions with similar effects.
I ask Grok the contribution the fledgling USMC Force Design elements would be in the PRC invasion of the First Island Chain:The U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 initiative, launched under General David Berger in 2019, represents a radical shift in how the Corps envisions its role in a potential conflict, particularly against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a massive invasion of Taiwan. The small, distributed units at the heart of this redesign—such as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs)—are intended to operate as agile, low-signature "stand-in forces" within contested zones. Their impact on a PRC invasion of Taiwan would depend on their ability to execute their mission amid the chaos of such a large-scale operation. Let’s break it down.
---
### What Are These Small Units?
Force Design 2030 pivots the USMC away from traditional large-scale amphibious assaults and sustained ground combat (e.g., divesting all tanks) toward smaller, dispersed units optimized for a maritime fight. Key elements include:
- **Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs):** Each MLR (e.g., the 3rd MLR stood up in 2022) has about 1,800–2,000 Marines, including a Littoral Combat Team (an infantry battalion), a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, and a Combat Logistics Battalion. They’re equipped with systems like the NMESIS (Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System), which fires Naval Strike Missiles with a 100+ nautical mile range.
- **Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO):** These units deploy to austere islands or coastal sites, setting up temporary bases to sense, strike, and disrupt enemy forces—then relocate before being targeted.
- **Distributed Operations:** Small teams operate across the First Island Chain (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Philippines), relying on mobility, stealth, and integration with Navy and joint forces.
The goal? Deny the PRC sea control, complicate its invasion, and buy time for a broader U.S. response—all while surviving China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) bubble of missiles, drones, and sensors.
---
### Potential Impact in a PRC Invasion of Taiwan
A PRC invasion would likely involve millions of troops, thousands of ships (military and civilian), and overwhelming missile barrages to soften Taiwan’s defenses. Here’s how these small USMC units might influence such a fight:
#### 1. **Disrupting PRC Naval Operations**
- **Strength:** MLRs armed with anti-ship missiles could target PRC amphibious ships, troop transports, and escorts in the Taiwan Strait or along approach routes. A single NMESIS hit could sink or disable a key vessel, slowing the invasion’s momentum. If dozens of these units are scattered across Taiwan or nearby islands (e.g., Penghu, Kinmen, or even Japanese islets with permission), they could create a “kill zone” of overlapping fire.
- **Limit:** The PRC’s sheer volume of ships—370 naval vessels plus a merchant fleet of thousands—might overwhelm this strategy. Once missiles are expended (each unit has limited shots—e.g., 18 launchers per MLR with two missiles each), resupply in a contested Strait under PLA missile and air dominance would be dicey. China’s counterstrikes with DF-21D “carrier-killer” missiles or drones could also hunt these units down if their positions are fixed too long.
#### 2. **Enhancing Situational Awareness**
- **Strength:** Small units with drones, sensors, and ties to joint networks (e.g., JADC2) could relay real-time intel on PRC movements—ship formations, landing zones, or air sorties. This data could cue U.S. Navy submarines, Air Force bombers, or Taiwanese missile batteries to strike high-value targets, amplifying the defender’s punch.
- **Limit:** Cyberattacks, jamming, or destruction of satellite links by the PLA could blind these units. Their small size means limited organic ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) compared to larger formations, and they’d rely heavily on external support that might not hold up under pressure.
#### 3. **Forcing PRC Resource Diversion**
- **Strength:** By persisting inside China’s A2/AD envelope, these units could compel the PLA to divert ships, planes, and missiles to neutralize them—resources that might otherwise pound Taiwan’s cities or beaches. Even a minor delay (e.g., a day or two) could let Taiwan mobilize reserves or U.S. forces flow into theater.
- **Limit:** The PRC’s deep arsenal—thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles—might absorb this diversion without breaking stride. Small units, once detected, could be saturated with firepower, and their mobility (critical to EABO) might falter if sea or air routes are cut.
