Sweden joins NATO today. Everyone between 16 and 70 years old is part of their defense strategy. At least they’ve a strategy that aligns with their reality!!!
"In the past, the Marine Corps never narrowly defined its battlespace or purpose-designed its forces for a specific geographic environment." -but the Marines have absolutely done that in the past and the units that did it played a vital role within the larger Pacific campaign of World War 2.
As always, I share my thoughts in hopes to continue a constructive dialogue and share insights on what historical parallels inform current thinking. This is a longer reply-but I think it is important we remember all aspects of our history and not just what we looked like/how we operated once victory was achieved.
The fleets of maritime nations have always had a landward component directly linked to the ability to extend operations. The landward component of fleets conducts tasks ashore for the fleet for the sole purpose of achieving fleet missions and campaigns. This aspect is foundational and historically backed. There is an aspect of that Marines do not appreciate in the modern era -what happens when the operating environment changes and conditions of sea control or local sea denial are no longer assumptive? What missions then does the landward element of a fleet conduct to enable entry operations ashore, forcible or otherwise, along with extending the fleet's ability to maintain presence well forward?
Prior to storied the storied actions of the 5th and 6th Regiments in France the question of sea control was asked first. BGen J.A. Lejeune wrote, "when the US entered the World War, the Allied fleets had already obtained control of the sea except for the submarine menace...there was no available naval mission, therefore, for an advanced base or expeditionary force. At the time our officers and men were clamoring for service. Their adventurous spirit would brook no delay. Their thoughts were constantly turned toward France." We know the rest of that story. However, Lejeune (ACMC at the time) knew well the Service's duty was to the fleet first and then found a way to get into the fight well ashore. That circumstance was different for the Navy and Marine Corps in the years leading up to WW2.
Commandant Holcomb faced a political environment that impacted upon funding and force design that is not too dissimilar from today. Largely isolationist policies and the branding of concepts and weapons as “defensive” -even battleships and heavy bombers were labeled as defensive. Holcomb also understood the coming conflict. To increase the Corps’ size beyond the 1939 end strength of 19, 432 officers and enlisted and get more funding he “read the room” and seized upon the defense battalion concept. But it was not him alone, as of course this was well before the Def Reorg Act of 47 and GWN as we know it today. The CNO at the time directed CMC Holcomb to train and equip 6 Marine Defense Battalions with the mission of “hold[ing] areas for the ultimate offensive actions of the Fleet.” These battalions consisted of a HQ element, three anti-aircraft batteries, three seacoast batteries, and a section for weapons repair and administrative specialists. The battalions were equipped with the latest advances in radios, anti-aircraft artillery, sound ranging gear, *tanks*, and eventually the SCR-268 ground search radar (it is important to note the SCR-268 was not complete at Wake Island but was operational during actions on Guadalcanal with the 1st MarDiv).
There was push back, as there always is, from within Holcomb’s own G-3 section. Col Pedro del Valle almost lost his job over stressing the importance of saving manpower to establish division formations. But that would not come until the expansion of the service and the creation of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions in 1941. Once created, each of the six battalions became a part of existing war plans with fleet commanders calling for the creation of more. The initial deployment of the battalions was word-wide including: Midway, Guantanamo Bay, the Azores, and Iceland. The 5th Defense Bn operating from the airfield and port of Reykjavik, Iceland actively contributed to sea denial missions in their sector of the Atlantic to ensure Lend-Lease shipping and other materiel made it to the already raging conflict in Europe. Now, Wake Island was a loss. But as already alluded to the battalion was not fully operational and was yet integrated into full Pacific Fleet operations -a mistake that was not repeated during the remainder of the war.
From Guadalcanal all the way to Okinawa the Marine Defense Bn’s contributed to holding open maritime choke points, enabling amphibious operations, and the integrated protection of afloat task groups/forces. Each time they went ashore they task organized to complete their mission reflective of the enemy threat and the terrain there were to operate. They were a crucial element to generate effect from the landward side of the littoral in to the seaward both ashore and at sea missions. It is also important to remember the transformation of these battalions as the war progressed. In 1941 they were equipped with the full anti-sea/anti-air capability set. Once the threat of the Japanese surface fleet threat waned the battalions shed their sea facing 155mm coastal guns and brought in more anti-aircraft guns. This became increasingly necessary as the closer US forces got to the Japanese home islands the more susceptible our shipping was to ground based fighters and suicide attacks. We must never forget more sailors were killed and wounded from enemy air attack while at sea than Marines fighting ashore.
At the close of the war the Defense Bn’s, now having predominantly anti-air capabilities were made what now know as Anti-Air Battalions -and the battle lineage of each of the battalions are tied back to the Marine Defense Bn’s of the Pacific. Most recently, the 3rd Littoral Anti-Air Battalion as a part the Marine Littoral Regiment was activated – it ties its lineage to the 3rd Marine Defense Bn that saw action on Pearl Harbor, Midway, Guadalcanal, the Northern Solomon Islands, and Bougainville. Interestingly also is that unit existed in 1961 as the 1st Provisional Marine Guided Missile Battalion -but what’s in name.
Now that’s more about previous roles and missions than anyone wanted to know, but the question was “where is the Marine Corps going?” I would submit that at least a part of where the Marine Corps is going is back to what we have always done -be the landward element of the fleet. The US and Allies achieved victory during WW2 exceedingly well -and that allowed how we operated hence forth to take on new forms and conduct crisis and contingency missions in dominant ways, but it would be folly to believe those conditions would last forever. The current operating environment challenges the assumptions the US has been able to enjoy for decades and conditions of sea control and air superiority are increasingly being challenged in all areas of the globe. Of course, the difference today are the gains we made through the Def Reorg Act of 47 and with the GWN Act, especially in terms of parity within the joint force. However, as beneficial as those gains were, they do present new risks when the assumptions underpinning those institutions change. The CNO can’t tell the CMC how to design the FMF to support expansive naval campaigns, Title 10 has its mandates by law, and of course it is difficult to maintain readiness and enhance the 21st Century combined arms capabilities of the MAGTF constrained by linked continuing resolutions. Despite this, the Corps has been told to prepare for a named threat while also to be prepared for global crisis -and in both of those circumstances the fact remains the conditions of sea control and air superiority remain a critical requirement for any operation ashore.
The creation of formations with the capabilities to conduct those functions, for me, is a logical step to address the threats that mitigate both risk to mission accomplishment and risk to the forces that will conduct them. Understandably the major rub is how those formations are created in a “no uncompensated structure” environment –“divesting to invest” incurs significant near term risk depending on how quickly you want to move. I’ve always admired how CMC Holcomb approached the problem in the years leading up to WW2 -I am not sure he would do things too differently than what we see occurring today (but of course that is my inference, there were also a lot of short-lived initiatives back then). Is all of change spot on correct, no -that is an impossibility. But are we doing anything differently by recognizing actual threats in the operating environment while understanding our link to fleet operations and putting forth methods to defend vital National interests -also no.
Thanks for remaining engaged and offering your considered thoughts. The defense battalions were not drawn from the operating forces but were a Congressional "plus up" of 9,000 Marines requested by CMC. The MLRs will pretty much emasculate the rest of the Marine Corps, particularly the ability to conduct combined arms operations. 2nd MarDiv has already been drawn down to two-thirds of its former strength and, as we know, with full implementation of FD 2030 3rd MarDiv will have no infantry regimental maneuver headquarters, which begs the question what does the division headquarters do other than allocate forces. An additional and important point. Wake Island fell because US forces were unable to support it logistically or operationally. Midway would have likely fallen also if the fleet had not been nearby. The Corps learned a hard lesson and made necessary change to the remaining seven defense battalions. To date our Corps has not presented a solution to how the SIFs will fare any better than the defense battalions if they are not operationally and logistically supported.
Sir- I missed this response, apologies for the delay.
*Of note, my original post was to address "In the past, the Marine Corps never narrowly defined its battlespace or purpose-designed its forces for a specific geographic environment." -those units did exist. The Def Bn analogy is imperfect at best*
The historic "order of operations" is certainly not parallel -but of course the circumstances differ. Again, the CNO directed Holcomb for the initial Def Bn's. That created tensions internal to the Service as it recognized the eventual creation and expansion of Division structure. Some have argued that Wake may have remained intact had the components of the radar been in place to defend against the second assault -either way, the fleet was not ready to support any of the distributed forces...Philippines included.
