Allow me to make one editorial comment upfront. I believe the Military.com article is wrong about the Marine Corps intending to divest HIMARS. From everything I’ve seen, the Marine Corps intends to keep 7 HIMARS batteries - - 4 on the West Coast and 3 on the East Coast.
The gutting of Marine Corps cannon artillery in the active force (from 21 batteries to 7 batteries) was done to help offset the cost of 14 Naval Strike Missile Batteries and 3 TLAM batteries. The misguided decision to jettison 67% of the artillery is stunning. It is arguably the biggest mistake in the history of the Marine Corps. It is compounded by the total divestments of tanks and bridging and significant reductions in assault breaching and aviation. Marine infantry can neither accomplish its mission nor survive without close, continuous, accurate, and all-weather cannon artillery support. Don’t take my word for it. Take the word of Major General James Livingston and Colonel Jay Vargas. They survived the battle of Dai Do. They know. Please take time to read the hyperlinked article: The Battle of Dai Do and Marine Corps Force Design 2030 by Major General James Livingston, USMC (Ret) and Colonel Jay Vargas, USMC (Ret).
The Marines have learned the hard way on countless battlefields that the minimum direct support artillery needed to fight, win, and survive is 1 battalion for every committed infantry regiment. For better information read the hyperlinked article: The Dangers of Overselling Insufficient Fire Support in the Active Force by Brigadier General Jerry McAbee, USMC (Ret), Colonel Stephen Baird, USMC (Ret), and Colonel Michael Marletto, USMC (Ret).
Today the Marine Corps has 7 active-duty cannon artillery batteries to support 3 Marine Divisions, barely 2 batteries per division. Do the math. Enough said.
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza are proof positive that cannon artillery is as relevant today as ever. Someone inside the Marine Corps needs to tell the emperor that he has no clothes on before it’s too late.
The four potential adversaries of the United States are: People's Republic of China, Russia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic Republic of North Korea.
All four are talking and acting in aggressive manner.
All four have and are engaged in supporting one another. Potential for global war.
All four are nations and militaries that invest in and rely on the principle of mass.
Russia's Military: According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Russia plans to expand its active personnel force to 1.5 million by 2026, which will make it the third largest in the world, after China and India." Plus 2 million reservists.
PRC Military: The PLA is the world's largest military force (not including paramilitary or reserve forces) and has the second largest defense budget in the world. Over 2 million active and over 500,000 reserves.
Iran's Military: Over 587,000 actives and 200,000 reserves.
North Korea's Military: As of 2021 it is the second largest military organization in the world, with 29.9% of the North Korean population actively serving, in reserve or in a paramilitary capacity: 1.3 Million actives and over 560,000 reserves.
The United States and its regional allies will have a difficult time stopping aggressive acts by only one of them. Coordinated action by two or more makes it exponentially more difficult.
Conducting a credible counter-offensive to end war and re-establish some degree of global deterrence is nearly impossible, especially after the previous Commandant's destructive "divest to invest" which, always a bad idea, was implemented at a most volatile and unstable time. The inept withdrawal from Afghanistan coupled with perceptions of declining national/international leadership and national will have significantly lowered the deterrent threshold.
Our adversaries can count. No amount of clever rhetoric is going to change the arithmetic.
Expensive (and frequently sensitive) precision will not offset MASS, especially resilient, all-weather mass.
Our Nation's fine young Americans may soon be thrust into combat without adequate combat and combat service support. They and their company grade and junior field grade leaders will pay the price.
Rhetoric continues to risk wars we don't want and may not be able to win. Force providers need to use every neuron, every dollar, every minute to build credible counter-offensive capabilities. Speaking bluntly: "Stop talking (cheerleading) and start building."
Significant and immediate investments in artillery are essential if the few infantry we have are to survive their first engagements.
Pasting a portion of 9 May CP that emphasizes the narrow, small aperture thinking that resulted in FD 2030, now FD.