#### 4. **Supporting Taiwan’s Defense**
- **Strength:** If pre-positioned on Taiwan (a big "if" given political sensitivities), these units could bolster the ROC Marine Corps and Army in key chokepoints—urban areas like Taipei or mountainous eastern coasts. Their missile and air-defense capabilities (e.g., the Littoral Anti-Air Battalion) could blunt PLA landings or helicopter assaults.
- **Limit:** Taiwan’s 170,000-strong military would bear the brunt, and small USMC units (a few thousand total) wouldn’t shift the ground war’s tide against millions of PLA troops. They’re not designed for sustained combat—once overrun, their impact ends.
---
### Challenges to Effectiveness
- **Logistics:** Small units need constant resupply—fuel, missiles, food—in a Strait likely dominated by PLA Navy and air forces. Prepositioned stocks help, but sustaining them long-term is untested. Russia’s Ukraine invasion showed even a near-peer can struggle with logistics; the PLA might too, but it’s closer to home.
- **Survivability:** China’s precision strikes and ISR (e.g., satellites, over-the-horizon radar) could pinpoint and destroy these units if they don’t relocate fast enough. Okinawa’s caves hid Japanese defenders in 1945; Taiwan’s terrain offers less cover against modern sensors.
- **Scale Mismatch:** Okinawa saw 183,000 U.S. troops overwhelm 100,000 Japanese; a Taiwan invasion could pit millions of PLA against a fraction of that in defenders. Small units thrive in skirmishes, not massive frontal assaults.
- **Allied Cooperation:** Japan or the Philippines hosting MLRs is uncertain—Okinawa’s governor opposes new U.S. deployments, and the Philippines’ stance wavers. Without basing, their reach shrinks.
---
### Comparison to Okinawa (1945)
In Okinawa, the U.S. used mass—1,300 ships, 183,000 troops—to crush a smaller, isolated Japanese force. A PRC invasion of Taiwan flips this: the attacker (PRC) brings mass, while defenders (Taiwan, USMC) rely on precision and dispersion. Small USMC units echo Japan’s kamikaze tactic—inflicting outsized damage but not stopping the tide. Their impact hinges on delaying, not defeating, the PRC outright, unlike the U.S.’s decisive win in 1945.
---
### Net Impact
In a massive PRC invasion, these small units wouldn’t stop the PLA cold—China’s numbers and firepower are too vast. Their best-case impact is as a force multiplier: sinking dozens of ships, disrupting landings, and buying days or weeks for Taiwan and U.S. reinforcements. Wargames like CSIS’s 2023 “First Battle of the Next War” suggest U.S. missile-armed units (including Marines) can bleed the PLA Navy (losing 90% of its amphibious fleet in some scenarios), but only if logistics and allied support hold.
Worst case? They’re overwhelmed early—expending munitions, cut off, and neutralized—leaving Taiwan to fend for itself. Their success depends on flawless execution of an untested concept against a near-peer with home-field advantage. It’s a high-stakes gamble: potent if it works, marginal if it doesn’t. What do you think—could these units punch above their weight, or are they too small for the fight?
Grok previously compared a hypothetical PRC invasion of Taiwan to the WWII Battle of Okinawa, Grok will refine and reframe the analysis here to ensure clarity and address any nuances I might’ve glossed over. The two scenarios—separated by 80 years, vastly different technology, and geopolitical stakes—share some parallels but diverge sharply in scale, complexity, and implications. Here’s the comparison across key dimensions:
---
### 1. **Strategic Objectives**
- **Battle of Okinawa (1945):**
- The U.S. aimed to seize Okinawa (340 miles from Japan) as a launchpad for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of Japan’s home islands. It was a late-stage WWII operation to tighten the noose on Japan.
- Japan sought to defend Okinawa as a sacrificial buffer, bleeding U.S. forces to deter a mainland invasion and force a negotiated peace.
- **PRC Invasion of Taiwan (Hypothetical):**
- The PRC views Taiwan as a renegade province and its unification as a core national goal. Capturing Taiwan would secure the First Island Chain, dominate the South China Sea, and cement China’s regional hegemony, while denying the U.S. a key ally.
