The Army, AF and Navy all have anti ship units and munitions fielded that are far superior to the concept the USMC continues to wrestle with five years after the EABO was conceived and which has yet to result in a fielded unit. The Army stood up the 11th Airborne Division in under three years and deployed to Shemya in a real world response. I note that no one called the USMC. Why would they? When did we last answer the phone call?
Having exercised on Adak I can assure anyone that “living off of the land” there is delusional.
I suspect the Army HIMARS unit that deployed to Shemya had the new Precision Strike Missile. I cannot confirm that. About a year ago they fired the PSM from their HIMARs.
This USMC HIMARs unit was deactivated in March 2024. The Corps is opting for a vehicle and missile mix to target moving ships and opted not to develop a rocket with that capability for HIMARS as it is too big. Still waiting for the demo of the marriage of radars, vehicles and ship killing rockets or missiles. The EABO concept has no operational unit yet.
Looking forward to seeing the USMC unit with NSMs, Radars, vehicles etc. When I see that T/O and T/E and see it “damage” a moving ship I will concede that a capability has been created. Until then all remains a concept and in many cases unfunded. It has been five years. Still waiting. Has anyone done an estimate on how many NSM launchers you might need to cover the less than 100 miles between islands in the first Island chain?
1500 miles vs 500. It pains me say it: USMC has no unit ready to deploy to anywhere that meets the EABO concept. Marine Littoral Regiments are Infantry Regiments downsized. A Regiment could be turned into a MLR in 36 hours. The idea is to deploy to remote locations to sink ships. Has yet to be demonstrated.
The Commandant could have signaled a new direction for the Marine Corps in the CPG. Instead, he elected to double down on FD, despite overwhelming evidence that Russia, Iran, North Korea, and various nonstate actors are real and growing threats to America's national interests.
Wow! There is a lot to unpack here. I have to agree that the CP “Comments and Analysis” on this section are on point and correct. The Commandant myopic thinking is a bit over whelming. As a Service Chief, he seems to be telling the Combatant Commanders how to fight their theater war. For example, in a global war there is no way he is going to be able to “protect I MEF (or 2 or 3 MEF) from emergent taskings to non-priority theaters.” The Marine Corps has 3 MEFs for 6 Combatant Commanders and he will not determine the MEF’s priority theater. A war with the CCP will be a GLOBAL WAR and will not be localized to the Pacific.
At the start of the WW2, the 6th Marines Regiment, forming in Southern California and getting ready for South Pacific jungle warfare. Suddenly, the 6th Marines got orders to sail to the Azores. Winston Churchill was short on forces and needed help to cover those British possessions in the Atlantic. The President (FDR) volunteered the Marines and ordered the 6th Marines to board ships to help defend the Azores. While in route their orders changed to defending Iceland (after a stop at South Carolina to pick up cold weather gear and the 1st Marine Brig HQ).
I believe that the US Army’s MDTF has beat the MRL to the punch. The MDTF has greater capability and does not need to hide (see CP – Ode to HEMTT and "polarbear" comments). In addition, I believe that the CCP can do the same by occupying those small islands before 3 MEF lands the MLR. After the Chinese Communist won the battles on the mainland, they conducted a number of amphibious assaults to seize coastal islands from the National Chinese. In reach case, the Communist first seized the adjacent islands to isolate the objectives. They will need to do the same in order to seize Taiwan and protect their SLOCs.
Forget the staff’s comments on the CPG, I want to see the Combatant Commander’s comments.
"I believe that the US Army’s MDTF has beat the MRL to the punch. The MDTF has greater capability and does not need to hide..."
THAT SIR IS THE SAD POINT! Current leadership has placed itself into a hole and can't find its way out. SIF is one of two things. Not a Stand-In-Force but to be blunt a "Stand & Die" quasi tripwire force that in its heroic death will (in the idea of the planners) rally the American public to engage with the Chinese over an island that most of the citizens can't even find on a map and wouldn't want to waste American lives/treasure in its defense if they could...OR it's a failed attempt to make the Marine Corps the priority service in the fight against the Chinese (notice the heavy focus on command & control for such a small force...is someone thinking they could lead the joint fight?).
