Compass Points - Conflict of Visions?

Which way for the Marine Corps?

Compass Points - Conflict of Visions?

Which way for the Marine Corps?

July 2, 2025

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Perhaps the discussion of the future of the Marine Corps is a discussion that involves a conflict of visions. In one vision, the future of the Marine Corps is primarily as a sit and sense, sensor node in a joint kill chain off the coast of China. In another vision, the Marine Corps in the future is called upon as it has in the past, to be a global, combined arms, 9-1-1 crisis response force.

Which conflicting vision best represents the future of the Marine Corps? One Korea era Marine, Thomas Sowell has written about conflicting visions.

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Visions are the foundations on which theories are built. The final structure depends not only on the foundation, but also on how carefully and consistently the framework of theory is constructed and how well buttressed it is with hard facts.

― Thomas Sowell, A Conflict of Visions

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A long time Compass Points member, Samuel Whittemore, suggests that in discussing the future of the Marine Corps it is worth remembering some words from the past -- specifically from another Korea era warrior, T.R. Fehrenbach.

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In July, 1950, one news commentator rather plaintively remarked that warfare had not changed so much, after all. For some reason, ground troops still seemed to be necessary, in spite of the atom bomb. And oddly and unfortunately, to this gentleman, man still seemed to be an important ingredient in battle. Troops were still getting killed, in pain and fury and dust and filth. What happened to the widely-heralded pushbutton warfare where skilled, immaculate technicians who never suffered the misery and ignominy of basic training blew each other to kingdom come like gentlemen?

In this unconsciously plaintive cry lies the buried a great deal of the truth why the United States was almost defeated.

Nothing had happened to pushbutton warfare; its emergence was at hand. Horrible weapons that could destroy every city on Earth were at hand—at too many hands. But, pushbutton warfare meant Armageddon, and Armageddon, hopefully, will never be an end of national policy.

Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud.

-- T.R. Fehrenbach, - This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War

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Which vision? Marines in the mud? Or missile Marines sitting and sensing on islands?

From bootcamp, Marines are taught that the mission of the Marine Corps rifle squad is to locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat.

Is that wrong? Is a better mission to sit on islands, monitor joint sensors, and pass on data?

The foundational publication of the Marine Corps MCDP-1 Warfighting says nothing about joint kill chains.

It talks about many important things including sections on:

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-- Speed and Focus

-- Surprise and Boldness

-- Creating and Exploiting Opportunity

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This discussion leads us to a corollary thought: the importance of creating and exploiting opportunity. In all cases, the commander must be prepared to react to the unexpected and to exploit opportunities created by conditions which develop from the initial action. When identification of enemy critical vulnerabilities is particularly difficult, the commander may have no choice but to exploit any and all vulnerabilities until action uncovers a decisive opportunity. As the opposing wills interact, they create various

fleeting opportunities for either foe. Such opportunities are often born of the fog and friction that is natural in war. They may be the result of our own actions, enemy mistakes, or even chance. By exploiting opportunities, we create in increasing numbers more opportunities for exploitation. It is often the ability and the willingness to ruthlessly exploit these opportunities that generate decisive results. The ability to take advantage of opportunity is a function of speed, flexibility, boldness, and initiative.

-- MCDP-1 Warfighting, p2-26

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Offensive, opportunity seeking, Marine Corps? Or a Marine Corps sitting and sensing on islands?

One of the hard facts is that the world is still a dangerous place. Crises and battles will erupt when and where they are least expected. When the next crisis comes and the Marine Corps is once more sent into the fray, what should Marine Corps be focused on? Sitting and sensing? Or fighting and winning?

Perhaps the answer to the conflict of visions is that a Marine Corps with the units, equipment, and capabilities for worldwide crisis response can also easily sit and sense. The opposite is not true. A Marine Corps focused on the units, equipment, and capabilities to sit and sense may have a terrible struggle when thrown into a sudden combined arms battle.

Author T.R. Fehrenbach came to the conclusion that the war in Korea was a war where too many American warriors died because they were unprepared for the fight. Let the Marine Corps restore and enhance its worldwide combine arms, forward deployed MAGTF. If there is sitting and sensing that need to be accomplished, The Marine MAGTF can accomplish the sit and sense mission as needed.

In the brutal conflicts ahead, there will be no time for the Marines to sot out conflicting visions. It is time for the Marine Corps to focus once again on the magnificent MAGTF and worldwide combined arms, crisis response.

Author T.R. Fehrenbach greatly admired the Marines who fought in Korea. The Korea era Marines were not split by conflicting visions, they were united by a shared commitment to overcome all obstacles and all enemies by always advancing to locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat.

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In 1950 a Marine Corps officer was still an officer, and a sergeant behaved the way good sergeants had behaved since the time of Caesar, expecting no nonsense, allowing none. And Marine leaders had never lost sight of their primary—their only—mission, which was to fight. The Marine Corps was not made pleasant for men who served in it. It remained the same hard, dirty, brutal way of life it had always been.

― T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War

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How can the Marine Corps best serve the Nation? How can the Marine Corps be best prepared for whatever challenge the future may bring? The answer maybe to focus first, last, and always, not on any narrow, defensive mission, but on a broad, global, crisis response mission. When Marines onboard Navy amphibious ships arrive off a nation in crisis, enemies are deterred, and friends are encouraged.

A restored and enhanced Marine MAGTF can complete a variety of missions, not only missile and drone strikes, sitting, and sensing and passing on data, but also a variety of other missions including fight, strike, deter, evacuate, rescue, restore order, and more. A renewed focus on worldwide crisis response is both the best way for the Marine Corps to serve the Nation, and is the best way for the Marine Corps to unify its conflicting visions and arrive at tomorrow’s battlefield stronger than today.