Reading the CMC comments just made me shake my head, over and over.
Being “inside the house” means our small, distributed, Marines with a handful of missiles will be facing a house full of adversaries…let’s talk numbers. The chines active military personnel number approx 2,000,000 with an additional 500,000 in reserve? Putting small units of Marines inside the WEZ is like placing an ant inside a hornets nest with no way out. The Chinese, as we are seeing the Russians do in Ukraine, will use mass to gain ground against any enemy who is just sitting there.
And I will keep going back to logistics. How is the Marine Corps going to resupply and or “maneuver” around these islands when we don’t have the ships to do it with, and I’m talking ships that are capable of going to toe to toe with the Chinese if necessary.
The Marine Corps has always had a logistics issue. Its range and endurance is limited. Current surface connector fleet can’t maintain throughput required to sustain a MEU ashore given maintenance, OTH time/space, and most air flows will be assigned to tower priorities. Suppose the 53K might help, but you lose one of those it’s hard to replace the capacity.
Building ships capable of fighting takes money from amphib shipping, connectors, amphib upgrades, and possibly magazine depth on Navy shooters.
To say the CMC Brookings interview was disappointing is an understatement for a number of reasons. CMC kept repeating how important Joint Operations are going to be and how the Marine Corps needs to enhance the Joint Operations based on the NDS to “Deter” and “Defeat” a peer enemy. He stated we you can do more damage (Deterrence) if you are inside the house vs kicking down the door to take the house…NOT TRUE. What if the enemy decides that eliminating the enemy inside the house is more important than the house? General Mattes basically made that decision when he flatten Fallujah in 2004. Allied casualties were approximately 100+ KIA and 600+ WIA compared to the enemy 1200 to 2000 killed and 1500 captured and let’s not forget the 800 civilian deaths. Remember the laws of war state you should not kill civilians. The LOAC do not state you cannot kill civilians because the principle of military necessity rules the battlefield. In either case, I don’t think the CCP is going to pay any attention to the LOAC when it comes to fighting and winning a war. Stay behind forces is a Marine Corps only idea. No other service is going to integrate into leaving forces behind. Especially, when the CCP is armed with thousands of A2/AD missiles: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/
CMC also got Marine Recruiting wrong. Systematic Recruiting does not write contracts. Systematic Recruiting is an analysis tool where the leadership can quickly identify where a problem exists. What turned recruiting around with the “all volunteer force” was the teaching of professional needs based sales skills. Specifically, Xerox Professional Sales Skills for recruiters and Xerox Sales Management for officers. With Systematic Recruiting and Sale Skills training the next issue is prospecting. Telling a prospect to “jump up on the pull up bar” is not prospecting and as a former OSO General Smith should know better.
At one point the CMC is asked about the US Coast Guard and if he sees any opportunities or advantages for employment of joint operations with the USCG. It was pretty obvious that question caught the Commandant by surprise. It also raises the question of how the US Joint Force is going to handle the CCP Militia Navy and the massive global fishing fleet. Yes, the USCG is small but does not mean that they can’t help.
If a war breaks out the first issue for the US Joint Force is how to establish air superiority. Yes, there will be waves of missiles going back and forth defensively. This should put a priority on missile air defense vs ground based anti-ship missiles. Airfields will be the key to SLOC control as it was in WW2. Offensive needs will dictate that missiles will be air launched by aircraft from the Marines, Navy and Air Force. How we coordinate and integrate the Joint Strikes Forces is the key. I would much rather have a FARP with vertical takeoff and landing jets armed with anti-ship missiles than a MLR attempting to hide on a Pacific island chain.
The Marine Corps needs to establish a better way to train, select and promote general officers in order to prevent strategic narrow minded thinking like trades combat power for experimenting and lethality.
On the F35: The F-35 Lightning II is capable of air refueling. It can receive fuel from tanker aircraft during flight, extending its operational range and endurance. The F-35C variant, in particular, carries nearly 20,000 pounds of internal fuel and has a range of greater than 1,200 nautical miles, allowing it to remain in a desired battlespace longer before refueling is necessary. Additionally, the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation program successfully conducted aerial refueling of an F-35C using the Boeing-owned MQ-25 test asset. The F-35’s internal fuel capacity reduces its reliance on external tanks and enhances its overall mission flexibility.