Neither plan is viable. The idea that Marine Ground in a highly kinetic fight at sea and in the air will be the "eyes and ears of the joint force" smacks of MADNESS!
So what are we left with? A Marine Corps that is no longer capable of forcible entry operations. A Marine Corps that is SO FREAKING LIGHT that the 82nd arrives with more ground combat firepower than an equivalent sized Marine Corps unit (same with the other light units in the Army in a few years).
So forcible entry is off the table. Rapid deployment is a joke without big amphibs and the Army brings more firepower anyway so Crisis Response is off the table.
In the one place that current leadership is placing all its eggs we see that the MDTF has out-Marine Corps'd the Marine Corps without destroying its force structure.
The most head freaking thing about this is that the "original designers" of Force Design 2030 DID HAVE SOME GOOD IDEAS. Unfortunately they acted in private, did not get buy in from stakeholders in this endeavour and would accept no criticism of their plan.
Force Design 2030 will be studied in business schools as the ultimate in "change agent" failure.
Fortunately the Marine Corps is a robust organization. It can be saved from a terrible plan and flawed thinking. Rebuilding the MAGTF is essential. Fixing naval shipping is essential. Putting together a solid plan to do so (I've seen a few linked from these pages) is also essential.
If we don't then the future will see US Army V-280s transporting 11th Airborne to seize islands in the pacific from LHDs with the well decks filled with robot boats to resupply those forces once ashore.....while SOCOM (that parachuted in earlier) will be acting as the "eyes and ears of the joint force" as they do a job that once belonged to the Marine Corps but was foolishly thrown away.
Members of Chowder Society II are working hard everyday to try to persuade the Corps' leadership to get the Corps on the right track. In general they listen but don't hear. There are several members of Congress who are concerned and endeavor to assist as much as they can (think the requirement for a federally funded research and development center to conduct an analysis of FD 2030). This "fight" will not be short but we must prevail.
General Van Riper, have Chowder Society II had any luck with Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D). She is the senior Senator from New Hampshire, sits on the armed services committee and sub committee on seapower. She/we here in seacoast NH have a dog in the hunt, so to say, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard employs over 6000 people, generally at least two to three boats are in here at all times. In principal one would hope she has a handle on appropriations and so forth in matters related to the Department of Navy, Navy Department and Marine Corps, makes one wonder if she is getting the straight scoop on the FD bun fight. Might be worth a try to fill,her in, if it hasn’t been tried already.
The Senator as a member of the SASC would likely receive copies of the many articles we have published and select Compass Points posts. I don't believe any of our retired generals have sought to meet with her. I have this for action and truly appreciate the heads up.
Charles, to add to my initial comment; The small staff of Chowder Society II that oversees relations with Congress provided the following information.
“Chowder Society II distributes Compass Points posts to select Congressional members and staff. Thanks for bringing the highly respected Senator Shaheen to our attention. She and her staff have been added to the distribution.”
My thanks also for asking about this and for your numerous insightful comments on Compass Points
I recommend that retired graybeards instead explain the past 40 years of utter failure before claiming clairvoyance over FD-2030.
I’m unsure of what you mean by the term “utter failure.” Surely you don’t mean Operation ‘Fury From the Sea,” the Marine’s landing in Grenada, “Operation Desert Storm,” or the two MEUs General Mattis led into Afghanistan, or I MEF’s performance under General Conway in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Explain the collapse of over-the-horizon warfare.
Over the Horizon operations did not “collapse.” OTH as it was known was followed by the Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) concept and the supporting concept, Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM), which were central to Marine Corps thinking until the 38th CMC walked away from them with EABO.
Explain the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a multi-billion dollar boondoggle with excessive moving parts that was never “Marine-proof.”
