The Marine Corps has also been conspicuously absent during recent contingencies in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The Air Force and Navy have been the “go to” forces.
True, the Marines have been hamstrung from performing their traditional 911 mission by episodic MEU deployments caused by the lack of amphibious ship readiness. But blaming the Navy for the problems does not make the Service more relevant. Fixing the problems will.
And who thinks the SIF will be relevant in a shooting war with China? The inability to position, reposition, and logistically support isolated and widely dispersed SIFs will render them irrelevant. The highly touted LAW/LSM/LSV is not the answer. It will be slow, relatively unarmed, and built to civilian survivability standards. It too will be conspicuously absent when the shooting starts. Even the previous CG, MCCDC knew this when he stated, “As war nears… the new amphibious ship goes into hiding, it goes into bed-down somewhere. Nowhere do we envision the LAW out transiting the sea lanes in the middle of a kinetic fight.” For more on the SIF as a house of cards see: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/05/28/marine_corps_stand-in_forces_a_house_of_cards_1034266.html
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron VMM‑162 operates out of Djibouti supporting Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, providing logistics, medevac, and other actions best left off here.
The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embarked on the USS Boxer, provided disaster relief in the Philippines following Typhoon Krathon (locally known as Julian)
In 2023, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) participated in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, following a volcanic eruption of Mount Bagana.
Yea, but can these MEUs participate in a robust combined arms conflict? With all the hype about Ukraine, there is still close combined arms battle. The current MEU/Marine Corps cannot fight the full range of combat operations.
You have to admit, that the Marine Corps is less capable without tanks, 60% less artillery, no breaching capabilities etc. It is no longer a robust combined arms force. You could still have sensing, and anti-ship missiles with a traditional Marine Corps. Sometimes armored support is necessary. The Israelis lost heavily against ATGMs during the Yom Kippur War, because they did not have a combined arms force: armor, arty, inf. Drones are good, but are not everything.
Jerry McAbee is exactly right….the issue is relevance and the Marine Corps is no longer relevant to the Combatant Commanders. Prior to 2020, the Marine Corps was on the first team. The Marine Corps had three robust combined arms Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). The operational capabilities of the MEFs enabled Marine Service Component planners to offer operational support to the Combatant Commanders across the spectrum of conflict.
With the implementation of Force Design, the Commandant neutered Service Component planners’ ability to offer operational support across the spectrum of conflict and has relegated the Marine Corps to second team status.
Korea surprised the post WWII world, including the Marine Corps. There were young recruits who never set foot in boot camp who were trained aboard ship on their way to Korea. Fortunately, senior leaders were flexible enough to alter force structure quickly to meet the challenge. In a peer to peer conflict, could our current leadership be flexible enough to scrap their ideological mindset to meet reality?
Assuming that the role of the Marines was to sit, sense and hit ships that blindly stray to within 100 miles of our undetectable radars and launchers it would imply we actually have those and can do that. Of course, six years in we do not have it and cannot do it. So, even this foggy and misguided vision has yet to be able to be executed.
If we were able to do exactly what FD-2030 envisions would it even be worth it? The vision is a worthless mirage.
Most visionaries hatch grand plans over sweeping vistas. It is rare that visionaries focus on inconsequential little objectives. In this case we see nothing but bad ideas in specific locations that are inconsequential and the visionaries have lacked the competence to develop their modest fantasy.
You’re not criticizing Force Design—you’re mocking a version that doesn’t exist. No one said Marines would sit around waiting for ships to stumble into range. That’s not the concept, and it’s certainly not the execution.
Six years in, Marines are forward. They are sensing, coordinating fires, and integrating with joint and allied forces. Task Force 61/2, III MEF, and the MLRs are operating in the First Island Chain right now—disrupting adversary targeting cycles and shaping the battlespace in real time.
If you think that’s a “worthless mirage,” maybe explain why PLA-affiliated think tanks are studying Noble Fusion and writing assessments on how it threatens their kill chain.
You call it inconsequential. INDOPACOM, PACFLEET, and our allies are asking for more.
And sure—the Corps could communicate this better to its critics. But let’s be honest: the critics aren’t being listened to because they’ve offered zero viable alternatives. Just hand-wringing and nostalgia.
This isn’t fantasy. It’s already changing how the fight is shaped. You’re just not seeing it—because you’re not looking where the real work is being done.
Where is USMC in current crises in Red Sea and Mediterranean? FD has transformed the USMC from a flexible, crisis response force to a one-trick pony. For a show that may never happen.
You could say that a robust combined arms expeditionary force Marine Corps, is more like a Swiss Army Knife of capabilities. It has more resources to do more different type of missions. A limited missile force Marine Corps cannot do the full range of military operations. To me, it's that simple.
Given that the Navy needs help, I can't say that using Pacific Marines to provide shore-based ship-killing power is wrong. Why the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command couldn't have been used for the anti-ship weapons while traditional Marine detachments protected them is beyond me.