Narratives are usually very narrow, and, as such, are dangerous, misleading representations of reality. They tend to focus on just one (frequently superficial) aspect of a problem. They tend to take a small aperture view of the problem and proposed solution set: Small apertures not just with respect to space but perhaps even more importantly to time.
Small aperture examples, both USMC and National, abound. Consider PRC:
Getting rid of close air support and cannon artillery is the stupidest thing I've seen in the 58 years I've been a Marine. If Marines are required ever again to make a frontal attack against fortified positions, what will be used to suppress enemy fire????? The general officers who allowed and directed this to happen obviously lack combat experience. You, gentlemen, are stupid.
As the Soviets got to within artillery range of Berlin they fired more tonnage in artillery than the total dropped on Berlin by the USAAF and the RAF. As numerous individuals above have stated, mass matters. The very notion that you do not need tube artillery is so alien to me it is incomprehensible. I believe I once read that no Marine Infantry company with a battery firing in direct support had ever been over run. I cannot verify that but it stuck. I always believed that you maneuver under the artillery umbrella or you operate at greater risk. The Marine Division did not need less artillery, it needed more.
In Korea the thing that broke the Chinese and N Koreans time and again was massed artillery fire.
The other points about FD-2030 stated above are 100% correct. I remain in total disbelief how Gen Berger drew his conclusions and how Gen Smith was his Palladin in the dismemberment of the MAGTF, the abandonment of its mission and complete lack of a functional alternative. Modernization is always at work. In this case it was divestment and irrelevance. No two individuals in the history of our Corps have ever been so wrong, uninformed and arrogant. It is hubris and perhaps mental illness. It is certainly a gross misunderstanding of history.
The Wolf with years of actual wartime experience, not Quantico wargame experience, knows that Marine infantrymen without cannon artillery support are far more likely to die!
To be of value to this Nation, the Marine Corps needs to be focused on one mission: a combined arms naval expeditionary force. It cannot be both a missile force and an expeditionary force. One or the other. To be a combined arms expeditionary force, it needs to have a strong artillery force. Artillery is rain or shine, 24/7 firepower support. Let the Army and the nations within the WEZ develop narrow focused missile forces. We need a general purpose expeditionary force with strong artillery which can respond to anything.
An interesting part of the discussion that has developed over time which lends total support to the MAGTF concept, is that divesting to invest as big a problem as it has created, has also lead to some granular review of what is needed to set T/O and T/E right to repair the damage done. As reviewed by General McAbee who KNOWS what we need for artillery, there is a body of knowledge here and on active duty that KNOW what else is needed now. We are accused of fighting the last war here by the proponents of FD whatever the Hell that means now. But the last war is the now war in Ukraine and Gaza. The next big question seems to be how do we get what is needed. If the total defense budget is &880 billion, and the gets $68 billion? (Round figures) then something is really wrong. We divested and got nothing in return, and now need to reinvest to get back to where we where. Someone needs to explain it, it gives one a major ice cream headache. cfrog nailed it, but there needs to be way forward, even the best bad idea seems something to put on the table. What is clear is the MAGTF works at all three levels it just needs to be wholly supported.
This reminds me of when guns were not put on new fighter Jets in Vietnam, because they would not be close enough to use them anymore the missile's and radar would be enough.
Seems the Corps is de-emphasizing fires: "The regiment’s sensing capability is as important or more important than its missiles, said Col. John Lehane, 3rd Marine littoral regiment commander. Marine senior leaders have emphasized reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance capabilities as a key Corps contribution.
Kind of hard to bring back something that was sent to Ukraine and have had the barrels shot out. The US gave Jordan 24 AH-1Z helicopters. Since the Marine Corps is the only service flying those, and it happened right about the time the Corps divested 2 squadrons of them....don't think they are coming back either.