To the best of my knowledge there was two battles of Fallujah. The second battle the combined force of Marine and Army Battalions flatten it.
Don’t know if the Navy or Marine Corps will risk 35Cs on the deck at obvious refuel locations. To your point if CCP doesn’t play by the rules, 35C plus 970 refueler = short targeting cycle.
Air to air is viable but degrades logistics throughput and maneuver if dependent on Marine C130. Could also limit the 35C depending on Suspected location of EN SAG.
This article addresses every tactical concern I have about FD. The logistical issues are foremost.The article eloquently spells out the end result of this forced change. To me , in simple terms , it describes a “ Die in place “ ,scenario.
The Marine Corps hasn’t possessed the organic logistics to support itself for decades. Nor are they truly trained to understand or access OPLOG.
Since the Marine Corps was a second land army in OPERATION DESERT STORM, OIF, and OEF the Army and the Component managed it. Thus the issue was ignored.
This is an old issue but glad folks are finally acknowledging it.
Re ploughing old ground here. Almost five years ago the suggestion was made to expand each of the four Artillery Regiments with a Bn of anti ship missile capability. With task organization four Bn’s could be brought to bear without the divesting that occurred in the dark of the night. Certainly would have provided time to develop the entire concept. This entire castration of the Corps was based on the alleged range, accuracy and lethality of a Chinese weapon that had never hit, let alone sunk a moving trash barge.
Sorry for the triple post, something went off the rails, ignore the duplication! File under once you cross the line of departure it all goes to hades in a hand basket.
Please explain to me how one Littoral Regiment with outdated missiles is going to tackle this force? How is our inadequate Navy going to defeat the Chinese? Technology alone will not do it. Sitting in defensive positions eating off the land with a few missiles will not do it. The only thing we need across all the service is MASSIVE CAPABILITIES across the spectrum, anything less and we fool ourselves!
“….With this huge numerical advantage, virtually all of which is in its coastal waters/South China Sea, China dominates the waters in that vital economic region. The U.S. has approximately 60 ships at any given time in the INDOPACOM area of operation, and 370 combatants to 60 is a worrisome metric…”
The critical,element is that CP and likely Chowder Society II have carefully laid out the more egregious areas of the Commandant’s “conversation” at the Brookings Institute last week. Bear in mind he had this ridiculously friendly moderator who never challenged a word the CMC said. The questions were mostly friendly and never got to the heart of the matter other than one question regarding armor and or lack of it. This Substack post is critical to the conversation, we have a subset of officers and or politicians and civilians that thought and or think today’s FDEXYZ is a good idea and or can be shoe horned into something workable. It can not be made “better”, it’s an Edsel, it’s “New Coke” and any other hopeless commercial product that is suitable as an analogy to this failed and to a large degree improperly vetted concept. Two final thoughts, 1. Thanks to CP and Chowder Society II for breaking it down here, though again it is worth viewing the “conversation” for one’s self. 2. The lurking issue in all of the shenanigans around FD2030 are a clear and present example of duplicity in our leadership. It points to loss of trust and confidence in the senior leaders, and this is an attack not only on our readiness, but our Marine Corps and everything it stands for, Our Ethos, our way of “being”:is absolutely under attack. It is tragedy in the making before our eyes. Hopefully this Brookings attention and the FFRDC will add further weight to the ongoing efforts to reset the planning and rebuilding the Corps capabilities so blithely tossed to the corner, over a few long range firecrackers and a defensive posture that was, is and will be defeat in detail if continued unabated.
The critical,element is that CP and likely Chowder Society II have carefully laid out the more egregious areas of the Commandant’s “conversation” at the Brookings Institute last week. Bear in mind he had this ridiculously friendly moderator who never challenged a word the CMC said. The questions were mostly friendly and never got to the heart of the matter other than one question regarding armor and or lack of it. This Substack post is critical to the conversation, we have a subset of officers and or politicians and civilians that thought and or think today’s FDEXYZ is a good idea and or can be shoe horned into something workable. It can not be made “better”, it’s an Edsel, it’s “New Coke” and any other hopeless commercial product that is suitable as an analogy to this failed and to a large degree improperly vetted concept. Two final thoughts, 1. Thanks to CP and Chowder Society II for breaking it down here, though again it is worth viewing the “conversation” for one’s self. 2. The lurking issue in all of the shenanigans around FD2030 are a clear and present example of duplicity in our leadership. It points to loss of trust and confidence in the senior leaders, and this is an attack not only on our readiness, but our Marine Corps and everything it stands for, Our Ethos, our way of “being”:is absolutely under attack. It is tragedy in the making before our eyes. Hopefully this Brookings attention and the FFRDC will add further weight to the ongoing efforts to reset the planning and rebuilding the Corps capabilities so blithely tossed to the corner, over a few long range firecrackers and a defensive posture that was, is and will be defeat in detail if continued unabated.