But granting for the sake of argument that western Pacific Marines had to be Force Designed into this role to directly help the Navy sink enemy ships, why did the rest of the Marine Corps have to be gutted and undermined for the 9-1-1 role?
Grok:”The USMC Force Design 2030 initiative aims to modernize the Marine Corps for naval expeditionary warfare, focusing on littoral operations and Great Power Competition. Below is a 280-word summary of key Force Design terms, distinguishing DoD-approved terms (published in official DoD/USMC documents) from unapproved concepts (not yet validated or endorsed by DoD), excluding acquisition programs as requested.
**Approved Terms (Published in DoD/USMC Documents)**:
- **EABO (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations)**: A published concept for mobile, low-signature bases in littoral areas to support naval sea control and denial, integrated with DoD’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO).
- **MLR (Marine Littoral Regiment)**: A formalized unit structure for littoral warfare, with active units like the 3rd MLR (Hawaii), approved through USMC restructuring and DoD budgets.
- **LRPF (Long-Range Precision Fires)**: A published capability for long-range strikes to enable sea denial, aligned with DoD joint fires doctrine.
- **DMO (Distributed Maritime Operations)**: A Navy-led, DoD-published concept for dispersed naval forces, adopted by USMC for Force Design.
- **MDO (Multi-Domain Operations)**: A DoD joint concept for integrated operations across domains, published and used in Force Design.
- **A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial)**: A DoD-standardized term for adversary strategies limiting U.S. access, published in JP 1-02.
- **SRI/SRIG (Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence/Group)**: Published USMC terms for ISR operations and units supporting distributed operations.
**Unapproved Concepts (Not Validated by DoD)**:
- **SIF (Stand-In Forces)**: A concept for units operating within adversary weapons engagement zones, unvalidated due to untested tactics and logistics concerns.
- **LOCE (Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment)**: A developmental concept for coastal combat, awaiting DoD validation.
- **MPSR (Mature Precision Strike Regime)**: A theoretical adversary threat environment, not yet formalized in DoD doctrine.
These unapproved concepts face scrutiny for feasibility, particularly logistics, and require further testing for DoD approval. See www.marines.mil for details.”!
Thomas Sowell, born June 30, 1930, in Gastonia, North Carolina, is a renowned American economist and conservative commentator. Orphaned young, he grew up in Harlem, dropped out of high school, and worked odd jobs. Drafted into the U.S. Marine Corps in 1951 during the Korean War, he served as a photographer, finding discipline that shaped his future. After earning a GED, he attended Howard University, then graduated magna cum laude from Harvard (BA, 1958), earned an MA from Columbia (1959), and a PhD from the University of Chicago (1968) under Milton Friedman.
Sowell worked as an economist at the U.S. Department of Labor and taught at Cornell, UCLA, and other universities. Since 1977, he has been a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, authoring over 45 books, including *Basic Economics* and *Black Rednecks and White Liberals*, critiquing affirmative action and social policies. He received the National Humanities Medal in 2002 and retired from his syndicated column in 2016. In April 2025, at 94, he warned against trade wars from Trump’s tariffs on *Uncommon Knowledge*. An X post (August 2024) celebrated his 94th birthday, calling him a “great philosopher.”
Married to Mary Ash with two children, Sowell is private but influential, with advocates pushing for a Presidential Medal of Freedom. His Korean War service and photography passion influenced his disciplined approach to scholarship. Semper Fidelis Hand Salute.
“Which vision? Marines in the mud? Or missile Marines sitting and sensing on islands?”
They’re not mutually exclusive—and both are happening right now.
Marines persisting in the Philippines aren’t just “sitting on islands.” They’re operating forward, under threat, and enabling the kill chain in ways that reflect both traditional grit and modern capability.
Do Recon Marines “just sit and sense”? Of course not. They persist, maneuver, and inform fires. The same applies to Stand-in Forces.
The above question underlies your fundamental misunderstanding of SIF, LOCE, and EABO. These concepts don’t replace traditional Marine roles—they build on them to meet modern threats head-on.
Then as Gen. Conway and Gen. Zinni write, and Gen. McAbee recounts why has the Marine Corps not been called upon, or been unable to react to a foreign policy need? Yes the Navy has plenty of responsibility for this, but to insinuate that the Corps is currently just as capable pre-FD is to deny the facts.
Where is the MEU off of Gaza? Where’s the MEU in the Red Sea? Where’s the MEU in the Indian Ocean? Where’s the MEU off of the Straits of Hormuz? Where’s the 9th MEB? Where’s III MEF?
Please Cpl. surely you can give the readers here assurances that the mystery of the missing MEUs is only a figment of our imagination.
