Compass Points - Deployed MEU
Producing the crown jewel MEU
September 1, 2025
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The Marine Corps announced an expansion to land based prepositioning supplies and equipment in the Pacific. This is vital to supporting what has been called the crown jewel of the Marine Corps, the deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operation Capable or MEU (SOC).
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The U.S. Marine Corps is planning to branch out across the West Pacific with new prepositioning sites as the force continues to shape its force design and long term planning goals around restricted mobility and a lack of hardened supply chains, according to documents published by the service last month.
Two new sites are being proposed in Palau in Australia following the format of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Philippines (MCPP-PHIL) which reached its initial operational capability in the second quarter of FY2025. Full operational capability is planned for FY2026.
MCPP-PHIL, located in a warehouse in Subic Bay outside the capital city of Manila, stores equipment used in Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response (HA/DR) roles. That includes equipment like fuel distribution trucks, transportation vehicles, power distribution equipment and material handling equipment, according to the Corps.
The Philippines has agreements to not permanently base U.S. troops, but those agreements do not apply to prepositioned equipment located inside the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) Freeport Zone. Subic Bay itself is also receiving prepositioning equipment in a 57,000-square-foot warehouse at the former Subic Bay Naval Supply Depot. The port area has also received attention as a possible location for a new ammunition plant.
-- Naval News
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Senior Marine Corps leaders have said that the deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operation Capable or MEU (SOC) is the crown jewel of the Marine Corps.
This is an important admission by Marine senior leaders because if the deployed MEU (SOC) is the Marine Corps' crown jewel, that means that small, defensive, sensor and missile units on islands off of China's coast are not the Marine Corps' crown jewel. Deployed, flexible, crisis response MEUs are much more useful to the Marine Corps and to the Nation than island missile units. That is an important starting point.
It raises the next question. Where do the crown jewel MEUs come from? How are they produced? How are they forged?
First though it is worth reviewing why Marine MEUs deployed on the world's oceans are so useful to US policy makers. Ideally, the Marine Corps should have at least three deployed MEUs around the globe 24/7/365. With at least three MEUs with combined arms infantry, armor, artillery, logistics and more always deployed, Marines can arrive quickly to the scene of any crisis to deter, assist, strike, or fight. Even better, if the crisis grows, the small Marine MEU should be able to be rapidly augment, reinforced, and supported by prepositioning supplies and equipment.
The best prepositioning option is prepositioning amphibious ships. The next best prepositioning option is prepositioning supplies and equipment on land. Over the last several years, the Marine Corps has not advocated enough for more prepositioning ships and as a result the Navy has allowed the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) to fall from 16 ships to 7 in full operating status, with 2 additional ships in reduced status. To support the crown jewel MEUs the Marine Corps needs more than 2 million square feet of prepositioning lift. Today the Marine Corps has only roughly half of what is needed.
Why are prepositioning ships and prepositioning supplies on land crucial to deployed MEUs? As flexible and capable as combined arms MEUs are, they are still small units. When a crisis grows larger, the deployed MEU must be able to be augmented by rapid Marine fly-in echelons and prepositioning supplies and equipment.
This brings us back to the question of where do the crown jewel MEUs come from? How are they produced? How are they forged? MEU's are produced from the much larger MEFs -- Marine Expeditionary Force. There are only three large Marine MEFs, one on the East coast of the US, one on the US West coast, and one forward deployed in Japan.
Without strong, robust MEFs there can be no MEUs.
That is why, over the years, many Commandants have spoken eloquently of the “primacy of the MEF” and the importance of recognizing that the MEF is a “reservoir of combat power” from which Marine operational forces flow.
For decades, the “primacy of the MEF” has been an established concept. From the MEF, flowed amphibious brigades, MPF brigades, MEUs, SPMAGTFs, JTFs, and any other task-organized forces designed to meet mission needs. Each of these were extensions of the larger force and were viewed as “forward elements” of the MEF. This concept was built on several pillars:
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1. Maximizing deployability assets.