Oh, I'm sure between Sierra Army Depot and Davis-Monthan, we'll just dig up and restomod old ground systems and old frames as needed. Nothing says 'Divest to Invest' like spending 3x the cost to regain 2/3 of the capability. No problem, barely an inconvenience. At least the maintenance nightmare will help the maintainers get up to speed a little quicker. (cue eye roll)
Where do I start. BGen. McAbee has framed the issue perfectly.
1. We now read of the Corps “divestment” of it’s HIMARS (the the general may be correct in saying they’re not), but for argument’s sake, say they are. They say they need GMLRS. Why? To launch a short range already obsolete rocket/missile? First, the ordnance itself is obsolete due to its short range and subsonic speed. Second, embarked footprint has always been a limiting planning factor. To go from a wheeled launcher to a tracked vehicle increases the footprint thereby constraining the load out. Third, the embarked footprint of the ordnance itself is greater than that of tubed artillery rounds/powder. Fourth, as Gen. McAbee stated, expensive missiles/low numbers make for engagement of high priority targets a must. If the Corps needs a rocket/ missile launcher, and they do, I can’t see where the HIMAR can’t continue in service.
2. I’ve never been in combat, but during my training at Ft. Sill, as part of our training we had to call in a 105 mm danger close mission in front of our position (we were in concrete bunkers). I remember that class vividly. The power, sound, and ground shaking impressed the h**l out of me. That was the moment when I realized that Marine Redlegs had a mission supporting the infantry that was vitally important and worthy of pursuing a career in that combat arm. I believe that to this day.
3. How does the Corps’ leadership rationalize the abandonment of the infantry? Without sufficient tubed artillery, a MINIMUM of one battalion to every committed regiment, the Corps is saying your mission is to “die in place”. How do they advance, hold a defensive position, or disengage without sufficient indirect fire support? As was said previously rocket/missile fires are “one and done”. How do you fire rockets/missiles in close to the FEBA? Where will specialized rounds come from? With the scarce density of tubed artillery, how will they displace to continue their support of the commander’s battle plan?
I could continue but I’m sure the readers get my point. The plan of “divest to invest” is wrong and disastrous to the Corps. My guess is Gen. Berger knew he couldn’t make a convincing argument before Congress for more dollars to fund an increase to field rocket/missile units so he decided on the “divest to invest” lunacy.
Sensing, reliance on drones, because drones are the weapon of the day!!!~. Enter EPIRUS, a company from which the army just bought $$$$anti drone material. Smart and precision guided munitions (for the near term)may be preempted by this,knew-it-was-coming, advancement.
CSMO, Redlegs, we’re still in the fight. Dumb munitions may yet rule the battlefield! Once fired they travel as expected, impervious to counter measures.
"Designed to replace the aging Landing Craft Mechanized-8 (LCM-8), the MSV-L is envisioned to operate at greater speeds and carry heavier payloads of M1 Abrams, Stryker and Bradley fighting vehicles in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as food and medical supplies. "
The Army, not having to compete with Navy's "sacred cows" is building EXACTLY what the Corps has been dreaming of. Don't think the Army has plans to do bigger and better of the Corps FD2030 plans?
Stupidity might not fit, I prefer Infinite hubris that culminated in institutional suicide. A gross case of Dereliction of Duty, compounded by deception, and intentional violation of 2 US Codes! These acts were criminal and should be treated as such!
Allow me to make one editorial comment upfront. I believe the Military.com article is wrong about the Marine Corps intending to divest HIMARS. From everything I’ve seen, the Marine Corps intends to keep 7 HIMARS batteries - - 4 on the West Coast and 3 on the East Coast.
