Compass Points - Battlespace
Where is the Marine Corps going?
Compass Points - Battlespace
Where is the Marine Corps going?
February 26, 2024
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A question for Craig Martell: Quo Vadis?
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Speaking to reporters on February 20, 2024 at the Data and AI Symposium in Washington, D.C., Craig Martell, DOD's Chief Digital and AI officer (CDAO) told reporters he had too little funding and too much to do. “We have to cannibalize some things in order to be able to keep other things alive,” (Defense News).
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Quo Vadis? Where are you going to go? What are you going to do?
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It is true with Artificial Intelligence as with every branch and department in the military. There is never unlimited funding. So services must focus on what is most important. Services must always focus on what they do better than anyone else. Quo Vadis? Always go with your strength. Shed ancillary roles and go with what you do best.
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If there is any benefit to the Marine Corps experiment with Force Design over the last several years, perhaps it is that it has helped the entire Marine Corps community to discuss the fundamental issues about the Marine Corps. What is the US Marine Corps? What is it for? What should it be? How can the Marine Corps best serve the Nation?
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For example, cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are a powerful weapon. They can be launched from ships, subs, and planes. With all those launching platforms already established, is there much need or benefit to the Marine Corps diverting into missile launching? One author in Task and Purpose back in 2022 said the Marine Corps was at an "inflection point" and needed to decide fundamental questions about roles and missions.
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There are fundamental issues regarding the operational character of the Marine Corps that must be addressed at this inflection point. Whether intended or not, the operational ethos built around the infantry, emphasizing closing with the enemy in close combat, and the offensive character of our forces is being challenged or rejected. The belief in our air-ground-logistics formation is diminished. The ability to fight at the corps level is being abandoned. The importance of combined arms maneuver is being pushed aside in favor of becoming a fires delivery system. Is this the course the Corps chooses to take?
-- Task & Purpose
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The author goes on to say that to best serve the combatant commands and the Nation the Marine Corps must,
1. Task organize for the mission, not permanently structure for it.
2. Maintain the highest degree of readiness.
3. Provide highly deployable and expeditionary forces.
4. Retain a balanced array of combined arms combat power.
5. Be able to contribute across the spectrum of conflict.
6. Retain forward bases and forward-deployed forces to respond to crises.
7. Maintain our naval character and amphibious capability.
8. Organize for missions with a combined air, ground, and logistics structure.
9. Leverage appropriate innovative technology to enhance our capabilities.
10. Retain our primary focus as an offensive force capable of closing with the enemy.
11. Easily integrate into any joint or combined structure.
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General Zinni is asking many of the same questions still today. Quo Vadis? Where is the Marine Corps going? Where should the Marine Corps be going?
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In remarks for Compass Points, General Anthony C. Zinni addresses the question of Marine battlespace. Should the Marine Corps expect and plan for a narrow, regional battlespace, or should it plan for a global, full spectrum, battlespace?
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BATTLESPACE
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By Anthony C. Zinni
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In the past, the Marine Corps never narrowly defined its battlespace or purpose-designed its forces for a specific geographic environment. Recently, however, the Corps’ senior leaders have declared that their operating forces must be dramatically restructured and reequipped for employment in the “littorals” of the world. This belief led to reorganizing the operating forces and divesting, or severely cutting, a great number of capabilities needed to fight and win today. A third of the Corps operational units are now or soon will be redesignated and reorganized (or to use the current term of art, “repurposed”) as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs). The remaining two-thirds of the operating force are being essentially “repurposed” to support the rotational requirements of the forward deployed MLRs.
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The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ‘littorals’ as relating to or situated on or near a shore of the sea. It also describes littorals as the shore zone between high tide and low tide points. Marines have always viewed this zone as a steppingstone to projecting power ashore. Now, we are told, it is the location from where the Corps fights. In World War II, Marines seized island chains as a progression toward the eventual invasion of Japan. In Korea, Marines landed at Inchon and continued sustained operations ashore. In Vietnam, Marines took the most challenging of the four Corps zones, I Corps. In Desert Storm, Marines took a Corps level battlespace on the right flank. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines took assigned battlespaces alongside other joint and combined forces.
