I am not a constitutional scholar ( in fact I am no kind of scholar) but when someone refers to, “ the constitution “ “says “ my ears pick up. The men who drafted that document debated the various tenets via the news papers (lacking internet or TV). Those debates are recorded as The Federalist and AntiFederalist papers. Easy to discern their thoughts on the numerous controversial passages. And to understand the how’s and why’s that make the document is so viable. Open debate is a worthy goal.
I find it odd that in this time of enlightened debate no one has volunteered to debate the 2030 document here on this forum. Surely there has to someone with conviction on that side.
I read every article knowing that some on here had/have access to the classified “reasoning” that most will never see again.
Off to wander aimlessly in the Sierras until the next installment arrives. I do thank the numerous contributors to this most important dialog.
The most critical phrases , appearing in both paragraphs of the the composition and functions quote, are "The Marine Corps.......shall.....". This is not optional.
Robert O’Brien is a confidant of President Trump. His advocacy for the entire Marine Corps to the Pacific reveals a glaring ignorance of what is left of the Corps and its utility in the opening stages of a conflict with China. I hope President Trump’s other advisors have a better understanding of the Corps’ limited capabilities.
The violations of US law by the senior uniformed leaders, SecNav and SecDef is unprecedented since the Civil War. The very same leaders who follow every policy and utterance with the loyalty of a dog feel perfectly comfortable picking and choosing which laws to follow in the case of the Organization and Mission of the Corps
The global challenges come from Russia, Radical Islam led by Iran and China to include its toxic dwarf in N Korea now with a formal defense agreement with Russia. That trifecta is focused on us and critical Allies of ours that are important to our prosperity. The Corps simply must have global utility and has self castrated itself to one theater without the ability to even have an impact there. (The wide receiver has decided he is no longer catching passes. He only wants to play on kick offs.) The entire conversation is divorced from reality. Very senior people talking about phantom units with phantom capabilities being deployed on phantom platforms to phantom bases. Who are these leaders?
Skip Polak is more than a “Constitutional Scholar” … he’s a Marine who knows his profession & is educated on its history: his is a voice of reason. His remarks merit our consideration, to wit: have we been given the picture of what drove FD 2030 design, its considerations, why the “hush-hush” character of its evolution, and why have we been driven to near tactical, operational, & strategic irrelevance? Marines need not be afraid of each other. Our history is rich in dealing with the new inherent in the unknown. No better example exists than our development of Amphibious doctrine coming out of the trenches of WW I. In a more contemporary setting, we were trend setters in tactical excellence via Palm Tree/CAX/Desert Viper exercises. Managed, informed & intelligent change is in our DNA! So, senior leadership, the time has come to get our house in order, and we should do that pronto. Engage us, active and retired Marines alike … we’re on your team. Semper Fidelis!
Concerns about FD 2030 are justified. Solutions to remedy the FD 2030 combined arms divesting are needed. What are they? The clock is ticking with certainty toward the next crisis where Marines and their capabilities are needed. The new Nostrademus in India recently tagged June 29 as one of the dates when WW 3 will begin. Next week?
There is no place in todays CP Title 10 recap where the word ^expeditionary^ is used to descibe the Marine Corps structure or missions. The words used that define and justify the Marine Corps are ^naval^ and ^amphibious.^
If the Nostrademous prediction for WW3, as an example, is precipitated by the PLA attack on Taiwan, what role should the Marine Corp be prepared to fulfill. Title 10 says it is a naval ampbibious role.
It is well established that there are naval capabilities far better suited to counter the PLAN in an invasion of Taiwan than will be Stand in Force Marines with missiles. But, there is a serious amphibious ship availability shortfall. How then can the Marine Corps fulfill its Title 10 amphibious role?
If China does initiate an invasion of Taiwan, the Marine MAGTF embarked aboard an ARG would provide the naval amphibious capability directed by Title 10. A key reason an ARG/MAGTF is so essential to this invasion scenario is the domino effect of escalating crisises. FD 2030 gives no attention to a domino effect such as North Korea attacking South Korea as an aid to China by tying up U. S. Forces.
An ARG/MAGTF in the Sea of Japan would provide grand strategy options for dealing with North Korea. Another ARG MEU in the Mideast would have deterrent value for Irans aggressive intentions. Finally, a FIE of a MEB to Norway would have deterrent value for expanded Russian attacks in Europe.
Back in the day, it was a requirement to include a solution with a problem.
My solution for amphibious ships to support 1 MEU is to have an ARG composed of 2 LHDs. For the air component, put the MV-22 (Rein) on 1 LHD and the F-35s on the second LHD. If you do the math, 24 LHDs could support 12 MEUs. The LHD cost based on available information is 1 billion dollars less than a new LPD so stop building LPDs.
If you dont like my solution, present your own. No more problems. Just solutions. SF. RW
Bob, I would prefer a three ship ARG, just to spread out the MEU. I do think an ARG/MEU off the coast of one of China's overseas bases may make them think twice. It would be more of a deterrent than the SIF.