To the point of emasculating the of the Marine Corps -this gets back to accepting near term risk to address current operational challenges. "Divest to Invest" was a method reflective of current capability development constraints. The question has always been how fast do you want to go and what level of risk are you willing to accept. Holcomb certainly had to contend with resource constraints early on but he did have to live to linked continuing resolutions. However, I believe his operational mindset was centered on what capabilities does this force need to extend a maritime campaign where the question of obtaining conditions of sea control to enable ashore operations was in no way assumptive.
We are backwards of that problem today. Our division structures have matured over time with focus on ashore capabilities due to freedom of action at sea being largely uncontested. Altering the force structure to address the operational dilemma represented by changing planning assumptions (sea control) puts division capacity again at risk -but in this circumstance its being taken away from existing formations, unlike the USMC in 1938-41.
To forget about how Def Bn's worked in close concert with the larger fleet actions from Guadalcanal onward and to only use the lessons of Wake is a red herring. Enabling USMC formations with capabilities to enhance fleet operation today, from my vantage point, is highly attractive to the joint force. Does it look and feel different from the Corps I've known from 1999 to present, yes. Is it a capability we need to enable operations ashore in any potential threat area in the world, also yes.
LtCol Hord: thank you for your considered and thoughtful response. I don't agree with your conclusions per se, but I greatly appreciate your comment as part of this discussion, especially your historical notes. The history of the Defense Battalions is a rich part of the USMC heritage. Notably, 1stLt George Canon, off the 6th Defense Battalion at Midway, was the first Marine Officer awarded the Medal of Honor in WWII (posthumously) and bears mention.
I would disagree though in the comparison of the Defense Battalions to the situation now. The defense battalions tied relevant legacy capabilities to emerging technologies and concepts in novel ways and organizations. Further, as you noted, in part it maintained the capability set that would form the basis for the FMF once the urgency of the situation opened the Congressional purse. In contrast, the modern Force Design divested relevant capabilities that then can not be matched with the emerging technology and concepts in novel ways. This in an era where the speed of information and pre-eminence of intertwined shipping, industry, and energy require a flexible and credible global rapid response force in the interests of the USA.
My conclusions are centered on the existence of units that possessed capabilities that effected both the landward and seaward space task organized to enable the larger naval mission -not just the mission once ashore. We must guard against selective use of history. Units, such as the MLR, present tremendous risk to adversaries when the capabilities they possess are purposefully linked to a fleet in motion. The tension today exists with the constraint of the method (ie divest to invest) and the particulars of the platforms chosen with no bridging solution in the interim. Believe me, my enlisted MOS was 1812 -I have personal feelings on the matter. The near term risk of recent decisions is uncomfortable, but that is no different in my mind to the angst experienced as the USMC really wanted to expand to divisions while it was building Defense Bn's. The larger approach is to ensure relevant capabilities, regardless of formation type, can make it to the area of operations in the first place. This whole thing is about risk and accepting the realities of what it takes to win the fight to get to the fight.
One last comment from me this morning. Your comments about mission: if planning is being done right, the mission ashore naturally rests in the context of the larger naval mission (much as Vicksburg nested in the mission to ensure Union control of the Mississippi). So why is the assumption that knowledge of the larger naval mission is the result of current insight? It isn't. I also agree about guarding against selective use of history...and also ignoring the lessons of history. The history of the defense battalions has many good lessons and only matches the development of the MLR if taken selectively. If we take the comparison at face value, we should accelerate to the point where the MLR becomes a Combined Battlespace Defense Regiment that facilitates the maneuver of MAGTF's as part of a greater NEF.
As far as loss of capabilities...there is no robust capability for amphibious operations, especially not compared to 20 years ago. No amount of innovate and iterate is going to fix that. The shipping piece, that critical enabler of landward and seaward tasks enabling the larger naval mission, is non existent in practice. It has fallen so far, and the USMC is culpable in whistling past the graveyard while the USN drives shipping into the Marianas Trench. I don't care if we are talking about big Gators or proposed baby Gators...there is not a realistic program to rebuild a credible amphib capability at play. I am talking new build, repair, maintenance, and COTs. One simply has to look at the history of the Amphib fleet from 1970 to 2023 to see the capability evaporate. Further, look at new construction rates and readiness rates for that time period. I might even advocate for the MLR if there was a concerted effort to press on the need for real growth over the next five years in amphibs (even though I think the baby Gator program as currently conceived is bananas...any ship is better than no ship).
I did spend a few years wearing rocket fins and funny shorts for work....I also have known quite a few 1812's. The loss of Marine Armor capability is not the same as when we stopped using MP5's because we realized that M4's were much better for the needed capability than the 'guns as used in the Princes' Gate assault'. The loss of Marine Armor is a slow motion train wreck that is still in motion while people just sidestep the derailing cars.
Anyway - I owe you a beer if you're around coastal NC.
No more Swift Ships for Marines?US Navy orders Swiftships to stop work on its landing craft program
By Megan Eckstein
Friday, Feb 23
Then-Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Gary Thomas, left, receives a shipyard tour from Jeff Leleux, center, president of Swiftships in New Orleans, La., on Aug. 12, 2020. (Sgt. Wesley Timm/U.S. Marine Corps)
The U.S. Navy has ordered the builder of its Landing Craft Utility 1700 program to stop work and moved to terminate the contract, the shipbuilder Swiftships told Defense News, following years of challenges and disagreements on the program.
The yard has laid off nearly 100 workers related to the LCU program since January and is considering actions to dispute the Navy’s termination of the contract, hoping to get back into a settlement process.
Louisiana-based small business Swiftships won the LCU competition in March 2018, with the Navy awarding a contract for $18 million for the detail design and the construction of the first craft. The yard also received follow-on contracts, one in 2019 worth $26.7 million for the next two craft, and another in 2020 worth $50.1 million for four more.
These craft haul Marines as well as their ground equipment and weapons from amphibious ships to the shore and back again. They are the slower but heavier-lift connectors, compared to the Ship to Shore Connectors that travel at higher speeds but carry less weight.
Swiftships’ contract called for options to build as many as 32 — the total number of craft needed to replace the Navy’s Vietnam-era LCU inventory.
In September 2023, the Navy awarded another LCU contract to Alabama-based Austal USA. The contract called for building three craft for $91.5 million — a significantly higher per-unit cost than Swiftships’ contract — and options for another nine.
According to interviews with and documentation provided by Swiftships, Naval Sea Systems Command on Nov. 9 raised the possibility of terminating the program.
NAVSEA wrote that the shipyard was not making progress on LCU production and offered to reach a settlement that would include Swiftships turning over parts and material delivered by its vendors. On Jan. 24, NAVSEA issued a stop-work order on the program, according to documentation provided by Swiftships, and on Feb. 20 the command formally notified the yard of its decision to terminate the contract.
In its notification to Swiftships, NAVSEA wrote the first three craft were supposed to be delivered by June, September and December 2023, but are still incomplete. NAVSEA declined to comment to Defense News.
Years of challenges
Swiftships’ chief executive, Shehraze Shah, told Defense News there had long been turbulence in the program. Indeed, he said, the Navy and Swiftships had not agreed on a final design two years into the program, and a third-party design agent was brought in to complete the design but continued to make changes. Shah pointed to these issues as reasons the construction could not move forward on time.
Jeff Leleux, the president of the yard, said the Navy and Swiftships took nearly a year to settle a request for equitable adjustment — needed to realign the cost and schedule associated with the contract due to the delays — during which Swiftships and its vendors went months without payment.
After the new timeline was set, said John Messinger, Swiftships’ director of proposals and contracts, the yard realized one of the design changes made by the third-party design agent would require the company to rip out the engine-cooling system and reinstall some piping on the craft, for example.
The executives said they are behind schedule, but contend the Navy has not negotiated with them in good faith amid design and supply chain challenges.
