What struck me as rather poignant passage from CP analysis is this: “There are instances where decorated officers with such experience and more have been banned from the Corps’ professional military education programs and denigrated as not having sufficient “expertise.” If the Corps talks only with its current members, it will miss out on the decades of combat experience that former and retired Marines have gained in regular and irregular combat operations.”
If the Marine Corps leadership believes that seasoned, combat experienced senior officers and enlisted, have no idea what they are talking about and must be banned from the dialogue, and professional development of/with active duty Marines, should we then tell ALL Marines to stop reading books about combat and strategy, in the tactical, operational, strategic and political realm? Should Marines burn books by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Frederick the Great, Napoleon and so on.
Marines should fear no one, especially when one is using no weapons but their voice!
As one of those Marine officers banned from MarineCorps University I can attest to the accuracy of this report. The irony is I served two tours at MCU and in retirement taught there for 11 years until 2017. I was told by the leadership of MCU that they were only interested in visitors with "expertise."
In discussion with other Marines, we came to a common conclusion. Our EXSUM? The Commandant signed a document that is empirically provable false. He knows it. I’ve lost “trust and confidence” in his ability to lead the Corps and I’m not alone.
He was surely knowingly aware his false word is widely disseminated and goes to Corps and combatant commander readiness and ultimately national security. Why is he not being called out for it? Because accountability does not exist.
Because those that should be holding him accountable, the House of Representative and Senate Armed Services Committees, are hopelessly divided and cannot meet in a common ground. That and I believe that they are awe struck by the stars and bits of colored ribbon on the uniforms. There are those within the Congress that have the expertise to call him out....but don't. Cannot understand why.
I find it particularly sad that the CPG praises the "campaign of learning" for minor adjustments to divestments in infantry, cannon artillery, aviation, and combat service support. The adjustments are proof positive that divestments were arbitrary and ill conceived. Trying to sugar coat the damage done by Force Design by lauding the "campaign of learning" is somewhat akin to praising the rancher for closing the barn door after the horses have escaped.
I have to say that the Commandant, when exercising his strategic thinking, demonstrates his flawed narrow mindedness of terrain appreciation. Attempting to hide HMARS (with anti-ship missiles) and Marine Raiders (as stay behind asymmetrical forces) on small islands is just a bad idea. As the “eyes and ears” of the Joint Force, both will be quickly located, isolated and neutralized. The Commandant’s terrain appreciation should have included the importance of SPODs (Sea Ports of Debarkation), APODS (Aerial Ports of Debarkation) and especially SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication). Missiles will contribute but aircraft will still play a major role in a Pacific peer-on-peer war. The US Air Force seems to have grasp this idea. I recently read an article where they are opening one of the old WW2 Tinian airfields. The correct strategic employment of air and naval forces will require the basic considerations of SPODs, APODs and SLOCs. These will be located on and determine the decisive key terrain in order to deter and win a peer-on-peer war with the CCP. General MacArthur’s pre-WW2 plan to hold the “key terrain” of the Philippines by controlling his SLOCs with PT Boats and Bombers. PT Boats were easily neutralized by naval gun fire. Bombers make for easy targets when parked on the ground. In addition, bombers had yet to develop effective tactics for sinking sailing ships. Control of the SLOCs will be essential and the best way to control a SLOC is from the ends at both the SPOE (Sea Port of Embarkation) and the SPOD.
Yep, I have been saying that since I started making comments on CP. My issue is why are we giving our top notch and experienced Marines to SOCCOM. I have met a lot of the Raiders .... including GySgt Negron and Drapper. As a rifle company commander, I would cut my right arm off to have either in my rifle company as my Company Gunny. Recommend you read Fred Galvin's book: A Few Bad Men https://www.uap.org/post/marsoc-3-appeals-court-gilmet-case/
There is a much improved tone in this Compass Points assessment of the CPG. The explanation as to why an MLR is nor trained or equipped to be employed as an RLT in a MAGTF combined arms, amphibious operations is particularly insightful and therefore more meaningful. A response from a FD 2030 proponent would be interesting. The Marine Corps cannot be a "Robe of Many Colors" and be the Marine Corps. SF
What struck me as rather poignant passage from CP analysis is this: “There are instances where decorated officers with such experience and more have been banned from the Corps’ professional military education programs and denigrated as not having sufficient “expertise.” If the Corps talks only with its current members, it will miss out on the decades of combat experience that former and retired Marines have gained in regular and irregular combat operations.”