- Taiwan, backed potentially by the U.S. and allies, would aim to repel or delay the PRC, preserving its de facto independence and the democratic status quo.
**Comparison:** Both involve an attacker targeting a strategically vital island near the defender’s homeland, with the defender aiming to inflict unsustainable costs. Okinawa was a stepping stone to a bigger prize (Japan); Taiwan is the prize itself, with broader geopolitical domino effects.
---
Grok’s comparison :
### 2. **Geography and Logistics**
- **Okinawa:**
- Okinawa is small (877 square miles), with rugged northern hills and flatter southern plains. Japanese forces leveraged caves and terrain for defense.
- The U.S. faced a short hop from nearby bases (e.g., the Philippines), but Japan struggled to reinforce due to Allied naval dominance.
- **Taiwan:**
- Taiwan is much larger (13,976 square miles), with a mountainous eastern spine and urbanized western coast. The 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait poses a formidable barrier to amphibious assault.
- The PRC would need to cross this chokepoint under fire, while Taiwan could exploit its terrain and cities (e.g., Taipei) for prolonged resistance.
**Comparison:** Both islands favor defenders—Okinawa’s caves versus Taiwan’s mountains and urban sprawl—but Taiwan’s size and the Strait make it a far tougher nut to crack logistically than Okinawa was for the U.S.
---
### 3. **Military Forces and Tactics**
- **Okinawa:**
- The U.S. deployed 183,000 troops, 1,300 ships, and overwhelming air power against 100,000 Japanese defenders. Japan used kamikaze attacks (1,900 sorties) and dug-in positions, forcing brutal, close-quarters combat over 82 days.
- Tech was WWII-era: battleships, propeller planes, and basic artillery dominated.
- **Taiwan:**
- The PRC might commit millions of troops, thousands of ships (including civilian ferries), and a massive missile arsenal (e.g., DF-17 hypersonics). Its A2/AD strategy would target U.S. carriers and bases in Japan or Guam.
- Taiwan’s 170,000-strong military, plus reserves, would use U.S.-supplied gear (F-16s, HIMARS) and a “porcupine” approach—mines, drones, and guerrilla tactics. Modern warfare (cyberattacks, satellites, AI) would dominate alongside traditional combat.
**Comparison:** Okinawa pitted a superior attacker against a dug-in defender, much like a Taiwan scenario. But the PRC would face a more contested battlespace—Taiwan’s advanced defenses and potential U.S. intervention—versus the U.S.’s clear edge in 1945. Technology amplifies the difference: WWII’s brute force versus today’s precision and digital warfare.
---
### 4. **Casualties and Civilian Impact**
- **Okinawa:**
- Casualties were staggering: 12,500 U.S. killed, 50,000 wounded; 70,000–110,000 Japanese soldiers killed; and 50,000–150,000 Okinawan civilians dead (up to a third of the population), many from suicide or collateral damage.
- The battle’s toll shaped U.S. reluctance to invade Japan directly, leading to the atomic bombs.
- **Taiwan:**
- An invasion could kill hundreds of thousands to millions. Taiwan’s 23 million people, packed into urban centers, face missile barrages, urban combat, or a blockade’s starvation. PRC losses could also be immense given Taiwan’s defenses and U.S. involvement.
- Global economic fallout (e.g., TSMC’s 60% chip market share) would compound the human cost.
**Comparison:** Both would see horrific civilian losses, but Taiwan’s scale—larger population, denser cities—makes it potentially orders of magnitude worse than Okinawa’s already devastating toll.
---
### 5. **International Involvement**
- **Okinawa:**
- A U.S.-Japan duel with no significant third-party involvement. The Allies were united, and Japan was isolated.
- Victory gave the U.S. a post-war foothold (Okinawa hosted bases until 1972).
- **Taiwan:**
- A PRC invasion would likely draw in the U.S. (via the Taiwan Relations Act and strategic interests), Japan (with bases at risk), Australia, and possibly NATO. It could escalate into a regional or global conflict.