The issue caught the attention of lawmakers far earlier. In September 2022, Republican Reps. Clay Higgins of Louisiana and Neal Dunn of Florida wrote a letter to the secretaries of the Navy and the Department of Homeland Security to discuss their concerns about work being taken from smaller yards and given to Austal USA.
“In addition to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,” the letter read, “SwiftShips notified Congress regarding unnecessary complications with the Navy’s handling of the LCU-1700 contract. These complications include four program manager transitions since the signing of the contract, needless stop work orders, delayed payments to SwiftShips and material vendors, and serious design delays. SwiftShips has continuously struggled with the acquisition of materials due to the Navy ceding its contractual obligation to pay material vendors.”
The letter stated the Navy notified Congress in April 2022 of its intention to award Austal the LCU work without formally re-competing the program, even though Austal at that time had not yet opened its steel ship production line. The Alabama yard had previously only constructed aluminum ships, but began establishing a steel construction line following a $50 million Defense Production Act grant in 2020.
About Megan Eckstein
Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.
Brigadier General Hennigan was commissioned through Office’s Candidate Course as a Second Lieutenant, June 1994 after graduating from Mary Washington College and studying abroad in 1993.
Brigadier General Hennigan has had the honor of commanding at various levels. She served as a platoon commander, C Company with 3d Support Battalion, 3d Force Service Support Group and as Headquarters and Services Detachment Commander, with Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 31, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Headquarters and Service Company Commander with 2d Radio Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Support Squadron 372, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; and Commanding Officer Combat Logistics Regiment 3, 3d Marine Logistics Group.
Brigadier General Hennigan’s staff assignments include: Protocol Officer, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Battalion S-4 at 2d Radio Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Facility S-4 and S-6, Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay; G-4 Operations and Plans Officer, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; G-4 Maritime Prepositioning Force Officer and G-4 Operations and Plans Officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and as the Chief of Staff for 3d Marine Logistics Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force.
In the Supporting Establishment, Brigadier General Hennigan served as a Legislative Liaison for the Office of Legislative Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps and as the Director, Marine Corps Legislative Liaison Office, United States House of Representatives.
Brigadier General Hennigan’s Joint and Coalition assignments include: G-3 Watch Officer, Marine Forces Europe, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; Deputy, Plans and Programs Vulnerability Officer, J-3 and Deputy Capabilities and Plans Officer, J-8, United States Pacific Command; and CJ-4, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan and in Special Operations Command – Yemen, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.
Brigadier General Hennigan is a graduate of The Basic School, Logistics Officer Course, U.S. Army Combined Logistics Captains’ Career Course, and Marine Corps Command and Staff College. She attended the United States Institute of Peace as a Commandant’s Fellow and studied Women’s Peace and Security. Brigadier General Hennigan holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Mary Washington College and a Masters’ Degree of Public Administration and Policy from American University.
Brigadier General Hennigan’s personal decorations include: Legion of Merit (2), Defense Meritorious Service Medal (2), Meritorious Service Medal (3), Joint Service Commendation (2), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2), and a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement.
Brigadier Hennigan informed me some months ago that I did not have the "expertise" to speak to students at MCU. Professors continue to ask for me to visit their seminars, but she denies their requests. I must not have learned much in my 41 years of Marine Corps service or as Director of Command and Staff College, President of MCU, and 11 years holding a teaching chair at MCU.
Does not open until 2025…MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, Va. --
Three years into Force Design 2030, the United States Marine Corps has evolved into a leaner, more agile force designed to fight and win against the nation’s stated adversaries, with a strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Aligning with the Department of Defense’s strategic pivot away from the Global War on Terrorism, this transformation relies not just on technological advancements and a structural reorganization but also on the strategic use of wargames—analytical tools used to simulate aspects of warfare at the tactical, operational, and strategic level.
Although wargaming has been integral throughout the Corps' history, the initial call for wargaming modernization came from Gen. Robert Neller, the 37th commandant of the Marine Corps, who envisioned a wargaming capability akin to a 'holodeck'—an imaginative technology from Star Trek that enables individuals to engage in virtual reality scenarios.
In a perfect world, it would be like Jean-Luc Picard in "Star Trek." I’d walk into the holodeck and I’d go, "Computer, Battle of Waterloo, 1812, Prussian army, I am in command, simulation — go." That’ll be here one day.
Gen. Robert Neller, the 37th commandant of the Marine Corps
“In a perfect world, it would be like Jean-Luc Picard in ‘Star Trek,’” Neller told reporters in 2017. “I’d walk into the holodeck and I’d go, ’Computer, Battle of Waterloo, 1812, Prussian army, I am in command, simulation — go.’ That’ll be here one day.”
Neller’s vision is predicated on decades of Marine Corps’ innovation by highlighting the need for exquisite technology and facilities to harness that innovation. Wargaming assists in transforming it into actionable data to inform requirements, provide analysis for live-force experimentation, and contribute to concept refinement.
Recognizing the importance of his predecessor’s vision, Gen. David H. Berger, the Corps’ visionary former commandant, called for the implementation of “an intensive program of iterative concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and simulation, and experimentation” in his first iteration of Force Design 2030.
Today, this vision of a data-driven future is coming to life aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico where Marine Corps Systems Command is currently constructing a state-of-the-art center for wargaming and analysis.
Recently named the “General Robert B. Neller Center for Wargaming and Analysis,” this 100,446 square foot facility will allow Marines of all ranks and billets to wargame repeatedly in a secure, centralized location. Managed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, this revolutionary new capability is set to open its doors in 2025.
As noted in a previous article, this will provide a crucial asset to the joint force and senior leadership, filling a gap previously absent in the National Capital Region by facilitating wargame participation for joint, interagency, and multinational organizations.
Historical Context and Modern Applications
The Marine Corps’ relationship with wargaming began in the early 20th century and ramped up leading to the Second World War as the Corps rushed to build a force—and develop tactics—that would allow it to successfully storm enemy beaches in Europe and the Pacific.
For the purposes of this article, a wargame can be defined as the methodical re-creation of competitive or conflict scenario(s), excluding real military forces, where human decisions shape events.
Col. George Schreffler, director of the Wargaming Division at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, explained this in layman’s terms on a recent episode of the Equipping the Corps podcast where he discussed wargaming using board games like Risk or Dungeons and Dragons.
“Although we don’t use those exact games, the principle remains the same: utilizing probability tables and dice rolls to drive decision-making and interactions. It's not about the specific results but rather the process of forcing decisions that mirror real-world scenarios.”
But wargaming isn’t all fun and games; it is a whole of Combat Development and Integration effort. According to Col. Ross Monta, portfolio manager for Command Element Systems, it’s “a practical tool that’s helping us build the future of the Marine Corps.”
“Wargaming is one of the most effective means available to offer a glimpse of future conflict, which is why it was specifically called out as key to ensuring Force Design 2030 initiatives reflect a holistic approach to warfighting modernization,” he noted.
Lt. Col. Wynndee Young, PM Wargaming Capability, added to the colonel’s insights, noting, “Wargaming is crucial at every step of the mission, from both a tactical and operational perspective. It’s a process that guides us in how to use our current capabilities to successfully execute the mission.”
Wargaming is also important because it allows Marine Corps leadership to justify its spending to Congress and the taxpayer.
"Wargaming serves as a robust validation tool for our force design and future spending. It’s how we provide Congress with concrete data, supporting our requests for specific capabilities. In essence, wargaming enables us to not only fine-tune our military strategy but also justify the resources needed to bring that strategy to life,” she added.
Contemporary Wargaming Scenarios and Challenges
Today, wargaming continues to shape the Marine Corps' preparations for the future fight by simulating a range of scenarios across different theaters, helping hone the warfighter’s ability to navigate complex challenges with agility and precision.
“Many of our wargames delve into scenarios that tackle key Pacific challenges, probing how we'd navigate them amid a national security crisis,” said Tim Barrick, wargaming director at Marine Corps University. “Some cater to European contexts with precision, while others are intricately designed for the nuanced demands of the Pacific Theater. Ranging from tactical intricacies to expansive theater-level maneuvers, these games cover a broad spectrum. Most maintain the agility to adapt across theaters, enabling versatile exploration."