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As the I MEF commander, I recall being assigned a Corps level battlespace for a potential Korean conflict with four to five divisions within the Combined Marine Expeditionary Force. When Marines were twice tasked to provide a JTF for Somalia, it had a battlespace that included half of Somalia and the forces from 28 nations. I am told by this new generation of Marine leaders that this is old think that we will never fight this way again. I realize that new weapons systems and better sensing capabilities have changed the way we will fight. I don’t, however, see that change as radically as this new generation of senior leaders.
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As I follow the current conflicts raging around the globe (still waiting for the guaranteed war with China many of them have predicted), I see much of the existing capabilities such as armor, artillery, infantry, engineers, and so forth as viable and applicable combined arms contributors. The “brilliance” of divesting our forces of these capabilities and the focus on Wake Island-like vulnerable static positions on remote islands escapes me. Surface ships and submarines seem better suited for this role with their mobility and built-in protection. The new Marine Corps concept seems to be limited to the littoral areas of the world. Is this what the Marine Corps has come to?
-- Anthony C. Zinni
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General Zinni was the former commander of US Central Command and I Marine Expeditionary Force. Compass Points thanks General Zinni for his decades of service to Country and Corps and for continuing to address the foundational questions about the Marine Corps. Compass Points wishes good luck to Craig Martell and to the Marine Corps. Both, need to figure out where they are going.
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Defense News - 02/23/2024
Pentagon AI office must ‘cannibalize’ to keep operating, Martell says
By Colin Demarest
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Task and Purpose - 04/19/2022
What is the role of the Marine Corps in today’s global security environment?
The Corps has been of greatest value to our nation by staying ready and adaptable.
By Anthony Zinni
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/zinni-marine-corps-role/
Sweden joins NATO today. Everyone between 16 and 70 years old is part of their defense strategy. At least they’ve a strategy that aligns with their reality!!!
"In the past, the Marine Corps never narrowly defined its battlespace or purpose-designed its forces for a specific geographic environment." -but the Marines have absolutely done that in the past and the units that did it played a vital role within the larger Pacific campaign of World War 2.
As always, I share my thoughts in hopes to continue a constructive dialogue and share insights on what historical parallels inform current thinking. This is a longer reply-but I think it is important we remember all aspects of our history and not just what we looked like/how we operated once victory was achieved.
The fleets of maritime nations have always had a landward component directly linked to the ability to extend operations. The landward component of fleets conducts tasks ashore for the fleet for the sole purpose of achieving fleet missions and campaigns. This aspect is foundational and historically backed. There is an aspect of that Marines do not appreciate in the modern era -what happens when the operating environment changes and conditions of sea control or local sea denial are no longer assumptive? What missions then does the landward element of a fleet conduct to enable entry operations ashore, forcible or otherwise, along with extending the fleet's ability to maintain presence well forward?
Prior to storied the storied actions of the 5th and 6th Regiments in France the question of sea control was asked first. BGen J.A. Lejeune wrote, "when the US entered the World War, the Allied fleets had already obtained control of the sea except for the submarine menace...there was no available naval mission, therefore, for an advanced base or expeditionary force. At the time our officers and men were clamoring for service. Their adventurous spirit would brook no delay. Their thoughts were constantly turned toward France." We know the rest of that story. However, Lejeune (ACMC at the time) knew well the Service's duty was to the fleet first and then found a way to get into the fight well ashore. That circumstance was different for the Navy and Marine Corps in the years leading up to WW2.
Commandant Holcomb faced a political environment that impacted upon funding and force design that is not too dissimilar from today. Largely isolationist policies and the branding of concepts and weapons as “defensive” -even battleships and heavy bombers were labeled as defensive. Holcomb also understood the coming conflict. To increase the Corps’ size beyond the 1939 end strength of 19, 432 officers and enlisted and get more funding he “read the room” and seized upon the defense battalion concept. But it was not him alone, as of course this was well before the Def Reorg Act of 47 and GWN as we know it today. The CNO at the time directed CMC Holcomb to train and equip 6 Marine Defense Battalions with the mission of “hold[ing] areas for the ultimate offensive actions of the Fleet.” These battalions consisted of a HQ element, three anti-aircraft batteries, three seacoast batteries, and a section for weapons repair and administrative specialists. The battalions were equipped with the latest advances in radios, anti-aircraft artillery, sound ranging gear, *tanks*, and eventually the SCR-268 ground search radar (it is important to note the SCR-268 was not complete at Wake Island but was operational during actions on Guadalcanal with the 1st MarDiv).
