I remember “In Chop, out chop” briefings in Rota as one MAU was coming into the Med as the other was leaving. Back in the early 80’s our country could always count on the Marines to be available for contingencies in the Med 365 days a year. The world has changed since then but different dangers still lurk.
The Marine Corps' MAGTF MEU is a force for any clime and place. Unlike Army forces which are often stationed in the area where they will fight, Marine MEU's can be deployed anywhere worldwide. Right now, a MEU is needed in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and in the Western Pacific. However, Commandant Berger's decision to lower the required number of L Class ships has limited the availability of Amphibious Ready Groups to patrol the seas, thus putting this Nation at risk.
The MEU can be tailored for specific contingencies based upon the expected conflict. Instead of tanks they can carry naval strike missile sections. Instead of Stand In Forces, the expeditionary strike missiles sections can be deployed on ampibs and landed where and when needed. If a Marine battalion is tasked to undertake beach assaults, heliborne assaults, mech operations, then why can't the same battalion also be trained to conduct a naval strike mission?? In my opinion, this renders the Littoral Combat unit meaningless.
The MEU is the Marine Corps bread and butter force. Without the MEUs sailing the seas, the United States has no ready deployable crisis expeditionary force.
I lost friends in the 1983 Beirut Terror Attack …I am certain many others of MCCP also had losses. History repeats itself, in this case because the CJCS and CentCom are once again under the thumb of fools. US leaders promise security for Gaza dock mission amid threat concerns
By Leo Shane III and Noah Robertson
Mar 28 at 03:29 PM
A Palestinian man walks amind the remains of a house destroyed in an Israeli strike in Rafah, Gaza, on March 26. (Fatima Shbair/AP)
Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. CQ Brown said he is confident that U.S. troops working to provide humanitarian aid to residents of Gaza will be protected from violence in the region. Brown’s comments come amid concerns from Senate Republicans that the mission could cost American military lives.
“Force protection is at the top of our list any time we put our forces in harm’s way,” Brown told reporters during a press event on Thursday. “There will be our own capabilities to protect our forces, the Israelis have also committed to help protect our forces in the area, and have other nations that are also part of this as well.
“So, as that capability is starting to move … that has given us time to work with allies and partners to start looking at not only the force protection piece but all the other parts that have to come together.”
Even if it were feasible to use a couple of mothballed LPHs......would the Navy even have the manpower to crew these ships in a stop gap measure until newer amphibious entered the fleet?
Battle of Midway: Repairing the Yorktown After the Battle of the Coral Sea
Yard workers and sailors worked flat out over three days to get the carrier Yorktown patched up and ready for the decisive Midway battle
BY DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMAN - MAY 26, 2012
USS Yorktown
The USS Yorktown drydocked at Pearl Harbor after the Battle of Coral Sea. Shipyard workers had just three days to patch up Yorktown and return her to the fleet in order for her to participate in the Battle of Midway. U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command photo
The Battle of the Coral Sea had barely concluded when Task Force 17 under the command of Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor as fast as the crippled Yorktown’s condition would allow. Despite hull damage that caused her to trail an oil slick ten miles long, the carrier was able to reach a sustained speed of twenty knots. The voyage to the naval base would take eighteen days. During that time, the Yorktown’s damage control teams succeeded in patching so cleanly the bomb hole in her flight deck that it would appear never to have been damaged. Meanwhile, her skipper, Capt. Elliott Buckmaster, prepared an action report for Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz that included a detailed list of the carrier’s damage. It would be a preliminary estimate of what would repairing the Yorktown would require.
I remember “In Chop, out chop” briefings in Rota as one MAU was coming into the Med as the other was leaving. Back in the early 80’s our country could always count on the Marines to be available for contingencies in the Med 365 days a year. The world has changed since then but different dangers still lurk.
We've needed additional amphibs for at least 15 years. We don't have them. Build the ships.
Repair the Amphibs we have lingering in Port!
The Marine Corps' MAGTF MEU is a force for any clime and place. Unlike Army forces which are often stationed in the area where they will fight, Marine MEU's can be deployed anywhere worldwide. Right now, a MEU is needed in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and in the Western Pacific. However, Commandant Berger's decision to lower the required number of L Class ships has limited the availability of Amphibious Ready Groups to patrol the seas, thus putting this Nation at risk.
The MEU can be tailored for specific contingencies based upon the expected conflict. Instead of tanks they can carry naval strike missile sections. Instead of Stand In Forces, the expeditionary strike missiles sections can be deployed on ampibs and landed where and when needed. If a Marine battalion is tasked to undertake beach assaults, heliborne assaults, mech operations, then why can't the same battalion also be trained to conduct a naval strike mission?? In my opinion, this renders the Littoral Combat unit meaningless.
The MEU is the Marine Corps bread and butter force. Without the MEUs sailing the seas, the United States has no ready deployable crisis expeditionary force.
The Corps slips further and further into irrelevance. If there is a need and you can’t be there, what exactly is your purpose?
Perfectly stated by retired Marine Colonel Gary Anderson. Col Anderson’s article is very apropos to today’s COMPASS POINTS -CALLING ALL MEUS!
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/25/beat-yemen-houthis/
I lost friends in the 1983 Beirut Terror Attack …I am certain many others of MCCP also had losses. History repeats itself, in this case because the CJCS and CentCom are once again under the thumb of fools. US leaders promise security for Gaza dock mission amid threat concerns
By Leo Shane III and Noah Robertson
Mar 28 at 03:29 PM
A Palestinian man walks amind the remains of a house destroyed in an Israeli strike in Rafah, Gaza, on March 26. (Fatima Shbair/AP)
Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. CQ Brown said he is confident that U.S. troops working to provide humanitarian aid to residents of Gaza will be protected from violence in the region. Brown’s comments come amid concerns from Senate Republicans that the mission could cost American military lives.
“Force protection is at the top of our list any time we put our forces in harm’s way,” Brown told reporters during a press event on Thursday. “There will be our own capabilities to protect our forces, the Israelis have also committed to help protect our forces in the area, and have other nations that are also part of this as well.
“So, as that capability is starting to move … that has given us time to work with allies and partners to start looking at not only the force protection piece but all the other parts that have to come together.”
Even if it were feasible to use a couple of mothballed LPHs......would the Navy even have the manpower to crew these ships in a stop gap measure until newer amphibious entered the fleet?
Battle of Midway: Repairing the Yorktown After the Battle of the Coral Sea
Yard workers and sailors worked flat out over three days to get the carrier Yorktown patched up and ready for the decisive Midway battle
BY DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMAN - MAY 26, 2012
USS Yorktown
The USS Yorktown drydocked at Pearl Harbor after the Battle of Coral Sea. Shipyard workers had just three days to patch up Yorktown and return her to the fleet in order for her to participate in the Battle of Midway. U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command photo
The Battle of the Coral Sea had barely concluded when Task Force 17 under the command of Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor as fast as the crippled Yorktown’s condition would allow. Despite hull damage that caused her to trail an oil slick ten miles long, the carrier was able to reach a sustained speed of twenty knots. The voyage to the naval base would take eighteen days. During that time, the Yorktown’s damage control teams succeeded in patching so cleanly the bomb hole in her flight deck that it would appear never to have been damaged. Meanwhile, her skipper, Capt. Elliott Buckmaster, prepared an action report for Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz that included a detailed list of the carrier’s damage. It would be a preliminary estimate of what would repairing the Yorktown would require.