As Marines stand ready to answer the call to arms, wargaming remains a pivotal tool in their arsenal, enabling them to innovate, adapt, and strategize for the unique challenges of modern naval expeditionary warfare in the global littorals.
“In preparation for the multifaceted challenges of the Indo-Pacific, wargaming is a practical tool that informs future operating concepts, what capabilities are needed and should be invested in, and operational decisions and planning,” said Monta. “Wargaming helps us break down complex military challenges into specific constraints and issues, while also allowing for insights into previously unknown issues that arise during the conduct of a game.”
The Future of Wargaming
As Force Design 2030 continues to drive the Corps towards the future, wargaming will continue to play a crucial role in the planning and development of the tactics and strategies that have allowed the warfighter to fight and win throughout American military history.
But wargaming in the 21st century seeks to involve more than a few officers huddled around a slab of cardboard. Heeding Gen. Berger’s call for modernization, MARCORSYSCOM is embracing bleeding edge technologies like artificial intelligence and cloud computing.
At Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, we’re taking things like large language models, like ChatGPT, and incorporating them into the simulations.
Joel Corrientes, subject matter expert at Marine Corps University
“At Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, we’re taking things like large language models, like ChatGPT, and incorporating them into the simulations,” Joel Corrientes, a subject matter expert at Marine Corps University, told reporters at Modern Day Marine.
Similarly, the development of the Warfighting Cloud means that a digital library of wargames can be securely accessed from various locations and devices—greatly expanding the scope of the capability.
“The difference with the new Wargaming Cloud is the ability to expand wargaming opportunities beyond the classroom. This offers Marines access to a library of digital games on their own time and at their own pace,” Brig. General Maura Hennigan, Marine Corps University president, said in a statement last year.
As Force Design 2030 continues to guide the Corps' modernization efforts, wargaming stands as an indispensable asset, helping to refine our strategies, validate our tactical approaches, and prepare us to face the intricacies of an ever-changing global landscape.
With the United States calibrating its strategic compass toward the Indo-Pacific, the role of wargaming transcends mere planning— rather, it has evolved into a key pillar, serving to shape strategy and fortify operational excellence.
As we continue to navigate the changing currents of great power politics, MARCORSYSCOM’s wargaming capability will help ensure that the warfighter remains agile, focused, and above all, prepared to fight and win in any clime or place.
Report to Congress on U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE STAFF
JUNE 13, 2023 7:36 AM
The following is the June 6, 2023, Congressional Research Service report, U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress.
From the report
The Indo-Pacific occupies a central role in U.S. national strategy and hosts a large number of U.S. military forces. To enable the operation of these forces and accomplish its strategic objectives, the United States maintains and uses at least 66 significant defense sites spread across the region. This defense infrastructure network performs and supports numerous military functions, including basing for military personnel and weapon systems; domain awareness and area defense; maintenance and repair; training and exercises, storage and prepositioning of materiel; and research, development, testing, and evaluation activities. Some Indo-Pacific installations are located in U.S. states, territories, or possessions (such as Hawaii and Guam); others are located in allied or partner nations (such as South Korea and Japan). In addition to installations directly owned or operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. military also makes use of sites operated by allied or partner nations (such as the Philippines and Australia).
DOD’s basing posture in the Indo-Pacific reflects in part the legacy of decisions made under the geopolitical and technological conditions of the Cold War. Following the Obama Administration’s announcement of a “pivot to Asia,” the focus of U.S. strategy (and with it, regional defense infrastructure) shifted toward prevailing in competition against peer or near-peer rivals—particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since 2011, the United States has negotiated access to 12 new defense sites in the Philippines and Australia, constructed new installations in Japan and Guam, and expanded facilities at dozens of existing installations across the region. Congress’ role in these developments has included, for example, appropriating over $8.9 billion for new military construction projects at Indo-Pacific sites since fiscal year (FY) 2020 and establishing infrastructure improvements as an investment priority through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI).
Issues that Congress may consider include (1) whether DOD’s current regional basing posture adequately supports strategic goals and operational requirements, and (2) whether the construction, maintenance, and utilization of defense infrastructure is appropriately resourced and managed. Within these issue areas, particular questions that may be raised in the 118th Congress include:
What criteria should inform the placement of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific, and what role should Congress play in determining those criteria?
How can DOD optimize the organization, operation, and resilience of its Indo-Pacific installations, and what assessment and oversight options are available to Congress?
What is an appropriate level of investment for military construction, facilities sustainment, and related infrastructure activities?
Where are we going? While I wish General Smith a speedy recovery from his medical issues, I also wish to read the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Will we continue in a direction many of us believe is wrong, or will we adjust our sails and get back on course?
Apparently the “official spokesperson” is a unfamiliar with “The emperor's new clothes
What's the meaning of the phrase 'The emperor's new clothes'?
The label given to any fictional item that viewers have been induced into believing as real.
What's the origin of the phrase 'The emperor's new clothes'?
The emperor's new clothesThe expression 'the emperor's new clothes' or variants like 'the emperor has no clothes' are difficult to explain briefly and are most easily understood by looking at its source, that is, Hans Christian Anderson's fable The Emperor’s New Clothes, 1837.
Anderson's tale involves a vain king who was preoccupied with his appearance and his wardrobe. A pair of swindlers took advantage of this by pretending to be able to weave the finest cloth, which couldn't be seen by people who were either unfit for office or were particularly stupid. The king decided to have a suit of clothes made from the fabric in order to test which of his courtiers was unfit for office. As he didn't want to appear stupid or unfit for rule himself, he pretended to be able to see the new clothes, as did all of his courtiers. He paraded the 'new clothes' through the streets and the onlookers, also not wishing to appear stupid, all admired them. A small child, who didn't understand the apparent necessity for pretence, piped up 'But he has nothing on!'. The bubble of pretence burst and soon all the onlookers were repeating what the child had said, whilst the king continued the procession, attempting to maintain his dignity by pretending that nothing had happened.
So, the meaning of the expression is clear from the story. It is used in contexts where people are widely acclaimed and admired but where others question whether what they have created is of any value. Modern-day examples might be the highly priced work of conceptual artists or the more avant-guard products of fashion designers.
The phrase bears some similarity to another modern-day expression - the elephant in the room. An essential factor with both phrases is the willingness of people to engage into an unspoken contract to willfully disbelieve what they know to be true.”! To the Marine spokesman it’s FD (FD 2030) was dropped. The NDAA directs the CMC to answer the questions it is not a desire it is a Law! To the DoD AI person whining about not enough dollars perhaps eliminating all Climate Change, DEI, Sex Change and Illegal Abortion Funding, etc etc….from the bloated DOD Budget would yield considerable billions.
English picked up both the concept of hubris and the term for that particular brand of cockiness from the ancient Greeks, who considered hubris a dangerous character flaw capable of provoking the wrath of the gods. In classical Greek tragedy, hubris was often a fatal shortcoming that brought about the fall of the tragic hero. Typically, overconfidence led the hero to attempt to overstep the boundaries of human limitations and assume a godlike status, and the gods inevitably humbled the offender with a sharp reminder of their mortality. “ I was unaware of her until yesterday after 2 minutes of searching, I read her biography I decided to make her even more of a legend then she already apparently believes she is in her own mind. Soon she will discover her fame has spread on X specifically w Senator Sullivan and Senator Cruz (his Chief of Staff is a Marine Reservist who previously served as a Texas Assistant Attorney General for Tx AG Ken Paxton). Samuel has a couple of other ideas to focus a “Klieg light” or 2 on the Brigadier.
Sweden joins NATO today. Everyone between 16 and 70 years old is part of their defense strategy. At least they’ve a strategy that aligns with their reality!!!
"In the past, the Marine Corps never narrowly defined its battlespace or purpose-designed its forces for a specific geographic environment." -but the Marines have absolutely done that in the past and the units that did it played a vital role within the larger Pacific campaign of World War 2.
As always, I share my thoughts in hopes to continue a constructive dialogue and share insights on what historical parallels inform current thinking. This is a longer reply-but I think it is important we remember all aspects of our history and not just what we looked like/how we operated once victory was achieved.
