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Joel T Bowling's avatar

FD2030 has rendered the Corps impotent to even deter the CHICOMs due to its devastating effect on our MAGTF capabilities... heck, the Corps can't even man its proposed FD2030 ship-killing missile batteries on the island chains to deter CHICOM naval ops... nor do we have the shipping to even make it into a fight!

VISION2035 is a MUST to reverse and restore our Corps' MAGTF lethality and capabilities to respond to ANY crisis in "every clime and place"!

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polarbear's avatar

If the US strategist (both political and military) take a minute to look at what the CCP has achieved in the “Horn of Africa”, we can see the five “means” the CCP is using to achieve the strategic goals of their “Belt Road Initiative”(BRI). I also feel that the BRI exposes the CCP’s Naval Strategy to establish global sea control.

A quick search on the CCP’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa exposes their focus on five strategic means:

Economic Investments: CCP has invested heavily in infrastructure projects across the region, including ports, railways, and roads. These investments are part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to enhance global trade routes and increase China's influence in international maritime logistics.

Military Presence: CCP established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. This base enhances China's ability to project power and protect its interests in the region.

Diplomatic Engagement: CCP has been actively engaging with countries in the Horn of Africa through diplomatic channels. For example, China's special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, has been involved in mediating regional crises and supporting Somalia's sovereignty.

Development Aid: CCP provides development aid and financial assistance to countries in the region, which helps to strengthen its political and economic ties with these nations.

Strategic Partnerships: CCP has established strategic partnerships with several countries in the Horn of Africa, including. These partnerships involve cooperation in various sectors, including trade, infrastructure development, and security.

Now let’s assume that the Horn of Africa is the CCP’s best example for gaining global influence over their strategic SLOC. If we then look at where the CCP is applying one or more of these means it makes for a very impressive list.

1. Sri Lanka: Hambantota Port

2. Pakistan: Gwadar Port

3. Greece: Port of Piraeus

4. Djibouti: Port of Doraleh

5. Myanmar: Kyaukpyu Port

6. Malaysia: Kuantan Port

7. Egypt: Port Said

8. United Arab Emirates: Khalifa Port

9. Spain: Port of Valencia

10. Italy: Port of Vado Ligure

11. Cambodia: CCP has close political and military ties

12. Equatorial Guinea: CCP is reportedly considering establishing a military base

13. Seychelles: CCP has shown interest in establishing military facilities

14. Tajikistan: CCP has increased its military presence and influence

15. Solomon Islands: In addition to Infrastructure Investments, and Economic Aid; the Solomon Islands switched diplomatic their recognition from Taiwan to China

16. Central and South America: The CCP is exercising all five of these five of the strategic “means” tools and (a new one) “Space Collaboration”. (China has established partnerships in the space sector, including building space infrastructure and collaborating on satellite projects. For example, China has been involved in building a new astronomical observatory in Chile.)

Now let’s assume that the Horn of Africa is the CCP’s model for gaining global influence over their strategic SLOC. Remember the CCP’s needs their strategic SLOC in order to ensure their people are fed and working. What we are currently seeing in the Red Sea (as a “Hot Spot”) is the effectiveness of this strategy. Iran and Yemen are surrogates and cooperating with the CCP and they have effectively closed the Red Sea SLOC except for oil tankers bound for China ports sailing the Bab al Mardab Strait and Strait of Hurmuz.

The above list represents the CCPs growing influence in the Great Power Competition with the US. In addition, this list also touches and is part of each and every US Combatant Command AORs. For this reason Military and Naval Strategy is also in play. If the Great Power Competition deterrence fails and several Red Sea scenarios are kicked off at critical SLOC choke points it seems the opposing competitor will be holding all the cards at the negotiation table. I have long said that each and every Combatant Commander needs a US Marine 911 floating MAGTF.

Instead of trading combat power to experimentation, the US Marine Commandant should have been standing on SECNAVs chest yelling that the global Great Power Competition dictates a new global military strategy. The SECNAV’s inability to build and maintain amphibious ships has denied the Combatant Commander not only an important deterrence tool but also an effective, adaptive and flexible combat force. S/F

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Anaphoric's avatar

Comical. the USMC has been neutered. They are nothing but weak light infantry with zero armor, artillery, aviation and combat engineers. Roll up the colors and give the money back to the navy because they are nothing but a drain on national resources as this point.

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Randy Shetter's avatar

The elimination of the traditional pre-FD MAGTF, and the inability to maintain ARGs is similar to abandoning the world's oceans to the Chinese. FD, is nothing more than a defensive strategy.