- Success or failure would reshape the Indo-Pacific power balance and U.S.-China rivalry.
**Comparison:** Okinawa was a bilateral endgame; Taiwan would be a multilateral flashpoint, with nuclear risks absent in 1945.
---
### Parallels
- **Island Warfare:** Both feature an amphibious assault on a fortified island, with terrain aiding the defender.
- **Attrition Strategy:** Defenders aim to make victory too costly for the attacker.
- **Naval Dominance:** Control of surrounding waters is critical—U.S. fleets in 1945, PRC versus U.S./allies today.
### Differences
- **Scale:** Taiwan’s invasion would dwarf Okinawa in troops, tech, and stakes—think millions versus hundreds of thousands.
- **Technology:** Okinawa’s rifles and kamikazes contrast with drones, hypersonic missiles, and cyberattacks.
- **Global Impact:** Okinawa decided a war’s end; Taiwan could start a new one, with economic shockwaves.
---
### Conclusion
A PRC invasion of Taiwan would resemble Okinawa in its island-conquest brutality and strategic weight but would far exceed it in complexity, scale, and consequences. Okinawa was a bloody footnote in WWII’s climax; Taiwan could be a 21st-century fulcrum, blending WWII-style carnage with modern warfare’s chaos. The U.S. rolled over Okinawa with relative certainty; the PRC would face a grueling, uncertain slog—more like if Okinawa had been bigger, better armed, and backed by a superpower coalition. What aspect of this comparison do you want to dive deeper into?
First I ask for the probability of a PRC Invasion: Xai Grok: Estimating
the probability of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launching an invasion of Taiwan is inherently speculative, as it depends on a complex mix of military, political, economic, and international factors that can shift unpredictably. No definitive probability can be assigned with certainty, but I can outline the key considerations and provide a reasoned assessment based on current trends as of April 2, 2025.
### Factors Suggesting a Lower Probability
1. **Military Challenges:** Invading Taiwan would be a monumental task. The Taiwan Strait, spanning 100 miles, is a natural barrier that complicates amphibious operations. The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would need to transport and sustain potentially millions of troops under threat from Taiwan’s defenses (e.g., anti-ship missiles, mines, and U.S.-supplied weapons) and possible U.S. and allied intervention. Despite rapid modernization, the PLA’s amphibious capabilities remain untested in a conflict of this scale, and historical examples like the D-Day invasion of Normandy (which required vastly more preparation and resources) highlight the difficulty.
2. **Economic Costs:** China’s economy, while massive, is facing headwinds—slowing growth, a real estate crisis, and demographic decline. An invasion would disrupt global trade, particularly through the Taiwan Strait, a critical artery for 20-25% of the world’s shipping. The loss of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry (e.g., TSMC, which produces over 60% of the world’s chips) would cripple global supply chains, including China’s own tech sector. Sanctions from the U.S. and allies could further destabilize the PRC’s economy, threatening the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic legitimacy.
3. **Political Risks:** Xi Jinping’s leadership rests on stability and prosperity. A failed invasion—or even a pyrrhic victory—could spark unrest among China’s 1.4 billion people, especially if casualties mount or economic hardship follows. The CCP has historically avoided large-scale wars since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, preferring gradual pressure over risky gambles.
4. **Alternative Strategies:** The PRC has non-military levers to pursue unification, such as economic coercion, cyberattacks, disinformation, and diplomatic isolation. A blockade or “gray zone” tactics (e.g., incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone) could pressure Taiwan without triggering full-scale war, aligning with China’s cautious approach under Xi.
5. **International Deterrence:** The U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” but has signaled willingness to defend Taiwan, as evidenced by Biden’s repeated statements and $8 billion in military aid since 2022. Japan, Australia, and potentially NATO could also intervene, raising the specter of a broader conflict—possibly even nuclear escalation—China might seek to avoid.