The fleets of maritime nations have always had a landward component directly linked to the ability to extend operations. The landward component of fleets conducts tasks ashore for the fleet for the sole purpose of achieving fleet missions and campaigns. This aspect is foundational and historically backed. There is an aspect of that Marines do not appreciate in the modern era -what happens when the operating environment changes and conditions of sea control or local sea denial are no longer assumptive? What missions then does the landward element of a fleet conduct to enable entry operations ashore, forcible or otherwise, along with extending the fleet's ability to maintain presence well forward?
Prior to storied the storied actions of the 5th and 6th Regiments in France the question of sea control was asked first. BGen J.A. Lejeune wrote, "when the US entered the World War, the Allied fleets had already obtained control of the sea except for the submarine menace...there was no available naval mission, therefore, for an advanced base or expeditionary force. At the time our officers and men were clamoring for service. Their adventurous spirit would brook no delay. Their thoughts were constantly turned toward France." We know the rest of that story. However, Lejeune (ACMC at the time) knew well the Service's duty was to the fleet first and then found a way to get into the fight well ashore. That circumstance was different for the Navy and Marine Corps in the years leading up to WW2.
Commandant Holcomb faced a political environment that impacted upon funding and force design that is not too dissimilar from today. Largely isolationist policies and the branding of concepts and weapons as “defensive” -even battleships and heavy bombers were labeled as defensive. Holcomb also understood the coming conflict. To increase the Corps’ size beyond the 1939 end strength of 19, 432 officers and enlisted and get more funding he “read the room” and seized upon the defense battalion concept. But it was not him alone, as of course this was well before the Def Reorg Act of 47 and GWN as we know it today. The CNO at the time directed CMC Holcomb to train and equip 6 Marine Defense Battalions with the mission of “hold[ing] areas for the ultimate offensive actions of the Fleet.” These battalions consisted of a HQ element, three anti-aircraft batteries, three seacoast batteries, and a section for weapons repair and administrative specialists. The battalions were equipped with the latest advances in radios, anti-aircraft artillery, sound ranging gear, *tanks*, and eventually the SCR-268 ground search radar (it is important to note the SCR-268 was not complete at Wake Island but was operational during actions on Guadalcanal with the 1st MarDiv).
There was push back, as there always is, from within Holcomb’s own G-3 section. Col Pedro del Valle almost lost his job over stressing the importance of saving manpower to establish division formations. But that would not come until the expansion of the service and the creation of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions in 1941. Once created, each of the six battalions became a part of existing war plans with fleet commanders calling for the creation of more. The initial deployment of the battalions was word-wide including: Midway, Guantanamo Bay, the Azores, and Iceland. The 5th Defense Bn operating from the airfield and port of Reykjavik, Iceland actively contributed to sea denial missions in their sector of the Atlantic to ensure Lend-Lease shipping and other materiel made it to the already raging conflict in Europe. Now, Wake Island was a loss. But as already alluded to the battalion was not fully operational and was yet integrated into full Pacific Fleet operations -a mistake that was not repeated during the remainder of the war.
From Guadalcanal all the way to Okinawa the Marine Defense Bn’s contributed to holding open maritime choke points, enabling amphibious operations, and the integrated protection of afloat task groups/forces. Each time they went ashore they task organized to complete their mission reflective of the enemy threat and the terrain there were to operate. They were a crucial element to generate effect from the landward side of the littoral in to the seaward both ashore and at sea missions. It is also important to remember the transformation of these battalions as the war progressed. In 1941 they were equipped with the full anti-sea/anti-air capability set. Once the threat of the Japanese surface fleet threat waned the battalions shed their sea facing 155mm coastal guns and brought in more anti-aircraft guns. This became increasingly necessary as the closer US forces got to the Japanese home islands the more susceptible our shipping was to ground based fighters and suicide attacks. We must never forget more sailors were killed and wounded from enemy air attack while at sea than Marines fighting ashore.
At the close of the war the Defense Bn’s, now having predominantly anti-air capabilities were made what now know as Anti-Air Battalions -and the battle lineage of each of the battalions are tied back to the Marine Defense Bn’s of the Pacific. Most recently, the 3rd Littoral Anti-Air Battalion as a part the Marine Littoral Regiment was activated – it ties its lineage to the 3rd Marine Defense Bn that saw action on Pearl Harbor, Midway, Guadalcanal, the Northern Solomon Islands, and Bougainville. Interestingly also is that unit existed in 1961 as the 1st Provisional Marine Guided Missile Battalion -but what’s in name.
Now that’s more about previous roles and missions than anyone wanted to know, but the question was “where is the Marine Corps going?” I would submit that at least a part of where the Marine Corps is going is back to what we have always done -be the landward element of the fleet. The US and Allies achieved victory during WW2 exceedingly well -and that allowed how we operated hence forth to take on new forms and conduct crisis and contingency missions in dominant ways, but it would be folly to believe those conditions would last forever. The current operating environment challenges the assumptions the US has been able to enjoy for decades and conditions of sea control and air superiority are increasingly being challenged in all areas of the globe. Of course, the difference today are the gains we made through the Def Reorg Act of 47 and with the GWN Act, especially in terms of parity within the joint force. However, as beneficial as those gains were, they do present new risks when the assumptions underpinning those institutions change. The CNO can’t tell the CMC how to design the FMF to support expansive naval campaigns, Title 10 has its mandates by law, and of course it is difficult to maintain readiness and enhance the 21st Century combined arms capabilities of the MAGTF constrained by linked continuing resolutions. Despite this, the Corps has been told to prepare for a named threat while also to be prepared for global crisis -and in both of those circumstances the fact remains the conditions of sea control and air superiority remain a critical requirement for any operation ashore.
The creation of formations with the capabilities to conduct those functions, for me, is a logical step to address the threats that mitigate both risk to mission accomplishment and risk to the forces that will conduct them. Understandably the major rub is how those formations are created in a “no uncompensated structure” environment –“divesting to invest” incurs significant near term risk depending on how quickly you want to move. I’ve always admired how CMC Holcomb approached the problem in the years leading up to WW2 -I am not sure he would do things too differently than what we see occurring today (but of course that is my inference, there were also a lot of short-lived initiatives back then). Is all of change spot on correct, no -that is an impossibility. But are we doing anything differently by recognizing actual threats in the operating environment while understanding our link to fleet operations and putting forth methods to defend vital National interests -also no.
LtCol T.L. Hord
Thanks for remaining engaged and offering your considered thoughts. The defense battalions were not drawn from the operating forces but were a Congressional "plus up" of 9,000 Marines requested by CMC. The MLRs will pretty much emasculate the rest of the Marine Corps, particularly the ability to conduct combined arms operations. 2nd MarDiv has already been drawn down to two-thirds of its former strength and, as we know, with full implementation of FD 2030 3rd MarDiv will have no infantry regimental maneuver headquarters, which begs the question what does the division headquarters do other than allocate forces. An additional and important point. Wake Island fell because US forces were unable to support it logistically or operationally. Midway would have likely fallen also if the fleet had not been nearby. The Corps learned a hard lesson and made necessary change to the remaining seven defense battalions. To date our Corps has not presented a solution to how the SIFs will fare any better than the defense battalions if they are not operationally and logistically supported.
Sir- I missed this response, apologies for the delay.
*Of note, my original post was to address "In the past, the Marine Corps never narrowly defined its battlespace or purpose-designed its forces for a specific geographic environment." -those units did exist. The Def Bn analogy is imperfect at best*
The historic "order of operations" is certainly not parallel -but of course the circumstances differ. Again, the CNO directed Holcomb for the initial Def Bn's. That created tensions internal to the Service as it recognized the eventual creation and expansion of Division structure. Some have argued that Wake may have remained intact had the components of the radar been in place to defend against the second assault -either way, the fleet was not ready to support any of the distributed forces...Philippines included.
To the point of emasculating the of the Marine Corps -this gets back to accepting near term risk to address current operational challenges. "Divest to Invest" was a method reflective of current capability development constraints. The question has always been how fast do you want to go and what level of risk are you willing to accept. Holcomb certainly had to contend with resource constraints early on but he did have to live to linked continuing resolutions. However, I believe his operational mindset was centered on what capabilities does this force need to extend a maritime campaign where the question of obtaining conditions of sea control to enable ashore operations was in no way assumptive.