Except, no one is actually doing SIF and EABO the way it has been sold. It's branding, kind of like Intel changing Core i9 to Core Ultra. yeah sure, maybe a recon unit somewhere is inserting and extracting, conducting Sensor Enhanced Multi Spectrum Joint Interoperability Multi Domain Information Extraction Operations (acronym-SEMSJIMDIEO) aka OPs in the WEZ (which varies). But no one is sitting on an islet, peeping out with a full active radar all cammied up while quietly persisting via authorized local contracting for food and gas while running info to the Joint Network. And there is no NMESIS battery waiting for a mission hiding like Kitt from Knightrider under the trees. And noone is printing F35 parts and UAS's out of a cave overlooking the Straits of Malacca. It's theatre.
Appreciate the discussion—seriously. You’ve been a lot more reasonable than most who jump into these debates just to throw stones.
That said, I think part of the disconnect here is just the classification barrier. A lot of what validates SIF and EABO isn’t sitting on public slides—it’s CUI and above. MCCLL reports, unit debriefs, and wargame takeaways show a very different picture than what critics often assume.
But even in the open-source space, there are real indicators this isn’t just branding:
• Task Force 61/2 has been executing real-world Recon-Counter Recon missions with MLR and MEU integration—forward, persistent, and under threat.
• III MEF’s NOBLE series, especially NOBLE FUSION, brought together two MEUs and a Carrier Strike Group operating in the First Island Chain. That wasn’t just a joint rep exercise—Chinese military analysts took it seriously, with PLA-affiliated think tanks publishing detailed assessments of U.S. stand-in force posture, kill chain disruption, and distributed survivability.
The early summaries of Force Design may not have captured the nuance or day-to-day realism of how these concepts are actually being implemented—but make no mistake, the operational shift is real, and it’s being closely watched by the very people it’s designed to deter.
I also don’t really understand the fixation on NMESIS. The true value of the MLR isn’t just a missile launcher—it’s in how it integrates and coordinates joint fires across domains. NMESIS is additive—not essential. Until critics accept that this is a joint fight, they’ll keep missing the entire point of Force Design.
All that said, I actually agree with you on one point—the Corps could absolutely tell its story better. A more deliberate effort to explain the “how” behind FD to internal skeptics might go a long way in dialing back concerns. But I also get why that hasn’t been the priority. At this point, no one in a position to make decisions is really listening to the critics.
Thanks again for the conversation—genuinely appreciate the honest back-and-forth.
The operational shift is real? You’re correct, it is. But in a way not intended. The operational shift is killing Marines.
HQMC released the Aviation Accident Report on the MV-22 accident in August 2023 in Australia.
The Command Investigation (CI) for the MV-22B Class A mishap in Australia resulted in the death of 3 Marines.
In a post crash interview with an H-1 pilot that was a member of the composite squadron for the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin he stated that “…is undermanned just due to force design stuff…”. (Encl. 26) The Investigating Officer even mentioned this in the body of the CI, so I think he thought it significant enough to include.
MV-22B Mishap
Opinions, MRF-D Man, Train, Equipment
1. “The Pre-Deployment Training Program developed for this MRF-D rotation was insufficient to train the MAGTF in their Mission Essential Tasks (METs) prior to deployment and was more focused on Force Design initiatives than on Core/Assigned METs required for proper integration prior to deployment. [FF 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287]”
This Investigating Officer’s (IO) opinion is found at the bottom of Page 51.
IO’s strive to put their opinions in what they perceive as the order of importance. I find it very significant that the IO very first opinion dealt with Force Design.
I’m wondering how many other units are being affected like this?
Jack, no IMO. A big part of the reason was that training and doctrine were stove-piped. Each service knew how to run an operation but didn’t understand how to integrate other services. Weather also played a big part.
What DoD or JCS, DON, USN, USMC Publication list all Force Design 2030 or as currently rebranded Force Design acronyms, terms etc..? Does such an approved list exist? SEMSJIMDIEO, WEZ, EABO, SIF, MLR, Kill Chain, SENSING, MULTI DOMAIN etc etc. Is NMESIS a DOD or JCS or USMC approved military definition, acronym or a system name. Is FDMSU an approved FD term?
Sam - I made up "SEMSJIMDIEO". I find a lot of humor in modern verbosity that takes simple concepts and labels them with ridiculous modern .milspeak terms (i.e. "Instructor" becomes a "knowledge transfer specialist"). Of course, I'm an old knucklehead who still thinks changing KOCOA to OCOKA/OAKOC was about the most ridiculous thing. Keep your stones in your hands...I've heard all the rationale. However, to answer your actual question, here is a link to the relevant Joint Pub: https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf If you have a CAC and legit access, the latest and greatest is on the jcs.mil website. This version may not have all the latest and greatest, but it's a good start. "words mean things" :)
Small little teams of sensing Marines will be destroyed in detail. You have to know that there are probably PLA surveillance teams in the Philippines monitoring where Marines deploy to. Marines will be attacked before they even set up.
“Small sensing teams will be destroyed in detail.”
Just like all the Ukrainians are dead because the Russians can see them?