There was push back, as there always is, from within Holcomb’s own G-3 section. Col Pedro del Valle almost lost his job over stressing the importance of saving manpower to establish division formations. But that would not come until the expansion of the service and the creation of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions in 1941. Once created, each of the six battalions became a part of existing war plans with fleet commanders calling for the creation of more. The initial deployment of the battalions was word-wide including: Midway, Guantanamo Bay, the Azores, and Iceland. The 5th Defense Bn operating from the airfield and port of Reykjavik, Iceland actively contributed to sea denial missions in their sector of the Atlantic to ensure Lend-Lease shipping and other materiel made it to the already raging conflict in Europe. Now, Wake Island was a loss. But as already alluded to the battalion was not fully operational and was yet integrated into full Pacific Fleet operations -a mistake that was not repeated during the remainder of the war.
From Guadalcanal all the way to Okinawa the Marine Defense Bn’s contributed to holding open maritime choke points, enabling amphibious operations, and the integrated protection of afloat task groups/forces. Each time they went ashore they task organized to complete their mission reflective of the enemy threat and the terrain there were to operate. They were a crucial element to generate effect from the landward side of the littoral in to the seaward both ashore and at sea missions. It is also important to remember the transformation of these battalions as the war progressed. In 1941 they were equipped with the full anti-sea/anti-air capability set. Once the threat of the Japanese surface fleet threat waned the battalions shed their sea facing 155mm coastal guns and brought in more anti-aircraft guns. This became increasingly necessary as the closer US forces got to the Japanese home islands the more susceptible our shipping was to ground based fighters and suicide attacks. We must never forget more sailors were killed and wounded from enemy air attack while at sea than Marines fighting ashore.
At the close of the war the Defense Bn’s, now having predominantly anti-air capabilities were made what now know as Anti-Air Battalions -and the battle lineage of each of the battalions are tied back to the Marine Defense Bn’s of the Pacific. Most recently, the 3rd Littoral Anti-Air Battalion as a part the Marine Littoral Regiment was activated – it ties its lineage to the 3rd Marine Defense Bn that saw action on Pearl Harbor, Midway, Guadalcanal, the Northern Solomon Islands, and Bougainville. Interestingly also is that unit existed in 1961 as the 1st Provisional Marine Guided Missile Battalion -but what’s in name.
Now that’s more about previous roles and missions than anyone wanted to know, but the question was “where is the Marine Corps going?” I would submit that at least a part of where the Marine Corps is going is back to what we have always done -be the landward element of the fleet. The US and Allies achieved victory during WW2 exceedingly well -and that allowed how we operated hence forth to take on new forms and conduct crisis and contingency missions in dominant ways, but it would be folly to believe those conditions would last forever. The current operating environment challenges the assumptions the US has been able to enjoy for decades and conditions of sea control and air superiority are increasingly being challenged in all areas of the globe. Of course, the difference today are the gains we made through the Def Reorg Act of 47 and with the GWN Act, especially in terms of parity within the joint force. However, as beneficial as those gains were, they do present new risks when the assumptions underpinning those institutions change. The CNO can’t tell the CMC how to design the FMF to support expansive naval campaigns, Title 10 has its mandates by law, and of course it is difficult to maintain readiness and enhance the 21st Century combined arms capabilities of the MAGTF constrained by linked continuing resolutions. Despite this, the Corps has been told to prepare for a named threat while also to be prepared for global crisis -and in both of those circumstances the fact remains the conditions of sea control and air superiority remain a critical requirement for any operation ashore.
The creation of formations with the capabilities to conduct those functions, for me, is a logical step to address the threats that mitigate both risk to mission accomplishment and risk to the forces that will conduct them. Understandably the major rub is how those formations are created in a “no uncompensated structure” environment –“divesting to invest” incurs significant near term risk depending on how quickly you want to move. I’ve always admired how CMC Holcomb approached the problem in the years leading up to WW2 -I am not sure he would do things too differently than what we see occurring today (but of course that is my inference, there were also a lot of short-lived initiatives back then). Is all of change spot on correct, no -that is an impossibility. But are we doing anything differently by recognizing actual threats in the operating environment while understanding our link to fleet operations and putting forth methods to defend vital National interests -also no.
LtCol T.L. Hord