You clearly know nothing of the history of the EFV. General P.X. Kelly halted an earlier program when it did not seem likely it would meet requirements. What followed was an extensive program involving seperate land-based and a water-based systems. In short, vehicles were built that met the requirements for both environments and then the experience from those programs were merged into a new program, which won high praise from Congress and DOD for innovation and management. I was at the opening of the plant near Occoquan in 1996 where the first prototypes were built. The program ran into trouble for two reasons; it was not designed to protect against IEDs, which were unknown when MCCDC created requirement documents and challenges with the complex hydraulics. General Amos halted it for these reasons; I was in the room when he made the decision.
Explain the death toll of the MV-22.
Every one of the 62 deaths was a tragedy. Military aviation is challenged by the inherent risks of flight. The V-22’s mishap rate is 3.43 for 100,000 flight hours, near average for the other type/model/series aircraft Marine aviators fly.
Explain why nearly 10,000 tanks have been destroyed in Ukraine by non-armor assets and why Kiev has pulled back our donated M1 tanks.
Tanks have been severely tested in the war in Ukraine, however, no modern military other than the US Marine Corps has abandoned them. Just the opposite; the US Army is developing a new tank with a requirement to be able to defend against the weapons seen in recent wars. The British Army is designing a new Leopard 3, and the Germans and French have formed a consortium to design and build a new modern tank with similar requirements.
Explain why you insist that literally every LCAC carry a single main battle tank (with nothing else) and thus only 4 tanks in a 3-ship MEU, and with each firing unguided rounds.
You surprise me you’re your lack of understanding of the role of tanks on the modern battlefield, that is, to provide the infantry with a mobile, protected, direct fire gun to fire on hard points and engage enemy armor. Unless absolutely needed early, my choice of landing craft would be LCUs.
Explain the immense fuel and logistical trains necessary to sustain tanks and the trivial number of artillery pieces brought by a MEU/MEB/MEF.
Most of these limitations are the result of the Navy’ inability (unwillingness) to provide the five amphibious ships MEUs used to deploy with. There was always competition for cube, square, and weight but not like there is today with three, granted more modern and capable, ships.
Explain why these assets were largely absent in Afghanistan. Over the past 40+ years the Marines insisted on hauling tiny elements of literally every capacity, as if expeditionary warfare was some kind of affirmative action program.
Marines embarked with what experience told them they needed for the expected missions, they did not “haul” anything.
Probably because they envisioned MEU forward deployments as officer familiarization regimes to feed white papers and enhance careers.
This is a gratuitous remark with no substance and thus unworthy of a reply.
General Berger saw through that charade, foresaw the demise of tanks by shoulder-fired systems, and recognized beach assaults were a fool’s errand.
In my view General Berger’s view of modern war was extremely limited; he failed to think like a professionally schooled MAGTF officer and more like a recon team leader. Thus, in four short years he destroyed what giants of the Corps—Generals Wilson, Barrow, Gray, Krulak, and Conway—built over 40 years.
A Corps that was able to fight as a combined arms MAGTF from battalion-level to corps-level and able to close with and destroy an enemy has been supplanted by one focused on small teams and a reconnaissance and sensing mission. Talk about “small ball.”
I don’t know what your background is, but your questions reflect an exceptionally poor understanding of combat development, tactics, weapons employment, and operational art. I’ll pass it off as you simply had a bad day among the many good ones I hope you have had.
The thing I most remember about combat structure of the Marine Corps was the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Everything was focused on mission and task organization from a MEU, MEB, or MEF. Further, I remember the Corps doing an Artillery reorganization study in 1988-or 89. I was a member of this study. The thrust behind this was to find a suitable lighter weight replacement for the M-198. The study also looked at the Multiple Launch Rocket System as a possible replacement for an artillery battery within the Artillery Regiment.
Over the years, I have watched the Force Structure of the Corps change...not necessarily for the better! I believe that the Force Design 2030 has taken the "sting" out of the MAGTF by reducing capabilities. The loss of Tanks, Bridging, Heavy Artillery, and reduction in aircraft will have serious consequences in the long-term. While I grasp the concept of seizing the littoral Islands in the South China Sea, it is fraught with too many unknowns. And to tell our Marines who will occupy these islands that they may have to forage is highly questionable strategy.