The critical,element is that CP and likely Chowder Society II have carefully laid out the more egregious areas of the Commandant’s “conversation” at the Brookings Institute last week. Bear in mind he had this ridiculously friendly moderator who never challenged a word the CMC said. The questions were mostly friendly and never got to the heart of the matter other than one question regarding armor and or lack of it. This Substack post is critical to the conversation, we have a subset of officers and or politicians and civilians that thought and or think today’s FDEXYZ is a good idea and or can be shoe horned into something workable. It can not be made “better”, it’s an Edsel, it’s “New Coke” and any other hopeless commercial product that is suitable as an analogy to this failed and to a large degree improperly vetted concept. Two final thoughts, 1. Thanks to CP and Chowder Society II for breaking it down here, though again it is worth viewing the “conversation” for one’s self. 2. The lurking issue in all of the shenanigans around FD2030 are a clear and present example of duplicity in our leadership. It points to loss of trust and confidence in the senior leaders, and this is an attack not only on our readiness, but our Marine Corps and everything it stands for, Our Ethos, our way of “being”:is absolutely under attack. It is tragedy in the making before our eyes. Hopefully this Brookings attention and the FFRDC will add further weight to the ongoing efforts to reset the planning and rebuilding the Corps capabilities so blithely tossed to the corner, over a few long range firecrackers and a defensive posture that was, is and will be defeat in detail if continued unabated.
Just a question. If we had the Marine Corps we did prior to FD, but included anti-ship missile batteries in the artillery regiments, would that be a good idea? We could conduct anti-ship missile raids, similar to artillery raids. Would that be beneficial? Just some thoughts and questions.
Yes, Best course of actions would have been to place missile batteries inside 12th Marines and task organize for anti-ship mission. Task organizing is the way the Corps operated for decades and it was the "magic" of the MAGTF. Whether the other artillery regiments needed missiles is my mind and open question.
Thank you Sir, for your reply. So theoretically we could have kept the traditional MAGTF, and just added a new capability. Now we have little to show for the divestment of the traditional capabilities.
Adding missile capability was the way to go without a doubt. Former CMC destroyed III MEF for a narrow mission Marines could not perform near as well as US Army's multi-domain task forces, of which there are two in the Pacific theater today.
My question is if we reconstituted 12th Marines back to an artillery regiment and added missile (real ones, not the old slow short-ranged ones), where do we first get the tubes? As you accurately noted the first 90 “divested” tubes went to Ukraine, the others probably are now in the Army’s inventory and purposed already.
More importantly where do we get the experienced 0811s, 0802s, and 0844s. We’ve “divested” ourselves of the most important component of artillery as a supporting arm, our Redleg Marines.
Gen. Berger and Gen. Smith have made the Corps a “one trick pony”, and that one trick makes the Corps irrelevant in U.S. power projection, even “inside the house”. I’m convinced that Gen. Berger knew he had a losing argument if he went before Congress and asked for additional funding for expanding the Corps’ combat support capabilities, so he decided that “divesting to invest” was the only option, and to hell with the rest of the requirements of Title 10.
Hopefully the FFRDC study will convince Congress to right the ship while there is still time. I have no confidence that the Corps’ leadership will listen to “the old guys” or the recommendations of the study and do it themselves.
Reading the CMC comments just made me shake my head, over and over.
Being “inside the house” means our small, distributed, Marines with a handful of missiles will be facing a house full of adversaries…let’s talk numbers. The chines active military personnel number approx 2,000,000 with an additional 500,000 in reserve? Putting small units of Marines inside the WEZ is like placing an ant inside a hornets nest with no way out. The Chinese, as we are seeing the Russians do in Ukraine, will use mass to gain ground against any enemy who is just sitting there.
