The bottom line is this, instead of reducing the Marine Corps capabilities to fund FD, the Corps needs to grow, and grow exponentially to meet the threat of peer and near peer competitors.
Heritage.Org published on Jan 24, 2024 “Executive Summary of the 2024 Index of U.S. Military Strength.”
While the Marine Corps was scored as “Strong,” they did state that the “Corps is already at 74 percent of the battalions and related air and logistical capabilities it should have. It needs to grow.”
Well, instead of growing, the Marine Corps downsized. In the Heritage report, they scored the e Marine Corps as “WEAK” with respect to “CAPACITY.”
Campus Point is absolutely correct, we need a Corps that is capable of conducting the bloody fight, against a huge, well armed adversary in that adversary’s backyard…we won’t be able to do that with a neutered Marine Corps.
By the way, the other services scored worse than the Marine Corps. If our brothers and sisters in arms are marginal, weak and very weak in capacity, capability and readiness, how the hell will our Marines survive?
Threats to Our Conus Bases:”By Todd Bensman as published June 26 by the Center for Immigration Studies
The U.S. government will withhold names of two illegal alien Jordanian nationals, one of whom illegally crossed the Southwest Border, who on May 3 tried to ram a box truck into Quantico Marine Corps base, citing as grounds that their personal privacy outweighs “minimal” public interest in knowing who they are, according to a …”
"The U.S. Army said it fired its newly fielded Precision Strike Missile from the Pacific island of Palau and engaged a moving target at sea, marking the first time the weapon has been used outside of American-based testing sites."
"The first set of Precision Strike Missiles, or PrSM, were delivered to the Army in December 2023 to begin replacing the legacy Army Tactical Missile System."
The Army, doing what the Marine Corps is half assed doing, bigger and better.
"The U.S. Army’s 3rd Multidomain Task Force, headquartered in Hawaii, is getting officers from both Australia and the U.K. this summer and will work on advancing technology that’s. focus of the second pillar of the AUKUS pact, according to U.S. Army Pacific Commander Gen. Charles Flynn."
"There are three MDTFs planned for the Pacific. The 1st MDTF is nearly complete in building out its force structure and the 3rd MDTF, which was established in September 2022, is still growing. The 4th MDTF is not yet established."
"Each MDTF uses assets that include electronic warfare capabilities, unmanned aircraft systems, high-altitude balloons and space sensors as part of its Multidomain Effects Battalion."
It would be interesting to know if the Army and Navy (and USMC) have established Inter-service or Joint procedures / digital integration standards for integration of Sensors, C&C, and Fires. As of the MLREX at 29 Palms winter '23, the integration was still mostly ad hoc for the USMC and surface fleet, at least between the various Fleets. Having those procedures and digital links would go a ways to squeezing some lemonade out of the Blue Water Maginot Lemons.
I have recently returned from my 50 year TBS Class Reunion (ECHO Co – 74) at MCB Quantico. Part of that trip was a visit to TBS and a motivating and outstanding Command Brief given by the TBS Staff. The brief was given in the “Hawk”…My, My! How the Hawk has changed! The Hawk is no longer a dingy corner in O’Bannon Hall (also long gone) but a spacious and well decorated pub style O Club.
ECHO Company 74, when asking questions, was surprised to learn that there is no longer a BASCOLEX, where every TBS Company boards an amphibious ship and then executes an amphibious landing. When asked why, the presenter sheepishly informed us that the amphibious shipping availability for BASCOLEX disappeared several years ago. WHHHAAAT? No BASCOLEX? My first thought was “Damn! Now I have to look at the new MOU on amphibious ships just signed by the Commandant and the SEVNAV.” Well it just appeared: https://news.usni.org/2024/06/25/navy-marine-corps-agree-on-readiness-standards-for-amphibious-warships
I do remember that some years ago the number for required amphibious ships was 38. This requirement was derived from the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP) that stated the Marine Corps had two MEBs available to the Combatant Commanders for contingency war planning purposes. This is important because to float an amphibious MEB it took 17 amphibious ships. Two MEBs meant 17 x 2 = 34 amphib ships. Back in those days the US Navy had an Operational Availability Rate (OAR) of 90% which meant the number moved to 38 amphibious ships, 34 x 90% = 4 (spars) + 34 = 38. The Marine Corps held to the 38 number for over 10 years.
Jan 7, 2009, a letter to the Chairman of the Congressional Appropriations Committee signed by the CNO (Admiral Roughead), CMC (General Conway) and SECNAV (Mr. Winter) stating the CNO and CMC “have determined that the force structure requirement to support a 2.0 MEB lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships. Understanding this requirement, and in light of the fiscal constraints with which the Navy is faced, the Department of the Navy will sustain a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon.”