The other big question that I ponder is the transport of our Marines on naval vessels that have questionable reliability. Does the US Navy have the total lift capability to handle our needs based on the mission(s) assigned? I don't have a warm and fuzzy feeling.
FD2030 has rendered the MAGTF capabilities impotent while solely focusing on fighting the CHICOMs on remote Pacific islands and disregarding the other 95% of real world threats. Divesting all tanks, 86% of tubed artillery, all bridging capabilities, heavy-lift helo capacity, massive infantry cuts, and eliminating STA platoons from infantry line companies will prove the death of our beloved Corps and its ability to fulfill its charter and mission.
Missle unit on an island-far away from any real support in a semi conflict situation?! Seems we have a test of the concept with an Army unit on Shemya this week. Will it affect the PRC or Russia’s transit of our territorial air and sea space? Those will be some wet soldiers out there—6 time zones from DC! Forage out there is as difficult (ask any of the surviving Japanese soldiers on Kiska-there were none ) as any place on earth other than the giant deserts.
“Need a new idea? Read an old book!” Absolutely true, and the Naval & Military Histories of our WW II campaigns are replete with well documented examples of the dangers of such a strategy. Let our judgment be tempered by our history! Semper Fidelis!
In the attempt to be civil and respectful, (as requested by CP) the element that protrudes into one’s frontal lob is that, as has been stated in the past by this writer, the current CMC just secretes arrogance mixed with a healthy dose of certitude coupled to a clear case of being metaphorically deaf. As General Van Riper says, “he listens but doesn’t hear.” We are back to 1 MEF being the be all and end all, and not much movement on truly getting FD Happy Talk placed in the trash bin of bad ideas, and a major effort to reprogram aka budget immediate, mid and long term funding in order to regain full MAGTF capability. Worse, the smell of consultants is all over the CPG. Recently, the US Navy announced that it has engaged a “local” (DC?) non profit (BlueForge Alliance) for one year at just under $1 billion dollars and further engaged Deloitte Consulting up to $2.4 Billion over four years to tell the Navy how to build submarines better. The total allocation is just $1 billion shy of the cost of one (1) SSN Virginia Class Attack submarine. One wonders if Deloitte or BlueForge helped to write the current CPG, because it is hard to fathom any Marine Commandant putting down as guidance this latest missive, which says a great deal and means very little.
I wish that our former CMC had used MCCDC's combat development process, but he did not. Instead he circumvented the command came up with the FD 2030 travesty behind closed doors with a very small group of retired field grade officers. The Corps could hardly have done worse if it had sought an outside consultant though that would never have been the approach of any previous commandant.
Sir quick question. Have you and others had and discussions or any thoughts on making sure this DOES NOT happen again with a future commandant? The traditional "guard rails" fell by the wayside to a fevered few. Will this require congressional action or can it be done differently?
I applaud your articles you've written and your input about this FD2030 insanity! I honestly don't rightly see a way to reverse this curse and restore our full MAGTF capabilities because any voices of dissent have been forced into retirement or squelched. I could see the Corps looking at more light weight but lethal tanks to best suit our amphib and expeditionary needs if somehow the voices of sanity could bring reason to this insanity. Restoring the tubed arty can be done without much effort, along with restoring STA platoons to line companies and restarting our infamous and elite Scout/Sniper Schools. The restoration of our combat engineering capabilities is essential as well. The restoration of our amphib USN shipping requirements is also a MUST if we're truly to return to being a "force in readiness"!
The Army, AF and Navy all have anti ship units and munitions fielded that are far superior to the concept the USMC continues to wrestle with five years after the EABO was conceived and which has yet to result in a fielded unit. The Army stood up the 11th Airborne Division in under three years and deployed to Shemya in a real world response. I note that no one called the USMC. Why would they? When did we last answer the phone call?