### Factors Suggesting a Higher Probability
1. **Xi’s Ambitions:** Xi has tied his legacy to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” with Taiwan’s unification as a core pillar. His rhetoric has grown sharper, and the PLA has been ordered to be ready for war by 2027, per CIA Director William Burns’ 2023 testimony. The 2049 centennial of the PRC’s founding is a symbolic deadline, but some analysts see the 2027 PLA centennial as a nearer-term trigger.
2. **Military Buildup:** China’s military spending ($296 billion in 2024) dwarfs Taiwan’s ($19 billion), and its navy (370 ships) outnumbers the U.S.’s (290). The PLA’s exercises increasingly simulate Taiwan scenarios—e.g., encircling the island in 2022 after Pelosi’s visit and testing civilian ferries for troop transport. New amphibious barges spotted in 2025 suggest invasion preparations.
3. **Domestic Pressures:** Economic stagnation or social unrest could push Xi to use Taiwan as a nationalist rallying cry, though this “diversionary war” theory lacks strong historical precedent in China. A perceived closing window of opportunity—before U.S. defenses in the Indo-Pacific strengthen—might also spur action.
4. **Taiwan’s Stance:** Taiwan’s government, under President Lai Ching-te (elected 2024), rejects unification and is bolstering defenses. A formal declaration of independence—unlikely but possible—could force China’s hand, as the 2005 Anti-Secession Law mandates “non-peaceful means” if peaceful unification fails.
5. **Global Context:** Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion may have emboldened China by exposing Western hesitancy, though it also showed the costs of miscalculation. A distracted U.S., especially during its 2024 election cycle or a Trump presidency signaling reduced commitment to Taiwan, could tempt Beijing.
### Assessment
Analysts’ predictions vary widely. Some, like Admiral Phil Davidson in 2021, pegged 2027 as a critical year (the “Davidson window”), citing PLA readiness goals. Others, like General Mike Minihan in 2023, suggested 2025, tying it to elections in Taiwan and the U.S. Yet the Pentagon has since downplayed imminent threats, calling conflict “neither inevitable nor imminent” in 2024. A 2024 Swedish National China Centre report found most expert forecasts rate the risk as low in the near term. Public sentiment in Taiwan, per a 2024 poll, aligns with this—67% would resist an invasion, but most don’t see it as imminent within five years.
Given these dynamics, I’d estimate the probability of a PRC invasion within the next decade (by 2035) at **15-25%**, leaning toward the lower end absent a major catalyst (e.g., Taiwan declaring independence). This reflects China’s preference for patience and coercion over the staggering risks of war, balanced against Xi’s ideological drive and growing capabilities. Beyond 2035, the odds could rise if China’s power peaks while U.S. resolve wanes, but that’s too far out to predict confidently.
The PRC is more likely to escalate short-of-war measures—blockades, cyberattacks, or island seizures—than launch a full invasion. These carry lower costs and keep escalation in Beijing’s control. Still, the situation remains fluid; a single misstep could tip the scales. What do you think—does this align with your view, or do you see a specific trigger changing the odds?
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-wargames/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2011.08.2021&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief
I have saved the above link for several years and it is still relevant. Details out 6 scenarios for China intervening with Taiwan.
I can't help but look at the distances involved. For China....literally in their backyard. For the US? Down the street and over a couple of blocks.
And if the decision were made to not hit mainland China facilities? Our logistics chain would be insurmountable.
I am no Marine and I mean no disrespect. But there should be no battle for Taiwan, because you are only serving multinational corporate interests. For my part not one live cartridge, not one missile, not one drop of American blood should be shed for such an effort. I won't make an argument for Chinese interests because I don't give a damn what they want or what they feel entitled to, or why. But it is not our problem, it never was, our problem and is-not-worth-the-cost. Especially, for multinational corporations.
