One need only look at the Ukrainian incursion into Russia. Not just any spot but into the Kursk region. Recall that one of the greatest armor battles among other major fights of WWII, occurred in the Kursk region. One of the proponents of maneuver warfare was German General “hurrying” Heinz Guderian, who for many reasons was opposed to the German General Staff and Hitler’s plan to attack soviet forces in the Kursk region. Volumes have been written, but all told Guderian would be proved correct on his concerns over the operation. Thus one wonders if the Ukrainians planned the attack (it might even be considered a large scale raid) knowing that it held as much or more historical and political consequence than simply running over the border in a limited advanced that likely once momentum was slowed would be difficult to exploit for further military gains.
How does this apply? Marines are capable of raids at all levels in the MEU perhaps beyond that, but it requires the maneuver mindset to pick and choose the right time and place to execute the raid. If the SIF is stranded on the grey island chains or elsewhere it seems pretty hard to imagine them conducting any high speed raids. In fact they might be more concerned that they fall victim to a raid on their positions. Raids make all
manner of mischief, however one looks at fhe success or not of the Makin Island Raid, it proves the point that sometimes there is value in a raid beyond the immediate military objectives. The MAGTF is a factory of creativity, task organized for many roles and missions. It has been said here before that when people see an ARG/MEU coming over the horizon and they are bad actors they get nervous very quickly. Full on assault? Raids? Other operations? A fully complemented MEU ought to scare the bad actors. Marines in a MLR stranded on island chains doesn’t do much to support any of the current conflicts that we see today. Lessons abound in the current conflicts yet none are germain to FD whatever, the SIF and MLR. Combined arms coupled with imaginative maneuver concepts of operations ought to be obvious to senior “Managment” but clearly more prodding in this regard is needed.
Excellent points. As had been said in the past, the MEU is like a Swiss Army Knife. It has a multitude of uses. The SIF can only sit on islands. The Littoral Combat Regiment, is only a shell of the pre FD Marine Regiment, and has very little offensive capability.
History once again serves as a reminder. Maj Gen O. P. Smith, CG 1st MarDiv, in 1950 had trouble getting the 10th Corps CG, Maj. Gen. Alford, USA, to understand that a Marine Division with supporting combined arms is a very powerful military force. Stringing the Division out along 160 miles of narrow mountain roads significantly diminished that power. Todays leaders need to understand the same lesson. Stringing infantry Marines along littoral coasts diminishes the military power expected of the Marine Corps. Marine infantry supported by Marine combined arms such as that whish the MAGTF structure provides must become the Marine Corps organizational emphasis as an urgent national security imperative.
The Corps’ frantic search for a new mission is inexplicable to those of us who have responded to a variety of world wide crises. The MEF, as designed in the past always left room for new weapons and tactical employment. The loss of armor, artillery, engineering assets and experience will be felt for years with disastrous consequences. The officers responsible will be rightly vilified. Semper Fi
Ray Maloy’s observation re the value of a robust MAGTF invites a bit of quiet reflection at this very moment. As conditions in the Near East simmers toward kinetic engagement, we who have been commenting in CP should simply ask “what now, lieutenant?” If the current issue results in U. S. involvement in armed conflict, it is fair to ask “what if” we are required to put boots on the ground? Can we do it with a credible force? I would argue a MEU will not be a credible force should this contest become existential for Israel. Should it degrade to an existential state, at what point does Israel opt for its “Sampson Option”? I am sobered by such potentialities, and I’m sure policy makers in D.C., likewise, lose sleep over this matter. So, here we are staring the “the elephant” in the eye just now. If our COCOM there calls for it, can we come from the sea with a meaningful force, now, with appropriate preparation, now, and prevail in battle. If not, I think “Mrs. Smith” in Peoria has a right to ask “what good are we? “Semper Fidelis!
The real crime about FD is not that anti-ship missiles were added to the Marine Corps mission and to the inventory, but by doing this and eliminating the core of the combined arms team, the whole raison d'etre for the Marine Corps has changed. No other US military force does what the Marine Corps does. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force do not have a combined arms naval expeditionary force. The Marine Corps operates at the seams of the other services. It operates on land and in the air, from the sea. Operating with a Navy ARG, the MEU is a combined arms naval expeditionary force that is at sea, ready for any contingency. By being at sea, the ARG/MEU can be anywhere it is needed.
