Bravo Zulu, Compass Points! It took way to long for HQMC to realize the futility of resistance to the inevitable. No Marine ever wanted a tattoo of a missile on their arm! kmd
Got off to a bad start and six years later still not much closer to a viable concept. How much longer? Well, the true problem is that the concept was flawed and remains flawed. How long of a “time out” does the Marine Corps need to figure it out?
One of the issues I have with FD2030 is the concept seemed to ignore history. Wake Island and the “Fall of the Philippines” are two very good historical examples of the FD2030 flaws. The Marine Corps Long Range Fires (LRF) launcher is another example. Its cancelation represents wasted time, effort and money on a bad idea from the FD2030 concept.
The US Air Force BGM-109G Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) was actually a Tomahawk land based “mobile” missile in service from 1983 to 1991. WHAAAAT! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BGM-109G_Gryphon
The “Gryphon” sported the tactical “W84 thermonuclear warhead”. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W84 . This system grew from worries about the Soviet mobile SS-20 Saber intermediate tactical “nuke” system that needed a counter. Both were decommissioned by the early 1990s with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
“Beginning in 2014, the US accused Russia of fielding a non-compliant ground-launched cruise missile (the SSC-8/9M729). Prompting Washington’s formal suspension of treaty obligations on 1 February 2019 and its withdrawal on 2 August 2019. Russia, in turn, suspended its own participation the following day, marking the treaty’s end after more than three decades.”
The Gryphon needed a hardened station site requiring extensive construction. The launchers were to be deployed to pre-surveyed sites during periods of increased tensions. These requirements seem very counter to the FD2030 idea of hiding on small Pacific Islands even with a smaller version of the Gryphon tow vehicle and launcher.
Good reddens to the Marine Corps Long Range Fires (LRF) launcher. Not our job and not supportive of our amphibious and MAGTF roots. The US Marine Corps leadership needs to get back to the history books (starting with the libraries of WW2 Pacific War books).
However, a warning, in the US Military’s belated rush and shuffle to the Pacific pivot, I have heard little discussion on the possibility of tactical nukes. In his book, Melting Point, General McKenzie USMC laments the lack of tactical nuclear training that usually occurred in exercises prior to the end of the INF Treaty (2019). With Russia’s threats in the Ukraine War, we know they are looking at tactical nukes. It is hard to believe that the CCP is not including tactical nukes in their planning and wargames. If the US military strategist and Combatant Commanders are ignoring tactical nuclear weapons, they need to be reminded that tactical nukes are back and on the playing table. S/F
If we are going to continue delving into the missle systems, bring back the direct support cannon artillery when you care enough to bring fire down to 200 yards in front of your foxhoile. 155mm howitzers, towed or self-propelled, can give you a very nice edge in a fight!
Good job - I was a fighter pilot 1973-1980 and I didn’t know much about the ground forces until I became a FAC with the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines in 1979. No real fire power on that cruise except our Marines, offshore destroyers and aircraft from the carrier.
Laudable. Unfortunately that effort to divest does not generate funding to build the force back to a full mission capable status. Giving away capabilities takes a minute, reacquiring equipment and skills is not an overnight event. A very good start
Outstanding post, General. It appears, however, the proponents of FD cannot see nor will they admit the error of their ways. We need a clean sweep at HQMC, the way President Kennedy did when he appointed General Shoup over a crop of hangers-on. Semper Fi
I certainly hope all hostile forces will appreciate the lethargic acceptance of the obvious error we made six years ago and withhold taking any direct action which would require a MAGTF response until we finally pull our finger out and get on with recreating the units we need! It would be the gentlemanly thing to do!
What a weird spin on what happened. In reality. . .
FY2022 Marine Corps Budget: Included procurement of 22 Block V Tactical Tomahawk missiles under “Procurement, Marine Corps” — indicating USMC-directed investment in Tomahawk for long-range fires.
Marine Corps RDT&E Funding: The FY 2022 RDT&E justification explicitly supported Marine Corps long-range precision fires experimentation, which included Tomahawk integration.
Shift to NMESIS After Cancellation: A Naval News report notes that after canceling Tomahawk integration, the USMC ramped up procurement of NMESIS launchers—signaling clear lessons learned and budget reallocation.
Together, these sources show that the Marine Corps received (didn’t spend their own money) over $100 million across FY 2022–FY 2025 for Tomahawk fires experimentation, used those funds for missile procurement, live-fire testing, and integration work, and then pivoted effectively to more suitable naval-strike systems like NMESIS.
How is this bad?
I realize this forum Is in desperate need of “good news” (still wrapping my head around watching veteran Marines actively hope the Corps fails), but the Corps was given money to validate a concept. It did.
Bravo Zulu, Compass Points! It took way to long for HQMC to realize the futility of resistance to the inevitable. No Marine ever wanted a tattoo of a missile on their arm! kmd
Got off to a bad start and six years later still not much closer to a viable concept. How much longer? Well, the true problem is that the concept was flawed and remains flawed. How long of a “time out” does the Marine Corps need to figure it out?