And I will keep going back to logistics. How is the Marine Corps going to resupply and or “maneuver” around these islands when we don’t have the ships to do it with, and I’m talking ships that are capable of going to toe to toe with the Chinese if necessary.
The Marine Corps has always had a logistics issue. Its range and endurance is limited. Current surface connector fleet can’t maintain throughput required to sustain a MEU ashore given maintenance, OTH time/space, and most air flows will be assigned to tower priorities. Suppose the 53K might help, but you lose one of those it’s hard to replace the capacity.
Building ships capable of fighting takes money from amphib shipping, connectors, amphib upgrades, and possibly magazine depth on Navy shooters.
To say the CMC Brookings interview was disappointing is an understatement for a number of reasons. CMC kept repeating how important Joint Operations are going to be and how the Marine Corps needs to enhance the Joint Operations based on the NDS to “Deter” and “Defeat” a peer enemy. He stated we you can do more damage (Deterrence) if you are inside the house vs kicking down the door to take the house…NOT TRUE. What if the enemy decides that eliminating the enemy inside the house is more important than the house? General Mattes basically made that decision when he flatten Fallujah in 2004. Allied casualties were approximately 100+ KIA and 600+ WIA compared to the enemy 1200 to 2000 killed and 1500 captured and let’s not forget the 800 civilian deaths. Remember the laws of war state you should not kill civilians. The LOAC do not state you cannot kill civilians because the principle of military necessity rules the battlefield. In either case, I don’t think the CCP is going to pay any attention to the LOAC when it comes to fighting and winning a war. Stay behind forces is a Marine Corps only idea. No other service is going to integrate into leaving forces behind. Especially, when the CCP is armed with thousands of A2/AD missiles: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/
CMC also got Marine Recruiting wrong. Systematic Recruiting does not write contracts. Systematic Recruiting is an analysis tool where the leadership can quickly identify where a problem exists. What turned recruiting around with the “all volunteer force” was the teaching of professional needs based sales skills. Specifically, Xerox Professional Sales Skills for recruiters and Xerox Sales Management for officers. With Systematic Recruiting and Sale Skills training the next issue is prospecting. Telling a prospect to “jump up on the pull up bar” is not prospecting and as a former OSO General Smith should know better.
At one point the CMC is asked about the US Coast Guard and if he sees any opportunities or advantages for employment of joint operations with the USCG. It was pretty obvious that question caught the Commandant by surprise. It also raises the question of how the US Joint Force is going to handle the CCP Militia Navy and the massive global fishing fleet. Yes, the USCG is small but does not mean that they can’t help.
If a war breaks out the first issue for the US Joint Force is how to establish air superiority. Yes, there will be waves of missiles going back and forth defensively. This should put a priority on missile air defense vs ground based anti-ship missiles. Airfields will be the key to SLOC control as it was in WW2. Offensive needs will dictate that missiles will be air launched by aircraft from the Marines, Navy and Air Force. How we coordinate and integrate the Joint Strikes Forces is the key. I would much rather have a FARP with vertical takeoff and landing jets armed with anti-ship missiles than a MLR attempting to hide on a Pacific island chain.
The Marine Corps needs to establish a better way to train, select and promote general officers in order to prevent strategic narrow minded thinking like trades combat power for experimenting and lethality.
F35B endurance makes FARPing impracticable given the USMCs ability to move JP in large quantities. Don’t think 35B can carry anything that big either.
Didn’t the Marine Corps need to go back through Fallujah. Flattening the place didn’t work, but different fight.
On the F35: The F-35 Lightning II is capable of air refueling. It can receive fuel from tanker aircraft during flight, extending its operational range and endurance. The F-35C variant, in particular, carries nearly 20,000 pounds of internal fuel and has a range of greater than 1,200 nautical miles, allowing it to remain in a desired battlespace longer before refueling is necessary. Additionally, the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation program successfully conducted aerial refueling of an F-35C using the Boeing-owned MQ-25 test asset. The F-35’s internal fuel capacity reduces its reliance on external tanks and enhances its overall mission flexibility.