This argument ignores how modern warfare actually plays out. Sensing doesn’t equal vulnerability—it enables survivability. The goal isn’t to hide and hope, it’s to sense first, shoot first, and move fast.
You assume these Marines are static. They’re not. They’re mobile, dispersed, camouflaged, and backed by long-range fires, cyber, space, and air support. The PLA may watch, but watching isn’t killing. The kill chain is contested—and the U.S. is making that contest hell for the adversary.
No, I don't expect Marine sensing teams to be static. But PLA teams will also be on the move. They are probably sensing our Marine teams right now. Cpl, the problem is not with sensing teams or kill chains. The problem is that in order to achieve this concept, the last Commandant eliminated 60% of tube artillery, all the tanks and other combat assets the Marine Corps had. The Marine Corps is no longer a robust expeditionary force. The 3rd MEF is no longer a combat division. It's mostly a missile and sensing force. You can say all you want about sensing, kill chains, and drone technology, but the Marine Corps now lacks the capability for close combat.
I almost didn’t want to drop all of these in one day—was going to pace the “PAO Jibber Jabber” out a bit.
But who am I kidding? There’s no shortage of proof when it comes to the Marine Corps’ global relevance and the success of Force Design. The story writes itself.
U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps integrate G/ATOR and TOC-L radar systems in joint training on Okinawa
“We wanted to take two branches of equipment together to integrate and potentially create an air defense system that can be better utilized and accessed on Okinawa,” said 1st Lt. Jack Langlais, 623rd ACS.
Radar data from the Marine Corps system now feeds directly into TOC-L, improving airspace clarity, coordination, and rapid decision-making in complex environments.
Navy, Marine Corps planning for third Large-Scale Exercise
Ryan Pallas reminds us Force Design didn’t appear out of thin air—it’s the result of decades of analysis, decisions, and adaptations across eleven Commandants.
The Corps’ history of embracing innovation—despite its cultural resistance to change—makes FD2030 less of a revolution and more of a return to its expeditionary, technologically-enabled roots.
Each of these undercuts the “arguments” floated on this forum lately. I was going to respond point-by-point, but I’ll let you connect the dots.
////
More Force Design “actions.” I’ll stand by for your collective “words.”
-Pallas; to paraphrase him 'everything since 1775 lead to Force Design in a coherent fashion. It's just natural and you are haters if you disagree'. That's Pallas; at least he's consistent. I agree that there are things in the past I thought were terrible. Case in point; the restructuring of Marine Reconnaissance in the early '90s was huge goose-egg. But that's doesn't make FD good. There were also things that were positive. They did not organically lead to present day.
-LSE 2025: okay, great. Global virtual network exercise. Hopefully it helps work out some connectivity and networking bugs and no BSD.
-DIE: great, joint USMC / USAF Exercise connecting a Gator to the USAF TOC-L. I actually like that - it's a good joint networking capability unique to the Gator radar. Almost as good as raiding the Kadena Airman's club back in '90...now that was some joint USMC/USAF operations! As far as an FD win? ...Do MRE's acquired post 2020 constitute proof of the global efficacy of Force Design also?
If I can make a request, I'd love to see the open source AAR for MLREX or something real. Show me a pic of 2 NMESIS's actually duckwalking behind the leader JLTV so I can see an actual NMESIS section with the autonomy working. Show me the doctrinal improvements for Navy wide USMC-Navy comms (which was an issue leading up to MLREX). Show me the AAR for an MLR deployed running full EABO logistics (please not a PAO pic of a drone flying a 5 gallon water can to a squad). Something?
The larger issue is relevance. Training exercises alone do make a Service relevant. Responding to crises and contingencies makes a Service relevant. When was the last time the Marines responded to a crisis or contingency? According to General Conway and General Zinni, not in the last three times needed. See: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/opinion/commentary/2023/07/07/how-capable-is-todays-marine-corps-to-answer-a-9-1-1-call-not-very/
The Marine Corps has also been conspicuously absent during recent contingencies in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The Air Force and Navy have been the “go to” forces.
True, the Marines have been hamstrung from performing their traditional 911 mission by episodic MEU deployments caused by the lack of amphibious ship readiness. But blaming the Navy for the problems does not make the Service more relevant. Fixing the problems will.
And who thinks the SIF will be relevant in a shooting war with China? The inability to position, reposition, and logistically support isolated and widely dispersed SIFs will render them irrelevant. The highly touted LAW/LSM/LSV is not the answer. It will be slow, relatively unarmed, and built to civilian survivability standards. It too will be conspicuously absent when the shooting starts. Even the previous CG, MCCDC knew this when he stated, “As war nears… the new amphibious ship goes into hiding, it goes into bed-down somewhere. Nowhere do we envision the LAW out transiting the sea lanes in the middle of a kinetic fight.” For more on the SIF as a house of cards see: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/05/28/marine_corps_stand-in_forces_a_house_of_cards_1034266.html
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron VMM‑162 operates out of Djibouti supporting Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, providing logistics, medevac, and other actions best left off here.
