Compass Points – China Power
Send in the Marine MAGTFs!
December 19, 2024
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Congress requires an annual report on China’s military power. On December 18, 2024, the Department of Defense released its latest report on China. The threat from China is still growing.
Below are some of the key takeaways from the China Military Power Report.
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KEY TAKEAWAYS
► Expanding PRC National Power to Confront a Strategic Environment that Beijing Views as Increasingly Turbulent. The PRC aims to accrue national power through political, social, economic, technological, and military development to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. With this power, the PRC seeks to revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests.
► Increasing PRC Military Coercion. Since late 2023, the PLA reduced the number of coercive and risky air intercepts of U.S. platforms compared to the previous two years, though it continues to conduct unsafe maneuvers in the vicinity of allied forces operating in the region.
► Developments in PRC Defense Industry. The PRC has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal and has advanced its development of both conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies over the past 20 years. Similarly, the PRC is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, weapons, and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.
► Intensifying Pressure Against Taiwan. In 2023, the PRC increased diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout the year, the PRC continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centerline and Air Defense Identification Zone, and conducting highly publicized major military exercises near Taiwan.
► Deepening PRC-Russia Ties. In 2023, the PRC maintained robust support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. It promoted Russian narratives blaming the United States and NATO for the war, buoyed Russia’s economy against international sanctions, and sold Russia dual use inputs that Russia’s military industries rely on. The PRC almost certainly is applying lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine toward its own strategic objectives and coercive activities.
► Continuing PRC Resistance to Military-to-Military Communications with the United States. In 2023, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication.
then, in November 2023, President Biden and PRC leader President Xi Jinping agreed that the United States and the PRC would resume military-to-military communication at all levels. DoD is committed to maintaining.
open lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict.
-- 2024 CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT
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When the report discusses PLA strategy and capabilities, it opens the door wide to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
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PLA STRATEGY IN CONTEXT
► One key part of this defense policy is the PRC’s approach to counter-intervention, which aims to restrict lawful U.S. presence in the East and South China Sea regions and limit U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the PRC is strengthening its reach farther into the Pacific Ocean and beyond.
PLA CAPABILITIES
► The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or if ordered defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region.
-- 2024 CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT
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China is not only a power in the Pacific, it is a growing global power. But in the Pacific China is a constant bully.
For example, nearly every week off the coast of the Philippines some arm or proxy of the PLA Navy is confronting Philippine civilians and military. The US needs to stand firm against China throughout the Pacific. Deterrence requires being present day after day after day.
For decades when the Soviet Union was the major threat to the United States, there was great danger that Soviet tank divisions would roll through the Fulda Gap in a bid to quickly conquer all of Europe. The US Army stationed its own tanks on the western side of the Fulda Gap. The Soviet tank attack never came. Deterrence resulted from the daily presence and daily power of US tank units.
Today, the US needs to deter China in the Pacific. If China was being sufficiently deterred today, it would be staging fewer confrontations in the South China Sea. Instead, the China threat continues to grow.
The US needs Marines onboard Navy ships patrolling the waterways of the Pacific. From port to port, from exercise to exercise, the constant power and presence of Marine MAGTFs. and Special Purpose MAGTFs are a flexible deterrent force to China throughout the Pacific.
It is not enough to threaten China with missiles and drones. What is needed is US forces patrolling the Pacific reassuring our allies and deterring China one day at a time.
As the report on China makes clear, China “aims to restrict lawful U.S. presence in the East and South China Sea regions.” Every MAGTF on patrol in the Pacific, every port call, every exercise, pushes back against China. Without starting World War III, Marines in the Pacific can be a constant deterrent force.
If China was being deterred, the risk of war would be going down. But China is not being sufficiently deterred. Lack of deterrence means the danger of war continues.
As serious as the threat from China is, the US has other serious challenges around the globe and always will. Neither the US nor the Marine Corps can afford to be myopically focused only on the Pacific. When US policy makers are suddenly faced with a crisis or a number of crises around the world, what military tool can they reach for? The answer is America’s 9-1-1 force, the global, combined arms Marine MAGTF. MAGTFs are not limited to the Pacific. The flexible, combined arms Marine MAGTF is a global force. When Marines are onboard Navy ships patrolling not just the Pacific, but all the oceans of the world, allies are reassured, alliances are strengthened, and enemies are deterred.