The gutting of Marine Corps cannon artillery in the active force (from 21 batteries to 7 batteries) was done to help offset the cost of 14 Naval Strike Missile Batteries and 3 TLAM batteries. The misguided decision to jettison 67% of the artillery is stunning. It is arguably the biggest mistake in the history of the Marine Corps. It is compounded by the total divestments of tanks and bridging and significant reductions in assault breaching and aviation. Marine infantry can neither accomplish its mission nor survive without close, continuous, accurate, and all-weather cannon artillery support. Don’t take my word for it. Take the word of Major General James Livingston and Colonel Jay Vargas. They survived the battle of Dai Do. They know. Please take time to read the hyperlinked article: The Battle of Dai Do and Marine Corps Force Design 2030 by Major General James Livingston, USMC (Ret) and Colonel Jay Vargas, USMC (Ret).
The Marines have learned the hard way on countless battlefields that the minimum direct support artillery needed to fight, win, and survive is 1 battalion for every committed infantry regiment. For better information read the hyperlinked article: The Dangers of Overselling Insufficient Fire Support in the Active Force by Brigadier General Jerry McAbee, USMC (Ret), Colonel Stephen Baird, USMC (Ret), and Colonel Michael Marletto, USMC (Ret).
Today the Marine Corps has 7 active-duty cannon artillery batteries to support 3 Marine Divisions, barely 2 batteries per division. Do the math. Enough said.
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza are proof positive that cannon artillery is as relevant today as ever. Someone inside the Marine Corps needs to tell the emperor that he has no clothes on before it’s too late.
Truer words have not been written! We must scream these facts to elected officials who can make a difference! Thank you Sir!
The Problem of Mass
The four potential adversaries of the United States are: People's Republic of China, Russia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic Republic of North Korea.
All four are talking and acting in aggressive manner.
All four have and are engaged in supporting one another. Potential for global war.
All four are nations and militaries that invest in and rely on the principle of mass.
Russia's Military: According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Russia plans to expand its active personnel force to 1.5 million by 2026, which will make it the third largest in the world, after China and India." Plus 2 million reservists.
PRC Military: The PLA is the world's largest military force (not including paramilitary or reserve forces) and has the second largest defense budget in the world. Over 2 million active and over 500,000 reserves.
Iran's Military: Over 587,000 actives and 200,000 reserves.
North Korea's Military: As of 2021 it is the second largest military organization in the world, with 29.9% of the North Korean population actively serving, in reserve or in a paramilitary capacity: 1.3 Million actives and over 560,000 reserves.
The United States and its regional allies will have a difficult time stopping aggressive acts by only one of them. Coordinated action by two or more makes it exponentially more difficult.
Conducting a credible counter-offensive to end war and re-establish some degree of global deterrence is nearly impossible, especially after the previous Commandant's destructive "divest to invest" which, always a bad idea, was implemented at a most volatile and unstable time. The inept withdrawal from Afghanistan coupled with perceptions of declining national/international leadership and national will have significantly lowered the deterrent threshold.
Our adversaries can count. No amount of clever rhetoric is going to change the arithmetic.
Expensive (and frequently sensitive) precision will not offset MASS, especially resilient, all-weather mass.
Our Nation's fine young Americans may soon be thrust into combat without adequate combat and combat service support. They and their company grade and junior field grade leaders will pay the price.
Rhetoric continues to risk wars we don't want and may not be able to win. Force providers need to use every neuron, every dollar, every minute to build credible counter-offensive capabilities. Speaking bluntly: "Stop talking (cheerleading) and start building."
Significant and immediate investments in artillery are essential if the few infantry we have are to survive their first engagements.
Pasting a portion of 9 May CP that emphasizes the narrow, small aperture thinking that resulted in FD 2030, now FD.
Narratives are usually very narrow, and, as such, are dangerous, misleading representations of reality. They tend to focus on just one (frequently superficial) aspect of a problem. They tend to take a small aperture view of the problem and proposed solution set: Small apertures not just with respect to space but perhaps even more importantly to time.
Small aperture examples, both USMC and National, abound. Consider PRC:
Small/narrow: China-Taiwan-First Island Chain versus Global PRC influence structures. Weiqi article: See https://nationalinterest.org/feature/getting-strategy-and-force-design-wrong-failing-appreciate-weiqi-model-206209.