Since the other services are sinking ships, why does the Marine Corps need to duplicate the same capability at the expense of its combined arms naval expeditionary mission? Adding a naval strike mission to the Marine artillery regiments may not be a bad idea, but not at the expense of eliminating the Marine Corps' strength. The United States had only one combined arms naval expeditionary force. Why would HQMC want to copy what the other services are doing and throw away its own unique capability?
My previous comments remain germane: The US Air Force, recently conducted a demonstration bomb drop from a B-52 that sank the USS Tarawa with a “Quicksink” bomb. This demonstration was part of Rimpac war drill.
Here again, our sister services have the technology and know-how to sink aircraft carriers with one cheap bomb at their disposal, why would the Marine Corps have a need to continue to pursue FD that is focused on access denial targeting the People’s Liberation Army Navy? Get back to maneuver warfare. Get away from the littoral regiments design. Get back to the MAGTF concept that is proven and is still very much in need for our combatant commanders who are dealing with multitudes of serious geopolitical issues around the world.
The Marine Corps leadership must refocus on the MAGTF concept and retool as fast as possible. Leave the sinking and sea lanes denial to our sister services…don’t duplicate the effort!
What is striking to me is as the US turns to address the CCP threat all the other services seem to be developing capabilities based on their expertise. For example, the Army is working on artillery and anti-air missile defense. They also are building small amphibs (something the US Navy can’t seem to do). The Air Force is working on air launched anti-ship missiles and the aircraft to launch them (thinking B-52 modifications here). The Navy is ahead of the power curve with Arleigh-Burke Destroyers and their anti-missile defense. They just cannot build and maintain ships. The US Marine Corps, instead of being true to their amphibious roots, reduces their combat power for the sake of experimentation on the bad idea of the MLR. Commandant Berger should have put the Joint Services to work on what was needed and put the US Navy on report for denying amphibious forces and capability to the Combatant Commanders. Semper Fi
One need only look at the Ukrainian incursion into Russia. Not just any spot but into the Kursk region. Recall that one of the greatest armor battles among other major fights of WWII, occurred in the Kursk region. One of the proponents of maneuver warfare was German General “hurrying” Heinz Guderian, who for many reasons was opposed to the German General Staff and Hitler’s plan to attack soviet forces in the Kursk region. Volumes have been written, but all told Guderian would be proved correct on his concerns over the operation. Thus one wonders if the Ukrainians planned the attack (it might even be considered a large scale raid) knowing that it held as much or more historical and political consequence than simply running over the border in a limited advanced that likely once momentum was slowed would be difficult to exploit for further military gains.
How does this apply? Marines are capable of raids at all levels in the MEU perhaps beyond that, but it requires the maneuver mindset to pick and choose the right time and place to execute the raid. If the SIF is stranded on the grey island chains or elsewhere it seems pretty hard to imagine them conducting any high speed raids. In fact they might be more concerned that they fall victim to a raid on their positions. Raids make all
manner of mischief, however one looks at fhe success or not of the Makin Island Raid, it proves the point that sometimes there is value in a raid beyond the immediate military objectives. The MAGTF is a factory of creativity, task organized for many roles and missions. It has been said here before that when people see an ARG/MEU coming over the horizon and they are bad actors they get nervous very quickly. Full on assault? Raids? Other operations? A fully complemented MEU ought to scare the bad actors. Marines in a MLR stranded on island chains doesn’t do much to support any of the current conflicts that we see today. Lessons abound in the current conflicts yet none are germain to FD whatever, the SIF and MLR. Combined arms coupled with imaginative maneuver concepts of operations ought to be obvious to senior “Managment” but clearly more prodding in this regard is needed.
Excellent points. As had been said in the past, the MEU is like a Swiss Army Knife. It has a multitude of uses. The SIF can only sit on islands. The Littoral Combat Regiment, is only a shell of the pre FD Marine Regiment, and has very little offensive capability.