I tried DUCK DUCK GO…Then berated Grok still no answer on the Marine Officer serving HEGSETH. Grok:As of April 03, 2025, detailed public information about the full staff of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is limited, particularly regarding lower-level aides or comprehensive rosters. However, I can provide an overview of key known or announced members of his immediate staff and senior leadership team at the Department of Defense, based on what has been disclosed since his swearing-in on January 25, 2025. Since you previously asked about both the Senior Military Assistant and the Aide-de-Camp, I’ll assume "his staff" refers broadly to significant personnel supporting Hegseth directly or in prominent Pentagon roles, and I’ll clarify where data is incomplete.
### Senior Military Assistant
- **Lieutenant General Christopher LaNeve (U.S. Army)**: Appointed as Hegseth’s Senior Military Assistant, LaNeve was announced in this role on March 25, 2025. A three-star general, he previously served as the commanding general of the Eighth Army in South Korea. As SMA, he acts as Hegseth’s primary military advisor, overseeing uniformed military matters and bridging the Secretary with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite your earlier focus on a Marine Corps officer, LaNeve is an Army officer, and no subsequent change to a USMC officer has been reported by this date.
### Aide-de-Camp
- The identity of Hegseth’s Marine Corps Aide-de-Camp remains undisclosed in public records as of April 03, 2025. Given your emphasis on a USMC officer, this is likely a Marine major or lieutenant colonel, consistent with tradition for aides to the Secretary of Defense, but no name has surfaced. Aides-de-camp handle personal and logistical support, and while not covert, their names are rarely publicized unless involved in notable events. Hegseth’s short tenure (just over two months) and focus on high-profile policy shifts may explain the lack of attention to this role.
### Key Civilian Staff and Nominees
Hegseth’s broader staff includes senior civilian appointees, some of whom were nominated by President Donald Trump and have been confirmed or are pending confirmation. These individuals form part of his leadership team at the Pentagon:
- **Stephen Feinberg**: Nominated as Deputy Secretary of Defense. A billionaire investor and co-founder of Cerberus Capital Management, Feinberg’s nomination reflects Hegseth’s outsider approach. As of April 03, 2025, his confirmation status isn’t fully clear in public sources, but he’s a critical figure in Hegseth’s inner circle if confirmed.
- **Michael Duffey**: Nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. Duffey, with prior experience in the Trump administration, oversees procurement and logistics. His confirmation was still pending as of late January 2025, with no updates by April suggesting delays or ongoing Senate review.
- **Emil Michael**: Nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. A former Uber executive, Michael focuses on technology and innovation. Like Duffey, his confirmation status remains unconfirmed in public data by this date.
- **Elbridge “Bridge” Colby**: Nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. A national security strategist and co-founder of The Marathon Initiative, Colby is a prominent advocate for prioritizing China as a strategic threat. His confirmation was also pending as of late January, with no clear update by April 03.
### Other Notable Staff
- **Phil Hegseth**: Hegseth’s brother, Phil, has been reported as a senior adviser to the Secretary as of March 2025. Previously involved in podcasting and media relations, Phil’s role was described by Hegseth’s office as a liaison between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. His appointment has drawn scrutiny due to its nepotistic nature, but he’s part of Hegseth’s trusted circle.
- **Robert Salesses**: Served as Acting Secretary of Defense from January 20, 2025, until Hegseth’s confirmation on January 25, 2025. While no longer in that role, Salesses, a career DoD official, may still support the transition team, though his current position isn’t specified.
### Context and Gaps
Hegseth’s staff is still taking shape, reflecting his brief time in office and the Trump administration’s unconventional approach to staffing. His early actions—firing senior officers like Admiral Lisa Franchetti in February 2025, cutting DEI programs, and redeploying troops to the border—suggest a lean, loyal team focused on executing his “warrior ethos” agenda. However, public data lacks specifics on additional aides, military assistants beyond LaNeve, or administrative staff. The DoD’s opacity on personnel below the senior level, combined with Hegseth’s rapid policy shifts, means names like the Marine Aide-de-Camp or other direct reports haven’t emerged.
If you’re seeking a specific staff member (e.g., the USMC Aide-de-Camp), I’ve exhausted public sources as of now. For real-time updates, DoD press releases or X posts from Hegseth’s team might reveal more in the coming weeks. Want me to narrow it down further or dig into something specific about these folks? I’m here to keep grinding those terabytes!