Small/narrow: One PRC weapon set (surface ships) of the great many (type and number) PRC has developed and fielded.
Small/narrow: PRC-Taiwan regional conflict versus global war.
Amen!
Getting rid of close air support and cannon artillery is the stupidest thing I've seen in the 58 years I've been a Marine. If Marines are required ever again to make a frontal attack against fortified positions, what will be used to suppress enemy fire????? The general officers who allowed and directed this to happen obviously lack combat experience. You, gentlemen, are stupid.
Cpl USMC BLT 2/4 '67-68 Battle of Dai Do, RVN
As the Soviets got to within artillery range of Berlin they fired more tonnage in artillery than the total dropped on Berlin by the USAAF and the RAF. As numerous individuals above have stated, mass matters. The very notion that you do not need tube artillery is so alien to me it is incomprehensible. I believe I once read that no Marine Infantry company with a battery firing in direct support had ever been over run. I cannot verify that but it stuck. I always believed that you maneuver under the artillery umbrella or you operate at greater risk. The Marine Division did not need less artillery, it needed more.
In Korea the thing that broke the Chinese and N Koreans time and again was massed artillery fire.
The other points about FD-2030 stated above are 100% correct. I remain in total disbelief how Gen Berger drew his conclusions and how Gen Smith was his Palladin in the dismemberment of the MAGTF, the abandonment of its mission and complete lack of a functional alternative. Modernization is always at work. In this case it was divestment and irrelevance. No two individuals in the history of our Corps have ever been so wrong, uninformed and arrogant. It is hubris and perhaps mental illness. It is certainly a gross misunderstanding of history.
The Wolf with years of actual wartime experience, not Quantico wargame experience, knows that Marine infantrymen without cannon artillery support are far more likely to die!
To be of value to this Nation, the Marine Corps needs to be focused on one mission: a combined arms naval expeditionary force. It cannot be both a missile force and an expeditionary force. One or the other. To be a combined arms expeditionary force, it needs to have a strong artillery force. Artillery is rain or shine, 24/7 firepower support. Let the Army and the nations within the WEZ develop narrow focused missile forces. We need a general purpose expeditionary force with strong artillery which can respond to anything.
An interesting part of the discussion that has developed over time which lends total support to the MAGTF concept, is that divesting to invest as big a problem as it has created, has also lead to some granular review of what is needed to set T/O and T/E right to repair the damage done. As reviewed by General McAbee who KNOWS what we need for artillery, there is a body of knowledge here and on active duty that KNOW what else is needed now. We are accused of fighting the last war here by the proponents of FD whatever the Hell that means now. But the last war is the now war in Ukraine and Gaza. The next big question seems to be how do we get what is needed. If the total defense budget is &880 billion, and the gets $68 billion? (Round figures) then something is really wrong. We divested and got nothing in return, and now need to reinvest to get back to where we where. Someone needs to explain it, it gives one a major ice cream headache. cfrog nailed it, but there needs to be way forward, even the best bad idea seems something to put on the table. What is clear is the MAGTF works at all three levels it just needs to be wholly supported.
This reminds me of when guns were not put on new fighter Jets in Vietnam, because they would not be close enough to use them anymore the missile's and radar would be enough.
Seems the Corps is de-emphasizing fires: "The regiment’s sensing capability is as important or more important than its missiles, said Col. John Lehane, 3rd Marine littoral regiment commander. Marine senior leaders have emphasized reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance capabilities as a key Corps contribution.