Having exercised on Adak I can assure anyone that “living off of the land” there is delusional.
I suspect the Army HIMARS unit that deployed to Shemya had the new Precision Strike Missile. I cannot confirm that. About a year ago they fired the PSM from their HIMARs.
This USMC HIMARs unit was deactivated in March 2024. The Corps is opting for a vehicle and missile mix to target moving ships and opted not to develop a rocket with that capability for HIMARS as it is too big. Still waiting for the demo of the marriage of radars, vehicles and ship killing rockets or missiles. The EABO concept has no operational unit yet.
Looking forward to seeing the USMC unit with NSMs, Radars, vehicles etc. When I see that T/O and T/E and see it “damage” a moving ship I will concede that a capability has been created. Until then all remains a concept and in many cases unfunded. It has been five years. Still waiting. Has anyone done an estimate on how many NSM launchers you might need to cover the less than 100 miles between islands in the first Island chain?
Those are all legitimate concerns. Heading off in another direction as you cut your nose off to spite your face is not the answer.
1500 miles vs 500. It pains me say it: USMC has no unit ready to deploy to anywhere that meets the EABO concept. Marine Littoral Regiments are Infantry Regiments downsized. A Regiment could be turned into a MLR in 36 hours. The idea is to deploy to remote locations to sink ships. Has yet to be demonstrated.
The Commandant could have signaled a new direction for the Marine Corps in the CPG. Instead, he elected to double down on FD, despite overwhelming evidence that Russia, Iran, North Korea, and various nonstate actors are real and growing threats to America's national interests.
Wow! There is a lot to unpack here. I have to agree that the CP “Comments and Analysis” on this section are on point and correct. The Commandant myopic thinking is a bit over whelming. As a Service Chief, he seems to be telling the Combatant Commanders how to fight their theater war. For example, in a global war there is no way he is going to be able to “protect I MEF (or 2 or 3 MEF) from emergent taskings to non-priority theaters.” The Marine Corps has 3 MEFs for 6 Combatant Commanders and he will not determine the MEF’s priority theater. A war with the CCP will be a GLOBAL WAR and will not be localized to the Pacific.
At the start of the WW2, the 6th Marines Regiment, forming in Southern California and getting ready for South Pacific jungle warfare. Suddenly, the 6th Marines got orders to sail to the Azores. Winston Churchill was short on forces and needed help to cover those British possessions in the Atlantic. The President (FDR) volunteered the Marines and ordered the 6th Marines to board ships to help defend the Azores. While in route their orders changed to defending Iceland (after a stop at South Carolina to pick up cold weather gear and the 1st Marine Brig HQ).
I believe that the US Army’s MDTF has beat the MRL to the punch. The MDTF has greater capability and does not need to hide (see CP – Ode to HEMTT and "polarbear" comments). In addition, I believe that the CCP can do the same by occupying those small islands before 3 MEF lands the MLR. After the Chinese Communist won the battles on the mainland, they conducted a number of amphibious assaults to seize coastal islands from the National Chinese. In reach case, the Communist first seized the adjacent islands to isolate the objectives. They will need to do the same in order to seize Taiwan and protect their SLOCs.
Forget the staff’s comments on the CPG, I want to see the Combatant Commander’s comments.
"I believe that the US Army’s MDTF has beat the MRL to the punch. The MDTF has greater capability and does not need to hide..."
THAT SIR IS THE SAD POINT! Current leadership has placed itself into a hole and can't find its way out. SIF is one of two things. Not a Stand-In-Force but to be blunt a "Stand & Die" quasi tripwire force that in its heroic death will (in the idea of the planners) rally the American public to engage with the Chinese over an island that most of the citizens can't even find on a map and wouldn't want to waste American lives/treasure in its defense if they could...OR it's a failed attempt to make the Marine Corps the priority service in the fight against the Chinese (notice the heavy focus on command & control for such a small force...is someone thinking they could lead the joint fight?).