https://www.marines.mil/News/Marines-TV/videoid/938372/dvpTag/ospreys/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embarked on the USS Boxer, provided disaster relief in the Philippines following Typhoon Krathon (locally known as Julian)
https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3931496/uss-boxer-15th-meu-arrive-in-philippines-to-deliver-emergency-relief-supplies/
In 2023, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) participated in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, following a volcanic eruption of Mount Bagana.
https://www.3rdmaw.marines.mil/Media-Room/Photos/igphoto/2003347389/
USMC F35s doing F35 things
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/05/05/inside-marine-corps-first-f-35-combat-sortie-services-aviator-of-year.html
Yea, but can these MEUs participate in a robust combined arms conflict? With all the hype about Ukraine, there is still close combined arms battle. The current MEU/Marine Corps cannot fight the full range of combat operations.
100% they can.
What makes you say that?
You have to admit, that the Marine Corps is less capable without tanks, 60% less artillery, no breaching capabilities etc. It is no longer a robust combined arms force. You could still have sensing, and anti-ship missiles with a traditional Marine Corps. Sometimes armored support is necessary. The Israelis lost heavily against ATGMs during the Yom Kippur War, because they did not have a combined arms force: armor, arty, inf. Drones are good, but are not everything.
Jerry McAbee is exactly right….the issue is relevance and the Marine Corps is no longer relevant to the Combatant Commanders. Prior to 2020, the Marine Corps was on the first team. The Marine Corps had three robust combined arms Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). The operational capabilities of the MEFs enabled Marine Service Component planners to offer operational support to the Combatant Commanders across the spectrum of conflict.
With the implementation of Force Design, the Commandant neutered Service Component planners’ ability to offer operational support across the spectrum of conflict and has relegated the Marine Corps to second team status.
Korea surprised the post WWII world, including the Marine Corps. There were young recruits who never set foot in boot camp who were trained aboard ship on their way to Korea. Fortunately, senior leaders were flexible enough to alter force structure quickly to meet the challenge. In a peer to peer conflict, could our current leadership be flexible enough to scrap their ideological mindset to meet reality?
Assuming that the role of the Marines was to sit, sense and hit ships that blindly stray to within 100 miles of our undetectable radars and launchers it would imply we actually have those and can do that. Of course, six years in we do not have it and cannot do it. So, even this foggy and misguided vision has yet to be able to be executed.
If we were able to do exactly what FD-2030 envisions would it even be worth it? The vision is a worthless mirage.
Most visionaries hatch grand plans over sweeping vistas. It is rare that visionaries focus on inconsequential little objectives. In this case we see nothing but bad ideas in specific locations that are inconsequential and the visionaries have lacked the competence to develop their modest fantasy.
This perfectly summarizes Force Delusions…!
FD= False Dreams!
Even better: FD=Fatal Dreams
What don't we have 24 NMESIS in FY25 and 32 requested for FY26?
You’re not criticizing Force Design—you’re mocking a version that doesn’t exist. No one said Marines would sit around waiting for ships to stumble into range. That’s not the concept, and it’s certainly not the execution.
Six years in, Marines are forward. They are sensing, coordinating fires, and integrating with joint and allied forces. Task Force 61/2, III MEF, and the MLRs are operating in the First Island Chain right now—disrupting adversary targeting cycles and shaping the battlespace in real time.
If you think that’s a “worthless mirage,” maybe explain why PLA-affiliated think tanks are studying Noble Fusion and writing assessments on how it threatens their kill chain.
You call it inconsequential. INDOPACOM, PACFLEET, and our allies are asking for more.
And sure—the Corps could communicate this better to its critics. But let’s be honest: the critics aren’t being listened to because they’ve offered zero viable alternatives. Just hand-wringing and nostalgia.
This isn’t fantasy. It’s already changing how the fight is shaped. You’re just not seeing it—because you’re not looking where the real work is being done.
Where is USMC in current crises in Red Sea and Mediterranean? FD has transformed the USMC from a flexible, crisis response force to a one-trick pony. For a show that may never happen.
I doubt it. Operating in the first Island Chain with what? They have no missiles. Disrupting adversary targeting cycles? Shaping the battle space?
Sorry, I am not buying it. Need to explain it better? You bet. But they cannot because it is not happening.
Think they are requesting 90 missiles in FY26 and have been ramping up the number every year the past few years.
You could say that a robust combined arms expeditionary force Marine Corps, is more like a Swiss Army Knife of capabilities. It has more resources to do more different type of missions. A limited missile force Marine Corps cannot do the full range of military operations. To me, it's that simple.
Given that the Navy needs help, I can't say that using Pacific Marines to provide shore-based ship-killing power is wrong. Why the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command couldn't have been used for the anti-ship weapons while traditional Marine detachments protected them is beyond me.
But granting for the sake of argument that western Pacific Marines had to be Force Designed into this role to directly help the Navy sink enemy ships, why did the rest of the Marine Corps have to be gutted and undermined for the 9-1-1 role?