“We’re giving to the (combatant) commander a low signature team with the ability to stand inside a weapons engagement zone and provide them information in a manner that is not risking an (Airborne Warning and Control System), a $1.6 billion destroyer or take your pick of high value asset that might be at risk when we can take that risk for you,” Lehane said." https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2024/05/13/in-chinas-backyard-the-new-marine-regiments-changing-the-fight/
I apologize that the hyperlinks dropped off. Both articles were published in the Marine Corps Gazette and can be easily called up on Google search
Kind of hard to bring back something that was sent to Ukraine and have had the barrels shot out. The US gave Jordan 24 AH-1Z helicopters. Since the Marine Corps is the only service flying those, and it happened right about the time the Corps divested 2 squadrons of them....don't think they are coming back either.
Oh, I'm sure between Sierra Army Depot and Davis-Monthan, we'll just dig up and restomod old ground systems and old frames as needed. Nothing says 'Divest to Invest' like spending 3x the cost to regain 2/3 of the capability. No problem, barely an inconvenience. At least the maintenance nightmare will help the maintainers get up to speed a little quicker. (cue eye roll)
Where do I start. BGen. McAbee has framed the issue perfectly.
1. We now read of the Corps “divestment” of it’s HIMARS (the the general may be correct in saying they’re not), but for argument’s sake, say they are. They say they need GMLRS. Why? To launch a short range already obsolete rocket/missile? First, the ordnance itself is obsolete due to its short range and subsonic speed. Second, embarked footprint has always been a limiting planning factor. To go from a wheeled launcher to a tracked vehicle increases the footprint thereby constraining the load out. Third, the embarked footprint of the ordnance itself is greater than that of tubed artillery rounds/powder. Fourth, as Gen. McAbee stated, expensive missiles/low numbers make for engagement of high priority targets a must. If the Corps needs a rocket/ missile launcher, and they do, I can’t see where the HIMAR can’t continue in service.
2. I’ve never been in combat, but during my training at Ft. Sill, as part of our training we had to call in a 105 mm danger close mission in front of our position (we were in concrete bunkers). I remember that class vividly. The power, sound, and ground shaking impressed the h**l out of me. That was the moment when I realized that Marine Redlegs had a mission supporting the infantry that was vitally important and worthy of pursuing a career in that combat arm. I believe that to this day.
3. How does the Corps’ leadership rationalize the abandonment of the infantry? Without sufficient tubed artillery, a MINIMUM of one battalion to every committed regiment, the Corps is saying your mission is to “die in place”. How do they advance, hold a defensive position, or disengage without sufficient indirect fire support? As was said previously rocket/missile fires are “one and done”. How do you fire rockets/missiles in close to the FEBA? Where will specialized rounds come from? With the scarce density of tubed artillery, how will they displace to continue their support of the commander’s battle plan?
I could continue but I’m sure the readers get my point. The plan of “divest to invest” is wrong and disastrous to the Corps. My guess is Gen. Berger knew he couldn’t make a convincing argument before Congress for more dollars to fund an increase to field rocket/missile units so he decided on the “divest to invest” lunacy.
Sensing, reliance on drones, because drones are the weapon of the day!!!~. Enter EPIRUS, a company from which the army just bought $$$$anti drone material. Smart and precision guided munitions (for the near term)may be preempted by this,knew-it-was-coming, advancement.
CSMO, Redlegs, we’re still in the fight. Dumb munitions may yet rule the battlefield! Once fired they travel as expected, impervious to counter measures.
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/aloha-fixes-ongoing-then-armys-new-watercraft-prototype-will-be-hawaii-bound-for-testing/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
"Designed to replace the aging Landing Craft Mechanized-8 (LCM-8), the MSV-L is envisioned to operate at greater speeds and carry heavier payloads of M1 Abrams, Stryker and Bradley fighting vehicles in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as food and medical supplies. "
The Army, not having to compete with Navy's "sacred cows" is building EXACTLY what the Corps has been dreaming of. Don't think the Army has plans to do bigger and better of the Corps FD2030 plans?
Stupidity might not fit, I prefer Infinite hubris that culminated in institutional suicide. A gross case of Dereliction of Duty, compounded by deception, and intentional violation of 2 US Codes! These acts were criminal and should be treated as such!