History once again serves as a reminder. Maj Gen O. P. Smith, CG 1st MarDiv, in 1950 had trouble getting the 10th Corps CG, Maj. Gen. Alford, USA, to understand that a Marine Division with supporting combined arms is a very powerful military force. Stringing the Division out along 160 miles of narrow mountain roads significantly diminished that power. Todays leaders need to understand the same lesson. Stringing infantry Marines along littoral coasts diminishes the military power expected of the Marine Corps. Marine infantry supported by Marine combined arms such as that whish the MAGTF structure provides must become the Marine Corps organizational emphasis as an urgent national security imperative.
The Corps’ frantic search for a new mission is inexplicable to those of us who have responded to a variety of world wide crises. The MEF, as designed in the past always left room for new weapons and tactical employment. The loss of armor, artillery, engineering assets and experience will be felt for years with disastrous consequences. The officers responsible will be rightly vilified. Semper Fi
Ray Maloy’s observation re the value of a robust MAGTF invites a bit of quiet reflection at this very moment. As conditions in the Near East simmers toward kinetic engagement, we who have been commenting in CP should simply ask “what now, lieutenant?” If the current issue results in U. S. involvement in armed conflict, it is fair to ask “what if” we are required to put boots on the ground? Can we do it with a credible force? I would argue a MEU will not be a credible force should this contest become existential for Israel. Should it degrade to an existential state, at what point does Israel opt for its “Sampson Option”? I am sobered by such potentialities, and I’m sure policy makers in D.C., likewise, lose sleep over this matter. So, here we are staring the “the elephant” in the eye just now. If our COCOM there calls for it, can we come from the sea with a meaningful force, now, with appropriate preparation, now, and prevail in battle. If not, I think “Mrs. Smith” in Peoria has a right to ask “what good are we? “Semper Fidelis!
The real crime about FD is not that anti-ship missiles were added to the Marine Corps mission and to the inventory, but by doing this and eliminating the core of the combined arms team, the whole raison d'etre for the Marine Corps has changed. No other US military force does what the Marine Corps does. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force do not have a combined arms naval expeditionary force. The Marine Corps operates at the seams of the other services. It operates on land and in the air, from the sea. Operating with a Navy ARG, the MEU is a combined arms naval expeditionary force that is at sea, ready for any contingency. By being at sea, the ARG/MEU can be anywhere it is needed.
Since the other services are sinking ships, why does the Marine Corps need to duplicate the same capability at the expense of its combined arms naval expeditionary mission? Adding a naval strike mission to the Marine artillery regiments may not be a bad idea, but not at the expense of eliminating the Marine Corps' strength. The United States had only one combined arms naval expeditionary force. Why would HQMC want to copy what the other services are doing and throw away its own unique capability?
My previous comments remain germane: The US Air Force, recently conducted a demonstration bomb drop from a B-52 that sank the USS Tarawa with a “Quicksink” bomb. This demonstration was part of Rimpac war drill.
Here again, our sister services have the technology and know-how to sink aircraft carriers with one cheap bomb at their disposal, why would the Marine Corps have a need to continue to pursue FD that is focused on access denial targeting the People’s Liberation Army Navy? Get back to maneuver warfare. Get away from the littoral regiments design. Get back to the MAGTF concept that is proven and is still very much in need for our combatant commanders who are dealing with multitudes of serious geopolitical issues around the world.
The Marine Corps leadership must refocus on the MAGTF concept and retool as fast as possible. Leave the sinking and sea lanes denial to our sister services…don’t duplicate the effort!
What is striking to me is as the US turns to address the CCP threat all the other services seem to be developing capabilities based on their expertise. For example, the Army is working on artillery and anti-air missile defense. They also are building small amphibs (something the US Navy can’t seem to do). The Air Force is working on air launched anti-ship missiles and the aircraft to launch them (thinking B-52 modifications here). The Navy is ahead of the power curve with Arleigh-Burke Destroyers and their anti-missile defense. They just cannot build and maintain ships. The US Marine Corps, instead of being true to their amphibious roots, reduces their combat power for the sake of experimentation on the bad idea of the MLR. Commandant Berger should have put the Joint Services to work on what was needed and put the US Navy on report for denying amphibious forces and capability to the Combatant Commanders. Semper Fi
From today's Real Clear Defense, an article by retired Col. Gary Anderson. As usual, Col. Anderson is right on target with his commentary!
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/08/14/we_need_a_real_marine_corps_to_fight_a_two_front_war_1051632.html