Randy, The dispersal of ARG/MEU ships is a vital and valid concern. What can be done to get the Marine Corps back into it's global naval, amphibious role. We ships, we need places to build the ships and we need the money to buy the ships. What to do? The air defense capability of the 2 LHD ARG/MEU is much greater than would be in the present 3 ship ARG configuration. Then there is the issue of cost. The new LPD is 3 billion dollars. An LHD with more combat power capability is 2 billion dollars, based on available information. Could Expeditionary Fast Transports enter into the ARG/MEU mix? Can DDGs be added to the mix for defense. Any proposal to get the Marine Corps back in the global business will have to deal with available ships, the need to build new ships. where to build the ships, and how to pay for the ships.
Thanks, Bob for this info. I wonder if you could get the same carrying capacity with two LHAs and one LPD? There has to be a reason for the 2 and 1 ARG. We are definitely in a hurt locker when it comes to shipping.
The 2 LHD ARG Cube should exceed the standard 3 ship ARG cube.
Also, regarding defense as well as offensive operations ashore, the Drone capability evolving as an operational concept for combat operations would be compatible with both the MV-22 and the F-35. You get more BANG for the buck.
The 2 LHD ARG gives enhanced mobility and greater combined arms mass. for combat operations.
What are the chances of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? 50/50? 70/30? We just don't know. We can't be certain. However, what are the chances of the need for worldwide crisis intervention by US forces, short of war? I would say 100%. There have already been at least two instances when the United States Marine Corps was not able to conduct this mission. Both were a result of a lack of amphibious ships. One was to respond to a Turkish earthquake, and the other was to have forces in Europe prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Yet, current Marine Corps leadership wants to focus on just one scenario at the expense of other world events. This pertains to lack of amphibious lift. Yet, they want to build a fleet of landing ships with limited capacity for a dubious mission. This is the opposite of readiness! Yes, former CMC Berger and current CMC Smith have made the United States Marine Corps lack in readiness. Readiness, was the hallmark of Commandant Lejeune.
The Marine Corps is no longer a robust combined arms naval expeditionary force. We no longer have have the ability to conduct a strong power projection force on a world wide scale. Without tanks, sufficient artillery, and weak in combat engineering, the Marine Corps lacks sufficient combat power to deal with every military scenario. US Code 8063, specifically says the Marine Corps shall be a force of combined arms, which means: infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and other supporting arms.
Because of the legal issues involved, we should contact Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska. His is currently a Reserve Colonel. I do not know his opinion on this issue, but he should have some legal clout.
I am not a constitutional scholar ( in fact I am no kind of scholar) but when someone refers to, “ the constitution “ “says “ my ears pick up. The men who drafted that document debated the various tenets via the news papers (lacking internet or TV). Those debates are recorded as The Federalist and AntiFederalist papers. Easy to discern their thoughts on the numerous controversial passages. And to understand the how’s and why’s that make the document is so viable. Open debate is a worthy goal.
I find it odd that in this time of enlightened debate no one has volunteered to debate the 2030 document here on this forum. Surely there has to someone with conviction on that side.
I read every article knowing that some on here had/have access to the classified “reasoning” that most will never see again.
Off to wander aimlessly in the Sierras until the next installment arrives. I do thank the numerous contributors to this most important dialog.
The most critical phrases , appearing in both paragraphs of the the composition and functions quote, are "The Marine Corps.......shall.....". This is not optional.
Robert O’Brien is a confidant of President Trump. His advocacy for the entire Marine Corps to the Pacific reveals a glaring ignorance of what is left of the Corps and its utility in the opening stages of a conflict with China. I hope President Trump’s other advisors have a better understanding of the Corps’ limited capabilities.
The violations of US law by the senior uniformed leaders, SecNav and SecDef is unprecedented since the Civil War. The very same leaders who follow every policy and utterance with the loyalty of a dog feel perfectly comfortable picking and choosing which laws to follow in the case of the Organization and Mission of the Corps
The global challenges come from Russia, Radical Islam led by Iran and China to include its toxic dwarf in N Korea now with a formal defense agreement with Russia. That trifecta is focused on us and critical Allies of ours that are important to our prosperity. The Corps simply must have global utility and has self castrated itself to one theater without the ability to even have an impact there. (The wide receiver has decided he is no longer catching passes. He only wants to play on kick offs.) The entire conversation is divorced from reality. Very senior people talking about phantom units with phantom capabilities being deployed on phantom platforms to phantom bases. Who are these leaders?
Skip Polak is more than a “Constitutional Scholar” … he’s a Marine who knows his profession & is educated on its history: his is a voice of reason. His remarks merit our consideration, to wit: have we been given the picture of what drove FD 2030 design, its considerations, why the “hush-hush” character of its evolution, and why have we been driven to near tactical, operational, & strategic irrelevance? Marines need not be afraid of each other. Our history is rich in dealing with the new inherent in the unknown. No better example exists than our development of Amphibious doctrine coming out of the trenches of WW I. In a more contemporary setting, we were trend setters in tactical excellence via Palm Tree/CAX/Desert Viper exercises. Managed, informed & intelligent change is in our DNA! So, senior leadership, the time has come to get our house in order, and we should do that pronto. Engage us, active and retired Marines alike … we’re on your team. Semper Fidelis!
