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Joel T Bowling's avatar

FD2030 has rendered the Corps impotent to even deter the CHICOMs due to its devastating effect on our MAGTF capabilities... heck, the Corps can't even man its proposed FD2030 ship-killing missile batteries on the island chains to deter CHICOM naval ops... nor do we have the shipping to even make it into a fight!

VISION2035 is a MUST to reverse and restore our Corps' MAGTF lethality and capabilities to respond to ANY crisis in "every clime and place"!

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polarbear's avatar

If the US strategist (both political and military) take a minute to look at what the CCP has achieved in the “Horn of Africa”, we can see the five “means” the CCP is using to achieve the strategic goals of their “Belt Road Initiative”(BRI). I also feel that the BRI exposes the CCP’s Naval Strategy to establish global sea control.

A quick search on the CCP’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa exposes their focus on five strategic means:

Economic Investments: CCP has invested heavily in infrastructure projects across the region, including ports, railways, and roads. These investments are part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to enhance global trade routes and increase China's influence in international maritime logistics.

Military Presence: CCP established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. This base enhances China's ability to project power and protect its interests in the region.

Diplomatic Engagement: CCP has been actively engaging with countries in the Horn of Africa through diplomatic channels. For example, China's special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, has been involved in mediating regional crises and supporting Somalia's sovereignty.

Development Aid: CCP provides development aid and financial assistance to countries in the region, which helps to strengthen its political and economic ties with these nations.

Strategic Partnerships: CCP has established strategic partnerships with several countries in the Horn of Africa, including. These partnerships involve cooperation in various sectors, including trade, infrastructure development, and security.

Now let’s assume that the Horn of Africa is the CCP’s best example for gaining global influence over their strategic SLOC. If we then look at where the CCP is applying one or more of these means it makes for a very impressive list.

1. Sri Lanka: Hambantota Port

2. Pakistan: Gwadar Port

3. Greece: Port of Piraeus

4. Djibouti: Port of Doraleh

5. Myanmar: Kyaukpyu Port

6. Malaysia: Kuantan Port

7. Egypt: Port Said

8. United Arab Emirates: Khalifa Port

9. Spain: Port of Valencia

10. Italy: Port of Vado Ligure

11. Cambodia: CCP has close political and military ties

12. Equatorial Guinea: CCP is reportedly considering establishing a military base

13. Seychelles: CCP has shown interest in establishing military facilities

14. Tajikistan: CCP has increased its military presence and influence

15. Solomon Islands: In addition to Infrastructure Investments, and Economic Aid; the Solomon Islands switched diplomatic their recognition from Taiwan to China

16. Central and South America: The CCP is exercising all five of these five of the strategic “means” tools and (a new one) “Space Collaboration”. (China has established partnerships in the space sector, including building space infrastructure and collaborating on satellite projects. For example, China has been involved in building a new astronomical observatory in Chile.)

Now let’s assume that the Horn of Africa is the CCP’s model for gaining global influence over their strategic SLOC. Remember the CCP’s needs their strategic SLOC in order to ensure their people are fed and working. What we are currently seeing in the Red Sea (as a “Hot Spot”) is the effectiveness of this strategy. Iran and Yemen are surrogates and cooperating with the CCP and they have effectively closed the Red Sea SLOC except for oil tankers bound for China ports sailing the Bab al Mardab Strait and Strait of Hurmuz.

The above list represents the CCPs growing influence in the Great Power Competition with the US. In addition, this list also touches and is part of each and every US Combatant Command AORs. For this reason Military and Naval Strategy is also in play. If the Great Power Competition deterrence fails and several Red Sea scenarios are kicked off at critical SLOC choke points it seems the opposing competitor will be holding all the cards at the negotiation table. I have long said that each and every Combatant Commander needs a US Marine 911 floating MAGTF.

Instead of trading combat power to experimentation, the US Marine Commandant should have been standing on SECNAVs chest yelling that the global Great Power Competition dictates a new global military strategy. The SECNAV’s inability to build and maintain amphibious ships has denied the Combatant Commander not only an important deterrence tool but also an effective, adaptive and flexible combat force. S/F

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