We are backwards of that problem today. Our division structures have matured over time with focus on ashore capabilities due to freedom of action at sea being largely uncontested. Altering the force structure to address the operational dilemma represented by changing planning assumptions (sea control) puts division capacity again at risk -but in this circumstance its being taken away from existing formations, unlike the USMC in 1938-41.
To forget about how Def Bn's worked in close concert with the larger fleet actions from Guadalcanal onward and to only use the lessons of Wake is a red herring. Enabling USMC formations with capabilities to enhance fleet operation today, from my vantage point, is highly attractive to the joint force. Does it look and feel different from the Corps I've known from 1999 to present, yes. Is it a capability we need to enable operations ashore in any potential threat area in the world, also yes.
LtCol Hord: thank you for your considered and thoughtful response. I don't agree with your conclusions per se, but I greatly appreciate your comment as part of this discussion, especially your historical notes. The history of the Defense Battalions is a rich part of the USMC heritage. Notably, 1stLt George Canon, off the 6th Defense Battalion at Midway, was the first Marine Officer awarded the Medal of Honor in WWII (posthumously) and bears mention.
I would disagree though in the comparison of the Defense Battalions to the situation now. The defense battalions tied relevant legacy capabilities to emerging technologies and concepts in novel ways and organizations. Further, as you noted, in part it maintained the capability set that would form the basis for the FMF once the urgency of the situation opened the Congressional purse. In contrast, the modern Force Design divested relevant capabilities that then can not be matched with the emerging technology and concepts in novel ways. This in an era where the speed of information and pre-eminence of intertwined shipping, industry, and energy require a flexible and credible global rapid response force in the interests of the USA.
My conclusions are centered on the existence of units that possessed capabilities that effected both the landward and seaward space task organized to enable the larger naval mission -not just the mission once ashore. We must guard against selective use of history. Units, such as the MLR, present tremendous risk to adversaries when the capabilities they possess are purposefully linked to a fleet in motion. The tension today exists with the constraint of the method (ie divest to invest) and the particulars of the platforms chosen with no bridging solution in the interim. Believe me, my enlisted MOS was 1812 -I have personal feelings on the matter. The near term risk of recent decisions is uncomfortable, but that is no different in my mind to the angst experienced as the USMC really wanted to expand to divisions while it was building Defense Bn's. The larger approach is to ensure relevant capabilities, regardless of formation type, can make it to the area of operations in the first place. This whole thing is about risk and accepting the realities of what it takes to win the fight to get to the fight.
One last comment from me this morning. Your comments about mission: if planning is being done right, the mission ashore naturally rests in the context of the larger naval mission (much as Vicksburg nested in the mission to ensure Union control of the Mississippi). So why is the assumption that knowledge of the larger naval mission is the result of current insight? It isn't. I also agree about guarding against selective use of history...and also ignoring the lessons of history. The history of the defense battalions has many good lessons and only matches the development of the MLR if taken selectively. If we take the comparison at face value, we should accelerate to the point where the MLR becomes a Combined Battlespace Defense Regiment that facilitates the maneuver of MAGTF's as part of a greater NEF.
As far as loss of capabilities...there is no robust capability for amphibious operations, especially not compared to 20 years ago. No amount of innovate and iterate is going to fix that. The shipping piece, that critical enabler of landward and seaward tasks enabling the larger naval mission, is non existent in practice. It has fallen so far, and the USMC is culpable in whistling past the graveyard while the USN drives shipping into the Marianas Trench. I don't care if we are talking about big Gators or proposed baby Gators...there is not a realistic program to rebuild a credible amphib capability at play. I am talking new build, repair, maintenance, and COTs. One simply has to look at the history of the Amphib fleet from 1970 to 2023 to see the capability evaporate. Further, look at new construction rates and readiness rates for that time period. I might even advocate for the MLR if there was a concerted effort to press on the need for real growth over the next five years in amphibs (even though I think the baby Gator program as currently conceived is bananas...any ship is better than no ship).
I did spend a few years wearing rocket fins and funny shorts for work....I also have known quite a few 1812's. The loss of Marine Armor capability is not the same as when we stopped using MP5's because we realized that M4's were much better for the needed capability than the 'guns as used in the Princes' Gate assault'. The loss of Marine Armor is a slow motion train wreck that is still in motion while people just sidestep the derailing cars.
Anyway - I owe you a beer if you're around coastal NC.
No more Swift Ships for Marines?US Navy orders Swiftships to stop work on its landing craft program
By Megan Eckstein
Friday, Feb 23
Then-Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Gary Thomas, left, receives a shipyard tour from Jeff Leleux, center, president of Swiftships in New Orleans, La., on Aug. 12, 2020. (Sgt. Wesley Timm/U.S. Marine Corps)
The U.S. Navy has ordered the builder of its Landing Craft Utility 1700 program to stop work and moved to terminate the contract, the shipbuilder Swiftships told Defense News, following years of challenges and disagreements on the program.
The yard has laid off nearly 100 workers related to the LCU program since January and is considering actions to dispute the Navy’s termination of the contract, hoping to get back into a settlement process.
Louisiana-based small business Swiftships won the LCU competition in March 2018, with the Navy awarding a contract for $18 million for the detail design and the construction of the first craft. The yard also received follow-on contracts, one in 2019 worth $26.7 million for the next two craft, and another in 2020 worth $50.1 million for four more.
These craft haul Marines as well as their ground equipment and weapons from amphibious ships to the shore and back again. They are the slower but heavier-lift connectors, compared to the Ship to Shore Connectors that travel at higher speeds but carry less weight.
Swiftships’ contract called for options to build as many as 32 — the total number of craft needed to replace the Navy’s Vietnam-era LCU inventory.
In September 2023, the Navy awarded another LCU contract to Alabama-based Austal USA. The contract called for building three craft for $91.5 million — a significantly higher per-unit cost than Swiftships’ contract — and options for another nine.
According to interviews with and documentation provided by Swiftships, Naval Sea Systems Command on Nov. 9 raised the possibility of terminating the program.
NAVSEA wrote that the shipyard was not making progress on LCU production and offered to reach a settlement that would include Swiftships turning over parts and material delivered by its vendors. On Jan. 24, NAVSEA issued a stop-work order on the program, according to documentation provided by Swiftships, and on Feb. 20 the command formally notified the yard of its decision to terminate the contract.
In its notification to Swiftships, NAVSEA wrote the first three craft were supposed to be delivered by June, September and December 2023, but are still incomplete. NAVSEA declined to comment to Defense News.
Years of challenges
Swiftships’ chief executive, Shehraze Shah, told Defense News there had long been turbulence in the program. Indeed, he said, the Navy and Swiftships had not agreed on a final design two years into the program, and a third-party design agent was brought in to complete the design but continued to make changes. Shah pointed to these issues as reasons the construction could not move forward on time.
Jeff Leleux, the president of the yard, said the Navy and Swiftships took nearly a year to settle a request for equitable adjustment — needed to realign the cost and schedule associated with the contract due to the delays — during which Swiftships and its vendors went months without payment.
After the new timeline was set, said John Messinger, Swiftships’ director of proposals and contracts, the yard realized one of the design changes made by the third-party design agent would require the company to rip out the engine-cooling system and reinstall some piping on the craft, for example.
The executives said they are behind schedule, but contend the Navy has not negotiated with them in good faith amid design and supply chain challenges.
The issue caught the attention of lawmakers far earlier. In September 2022, Republican Reps. Clay Higgins of Louisiana and Neal Dunn of Florida wrote a letter to the secretaries of the Navy and the Department of Homeland Security to discuss their concerns about work being taken from smaller yards and given to Austal USA.
“In addition to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,” the letter read, “SwiftShips notified Congress regarding unnecessary complications with the Navy’s handling of the LCU-1700 contract. These complications include four program manager transitions since the signing of the contract, needless stop work orders, delayed payments to SwiftShips and material vendors, and serious design delays. SwiftShips has continuously struggled with the acquisition of materials due to the Navy ceding its contractual obligation to pay material vendors.”