Concerns about FD 2030 are justified. Solutions to remedy the FD 2030 combined arms divesting are needed. What are they? The clock is ticking with certainty toward the next crisis where Marines and their capabilities are needed. The new Nostrademus in India recently tagged June 29 as one of the dates when WW 3 will begin. Next week?
There is no place in todays CP Title 10 recap where the word ^expeditionary^ is used to descibe the Marine Corps structure or missions. The words used that define and justify the Marine Corps are ^naval^ and ^amphibious.^
If the Nostrademous prediction for WW3, as an example, is precipitated by the PLA attack on Taiwan, what role should the Marine Corp be prepared to fulfill. Title 10 says it is a naval ampbibious role.
It is well established that there are naval capabilities far better suited to counter the PLAN in an invasion of Taiwan than will be Stand in Force Marines with missiles. But, there is a serious amphibious ship availability shortfall. How then can the Marine Corps fulfill its Title 10 amphibious role?
If China does initiate an invasion of Taiwan, the Marine MAGTF embarked aboard an ARG would provide the naval amphibious capability directed by Title 10. A key reason an ARG/MAGTF is so essential to this invasion scenario is the domino effect of escalating crisises. FD 2030 gives no attention to a domino effect such as North Korea attacking South Korea as an aid to China by tying up U. S. Forces.
An ARG/MAGTF in the Sea of Japan would provide grand strategy options for dealing with North Korea. Another ARG MEU in the Mideast would have deterrent value for Irans aggressive intentions. Finally, a FIE of a MEB to Norway would have deterrent value for expanded Russian attacks in Europe.
Back in the day, it was a requirement to include a solution with a problem.
My solution for amphibious ships to support 1 MEU is to have an ARG composed of 2 LHDs. For the air component, put the MV-22 (Rein) on 1 LHD and the F-35s on the second LHD. If you do the math, 24 LHDs could support 12 MEUs. The LHD cost based on available information is 1 billion dollars less than a new LPD so stop building LPDs.
If you dont like my solution, present your own. No more problems. Just solutions. SF. RW
Bob, I would prefer a three ship ARG, just to spread out the MEU. I do think an ARG/MEU off the coast of one of China's overseas bases may make them think twice. It would be more of a deterrent than the SIF.
Randy, The dispersal of ARG/MEU ships is a vital and valid concern. What can be done to get the Marine Corps back into it's global naval, amphibious role. We ships, we need places to build the ships and we need the money to buy the ships. What to do? The air defense capability of the 2 LHD ARG/MEU is much greater than would be in the present 3 ship ARG configuration. Then there is the issue of cost. The new LPD is 3 billion dollars. An LHD with more combat power capability is 2 billion dollars, based on available information. Could Expeditionary Fast Transports enter into the ARG/MEU mix? Can DDGs be added to the mix for defense. Any proposal to get the Marine Corps back in the global business will have to deal with available ships, the need to build new ships. where to build the ships, and how to pay for the ships.
Thanks, Bob for this info. I wonder if you could get the same carrying capacity with two LHAs and one LPD? There has to be a reason for the 2 and 1 ARG. We are definitely in a hurt locker when it comes to shipping.
The 2 LHD ARG Cube should exceed the standard 3 ship ARG cube.
Also, regarding defense as well as offensive operations ashore, the Drone capability evolving as an operational concept for combat operations would be compatible with both the MV-22 and the F-35. You get more BANG for the buck.
The 2 LHD ARG gives enhanced mobility and greater combined arms mass. for combat operations.
What are the chances of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? 50/50? 70/30? We just don't know. We can't be certain. However, what are the chances of the need for worldwide crisis intervention by US forces, short of war? I would say 100%. There have already been at least two instances when the United States Marine Corps was not able to conduct this mission. Both were a result of a lack of amphibious ships. One was to respond to a Turkish earthquake, and the other was to have forces in Europe prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Yet, current Marine Corps leadership wants to focus on just one scenario at the expense of other world events. This pertains to lack of amphibious lift. Yet, they want to build a fleet of landing ships with limited capacity for a dubious mission. This is the opposite of readiness! Yes, former CMC Berger and current CMC Smith have made the United States Marine Corps lack in readiness. Readiness, was the hallmark of Commandant Lejeune.
The Marine Corps is no longer a robust combined arms naval expeditionary force. We no longer have have the ability to conduct a strong power projection force on a world wide scale. Without tanks, sufficient artillery, and weak in combat engineering, the Marine Corps lacks sufficient combat power to deal with every military scenario. US Code 8063, specifically says the Marine Corps shall be a force of combined arms, which means: infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and other supporting arms.
Because of the legal issues involved, we should contact Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska. His is currently a Reserve Colonel. I do not know his opinion on this issue, but he should have some legal clout.