3
No, sir. It was 5. Remember?
“When they opened his "flak jacket" he had five massive wounds from that machine gun. FIVE...”
Grok:”The USMC Force Design 2030 initiative aims to modernize the Marine Corps for naval expeditionary warfare, focusing on littoral operations and Great Power Competition. Below is a 280-word summary of key Force Design terms, distinguishing DoD-approved terms (published in official DoD/USMC documents) from unapproved concepts (not yet validated or endorsed by DoD), excluding acquisition programs as requested.
**Approved Terms (Published in DoD/USMC Documents)**:
- **EABO (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations)**: A published concept for mobile, low-signature bases in littoral areas to support naval sea control and denial, integrated with DoD’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO).
- **MLR (Marine Littoral Regiment)**: A formalized unit structure for littoral warfare, with active units like the 3rd MLR (Hawaii), approved through USMC restructuring and DoD budgets.
- **LRPF (Long-Range Precision Fires)**: A published capability for long-range strikes to enable sea denial, aligned with DoD joint fires doctrine.
- **DMO (Distributed Maritime Operations)**: A Navy-led, DoD-published concept for dispersed naval forces, adopted by USMC for Force Design.
- **MDO (Multi-Domain Operations)**: A DoD joint concept for integrated operations across domains, published and used in Force Design.
- **A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial)**: A DoD-standardized term for adversary strategies limiting U.S. access, published in JP 1-02.
- **SRI/SRIG (Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence/Group)**: Published USMC terms for ISR operations and units supporting distributed operations.
**Unapproved Concepts (Not Validated by DoD)**:
- **SIF (Stand-In Forces)**: A concept for units operating within adversary weapons engagement zones, unvalidated due to untested tactics and logistics concerns.
- **LOCE (Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment)**: A developmental concept for coastal combat, awaiting DoD validation.
- **MPSR (Mature Precision Strike Regime)**: A theoretical adversary threat environment, not yet formalized in DoD doctrine.
These unapproved concepts face scrutiny for feasibility, particularly logistics, and require further testing for DoD approval. See www.marines.mil for details.”!
Thomas Sowell, born June 30, 1930, in Gastonia, North Carolina, is a renowned American economist and conservative commentator. Orphaned young, he grew up in Harlem, dropped out of high school, and worked odd jobs. Drafted into the U.S. Marine Corps in 1951 during the Korean War, he served as a photographer, finding discipline that shaped his future. After earning a GED, he attended Howard University, then graduated magna cum laude from Harvard (BA, 1958), earned an MA from Columbia (1959), and a PhD from the University of Chicago (1968) under Milton Friedman.
Sowell worked as an economist at the U.S. Department of Labor and taught at Cornell, UCLA, and other universities. Since 1977, he has been a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, authoring over 45 books, including *Basic Economics* and *Black Rednecks and White Liberals*, critiquing affirmative action and social policies. He received the National Humanities Medal in 2002 and retired from his syndicated column in 2016. In April 2025, at 94, he warned against trade wars from Trump’s tariffs on *Uncommon Knowledge*. An X post (August 2024) celebrated his 94th birthday, calling him a “great philosopher.”
Married to Mary Ash with two children, Sowell is private but influential, with advocates pushing for a Presidential Medal of Freedom. His Korean War service and photography passion influenced his disciplined approach to scholarship. Semper Fidelis Hand Salute.
“Which vision? Marines in the mud? Or missile Marines sitting and sensing on islands?”
They’re not mutually exclusive—and both are happening right now.
Marines persisting in the Philippines aren’t just “sitting on islands.” They’re operating forward, under threat, and enabling the kill chain in ways that reflect both traditional grit and modern capability.
Do Recon Marines “just sit and sense”? Of course not. They persist, maneuver, and inform fires. The same applies to Stand-in Forces.
The above question underlies your fundamental misunderstanding of SIF, LOCE, and EABO. These concepts don’t replace traditional Marine roles—they build on them to meet modern threats head-on.
Ah, the good FD proponent!
Then as Gen. Conway and Gen. Zinni write, and Gen. McAbee recounts why has the Marine Corps not been called upon, or been unable to react to a foreign policy need? Yes the Navy has plenty of responsibility for this, but to insinuate that the Corps is currently just as capable pre-FD is to deny the facts.
Where is the MEU off of Gaza? Where’s the MEU in the Red Sea? Where’s the MEU in the Indian Ocean? Where’s the MEU off of the Straits of Hormuz? Where’s the 9th MEB? Where’s III MEF?
Please Cpl. surely you can give the readers here assurances that the mystery of the missing MEUs is only a figment of our imagination.
