Good post by CP; I may have talked about this very topic in the comments a time or two. The tie in to 'broken window theory' and measured aggression is appropriate to the topic. The PRC has shown how they push until conditions allow them to consolidate. There has been no real pushing back; it's been more a game fo passive resistance in the face of aggressive PRC action. I've floated the concept of deploying a very small det of US Marines to the most troublesome zones like Second Thomas Shoal. The idea is that the presence of the Marines, like reflagging a commercial vessel, change the dynamics of the game. Now, instead of just the chicken....the monkey is involved and he's not letting go of the peanut. I am fairly certain we can figure out how to push back in the squirt gun wars without blowing stuff up if the PRC can do it. Frankly, just take a page out of the PRC manual for assuming control of shoals in the South China Sea. 1) Invent an excuse to be there. 2) Put more ships and more ships with water cannons on scene than the chicken can. 3) Harass the chicken at all opportunities. 4) Where presence of the other nation is withdrawn, act as if it yours, quickly, so it is too late for them to comeback. 4) Continue until inertia sets in and the area is yours by default. Having a MEU or a SPMAGTF as a backup would be good.
Excellent concepts cfrog. I wonder what would happen if we assisted the Philippine Navy in their resupply missions to their ship anchored on the shoal? Another mission would be to have MEU/ARG patrolling off the coast of some of the Chinese ports in the Middle East or South America. We cannot ignore their movements. That would only invite more Chinese aggression.
First I have ever heard of either of these theories. Excellent article and bring these two together to illustrate the issues.
1995 I was contemplating a lat move to the intel field. The MSgt took me in the office and tested me on a few things. One was telling him what was at LAT/LONG. Not knowing that I relied on good old map reading techniques and accurately pointed out the place he was asking.
The next thing he asked is where, in the next 10-15 years, in the Pacific region, tensions would become high. I immediately pointed to the South China Sea. The local news had just started covering Chinas increasing activities in that region (I got the Japanese news translations daily from the III MEF G2).
Since that time, of course, they have built islands on the shoals and submerged reefs, probably killing the fishing grounds that were high on their agenda, and have become increasing belligerent toward the countries that surround that area.
I can't agree more that the US should become a bit more visible in the area. There are 4 amphibs in Sasebo and I am understanding that the 31st MEU will only be doing 1 patrol a year vice the 2 they have been doing for decades starting in 2026. So instead of increasing our visibility in that region, we seem to be cutting back. The exact antithesis of what should be happening.
Excellent article here... FD2030 has rendered our Corps incapable of providing a deterrent to the CHICOM aggression via our once capable "special MAGTFs" or with the MEU (SOC) element...
Good post by CP; I may have talked about this very topic in the comments a time or two. The tie in to 'broken window theory' and measured aggression is appropriate to the topic. The PRC has shown how they push until conditions allow them to consolidate. There has been no real pushing back; it's been more a game fo passive resistance in the face of aggressive PRC action. I've floated the concept of deploying a very small det of US Marines to the most troublesome zones like Second Thomas Shoal. The idea is that the presence of the Marines, like reflagging a commercial vessel, change the dynamics of the game. Now, instead of just the chicken....the monkey is involved and he's not letting go of the peanut. I am fairly certain we can figure out how to push back in the squirt gun wars without blowing stuff up if the PRC can do it. Frankly, just take a page out of the PRC manual for assuming control of shoals in the South China Sea. 1) Invent an excuse to be there. 2) Put more ships and more ships with water cannons on scene than the chicken can. 3) Harass the chicken at all opportunities. 4) Where presence of the other nation is withdrawn, act as if it yours, quickly, so it is too late for them to comeback. 4) Continue until inertia sets in and the area is yours by default. Having a MEU or a SPMAGTF as a backup would be good.
Excellent concepts cfrog. I wonder what would happen if we assisted the Philippine Navy in their resupply missions to their ship anchored on the shoal? Another mission would be to have MEU/ARG patrolling off the coast of some of the Chinese ports in the Middle East or South America. We cannot ignore their movements. That would only invite more Chinese aggression.
First I have ever heard of either of these theories. Excellent article and bring these two together to illustrate the issues.
1995 I was contemplating a lat move to the intel field. The MSgt took me in the office and tested me on a few things. One was telling him what was at LAT/LONG. Not knowing that I relied on good old map reading techniques and accurately pointed out the place he was asking.
The next thing he asked is where, in the next 10-15 years, in the Pacific region, tensions would become high. I immediately pointed to the South China Sea. The local news had just started covering Chinas increasing activities in that region (I got the Japanese news translations daily from the III MEF G2).
Since that time, of course, they have built islands on the shoals and submerged reefs, probably killing the fishing grounds that were high on their agenda, and have become increasing belligerent toward the countries that surround that area.
I can't agree more that the US should become a bit more visible in the area. There are 4 amphibs in Sasebo and I am understanding that the 31st MEU will only be doing 1 patrol a year vice the 2 they have been doing for decades starting in 2026. So instead of increasing our visibility in that region, we seem to be cutting back. The exact antithesis of what should be happening.
Excellent article here... FD2030 has rendered our Corps incapable of providing a deterrent to the CHICOM aggression via our once capable "special MAGTFs" or with the MEU (SOC) element...