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Dec 19
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Raymond Lee Maloy's avatar

Agreed…It’s obvious that those years spent in the sand has resulted in a loss of operational capability. We went through a somewhat similar transition in 1959 when we also thought that we were on top of things.

In May 1959 after tours at Camp White Beach, Okinawa and Marine Barracks, NAS, Pensacola, FL, I reported to Force Troops, FMF, Camp Lejeune, NC…I was a Corporal.

Force Troops was an unusual organization which contained all of the support organizations for the 2nd Marine Division. It was commanded by a Brigadier General. After serving at a Marine Barracks where excellence was the norm, Force Troops seemed sloppy, but that didn’t last very long.

We got a new commanding General and it seemed that we were hit by an earthquake. Brigadier General Leonard F. Chapman arrived and proved to be the finest, most effective officer I have ever known. He was the model Marine - slim, fit and impeccably dressed. He became the role model for many of us and the lessons learned under his leadership and guidance carried throughout our careers. It was no surprise that he became the 24th Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1968-1972.

When he took the helm of Force Troops, the first thing he did was to conduct a personnel inspection of his General Staff in the early morning at Force Troops Headquarters. They all Failed! He expected absolute perfection in fitness, appearance, uniform fit, and placement of ribbons/badges that had to be properly sequenced with measured separations. Word of this inspection quickly spread throughout the Force…But we had no idea.

When his staff was squared away and understood what he expected, they were dispatched throughout the Command and accomplished the same with every man. Then came buildings and grounds, where even the rocks used to delineate walkways were painted white. Everything was soon immaculate and in proper working order. This condition soon became known as “Chapmanized”.

Every organization in Force Troops was inspected by the General and his detail inspectors who fanned out to inspect everything: troops, individual equipment, administration, maintenance, communications, supply and mount-out supplies. Our heavy equipment was inspected with all on-board weapons, radios, tools and equipment and were subjected to the now, usual, scrutiny and correction. He also insisted that every tent, piece of rolling stock and tracked vehicle have a camouflage net with 100% seasonal coverage. Of course, everything failed. We were given lists of failed items/areas…Why they failed and what was necessary to get it right. And get it right we did. Force Troops became a standard for the Marine Corps, but he was just getting started. Our outfit, 2nd AAV Battalion was his “whipping boy” because we had the most equipment which took the heaviest beatings and were the vanguard of all operations.

The new phase began with a call to our Battalion Duty Officer, who was directed to implement our recall procedure. “Recall procedure” - what the hell was that? We soon found out and once it was established, our Company Duty NCO received a midnight call to ordering him to recall the Company and mount-out to the grid coordinate that was provided; to tactically disperse; and disappear under camouflage. It went like clockwork, but the first thing inspected was our empty Company area. Deadlined equipment was not dealt with through the Force Service Regiment; we had failed to transfer our base equipment back to the base command, since we were just a tenant. We had also failed to transfer non-deployable personnel to Battalion…All on paper, of course, but you get the idea. Nothing could be left behind in our former areas and he expected it to be spotless.

He then flew over our positions in the field to check camouflage and ensure that tell-tale tracks were eliminated. Then he landed and checked our dispersion and defensive positions, galley, heads,etc…The Command Post layout. Then we laid out all equipment on the ramps and were subjected to, yet another, detailed inspection. All of our mount-out boxes were inspected. They were painted green with yellow tac marks and CuFt/Wt stenciled there on. An inventory list of the contents of each box was under the lid on top of the contents, in accordance with the Table of Equipment. Every item was checked against the inventory and checked for serviceability. He had us in shape and word of this evolution spread throughout the Force (and Division). We became a model, but just getting started.

Operations were next. We were ordered to another mount-out to test alternate departure locations. The Company boarded flat cars at mainside and took the train to Sunny Point Army Terminal on the coast where we off loaded and boarded LSTs which took us back to Onslow Beach where we landed and finally returned to Courthouse Bay. All of this work and effort is vital, but it just gets you to the fight.

Camp Lejeune was a busy place with continuous MEUs in the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas. Our Company spent one summer at Little Creek Amphibious Base, VA training reserves and midshipmen. We had memorable inspection for the Secretary of the Navy where every piece of equipment in Force Troops was displayed on the large Mainside parade deck. We routinely hosted Congressmen, Senators and Governors to keep them informed on Marine Corps operations and equipment.

We all learned what the Marine Corps was intended to be and, as we grew and were transferred, those valuable lessons were spread and applied throughout the Corps.

I would like to think that those standards and operational capabilities could still be accomplished. Can it??? Semper Fi

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