Except, no one is actually doing SIF and EABO the way it has been sold. It's branding, kind of like Intel changing Core i9 to Core Ultra. yeah sure, maybe a recon unit somewhere is inserting and extracting, conducting Sensor Enhanced Multi Spectrum Joint Interoperability Multi Domain Information Extraction Operations (acronym-SEMSJIMDIEO) aka OPs in the WEZ (which varies). But no one is sitting on an islet, peeping out with a full active radar all cammied up while quietly persisting via authorized local contracting for food and gas while running info to the Joint Network. And there is no NMESIS battery waiting for a mission hiding like Kitt from Knightrider under the trees. And noone is printing F35 parts and UAS's out of a cave overlooking the Straits of Malacca. It's theatre.
Appreciate the discussion—seriously. You’ve been a lot more reasonable than most who jump into these debates just to throw stones.
That said, I think part of the disconnect here is just the classification barrier. A lot of what validates SIF and EABO isn’t sitting on public slides—it’s CUI and above. MCCLL reports, unit debriefs, and wargame takeaways show a very different picture than what critics often assume.
But even in the open-source space, there are real indicators this isn’t just branding:
• Task Force 61/2 has been executing real-world Recon-Counter Recon missions with MLR and MEU integration—forward, persistent, and under threat.
• III MEF’s NOBLE series, especially NOBLE FUSION, brought together two MEUs and a Carrier Strike Group operating in the First Island Chain. That wasn’t just a joint rep exercise—Chinese military analysts took it seriously, with PLA-affiliated think tanks publishing detailed assessments of U.S. stand-in force posture, kill chain disruption, and distributed survivability.
The early summaries of Force Design may not have captured the nuance or day-to-day realism of how these concepts are actually being implemented—but make no mistake, the operational shift is real, and it’s being closely watched by the very people it’s designed to deter.
I also don’t really understand the fixation on NMESIS. The true value of the MLR isn’t just a missile launcher—it’s in how it integrates and coordinates joint fires across domains. NMESIS is additive—not essential. Until critics accept that this is a joint fight, they’ll keep missing the entire point of Force Design.
All that said, I actually agree with you on one point—the Corps could absolutely tell its story better. A more deliberate effort to explain the “how” behind FD to internal skeptics might go a long way in dialing back concerns. But I also get why that hasn’t been the priority. At this point, no one in a position to make decisions is really listening to the critics.
Thanks again for the conversation—genuinely appreciate the honest back-and-forth.
The operational shift is real? You’re correct, it is. But in a way not intended. The operational shift is killing Marines.
HQMC released the Aviation Accident Report on the MV-22 accident in August 2023 in Australia.
The Command Investigation (CI) for the MV-22B Class A mishap in Australia resulted in the death of 3 Marines.
In a post crash interview with an H-1 pilot that was a member of the composite squadron for the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin he stated that “…is undermanned just due to force design stuff…”. (Encl. 26) The Investigating Officer even mentioned this in the body of the CI, so I think he thought it significant enough to include.
MV-22B Mishap
Opinions, MRF-D Man, Train, Equipment
1. “The Pre-Deployment Training Program developed for this MRF-D rotation was insufficient to train the MAGTF in their Mission Essential Tasks (METs) prior to deployment and was more focused on Force Design initiatives than on Core/Assigned METs required for proper integration prior to deployment. [FF 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287]”
This Investigating Officer’s (IO) opinion is found at the bottom of Page 51.
IO’s strive to put their opinions in what they perceive as the order of importance. I find it very significant that the IO very first opinion dealt with Force Design.
I’m wondering how many other units are being affected like this?
Was Marine involvement in the DESERT CLAW accident that derailed a strategic mission very similar? Just asking?
Jack, no IMO. A big part of the reason was that training and doctrine were stove-piped. Each service knew how to run an operation but didn’t understand how to integrate other services. Weather also played a big part.
Cfrog re your wonderful acronym, although I may be 328 years old, I was aware of this fact. Happy Independence Samuel
What DoD or JCS, DON, USN, USMC Publication list all Force Design 2030 or as currently rebranded Force Design acronyms, terms etc..? Does such an approved list exist? SEMSJIMDIEO, WEZ, EABO, SIF, MLR, Kill Chain, SENSING, MULTI DOMAIN etc etc. Is NMESIS a DOD or JCS or USMC approved military definition, acronym or a system name. Is FDMSU an approved FD term?
Sam - I made up "SEMSJIMDIEO". I find a lot of humor in modern verbosity that takes simple concepts and labels them with ridiculous modern .milspeak terms (i.e. "Instructor" becomes a "knowledge transfer specialist"). Of course, I'm an old knucklehead who still thinks changing KOCOA to OCOKA/OAKOC was about the most ridiculous thing. Keep your stones in your hands...I've heard all the rationale. However, to answer your actual question, here is a link to the relevant Joint Pub: https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf If you have a CAC and legit access, the latest and greatest is on the jcs.mil website. This version may not have all the latest and greatest, but it's a good start. "words mean things" :)
Small little teams of sensing Marines will be destroyed in detail. You have to know that there are probably PLA surveillance teams in the Philippines monitoring where Marines deploy to. Marines will be attacked before they even set up.