The only Tomahawk suitable for Marines would be optional combat gear and made by Winkler!
Great news, indeed!
One of the issues I have with FD2030 is the concept seemed to ignore history. Wake Island and the “Fall of the Philippines” are two very good historical examples of the FD2030 flaws. The Marine Corps Long Range Fires (LRF) launcher is another example. Its cancelation represents wasted time, effort and money on a bad idea from the FD2030 concept.
The US Air Force BGM-109G Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) was actually a Tomahawk land based “mobile” missile in service from 1983 to 1991. WHAAAAT! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BGM-109G_Gryphon
The “Gryphon” sported the tactical “W84 thermonuclear warhead”. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W84 . This system grew from worries about the Soviet mobile SS-20 Saber intermediate tactical “nuke” system that needed a counter. Both were decommissioned by the early 1990s with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
“Beginning in 2014, the US accused Russia of fielding a non-compliant ground-launched cruise missile (the SSC-8/9M729). Prompting Washington’s formal suspension of treaty obligations on 1 February 2019 and its withdrawal on 2 August 2019. Russia, in turn, suspended its own participation the following day, marking the treaty’s end after more than three decades.”
The Gryphon needed a hardened station site requiring extensive construction. The launchers were to be deployed to pre-surveyed sites during periods of increased tensions. These requirements seem very counter to the FD2030 idea of hiding on small Pacific Islands even with a smaller version of the Gryphon tow vehicle and launcher.
Good reddens to the Marine Corps Long Range Fires (LRF) launcher. Not our job and not supportive of our amphibious and MAGTF roots. The US Marine Corps leadership needs to get back to the history books (starting with the libraries of WW2 Pacific War books).
However, a warning, in the US Military’s belated rush and shuffle to the Pacific pivot, I have heard little discussion on the possibility of tactical nukes. In his book, Melting Point, General McKenzie USMC laments the lack of tactical nuclear training that usually occurred in exercises prior to the end of the INF Treaty (2019). With Russia’s threats in the Ukraine War, we know they are looking at tactical nukes. It is hard to believe that the CCP is not including tactical nukes in their planning and wargames. If the US military strategist and Combatant Commanders are ignoring tactical nuclear weapons, they need to be reminded that tactical nukes are back and on the playing table. S/F
If we are going to continue delving into the missle systems, bring back the direct support cannon artillery when you care enough to bring fire down to 200 yards in front of your foxhoile. 155mm howitzers, towed or self-propelled, can give you a very nice edge in a fight!
Good job - I was a fighter pilot 1973-1980 and I didn’t know much about the ground forces until I became a FAC with the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines in 1979. No real fire power on that cruise except our Marines, offshore destroyers and aircraft from the carrier.
Again, good article.
Laudable. Unfortunately that effort to divest does not generate funding to build the force back to a full mission capable status. Giving away capabilities takes a minute, reacquiring equipment and skills is not an overnight event. A very good start
Outstanding post, General. It appears, however, the proponents of FD cannot see nor will they admit the error of their ways. We need a clean sweep at HQMC, the way President Kennedy did when he appointed General Shoup over a crop of hangers-on. Semper Fi
I certainly hope all hostile forces will appreciate the lethargic acceptance of the obvious error we made six years ago and withhold taking any direct action which would require a MAGTF response until we finally pull our finger out and get on with recreating the units we need! It would be the gentlemanly thing to do!
Excellent news. Slowly, but surely! Stick with the HIMARS PrSM missile. A hearty Aaaaarah, to our Corps and the GCRC!
What a weird spin on what happened. In reality. . .
FY2022 Marine Corps Budget: Included procurement of 22 Block V Tactical Tomahawk missiles under “Procurement, Marine Corps” — indicating USMC-directed investment in Tomahawk for long-range fires.
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/3/11/marine-corps-budget-focuses-on-readiness-but-remains-mostly-flat?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Marine Corps RDT&E Funding: The FY 2022 RDT&E justification explicitly supported Marine Corps long-range precision fires experimentation, which included Tomahawk integration.
Shift to NMESIS After Cancellation: A Naval News report notes that after canceling Tomahawk integration, the USMC ramped up procurement of NMESIS launchers—signaling clear lessons learned and budget reallocation.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/u-s-marine-corps-abandons-tomahawk-missiles-doubles-down-on-extended-range-nmesis-in-fy2026-budget/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Together, these sources show that the Marine Corps received (didn’t spend their own money) over $100 million across FY 2022–FY 2025 for Tomahawk fires experimentation, used those funds for missile procurement, live-fire testing, and integration work, and then pivoted effectively to more suitable naval-strike systems like NMESIS.
How is this bad?
I realize this forum Is in desperate need of “good news” (still wrapping my head around watching veteran Marines actively hope the Corps fails), but the Corps was given money to validate a concept. It did.