Apparently, the USMC recognized that the Navy was unable to meet the 38 amphibious ship number and told the Navy that the Marines are willing to accept “risk” by reducing the CSS amphibious requirement by moving it to the fly-in echelon. This reduced the amphibious requirement to 15 amphibious ships per MEB x 2 for 30 + 3 for maintenance (OAR) for a total of 33 amphibious ships.
I should note that in Aug 2016 CMC Neller stated: “Both (Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John) Richardson’s and my predecessors have documented a valid requirement for a minimum of 38 amphib ships. So that’s not being met today, there’s 30. Based on the ship construction plan it’ll go to 34 and then it will probably taper off again. There’s not a current plan that gets us to 38,” Neller said.
“Ships are expensive, I understand that, but we will continue to advocate to do anything we can do to increase the number of amphib ships because we believe that provides operational advantage to combatant commanders and enhances the security of the United States.”
The acceptance of “risk” also reduced the size of the ARG when it went from 4 ships to 3 (1 large amphib, 1 LSD, and 1 LPD). To support a 3 ship ARG’s rotation, you need a total of 9 amphibious ships; 3 deployed, 3 training to deploy, and three tied to the dock for maintenance and refit.
BTW after 2009 the 2 Marine Corps MEBs were dropped from the JSCP. The JSCP “is the primary vehicle through which the CJCS exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans. It apportions limited forces and resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments.” I am not sure what the cause and effect was here other than providing the SECNAV wiggle room on amphibious ship building and maintenance.
Somewhere between 2009 and the current “new” MOU: 2021 US Code: Title 10 - Armed Forces, 2021 US Code: 2021 US Code Title 10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle C - Navy and Marine Corps: Part I – Organization Chapter 807 - Composition of the Department of the Navy Sec. 8062 - United States Navy: composition; functions; sub paragraph (b) changed. The key paragraph here is (b): “The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious assault ships. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft carrier or amphibious warfare ship includes an aircraft carrier or amphibious warfare ship that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.” Talk about wiggle room. The SECNAV can count any amphibious ship tied to the dock or in maintenance as operational. What a deal!
The US Navy’s downward slide of operational amphibious ships has a long history but it has definitely been downward and it desperately needs to be reversed. The new MOU establishes two categories: Available and Not-Available. IMO that is a good start, however, it does not change the US Navy’s problems in ship building and maintenance. In addition, let’s get the 2 MEBs and 2 MPFs back into the JSCP (and “Available”) in order that the Combatant Commanders can included them in their war plans. If the US Navy wants to be ready for a global war and the "big battles" with the CCP it has to get its Operational Available Rate (OAR) back to 90% and start building all ships on time.
The first shots of the next”big” war have already been fired:
budget skirmishes in congress, and with our sister, the U.S.Navy, over funding-not just ships!
And the recruiting battle-no service can find enough qualified individuals to raise up to the many levels required. Good old Project 100,000 redux??. And add gender issues to that!!!
As was oft opined at the MCU-NEED A NEW IDEA-READ AN OLD BOOK.
US-Made HIMARS ‘Ineffective’ in Ukraine Due to Russian Jamming: Report
Photo of Joe Saballa JOE SABALLAMAY 27, 20241 MINUTE READ
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) supplied to Ukraine by the US has been “completely ineffective” on the battlefield due to persistent Russian jamming.
This is according to a classified Ukrainian weapons assessment seen by The Washington Post, exposing more flaws in some of America’s most sophisticated weapon systems”…oh my.
I ask the question do we have time for mobilization this part one of the answers:”Articles
THE ARMY’S MOBILIZATION PROBLEM
JOSEPH WHITLOCK OCTOBER 13, 2017 9 MIN READ
Mobilization – the process by which selected portions of the U.S. Armed Forces are brought to a state of readiness for war – no longer operates effectively to meet the volume and speed required in modern war.
Today the United States Army is the finest and most capable fighting force the world has ever seen. However, an outstanding military is not effective if it is not there to affect the outcome. The United States is running a high risk that it may lose in a major theater war because it cannot mobilize and deploy the Army quickly enough.
Given the tremendous experience and expertise that our Army has demonstrated over the past three decades, Americans might ask “How could this be possible?” It is the result of four contributing factors: 1) the changing character of war; 2) a smaller Army that has moved from being forward stationed to rotational; 3) the Army’s increasing reliance on its Reserve Component as an operational force; and…
Because of the Kamikazi's there were more USN KIA than USMC or USA together,,, Only time that happened, My wife's father, 19 year old from NY was on one of the Navy ships,,,, did not get hit.
The bottom line is this, instead of reducing the Marine Corps capabilities to fund FD, the Corps needs to grow, and grow exponentially to meet the threat of peer and near peer competitors.
Heritage.Org published on Jan 24, 2024 “Executive Summary of the 2024 Index of U.S. Military Strength.”