“Small sensing teams will be destroyed in detail.”
Just like all the Ukrainians are dead because the Russians can see them?
This argument ignores how modern warfare actually plays out. Sensing doesn’t equal vulnerability—it enables survivability. The goal isn’t to hide and hope, it’s to sense first, shoot first, and move fast.
You assume these Marines are static. They’re not. They’re mobile, dispersed, camouflaged, and backed by long-range fires, cyber, space, and air support. The PLA may watch, but watching isn’t killing. The kill chain is contested—and the U.S. is making that contest hell for the adversary.
No, I don't expect Marine sensing teams to be static. But PLA teams will also be on the move. They are probably sensing our Marine teams right now. Cpl, the problem is not with sensing teams or kill chains. The problem is that in order to achieve this concept, the last Commandant eliminated 60% of tube artillery, all the tanks and other combat assets the Marine Corps had. The Marine Corps is no longer a robust expeditionary force. The 3rd MEF is no longer a combat division. It's mostly a missile and sensing force. You can say all you want about sensing, kill chains, and drone technology, but the Marine Corps now lacks the capability for close combat.
Semper Fidelis! Hand Salute!
The Feather Merchants: Senior Leaders Subverted the Marine Corps
Incompetent leaders misled the Marine Corps into ‘force design.’ It badly needs to return to conventional combat power.
by GARY ANDERSON
June 29, 2025, 10:25 PM
Gen. Eric Smith is currently serving as 39th Commandant of the US Marine Corps (Marines/Youtube)
In the Marine Corps of my father and….Recommend reading American Spectator.
I almost didn’t want to drop all of these in one day—was going to pace the “PAO Jibber Jabber” out a bit.
But who am I kidding? There’s no shortage of proof when it comes to the Marine Corps’ global relevance and the success of Force Design. The story writes itself.
U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps integrate G/ATOR and TOC-L radar systems in joint training on Okinawa
Defence Industry Europe
https://defence-industry.eu/u-s-air-force-marine-corps-integrate-g-ator-and-toc-l-radar-systems-in-joint-training-on-okinawa/
“We wanted to take two branches of equipment together to integrate and potentially create an air defense system that can be better utilized and accessed on Okinawa,” said 1st Lt. Jack Langlais, 623rd ACS.
Radar data from the Marine Corps system now feeds directly into TOC-L, improving airspace clarity, coordination, and rapid decision-making in complex environments.
Navy, Marine Corps planning for third Large-Scale Exercise
Seapower Magazine
https://seapowermagazine.org/navy-marine-corps-in-planning-for-third-large-scale-exercise/
LSE 2025 kicks off this August, spanning 22 time zones and incorporating allies and partners into a mostly virtual, global warfighting scenario.
Rear Adm. Kenneth Blackmon: “LVC enables realistic, global-scale training while conserving resources and increasing safety.”
Force Design: Four decades in the making
War on the Rocks
https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/marine-force-design-is-four-decades-in-the-making/
Ryan Pallas reminds us Force Design didn’t appear out of thin air—it’s the result of decades of analysis, decisions, and adaptations across eleven Commandants.
The Corps’ history of embracing innovation—despite its cultural resistance to change—makes FD2030 less of a revolution and more of a return to its expeditionary, technologically-enabled roots.
Each of these undercuts the “arguments” floated on this forum lately. I was going to respond point-by-point, but I’ll let you connect the dots.
////
More Force Design “actions.” I’ll stand by for your collective “words.”
Ok, just read through it all (slow trading day).
-Pallas; to paraphrase him 'everything since 1775 lead to Force Design in a coherent fashion. It's just natural and you are haters if you disagree'. That's Pallas; at least he's consistent. I agree that there are things in the past I thought were terrible. Case in point; the restructuring of Marine Reconnaissance in the early '90s was huge goose-egg. But that's doesn't make FD good. There were also things that were positive. They did not organically lead to present day.
-LSE 2025: okay, great. Global virtual network exercise. Hopefully it helps work out some connectivity and networking bugs and no BSD.
-DIE: great, joint USMC / USAF Exercise connecting a Gator to the USAF TOC-L. I actually like that - it's a good joint networking capability unique to the Gator radar. Almost as good as raiding the Kadena Airman's club back in '90...now that was some joint USMC/USAF operations! As far as an FD win? ...Do MRE's acquired post 2020 constitute proof of the global efficacy of Force Design also?
If I can make a request, I'd love to see the open source AAR for MLREX or something real. Show me a pic of 2 NMESIS's actually duckwalking behind the leader JLTV so I can see an actual NMESIS section with the autonomy working. Show me the doctrinal improvements for Navy wide USMC-Navy comms (which was an issue leading up to MLREX). Show me the AAR for an MLR deployed running full EABO logistics (please not a PAO pic of a drone flying a 5 gallon water can to a squad). Something?
Force Design is a mirage !