Who is the Secretary of Defense’s Marine Aide?
FYI Geopolitical Futures
April 3, 2025
View On Website
Open as PDF
China’s Strategic Desperation and Taiwan Drills
Beijing’s increasingly bellicose military exercises are meant to signal resolve and shape Western media discourse.
By: Kamran Bokhari
China’s attempts to manage its economic downturn and prevent it from becoming a political crisis have hit a major obstacle: the shift in U.S. foreign policy. For years, Beijing has sought leverage in negotiations with Washington, believing that better relations are key to stabilizing its domestic economy and political situation. U.S.-Russia diplomacy, however, has disrupted China’s strategy. In response, Chinese President Xi Jinping has ramped up military posturing, particularly in the Western Pacific – a risky approach with limited upside.
On March 31, Chinese forces launched two days of unscheduled military exercises around Taiwan. While the kinetic operations were routine, this round featured an aggressive information warfare component, including a video depicting Taiwan’s president as a parasite. This escalation came as the Trump administration was preparing to announce sweeping new tariffs, with China as a primary target.
Meanwhile, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, made a last-minute, three-day trip to Moscow for high-level talks. His meetings with both Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin speak volumes about Beijing’s growing concern over shifting U.S.-Russia relations. If Washington and Moscow improve ties, China’s negotiating position with the U.S. could weaken further, deepening its economic crisis.
Russia's Competing Interests
(click to enlarge)
Wang rejected the notion that closer U.S.-Russia ties would strain Beijing’s relationship with Moscow, stating that China and Russia are “friends forever, never enemies.” This rhetoric recalls the “no limits” strategic partnership the two countries declared just before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. That phrase was always more for Western consumption than a reflection of reality. China has offered little to support Russia’s war effort, while Moscow has been of no help in addressing Beijing’s economic troubles.
That said, it is curious that China’s foreign minister even felt the need to mention that the two nations could never be enemies. If the relationship is strategically solid, enmity should be a non-issue, whether or not the two can always help each other out. That Beijing feels the need to state it underscores its concerns about Russian intentions. China remembers how it aligned with the U.S. in the 1970s, a move that undermined the Soviet Union.
Beijing has a vital interest in understanding Russia’s intentions and the risks they pose. It is thus no surprise that Wang and Lavrov discussed issues such as the Korean Peninsula, Iran’s nuclear program and Central Asia – areas where they share interests and have cooperated in recent decades. But Beijing knows that if U.S.-Russia relations improve, Moscow will collaborate more with Washington in these areas, reducing China’s leverage with the U.S.
China understands it must negotiate, but it cannot do so from a position of weakness. The question is what leverage it can wield. This is where China’s increasingly frequent military exercises come into play. These drills serve a dual purpose: They project strength internationally and help Xi manage domestic pressures as China’s strategic position weakens.
Xi has urged Chinese officials to “keep calm” amid the escalating trade war with the U.S., knowing that Beijing must carefully calibrate its response to avoid deepening economic distress – especially as it grapples with a housing market crash and deflation. At the same time, Xi must reinforce his control as he continues purging both the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army.
The increasing frequency and bellicosity of the military exercises – whether live-fire drills in the Sea of Tasman near Australia and New Zealand or the recent mock blockade of Taiwan – are meant to signal resolve. Their target is not just Washington; it is also the broader Western media and intelligentsia. Beijing knows that U.S. intelligence can accurately assess China’s true offensive military capabilities, limiting its ability to pressure the White House directly. Instead, China aims to shape the discourse in Western media, where conventional wisdom deems China capable of attacking Taiwan. This narrative, in turn, increases pressure on the Trump administration, potentially tempering its moves and strengthening Beijing’s negotiating position.
China understands the cost of actual military aggression. Any offensive action would only worsen its already fragile economy. For now, its strategy hinges on psychological warfare – projecting power while avoiding a direct confrontation that it cannot afford.