Neither plan is viable. The idea that Marine Ground in a highly kinetic fight at sea and in the air will be the "eyes and ears of the joint force" smacks of MADNESS!
So what are we left with? A Marine Corps that is no longer capable of forcible entry operations. A Marine Corps that is SO FREAKING LIGHT that the 82nd arrives with more ground combat firepower than an equivalent sized Marine Corps unit (same with the other light units in the Army in a few years).
So forcible entry is off the table. Rapid deployment is a joke without big amphibs and the Army brings more firepower anyway so Crisis Response is off the table.
In the one place that current leadership is placing all its eggs we see that the MDTF has out-Marine Corps'd the Marine Corps without destroying its force structure.
The most head freaking thing about this is that the "original designers" of Force Design 2030 DID HAVE SOME GOOD IDEAS. Unfortunately they acted in private, did not get buy in from stakeholders in this endeavour and would accept no criticism of their plan.
Force Design 2030 will be studied in business schools as the ultimate in "change agent" failure.
Fortunately the Marine Corps is a robust organization. It can be saved from a terrible plan and flawed thinking. Rebuilding the MAGTF is essential. Fixing naval shipping is essential. Putting together a solid plan to do so (I've seen a few linked from these pages) is also essential.
If we don't then the future will see US Army V-280s transporting 11th Airborne to seize islands in the pacific from LHDs with the well decks filled with robot boats to resupply those forces once ashore.....while SOCOM (that parachuted in earlier) will be acting as the "eyes and ears of the joint force" as they do a job that once belonged to the Marine Corps but was foolishly thrown away.
Members of Chowder Society II are working hard everyday to try to persuade the Corps' leadership to get the Corps on the right track. In general they listen but don't hear. There are several members of Congress who are concerned and endeavor to assist as much as they can (think the requirement for a federally funded research and development center to conduct an analysis of FD 2030). This "fight" will not be short but we must prevail.
General Van Riper, have Chowder Society II had any luck with Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D). She is the senior Senator from New Hampshire, sits on the armed services committee and sub committee on seapower. She/we here in seacoast NH have a dog in the hunt, so to say, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard employs over 6000 people, generally at least two to three boats are in here at all times. In principal one would hope she has a handle on appropriations and so forth in matters related to the Department of Navy, Navy Department and Marine Corps, makes one wonder if she is getting the straight scoop on the FD bun fight. Might be worth a try to fill,her in, if it hasn’t been tried already.
The Senator as a member of the SASC would likely receive copies of the many articles we have published and select Compass Points posts. I don't believe any of our retired generals have sought to meet with her. I have this for action and truly appreciate the heads up.
Charles, to add to my initial comment; The small staff of Chowder Society II that oversees relations with Congress provided the following information.
“Chowder Society II distributes Compass Points posts to select Congressional members and staff. Thanks for bringing the highly respected Senator Shaheen to our attention. She and her staff have been added to the distribution.”
My thanks also for asking about this and for your numerous insightful comments on Compass Points
PKVR
We're Marines, and we'll see this battle through!
My replies follow each of your accusations.
I recommend that retired graybeards instead explain the past 40 years of utter failure before claiming clairvoyance over FD-2030.
I’m unsure of what you mean by the term “utter failure.” Surely you don’t mean Operation ‘Fury From the Sea,” the Marine’s landing in Grenada, “Operation Desert Storm,” or the two MEUs General Mattis led into Afghanistan, or I MEF’s performance under General Conway in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Explain the collapse of over-the-horizon warfare.
Over the Horizon operations did not “collapse.” OTH as it was known was followed by the Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) concept and the supporting concept, Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM), which were central to Marine Corps thinking until the 38th CMC walked away from them with EABO.
Explain the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a multi-billion dollar boondoggle with excessive moving parts that was never “Marine-proof.”