To the best of my knowledge there was two battles of Fallujah. The second battle the combined force of Marine and Army Battalions flatten it.
Don’t know if the Navy or Marine Corps will risk 35Cs on the deck at obvious refuel locations. To your point if CCP doesn’t play by the rules, 35C plus 970 refueler = short targeting cycle.
Air to air is viable but degrades logistics throughput and maneuver if dependent on Marine C130. Could also limit the 35C depending on Suspected location of EN SAG.
MQ-25 is a great asset but should a be a shooter.
You’re right on target. Fire for Effect!
This article addresses every tactical concern I have about FD. The logistical issues are foremost.The article eloquently spells out the end result of this forced change. To me , in simple terms , it describes a “ Die in place “ ,scenario.
The Marine Corps hasn’t possessed the organic logistics to support itself for decades. Nor are they truly trained to understand or access OPLOG.
Since the Marine Corps was a second land army in OPERATION DESERT STORM, OIF, and OEF the Army and the Component managed it. Thus the issue was ignored.
This is an old issue but glad folks are finally acknowledging it.
I would never recommend someone join the USMC as long as this type of thinking by the CMC continues.
Re ploughing old ground here. Almost five years ago the suggestion was made to expand each of the four Artillery Regiments with a Bn of anti ship missile capability. With task organization four Bn’s could be brought to bear without the divesting that occurred in the dark of the night. Certainly would have provided time to develop the entire concept. This entire castration of the Corps was based on the alleged range, accuracy and lethality of a Chinese weapon that had never hit, let alone sunk a moving trash barge.
Sorry for the triple post, something went off the rails, ignore the duplication! File under once you cross the line of departure it all goes to hades in a hand basket.
Not to worry! “Fire when ready, Gridley!” 🇺🇸😊
Please explain to me how one Littoral Regiment with outdated missiles is going to tackle this force? How is our inadequate Navy going to defeat the Chinese? Technology alone will not do it. Sitting in defensive positions eating off the land with a few missiles will not do it. The only thing we need across all the service is MASSIVE CAPABILITIES across the spectrum, anything less and we fool ourselves!
https://patriotpost.us/articles/108297-chinas-nautical-strategy-2024-07-09
“….With this huge numerical advantage, virtually all of which is in its coastal waters/South China Sea, China dominates the waters in that vital economic region. The U.S. has approximately 60 ships at any given time in the INDOPACOM area of operation, and 370 combatants to 60 is a worrisome metric…”
The critical,element is that CP and likely Chowder Society II have carefully laid out the more egregious areas of the Commandant’s “conversation” at the Brookings Institute last week. Bear in mind he had this ridiculously friendly moderator who never challenged a word the CMC said. The questions were mostly friendly and never got to the heart of the matter other than one question regarding armor and or lack of it. This Substack post is critical to the conversation, we have a subset of officers and or politicians and civilians that thought and or think today’s FDEXYZ is a good idea and or can be shoe horned into something workable. It can not be made “better”, it’s an Edsel, it’s “New Coke” and any other hopeless commercial product that is suitable as an analogy to this failed and to a large degree improperly vetted concept. Two final thoughts, 1. Thanks to CP and Chowder Society II for breaking it down here, though again it is worth viewing the “conversation” for one’s self. 2. The lurking issue in all of the shenanigans around FD2030 are a clear and present example of duplicity in our leadership. It points to loss of trust and confidence in the senior leaders, and this is an attack not only on our readiness, but our Marine Corps and everything it stands for, Our Ethos, our way of “being”:is absolutely under attack. It is tragedy in the making before our eyes. Hopefully this Brookings attention and the FFRDC will add further weight to the ongoing efforts to reset the planning and rebuilding the Corps capabilities so blithely tossed to the corner, over a few long range firecrackers and a defensive posture that was, is and will be defeat in detail if continued unabated.