While the Marine Corps was scored as “Strong,” they did state that the “Corps is already at 74 percent of the battalions and related air and logistical capabilities it should have. It needs to grow.”
Well, instead of growing, the Marine Corps downsized. In the Heritage report, they scored the e Marine Corps as “WEAK” with respect to “CAPACITY.”
Campus Point is absolutely correct, we need a Corps that is capable of conducting the bloody fight, against a huge, well armed adversary in that adversary’s backyard…we won’t be able to do that with a neutered Marine Corps.
By the way, the other services scored worse than the Marine Corps. If our brothers and sisters in arms are marginal, weak and very weak in capacity, capability and readiness, how the hell will our Marines survive?
Threats to Our Conus Bases:”By Todd Bensman as published June 26 by the Center for Immigration Studies
The U.S. government will withhold names of two illegal alien Jordanian nationals, one of whom illegally crossed the Southwest Border, who on May 3 tried to ram a box truck into Quantico Marine Corps base, citing as grounds that their personal privacy outweighs “minimal” public interest in knowing who they are, according to a …”
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/06/25/us-armys-new-precision-missile-hit-moving-target-in-pacific-exercise/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
"The U.S. Army said it fired its newly fielded Precision Strike Missile from the Pacific island of Palau and engaged a moving target at sea, marking the first time the weapon has been used outside of American-based testing sites."
"The first set of Precision Strike Missiles, or PrSM, were delivered to the Army in December 2023 to begin replacing the legacy Army Tactical Missile System."
The Army, doing what the Marine Corps is half assed doing, bigger and better.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/05/17/heres-how-the-us-armys-multidomain-task-force-is-contributing-to-aukus/
"The U.S. Army’s 3rd Multidomain Task Force, headquartered in Hawaii, is getting officers from both Australia and the U.K. this summer and will work on advancing technology that’s. focus of the second pillar of the AUKUS pact, according to U.S. Army Pacific Commander Gen. Charles Flynn."
"There are three MDTFs planned for the Pacific. The 1st MDTF is nearly complete in building out its force structure and the 3rd MDTF, which was established in September 2022, is still growing. The 4th MDTF is not yet established."
"Each MDTF uses assets that include electronic warfare capabilities, unmanned aircraft systems, high-altitude balloons and space sensors as part of its Multidomain Effects Battalion."
It would be interesting to know if the Army and Navy (and USMC) have established Inter-service or Joint procedures / digital integration standards for integration of Sensors, C&C, and Fires. As of the MLREX at 29 Palms winter '23, the integration was still mostly ad hoc for the USMC and surface fleet, at least between the various Fleets. Having those procedures and digital links would go a ways to squeezing some lemonade out of the Blue Water Maginot Lemons.
I have recently returned from my 50 year TBS Class Reunion (ECHO Co – 74) at MCB Quantico. Part of that trip was a visit to TBS and a motivating and outstanding Command Brief given by the TBS Staff. The brief was given in the “Hawk”…My, My! How the Hawk has changed! The Hawk is no longer a dingy corner in O’Bannon Hall (also long gone) but a spacious and well decorated pub style O Club.
ECHO Company 74, when asking questions, was surprised to learn that there is no longer a BASCOLEX, where every TBS Company boards an amphibious ship and then executes an amphibious landing. When asked why, the presenter sheepishly informed us that the amphibious shipping availability for BASCOLEX disappeared several years ago. WHHHAAAT? No BASCOLEX? My first thought was “Damn! Now I have to look at the new MOU on amphibious ships just signed by the Commandant and the SEVNAV.” Well it just appeared: https://news.usni.org/2024/06/25/navy-marine-corps-agree-on-readiness-standards-for-amphibious-warships
I do remember that some years ago the number for required amphibious ships was 38. This requirement was derived from the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP) that stated the Marine Corps had two MEBs available to the Combatant Commanders for contingency war planning purposes. This is important because to float an amphibious MEB it took 17 amphibious ships. Two MEBs meant 17 x 2 = 34 amphib ships. Back in those days the US Navy had an Operational Availability Rate (OAR) of 90% which meant the number moved to 38 amphibious ships, 34 x 90% = 4 (spars) + 34 = 38. The Marine Corps held to the 38 number for over 10 years.
Jan 7, 2009, a letter to the Chairman of the Congressional Appropriations Committee signed by the CNO (Admiral Roughead), CMC (General Conway) and SECNAV (Mr. Winter) stating the CNO and CMC “have determined that the force structure requirement to support a 2.0 MEB lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships. Understanding this requirement, and in light of the fiscal constraints with which the Navy is faced, the Department of the Navy will sustain a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon.”