You clearly know nothing of the history of the EFV. General P.X. Kelly halted an earlier program when it did not seem likely it would meet requirements. What followed was an extensive program involving seperate land-based and a water-based systems. In short, vehicles were built that met the requirements for both environments and then the experience from those programs were merged into a new program, which won high praise from Congress and DOD for innovation and management. I was at the opening of the plant near Occoquan in 1996 where the first prototypes were built. The program ran into trouble for two reasons; it was not designed to protect against IEDs, which were unknown when MCCDC created requirement documents and challenges with the complex hydraulics. General Amos halted it for these reasons; I was in the room when he made the decision.
Explain the death toll of the MV-22.
Every one of the 62 deaths was a tragedy. Military aviation is challenged by the inherent risks of flight. The V-22’s mishap rate is 3.43 for 100,000 flight hours, near average for the other type/model/series aircraft Marine aviators fly.
Explain why nearly 10,000 tanks have been destroyed in Ukraine by non-armor assets and why Kiev has pulled back our donated M1 tanks.
Tanks have been severely tested in the war in Ukraine, however, no modern military other than the US Marine Corps has abandoned them. Just the opposite; the US Army is developing a new tank with a requirement to be able to defend against the weapons seen in recent wars. The British Army is designing a new Leopard 3, and the Germans and French have formed a consortium to design and build a new modern tank with similar requirements.
Explain why you insist that literally every LCAC carry a single main battle tank (with nothing else) and thus only 4 tanks in a 3-ship MEU, and with each firing unguided rounds.
You surprise me you’re your lack of understanding of the role of tanks on the modern battlefield, that is, to provide the infantry with a mobile, protected, direct fire gun to fire on hard points and engage enemy armor. Unless absolutely needed early, my choice of landing craft would be LCUs.
Explain the immense fuel and logistical trains necessary to sustain tanks and the trivial number of artillery pieces brought by a MEU/MEB/MEF.
Most of these limitations are the result of the Navy’ inability (unwillingness) to provide the five amphibious ships MEUs used to deploy with. There was always competition for cube, square, and weight but not like there is today with three, granted more modern and capable, ships.
Explain why these assets were largely absent in Afghanistan. Over the past 40+ years the Marines insisted on hauling tiny elements of literally every capacity, as if expeditionary warfare was some kind of affirmative action program.
Marines embarked with what experience told them they needed for the expected missions, they did not “haul” anything.
Probably because they envisioned MEU forward deployments as officer familiarization regimes to feed white papers and enhance careers.
This is a gratuitous remark with no substance and thus unworthy of a reply.
General Berger saw through that charade, foresaw the demise of tanks by shoulder-fired systems, and recognized beach assaults were a fool’s errand.
In my view General Berger’s view of modern war was extremely limited; he failed to think like a professionally schooled MAGTF officer and more like a recon team leader. Thus, in four short years he destroyed what giants of the Corps—Generals Wilson, Barrow, Gray, Krulak, and Conway—built over 40 years.
A Corps that was able to fight as a combined arms MAGTF from battalion-level to corps-level and able to close with and destroy an enemy has been supplanted by one focused on small teams and a reconnaissance and sensing mission. Talk about “small ball.”
I don’t know what your background is, but your questions reflect an exceptionally poor understanding of combat development, tactics, weapons employment, and operational art. I’ll pass it off as you simply had a bad day among the many good ones I hope you have had.
The thing I most remember about combat structure of the Marine Corps was the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Everything was focused on mission and task organization from a MEU, MEB, or MEF. Further, I remember the Corps doing an Artillery reorganization study in 1988-or 89. I was a member of this study. The thrust behind this was to find a suitable lighter weight replacement for the M-198. The study also looked at the Multiple Launch Rocket System as a possible replacement for an artillery battery within the Artillery Regiment.
Over the years, I have watched the Force Structure of the Corps change...not necessarily for the better! I believe that the Force Design 2030 has taken the "sting" out of the MAGTF by reducing capabilities. The loss of Tanks, Bridging, Heavy Artillery, and reduction in aircraft will have serious consequences in the long-term. While I grasp the concept of seizing the littoral Islands in the South China Sea, it is fraught with too many unknowns. And to tell our Marines who will occupy these islands that they may have to forage is highly questionable strategy.