The letter stated the Navy notified Congress in April 2022 of its intention to award Austal the LCU work without formally re-competing the program, even though Austal at that time had not yet opened its steel ship production line. The Alabama yard had previously only constructed aluminum ships, but began establishing a steel construction line following a $50 million Defense Production Act grant in 2020.
About Megan Eckstein
Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.
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Brigadier General Maura M. Hennigan, USMC
Brigadier General Hennigan was commissioned through Office’s Candidate Course as a Second Lieutenant, June 1994 after graduating from Mary Washington College and studying abroad in 1993.
Brigadier General Hennigan has had the honor of commanding at various levels. She served as a platoon commander, C Company with 3d Support Battalion, 3d Force Service Support Group and as Headquarters and Services Detachment Commander, with Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 31, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Headquarters and Service Company Commander with 2d Radio Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Support Squadron 372, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; and Commanding Officer Combat Logistics Regiment 3, 3d Marine Logistics Group.
Brigadier General Hennigan’s staff assignments include: Protocol Officer, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Battalion S-4 at 2d Radio Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Facility S-4 and S-6, Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay; G-4 Operations and Plans Officer, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; G-4 Maritime Prepositioning Force Officer and G-4 Operations and Plans Officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and as the Chief of Staff for 3d Marine Logistics Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force.
In the Supporting Establishment, Brigadier General Hennigan served as a Legislative Liaison for the Office of Legislative Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps and as the Director, Marine Corps Legislative Liaison Office, United States House of Representatives.
Brigadier General Hennigan’s Joint and Coalition assignments include: G-3 Watch Officer, Marine Forces Europe, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; Deputy, Plans and Programs Vulnerability Officer, J-3 and Deputy Capabilities and Plans Officer, J-8, United States Pacific Command; and CJ-4, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan and in Special Operations Command – Yemen, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.
Brigadier General Hennigan is a graduate of The Basic School, Logistics Officer Course, U.S. Army Combined Logistics Captains’ Career Course, and Marine Corps Command and Staff College. She attended the United States Institute of Peace as a Commandant’s Fellow and studied Women’s Peace and Security. Brigadier General Hennigan holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Mary Washington College and a Masters’ Degree of Public Administration and Policy from American University.
Brigadier General Hennigan’s personal decorations include: Legion of Merit (2), Defense Meritorious Service Medal (2), Meritorious Service Medal (3), Joint Service Commendation (2), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2), and a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement.
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Brigadier Hennigan informed me some months ago that I did not have the "expertise" to speak to students at MCU. Professors continue to ask for me to visit their seminars, but she denies their requests. I must not have learned much in my 41 years of Marine Corps service or as Director of Command and Staff College, President of MCU, and 11 years holding a teaching chair at MCU.
Does not open until 2025…MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, Va. --
Three years into Force Design 2030, the United States Marine Corps has evolved into a leaner, more agile force designed to fight and win against the nation’s stated adversaries, with a strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Aligning with the Department of Defense’s strategic pivot away from the Global War on Terrorism, this transformation relies not just on technological advancements and a structural reorganization but also on the strategic use of wargames—analytical tools used to simulate aspects of warfare at the tactical, operational, and strategic level.
Although wargaming has been integral throughout the Corps' history, the initial call for wargaming modernization came from Gen. Robert Neller, the 37th commandant of the Marine Corps, who envisioned a wargaming capability akin to a 'holodeck'—an imaginative technology from Star Trek that enables individuals to engage in virtual reality scenarios.
In a perfect world, it would be like Jean-Luc Picard in "Star Trek." I’d walk into the holodeck and I’d go, "Computer, Battle of Waterloo, 1812, Prussian army, I am in command, simulation — go." That’ll be here one day.
Gen. Robert Neller, the 37th commandant of the Marine Corps
“In a perfect world, it would be like Jean-Luc Picard in ‘Star Trek,’” Neller told reporters in 2017. “I’d walk into the holodeck and I’d go, ’Computer, Battle of Waterloo, 1812, Prussian army, I am in command, simulation — go.’ That’ll be here one day.”
Neller’s vision is predicated on decades of Marine Corps’ innovation by highlighting the need for exquisite technology and facilities to harness that innovation. Wargaming assists in transforming it into actionable data to inform requirements, provide analysis for live-force experimentation, and contribute to concept refinement.
Recognizing the importance of his predecessor’s vision, Gen. David H. Berger, the Corps’ visionary former commandant, called for the implementation of “an intensive program of iterative concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and simulation, and experimentation” in his first iteration of Force Design 2030.
Today, this vision of a data-driven future is coming to life aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico where Marine Corps Systems Command is currently constructing a state-of-the-art center for wargaming and analysis.
Recently named the “General Robert B. Neller Center for Wargaming and Analysis,” this 100,446 square foot facility will allow Marines of all ranks and billets to wargame repeatedly in a secure, centralized location. Managed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, this revolutionary new capability is set to open its doors in 2025.
As noted in a previous article, this will provide a crucial asset to the joint force and senior leadership, filling a gap previously absent in the National Capital Region by facilitating wargame participation for joint, interagency, and multinational organizations.
Historical Context and Modern Applications
The Marine Corps’ relationship with wargaming began in the early 20th century and ramped up leading to the Second World War as the Corps rushed to build a force—and develop tactics—that would allow it to successfully storm enemy beaches in Europe and the Pacific.
For the purposes of this article, a wargame can be defined as the methodical re-creation of competitive or conflict scenario(s), excluding real military forces, where human decisions shape events.
Col. George Schreffler, director of the Wargaming Division at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, explained this in layman’s terms on a recent episode of the Equipping the Corps podcast where he discussed wargaming using board games like Risk or Dungeons and Dragons.
“Although we don’t use those exact games, the principle remains the same: utilizing probability tables and dice rolls to drive decision-making and interactions. It's not about the specific results but rather the process of forcing decisions that mirror real-world scenarios.”
But wargaming isn’t all fun and games; it is a whole of Combat Development and Integration effort. According to Col. Ross Monta, portfolio manager for Command Element Systems, it’s “a practical tool that’s helping us build the future of the Marine Corps.”
“Wargaming is one of the most effective means available to offer a glimpse of future conflict, which is why it was specifically called out as key to ensuring Force Design 2030 initiatives reflect a holistic approach to warfighting modernization,” he noted.
Lt. Col. Wynndee Young, PM Wargaming Capability, added to the colonel’s insights, noting, “Wargaming is crucial at every step of the mission, from both a tactical and operational perspective. It’s a process that guides us in how to use our current capabilities to successfully execute the mission.”
Wargaming is also important because it allows Marine Corps leadership to justify its spending to Congress and the taxpayer.
"Wargaming serves as a robust validation tool for our force design and future spending. It’s how we provide Congress with concrete data, supporting our requests for specific capabilities. In essence, wargaming enables us to not only fine-tune our military strategy but also justify the resources needed to bring that strategy to life,” she added.
Contemporary Wargaming Scenarios and Challenges
Today, wargaming continues to shape the Marine Corps' preparations for the future fight by simulating a range of scenarios across different theaters, helping hone the warfighter’s ability to navigate complex challenges with agility and precision.
“Many of our wargames delve into scenarios that tackle key Pacific challenges, probing how we'd navigate them amid a national security crisis,” said Tim Barrick, wargaming director at Marine Corps University. “Some cater to European contexts with precision, while others are intricately designed for the nuanced demands of the Pacific Theater. Ranging from tactical intricacies to expansive theater-level maneuvers, these games cover a broad spectrum. Most maintain the agility to adapt across theaters, enabling versatile exploration."
As Marines stand ready to answer the call to arms, wargaming remains a pivotal tool in their arsenal, enabling them to innovate, adapt, and strategize for the unique challenges of modern naval expeditionary warfare in the global littorals.
“In preparation for the multifaceted challenges of the Indo-Pacific, wargaming is a practical tool that informs future operating concepts, what capabilities are needed and should be invested in, and operational decisions and planning,” said Monta. “Wargaming helps us break down complex military challenges into specific constraints and issues, while also allowing for insights into previously unknown issues that arise during the conduct of a game.”