The critical,element is that CP and likely Chowder Society II have carefully laid out the more egregious areas of the Commandant’s “conversation” at the Brookings Institute last week. Bear in mind he had this ridiculously friendly moderator who never challenged a word the CMC said. The questions were mostly friendly and never got to the heart of the matter other than one question regarding armor and or lack of it. This Substack post is critical to the conversation, we have a subset of officers and or politicians and civilians that thought and or think today’s FDEXYZ is a good idea and or can be shoe horned into something workable. It can not be made “better”, it’s an Edsel, it’s “New Coke” and any other hopeless commercial product that is suitable as an analogy to this failed and to a large degree improperly vetted concept. Two final thoughts, 1. Thanks to CP and Chowder Society II for breaking it down here, though again it is worth viewing the “conversation” for one’s self. 2. The lurking issue in all of the shenanigans around FD2030 are a clear and present example of duplicity in our leadership. It points to loss of trust and confidence in the senior leaders, and this is an attack not only on our readiness, but our Marine Corps and everything it stands for, Our Ethos, our way of “being”:is absolutely under attack. It is tragedy in the making before our eyes. Hopefully this Brookings attention and the FFRDC will add further weight to the ongoing efforts to reset the planning and rebuilding the Corps capabilities so blithely tossed to the corner, over a few long range firecrackers and a defensive posture that was, is and will be defeat in detail if continued unabated.
The critical,element is that CP and likely Chowder Society II have carefully laid out the more egregious areas of the Commandant’s “conversation” at the Brookings Institute last week. Bear in mind he had this ridiculously friendly moderator who never challenged a word the CMC said. The questions were mostly friendly and never got to the heart of the matter other than one question regarding armor and or lack of it. This Substack post is critical to the conversation, we have a subset of officers and or politicians and civilians that thought and or think today’s FDEXYZ is a good idea and or can be shoe horned into something workable. It can not be made “better”, it’s an Edsel, it’s “New Coke” and any other hopeless commercial product that is suitable as an analogy to this failed and to a large degree improperly vetted concept. Two final thoughts, 1. Thanks to CP and Chowder Society II for breaking it down here, though again it is worth viewing the “conversation” for one’s self. 2. The lurking issue in all of the shenanigans around FD2030 are a clear and present example of duplicity in our leadership. It points to loss of trust and confidence in the senior leaders, and this is an attack not only on our readiness, but our Marine Corps and everything it stands for, Our Ethos, our way of “being”:is absolutely under attack. It is tragedy in the making before our eyes. Hopefully this Brookings attention and the FFRDC will add further weight to the ongoing efforts to reset the planning and rebuilding the Corps capabilities so blithely tossed to the corner, over a few long range firecrackers and a defensive posture that was, is and will be defeat in detail if continued unabated.
Just a question. If we had the Marine Corps we did prior to FD, but included anti-ship missile batteries in the artillery regiments, would that be a good idea? We could conduct anti-ship missile raids, similar to artillery raids. Would that be beneficial? Just some thoughts and questions.
Yes, Best course of actions would have been to place missile batteries inside 12th Marines and task organize for anti-ship mission. Task organizing is the way the Corps operated for decades and it was the "magic" of the MAGTF. Whether the other artillery regiments needed missiles is my mind and open question.
Thank you Sir, for your reply. So theoretically we could have kept the traditional MAGTF, and just added a new capability. Now we have little to show for the divestment of the traditional capabilities.
Adding missile capability was the way to go without a doubt. Former CMC destroyed III MEF for a narrow mission Marines could not perform near as well as US Army's multi-domain task forces, of which there are two in the Pacific theater today.
My question is if we reconstituted 12th Marines back to an artillery regiment and added missile (real ones, not the old slow short-ranged ones), where do we first get the tubes? As you accurately noted the first 90 “divested” tubes went to Ukraine, the others probably are now in the Army’s inventory and purposed already.
More importantly where do we get the experienced 0811s, 0802s, and 0844s. We’ve “divested” ourselves of the most important component of artillery as a supporting arm, our Redleg Marines.
Gen. Berger and Gen. Smith have made the Corps a “one trick pony”, and that one trick makes the Corps irrelevant in U.S. power projection, even “inside the house”. I’m convinced that Gen. Berger knew he had a losing argument if he went before Congress and asked for additional funding for expanding the Corps’ combat support capabilities, so he decided that “divesting to invest” was the only option, and to hell with the rest of the requirements of Title 10.
Hopefully the FFRDC study will convince Congress to right the ship while there is still time. I have no confidence that the Corps’ leadership will listen to “the old guys” or the recommendations of the study and do it themselves.
Greg, that is an important point. Experience takes time, something I don't think we have much of right now considering the world situation.