It is time to once again to have Marine MAGTFs in the Western Pacific and around the world 24/7/365!
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U.S. Department of Defense
FACT SHEET
2024 CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT
https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615417/-1/-1/0/2024-CMPR-FACT-SHEET.PDF
FD2030 has rendered the Corps impotent to even deter the CHICOMs due to its devastating effect on our MAGTF capabilities... heck, the Corps can't even man its proposed FD2030 ship-killing missile batteries on the island chains to deter CHICOM naval ops... nor do we have the shipping to even make it into a fight!
VISION2035 is a MUST to reverse and restore our Corps' MAGTF lethality and capabilities to respond to ANY crisis in "every clime and place"!
If the US strategist (both political and military) take a minute to look at what the CCP has achieved in the “Horn of Africa”, we can see the five “means” the CCP is using to achieve the strategic goals of their “Belt Road Initiative”(BRI). I also feel that the BRI exposes the CCP’s Naval Strategy to establish global sea control.
A quick search on the CCP’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa exposes their focus on five strategic means:
Economic Investments: CCP has invested heavily in infrastructure projects across the region, including ports, railways, and roads. These investments are part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to enhance global trade routes and increase China's influence in international maritime logistics.
Military Presence: CCP established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. This base enhances China's ability to project power and protect its interests in the region.
Diplomatic Engagement: CCP has been actively engaging with countries in the Horn of Africa through diplomatic channels. For example, China's special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, has been involved in mediating regional crises and supporting Somalia's sovereignty.
Development Aid: CCP provides development aid and financial assistance to countries in the region, which helps to strengthen its political and economic ties with these nations.
Strategic Partnerships: CCP has established strategic partnerships with several countries in the Horn of Africa, including. These partnerships involve cooperation in various sectors, including trade, infrastructure development, and security.
Now let’s assume that the Horn of Africa is the CCP’s best example for gaining global influence over their strategic SLOC. If we then look at where the CCP is applying one or more of these means it makes for a very impressive list.
1. Sri Lanka: Hambantota Port
2. Pakistan: Gwadar Port
3. Greece: Port of Piraeus
4. Djibouti: Port of Doraleh
5. Myanmar: Kyaukpyu Port
6. Malaysia: Kuantan Port
7. Egypt: Port Said
8. United Arab Emirates: Khalifa Port
9. Spain: Port of Valencia
10. Italy: Port of Vado Ligure
11. Cambodia: CCP has close political and military ties
12. Equatorial Guinea: CCP is reportedly considering establishing a military base
13. Seychelles: CCP has shown interest in establishing military facilities
14. Tajikistan: CCP has increased its military presence and influence
15. Solomon Islands: In addition to Infrastructure Investments, and Economic Aid; the Solomon Islands switched diplomatic their recognition from Taiwan to China
16. Central and South America: The CCP is exercising all five of these five of the strategic “means” tools and (a new one) “Space Collaboration”. (China has established partnerships in the space sector, including building space infrastructure and collaborating on satellite projects. For example, China has been involved in building a new astronomical observatory in Chile.)
Now let’s assume that the Horn of Africa is the CCP’s model for gaining global influence over their strategic SLOC. Remember the CCP’s needs their strategic SLOC in order to ensure their people are fed and working. What we are currently seeing in the Red Sea (as a “Hot Spot”) is the effectiveness of this strategy. Iran and Yemen are surrogates and cooperating with the CCP and they have effectively closed the Red Sea SLOC except for oil tankers bound for China ports sailing the Bab al Mardab Strait and Strait of Hurmuz.
The above list represents the CCPs growing influence in the Great Power Competition with the US. In addition, this list also touches and is part of each and every US Combatant Command AORs. For this reason Military and Naval Strategy is also in play. If the Great Power Competition deterrence fails and several Red Sea scenarios are kicked off at critical SLOC choke points it seems the opposing competitor will be holding all the cards at the negotiation table. I have long said that each and every Combatant Commander needs a US Marine 911 floating MAGTF.
Instead of trading combat power to experimentation, the US Marine Commandant should have been standing on SECNAVs chest yelling that the global Great Power Competition dictates a new global military strategy. The SECNAV’s inability to build and maintain amphibious ships has denied the Combatant Commander not only an important deterrence tool but also an effective, adaptive and flexible combat force. S/F