Amphibious ships, Maritime Prepositioning ships, and air transport were not just regarded as transportation. Brigades with fly-in echelons joined these assets to quickly become operational units.
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2. Creating and maintaining forces in readiness.
Air Alert forces, Air Contingency Forces, and fly-in Echelons were part of each MEF, ready and organized for rapid deployment.
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3. Developing compositing capability.
Forces were balanced and similar in each MEF. Forces from each MEF and the Reserves could join and composite to rapidly build combat power. Units were interchangeable.
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4. Emphasizing expeditionary organization and training.
The ability to operate in austere environments was part of the training, organization, and equipment of each unit. Expeditionary airfields, VSTOL aircraft, and minimal logistic tails were developed and employed.
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5. Preparing for full spectrum operations.
From multi-division/wing MEFs to small SPMAGTFs, Marine units were trained and prepared to operate as corps-level MEF forces in major combat roles down to small independent forces conducting humanitarian or disaster relief operations.
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6. Building integrated combined arms organizations.
Balanced combined arms formations and training were emphasized. Modernization and introduction of new technology were thoroughly tested and validated through the Concepts Based Requirement Process at MCCDC and introduced to compliment and expand the combined arms forces.
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7. Task organizing for missions.
The flexibility and efficiency of task organizing for missions, vice purpose designing units, provided for more utility for COCOM commanders and more streamlined organizations for JTF operations.
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8. Developing the capability for rapid convergence.
The commonality of MEF organizations and compositing of forces allowed for the convergence of the readiest, globally located Marine forces to rapidly close the scene of the crime.
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9. Maintaining a global orientation.
The concept of every “clime and place” had meaning. The Corps did not chase pacing threats or particular regional missions. From jungles to arctic, to deserts, it prepared for all contingencies.
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Compass Points congratulates the Marine Corps for expanding the land based supplies and equipment available to deployed MEUs. Much more needs to be done. The global prepositioning fleet must also be restored. Above all, the three large Marine MEFs -- particularly the Pacific based III MEF -- must be restored and enhanced. The Nation needs three Marine MEU's always deployed around the group. But the small MEUs do not make themselves. The small MEUs are forged by the larger Marine MEFs and supplied and supported by the prepositioning fleet and by Marine rapid fly-in echelons.
Right now the Marine 22nd MEU is sailing into harms way in the Pacific. The Marine Corps must focus on the MEF's and the prepositioning fleet needed to support deployed MEUs like the 22nd MEU. God speed.
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Naval News - 08/23/2025
U.S. Marine Corps Mulling New Prepositioning Sites in Palau and Australia to Counter Growing Chinese Missile Threat
By Carter Johnston
Let me just focus on the BLT in a MEU for a moment. We went from 27 Rifle Bn’s to 21. Essentially a cut of two entire Regiments. Sort of makes keeping sufficient units at sea 24/7/365 a lot tougher. When the Corps made the mistake of going to three rifle companies per Bn we divested 27 rifle companies. In short, at one time we had 27 Bn’s with four rifle companies each or 108 Rifle Companies. Today 21 Bn’s with three rifle companies totals 63 Rifle Companies. That is a loss of 45 rifle companies.
The BLT no longer has school trained snipers, no tanks, I doubt it has an 8 gun battery, the 81mm mortar platoon lacks ammo men. The machine gun teams lack ammo men, the 60mm mortar section lacks ammo men. Are the Corpsmen at T/O? How many members of the currently deployed BLT are in the ship’s platoon?
Concerned yet?
A very good assessment, but until the Marine Corps actually begins to rebuild those assets that were “divested”, then it’s just lip service. The present Commandant and those surrounding him are too invested in Force Design to actually change…Nor do they display the intellect and ability to do so. None of them have a clue or the experience and other background that will be needed to get it done.
It’s going to take a clean sweep and advance new people who are willing to undertake the hard training and study, then build on past relevant operations.
Anyone remember the Commandant’s Reading List? A look at the professional libraries of these people should be interesting. Semper Fi