The other big question that I ponder is the transport of our Marines on naval vessels that have questionable reliability. Does the US Navy have the total lift capability to handle our needs based on the mission(s) assigned? I don't have a warm and fuzzy feeling.
Excellent observations! Semper Fi!
FD2030 has rendered the MAGTF capabilities impotent while solely focusing on fighting the CHICOMs on remote Pacific islands and disregarding the other 95% of real world threats. Divesting all tanks, 86% of tubed artillery, all bridging capabilities, heavy-lift helo capacity, massive infantry cuts, and eliminating STA platoons from infantry line companies will prove the death of our beloved Corps and its ability to fulfill its charter and mission.
Missle unit on an island-far away from any real support in a semi conflict situation?! Seems we have a test of the concept with an Army unit on Shemya this week. Will it affect the PRC or Russia’s transit of our territorial air and sea space? Those will be some wet soldiers out there—6 time zones from DC! Forage out there is as difficult (ask any of the surviving Japanese soldiers on Kiska-there were none ) as any place on earth other than the giant deserts.
Need a new idea?read an old book.
“Need a new idea? Read an old book!” Absolutely true, and the Naval & Military Histories of our WW II campaigns are replete with well documented examples of the dangers of such a strategy. Let our judgment be tempered by our history! Semper Fidelis!
Excellent point. With the battle of Guadalcanal in our history, why would we want to repeat that with the SIF?
In the attempt to be civil and respectful, (as requested by CP) the element that protrudes into one’s frontal lob is that, as has been stated in the past by this writer, the current CMC just secretes arrogance mixed with a healthy dose of certitude coupled to a clear case of being metaphorically deaf. As General Van Riper says, “he listens but doesn’t hear.” We are back to 1 MEF being the be all and end all, and not much movement on truly getting FD Happy Talk placed in the trash bin of bad ideas, and a major effort to reprogram aka budget immediate, mid and long term funding in order to regain full MAGTF capability. Worse, the smell of consultants is all over the CPG. Recently, the US Navy announced that it has engaged a “local” (DC?) non profit (BlueForge Alliance) for one year at just under $1 billion dollars and further engaged Deloitte Consulting up to $2.4 Billion over four years to tell the Navy how to build submarines better. The total allocation is just $1 billion shy of the cost of one (1) SSN Virginia Class Attack submarine. One wonders if Deloitte or BlueForge helped to write the current CPG, because it is hard to fathom any Marine Commandant putting down as guidance this latest missive, which says a great deal and means very little.
I wish that our former CMC had used MCCDC's combat development process, but he did not. Instead he circumvented the command came up with the FD 2030 travesty behind closed doors with a very small group of retired field grade officers. The Corps could hardly have done worse if it had sought an outside consultant though that would never have been the approach of any previous commandant.
Sir quick question. Have you and others had and discussions or any thoughts on making sure this DOES NOT happen again with a future commandant? The traditional "guard rails" fell by the wayside to a fevered few. Will this require congressional action or can it be done differently?
Sir,
I applaud your articles you've written and your input about this FD2030 insanity! I honestly don't rightly see a way to reverse this curse and restore our full MAGTF capabilities because any voices of dissent have been forced into retirement or squelched. I could see the Corps looking at more light weight but lethal tanks to best suit our amphib and expeditionary needs if somehow the voices of sanity could bring reason to this insanity. Restoring the tubed arty can be done without much effort, along with restoring STA platoons to line companies and restarting our infamous and elite Scout/Sniper Schools. The restoration of our combat engineering capabilities is essential as well. The restoration of our amphib USN shipping requirements is also a MUST if we're truly to return to being a "force in readiness"!
Semper Fidelis!
Joel Bowling
USMC active duty 1985-91, SGT, 2531/0321
NCARNG 1991-2013, CWO2 (ret), 915A MOS