The Future of Wargaming
As Force Design 2030 continues to drive the Corps towards the future, wargaming will continue to play a crucial role in the planning and development of the tactics and strategies that have allowed the warfighter to fight and win throughout American military history.
But wargaming in the 21st century seeks to involve more than a few officers huddled around a slab of cardboard. Heeding Gen. Berger’s call for modernization, MARCORSYSCOM is embracing bleeding edge technologies like artificial intelligence and cloud computing.
At Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, we’re taking things like large language models, like ChatGPT, and incorporating them into the simulations.
Joel Corrientes, subject matter expert at Marine Corps University
“At Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, we’re taking things like large language models, like ChatGPT, and incorporating them into the simulations,” Joel Corrientes, a subject matter expert at Marine Corps University, told reporters at Modern Day Marine.
Similarly, the development of the Warfighting Cloud means that a digital library of wargames can be securely accessed from various locations and devices—greatly expanding the scope of the capability.
“The difference with the new Wargaming Cloud is the ability to expand wargaming opportunities beyond the classroom. This offers Marines access to a library of digital games on their own time and at their own pace,” Brig. General Maura Hennigan, Marine Corps University president, said in a statement last year.
As Force Design 2030 continues to guide the Corps' modernization efforts, wargaming stands as an indispensable asset, helping to refine our strategies, validate our tactical approaches, and prepare us to face the intricacies of an ever-changing global landscape.
With the United States calibrating its strategic compass toward the Indo-Pacific, the role of wargaming transcends mere planning— rather, it has evolved into a key pillar, serving to shape strategy and fortify operational excellence.
As we continue to navigate the changing currents of great power politics, MARCORSYSCOM’s wargaming capability will help ensure that the warfighter remains agile, focused, and above all, prepared to fight and win in any clime or place.
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Report to Congress on U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE STAFF
JUNE 13, 2023 7:36 AM
The following is the June 6, 2023, Congressional Research Service report, U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress.
From the report
The Indo-Pacific occupies a central role in U.S. national strategy and hosts a large number of U.S. military forces. To enable the operation of these forces and accomplish its strategic objectives, the United States maintains and uses at least 66 significant defense sites spread across the region. This defense infrastructure network performs and supports numerous military functions, including basing for military personnel and weapon systems; domain awareness and area defense; maintenance and repair; training and exercises, storage and prepositioning of materiel; and research, development, testing, and evaluation activities. Some Indo-Pacific installations are located in U.S. states, territories, or possessions (such as Hawaii and Guam); others are located in allied or partner nations (such as South Korea and Japan). In addition to installations directly owned or operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. military also makes use of sites operated by allied or partner nations (such as the Philippines and Australia).
DOD’s basing posture in the Indo-Pacific reflects in part the legacy of decisions made under the geopolitical and technological conditions of the Cold War. Following the Obama Administration’s announcement of a “pivot to Asia,” the focus of U.S. strategy (and with it, regional defense infrastructure) shifted toward prevailing in competition against peer or near-peer rivals—particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since 2011, the United States has negotiated access to 12 new defense sites in the Philippines and Australia, constructed new installations in Japan and Guam, and expanded facilities at dozens of existing installations across the region. Congress’ role in these developments has included, for example, appropriating over $8.9 billion for new military construction projects at Indo-Pacific sites since fiscal year (FY) 2020 and establishing infrastructure improvements as an investment priority through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI).
Issues that Congress may consider include (1) whether DOD’s current regional basing posture adequately supports strategic goals and operational requirements, and (2) whether the construction, maintenance, and utilization of defense infrastructure is appropriately resourced and managed. Within these issue areas, particular questions that may be raised in the 118th Congress include:
What criteria should inform the placement of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific, and what role should Congress play in determining those criteria?
How can DOD optimize the organization, operation, and resilience of its Indo-Pacific installations, and what assessment and oversight options are available to Congress?
What is an appropriate level of investment for military construction, facilities sustainment, and related infrastructure activities?
Where are we going? While I wish General Smith a speedy recovery from his medical issues, I also wish to read the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Will we continue in a direction many of us believe is wrong, or will we adjust our sails and get back on course?
Do we have a CMC on duty or is he like CJCS “medically not fit for duty” or on extended convalescence leave?
I have seen nothing on General Smith's status, recovery, or when he will return to duty.
Apparently the “official spokesperson” is a unfamiliar with “The emperor's new clothes
What's the meaning of the phrase 'The emperor's new clothes'?
The label given to any fictional item that viewers have been induced into believing as real.
What's the origin of the phrase 'The emperor's new clothes'?
The emperor's new clothesThe expression 'the emperor's new clothes' or variants like 'the emperor has no clothes' are difficult to explain briefly and are most easily understood by looking at its source, that is, Hans Christian Anderson's fable The Emperor’s New Clothes, 1837.
Anderson's tale involves a vain king who was preoccupied with his appearance and his wardrobe. A pair of swindlers took advantage of this by pretending to be able to weave the finest cloth, which couldn't be seen by people who were either unfit for office or were particularly stupid. The king decided to have a suit of clothes made from the fabric in order to test which of his courtiers was unfit for office. As he didn't want to appear stupid or unfit for rule himself, he pretended to be able to see the new clothes, as did all of his courtiers. He paraded the 'new clothes' through the streets and the onlookers, also not wishing to appear stupid, all admired them. A small child, who didn't understand the apparent necessity for pretence, piped up 'But he has nothing on!'. The bubble of pretence burst and soon all the onlookers were repeating what the child had said, whilst the king continued the procession, attempting to maintain his dignity by pretending that nothing had happened.
So, the meaning of the expression is clear from the story. It is used in contexts where people are widely acclaimed and admired but where others question whether what they have created is of any value. Modern-day examples might be the highly priced work of conceptual artists or the more avant-guard products of fashion designers.
The phrase bears some similarity to another modern-day expression - the elephant in the room. An essential factor with both phrases is the willingness of people to engage into an unspoken contract to willfully disbelieve what they know to be true.”! To the Marine spokesman it’s FD (FD 2030) was dropped. The NDAA directs the CMC to answer the questions it is not a desire it is a Law! To the DoD AI person whining about not enough dollars perhaps eliminating all Climate Change, DEI, Sex Change and Illegal Abortion Funding, etc etc….from the bloated DOD Budget would yield considerable billions.
From the official spokesperson for FD 2030: "I have to say that FD 2030, to anyone with the eyes to listen, unquestionably provides the solution set to General Zinni's list. In numerous war-games, it proved highly effective. Any capability gap that naysayer's point out is either being developed through a program of learning or will be provided by the Army. All will be interested to note that our fleet of Amphibious Shipping Game pieces have been fully funded and have proven highly effective in several Friday night rounds of "The Battle of Second Thomas Shoal: The WarGame©2024".".
The FD Spokesperson states “All will be interested to note that our fleet of Amphibious Shipping Game pieces have been fully funded and have proven highly effective in several Friday night rounds of "The Battle of Second Thomas Shoal: The WarGame©2024". Where were these “game pieces” procured? Amazon, K Mart?
etsy.....
Anybody who tells you that “we will never fight this away again” needs to be heard and understood as meaning “I will never…but your mileage may vary”.
We all know “Hubris Comes From Ancient Greece
English picked up both the concept of hubris and the term for that particular brand of cockiness from the ancient Greeks, who considered hubris a dangerous character flaw capable of provoking the wrath of the gods. In classical Greek tragedy, hubris was often a fatal shortcoming that brought about the fall of the tragic hero. Typically, overconfidence led the hero to attempt to overstep the boundaries of human limitations and assume a godlike status, and the gods inevitably humbled the offender with a sharp reminder of their mortality. “ I was unaware of her until yesterday after 2 minutes of searching, I read her biography I decided to make her even more of a legend then she already apparently believes she is in her own mind. Soon she will discover her fame has spread on X specifically w Senator Sullivan and Senator Cruz (his Chief of Staff is a Marine Reservist who previously served as a Texas Assistant Attorney General for Tx AG Ken Paxton). Samuel has a couple of other ideas to focus a “Klieg light” or 2 on the Brigadier.