If the Marine Corps leadership believes that seasoned, combat experienced senior officers and enlisted, have no idea what they are talking about and must be banned from the dialogue, and professional development of/with active duty Marines, should we then tell ALL Marines to stop reading books about combat and strategy, in the tactical, operational, strategic and political realm? Should Marines burn books by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Frederick the Great, Napoleon and so on.
Marines should fear no one, especially when one is using no weapons but their voice!
As one of those Marine officers banned from MarineCorps University I can attest to the accuracy of this report. The irony is I served two tours at MCU and in retirement taught there for 11 years until 2017. I was told by the leadership of MCU that they were only interested in visitors with "expertise."
In discussion with other Marines, we came to a common conclusion. Our EXSUM? The Commandant signed a document that is empirically provable false. He knows it. I’ve lost “trust and confidence” in his ability to lead the Corps and I’m not alone.
He was surely knowingly aware his false word is widely disseminated and goes to Corps and combatant commander readiness and ultimately national security. Why is he not being called out for it? Because accountability does not exist.
Because those that should be holding him accountable, the House of Representative and Senate Armed Services Committees, are hopelessly divided and cannot meet in a common ground. That and I believe that they are awe struck by the stars and bits of colored ribbon on the uniforms. There are those within the Congress that have the expertise to call him out....but don't. Cannot understand why.
I find it particularly sad that the CPG praises the "campaign of learning" for minor adjustments to divestments in infantry, cannon artillery, aviation, and combat service support. The adjustments are proof positive that divestments were arbitrary and ill conceived. Trying to sugar coat the damage done by Force Design by lauding the "campaign of learning" is somewhat akin to praising the rancher for closing the barn door after the horses have escaped.
I have to say that the Commandant, when exercising his strategic thinking, demonstrates his flawed narrow mindedness of terrain appreciation. Attempting to hide HMARS (with anti-ship missiles) and Marine Raiders (as stay behind asymmetrical forces) on small islands is just a bad idea. As the “eyes and ears” of the Joint Force, both will be quickly located, isolated and neutralized. The Commandant’s terrain appreciation should have included the importance of SPODs (Sea Ports of Debarkation), APODS (Aerial Ports of Debarkation) and especially SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication). Missiles will contribute but aircraft will still play a major role in a Pacific peer-on-peer war. The US Air Force seems to have grasp this idea. I recently read an article where they are opening one of the old WW2 Tinian airfields. The correct strategic employment of air and naval forces will require the basic considerations of SPODs, APODs and SLOCs. These will be located on and determine the decisive key terrain in order to deter and win a peer-on-peer war with the CCP. General MacArthur’s pre-WW2 plan to hold the “key terrain” of the Philippines by controlling his SLOCs with PT Boats and Bombers. PT Boats were easily neutralized by naval gun fire. Bombers make for easy targets when parked on the ground. In addition, bombers had yet to develop effective tactics for sinking sailing ships. Control of the SLOCs will be essential and the best way to control a SLOC is from the ends at both the SPOE (Sea Port of Embarkation) and the SPOD.
The Corps does not control the Raiders. They equip and train but their employment belongs to SOCOM.
Yep, I have been saying that since I started making comments on CP. My issue is why are we giving our top notch and experienced Marines to SOCCOM. I have met a lot of the Raiders .... including GySgt Negron and Drapper. As a rifle company commander, I would cut my right arm off to have either in my rifle company as my Company Gunny. Recommend you read Fred Galvin's book: A Few Bad Men https://www.uap.org/post/marsoc-3-appeals-court-gilmet-case/
There is a much improved tone in this Compass Points assessment of the CPG. The explanation as to why an MLR is nor trained or equipped to be employed as an RLT in a MAGTF combined arms, amphibious operations is particularly insightful and therefore more meaningful. A response from a FD 2030 proponent would be interesting. The Marine Corps cannot be a "Robe of Many Colors" and be the Marine Corps. SF