Apparently, the USMC recognized that the Navy was unable to meet the 38 amphibious ship number and told the Navy that the Marines are willing to accept “risk” by reducing the CSS amphibious requirement by moving it to the fly-in echelon. This reduced the amphibious requirement to 15 amphibious ships per MEB x 2 for 30 + 3 for maintenance (OAR) for a total of 33 amphibious ships.
I should note that in Aug 2016 CMC Neller stated: “Both (Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John) Richardson’s and my predecessors have documented a valid requirement for a minimum of 38 amphib ships. So that’s not being met today, there’s 30. Based on the ship construction plan it’ll go to 34 and then it will probably taper off again. There’s not a current plan that gets us to 38,” Neller said.
“Ships are expensive, I understand that, but we will continue to advocate to do anything we can do to increase the number of amphib ships because we believe that provides operational advantage to combatant commanders and enhances the security of the United States.”
General Burger then states at the beginning of his tour, that the US Marine Corps will settle for 28 when he knew that by law the number was 31. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16mh82PpRmw&t=233s
The acceptance of “risk” also reduced the size of the ARG when it went from 4 ships to 3 (1 large amphib, 1 LSD, and 1 LPD). To support a 3 ship ARG’s rotation, you need a total of 9 amphibious ships; 3 deployed, 3 training to deploy, and three tied to the dock for maintenance and refit.
BTW after 2009 the 2 Marine Corps MEBs were dropped from the JSCP. The JSCP “is the primary vehicle through which the CJCS exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans. It apportions limited forces and resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments.” I am not sure what the cause and effect was here other than providing the SECNAV wiggle room on amphibious ship building and maintenance.
Somewhere between 2009 and the current “new” MOU: 2021 US Code: Title 10 - Armed Forces, 2021 US Code: 2021 US Code Title 10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle C - Navy and Marine Corps: Part I – Organization Chapter 807 - Composition of the Department of the Navy Sec. 8062 - United States Navy: composition; functions; sub paragraph (b) changed. The key paragraph here is (b): “The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious assault ships. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft carrier or amphibious warfare ship includes an aircraft carrier or amphibious warfare ship that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.” Talk about wiggle room. The SECNAV can count any amphibious ship tied to the dock or in maintenance as operational. What a deal!
The US Navy’s downward slide of operational amphibious ships has a long history but it has definitely been downward and it desperately needs to be reversed. The new MOU establishes two categories: Available and Not-Available. IMO that is a good start, however, it does not change the US Navy’s problems in ship building and maintenance. In addition, let’s get the 2 MEBs and 2 MPFs back into the JSCP (and “Available”) in order that the Combatant Commanders can included them in their war plans. If the US Navy wants to be ready for a global war and the "big battles" with the CCP it has to get its Operational Available Rate (OAR) back to 90% and start building all ships on time.
The first shots of the next”big” war have already been fired:
budget skirmishes in congress, and with our sister, the U.S.Navy, over funding-not just ships!
And the recruiting battle-no service can find enough qualified individuals to raise up to the many levels required. Good old Project 100,000 redux??. And add gender issues to that!!!
As was oft opined at the MCU-NEED A NEW IDEA-READ AN OLD BOOK.
Russia Jamming of Himars GPS “AMERICASEUROPEWAR
US-Made HIMARS ‘Ineffective’ in Ukraine Due to Russian Jamming: Report
Photo of Joe Saballa JOE SABALLAMAY 27, 20241 MINUTE READ
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) supplied to Ukraine by the US has been “completely ineffective” on the battlefield due to persistent Russian jamming.
This is according to a classified Ukrainian weapons assessment seen by The Washington Post, exposing more flaws in some of America’s most sophisticated weapon systems”…oh my.
I ask the question do we have time for mobilization this part one of the answers:”Articles
THE ARMY’S MOBILIZATION PROBLEM
JOSEPH WHITLOCK OCTOBER 13, 2017 9 MIN READ
Mobilization – the process by which selected portions of the U.S. Armed Forces are brought to a state of readiness for war – no longer operates effectively to meet the volume and speed required in modern war.
Today the United States Army is the finest and most capable fighting force the world has ever seen. However, an outstanding military is not effective if it is not there to affect the outcome. The United States is running a high risk that it may lose in a major theater war because it cannot mobilize and deploy the Army quickly enough.
Given the tremendous experience and expertise that our Army has demonstrated over the past three decades, Americans might ask “How could this be possible?” It is the result of four contributing factors: 1) the changing character of war; 2) a smaller Army that has moved from being forward stationed to rotational; 3) the Army’s increasing reliance on its Reserve Component as an operational force; and…
Because of the Kamikazi's there were more USN KIA than USMC or USA together,,, Only time that happened, My wife's father, 19 year old from NY was on one of the Navy ships,,,, did not get hit.
Knute
Should read”this is part of one..