Let me just focus on the BLT in a MEU for a moment. We went from 27 Rifle Bn’s to 21. Essentially a cut of two entire Regiments. Sort of makes keeping sufficient units at sea 24/7/365 a lot tougher. When the Corps made the mistake of going to three rifle companies per Bn we divested 27 rifle companies. In short, at one time we had 27 Bn’s with four rifle companies each or 108 Rifle Companies. Today 21 Bn’s with three rifle companies totals 63 Rifle Companies. That is a loss of 45 rifle companies.
The BLT no longer has school trained snipers, no tanks, I doubt it has an 8 gun battery, the 81mm mortar platoon lacks ammo men. The machine gun teams lack ammo men, the 60mm mortar section lacks ammo men. Are the Corpsmen at T/O? How many members of the currently deployed BLT are in the ship’s platoon?
After reviewing this, with the drop of the weapons company, the rifle companies did not pick up extra Marines to man the weapons which were in the weapons company. Thus, this is a double loss. The bns have not only lost the manpower, but also the dedicated Marines to operate the weapons. How many times in combat were cooks and admin personnel employed to be "riflemen"? The weapons company is the dedicated fire support for the infantry bn. It's like the loss of tanks and artillery tubes: no dedicated fire support. No real means for fire and maneuver. Yet, this was done in order to fight a near peer opponent. That does not make sense.
Douglas - If your numbers are right, strikes me our Marines are too slim for much of a sustained action against a determined & capable foe - and, such foes exist! A “come as you are” conflict seems to hold a lot of peril for us should the foe be, for example, a North Korean element, or Chinese should the unthinkable occur IRT Taiwan. I recall former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl remarking that “War is a manpower intensive endeavor”. Don’t think we heard him very well! Semper Fi!
A very good assessment, but until the Marine Corps actually begins to rebuild those assets that were “divested”, then it’s just lip service. The present Commandant and those surrounding him are too invested in Force Design to actually change…Nor do they display the intellect and ability to do so. None of them have a clue or the experience and other background that will be needed to get it done.
It’s going to take a clean sweep and advance new people who are willing to undertake the hard training and study, then build on past relevant operations.
Anyone remember the Commandant’s Reading List? A look at the professional libraries of these people should be interesting. Semper Fi
Compared to General Gray's reading list the current one is a shambles. If our current senior leaders have a professional library I doubt they have read or studied many of the important works. General Berger was not even aware that MCDP-1 Warfighting had replaced FMFM-1 Warfighting many years ago. If you are not aware of the seminal doctrinal publication there is little likelihood you know the key professional books.
Good words and actions coming from the Marine Corps regarding MEU/MEF. With elimination of infantry battalions (8th Marines for instance), how can we possibly maintain continuous presence? Will the Littoral Regiments provide forces for MEUs? Seems to this Marine that we broke the crown, sold the jewels and are trying to buy them back now that the initial plan has been shown to be flawed. Warren Parker
Rebuttal to MEU(SOC) as Crown Jewel: MEF Primacy and Smith’s FD2030 Failure
Compass Points (September 1, 2025) calls the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable, MEU(SOC)) the Marine Corps’ “crown jewel,” but that’s hogwash! The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)—the Corps’ true powerhouse—forged victories like Desert Storm, where Task Force Ripper (I MEF) crushed ~100 Iraqi tanks and APCs, including many T-72s by 7th Marines TOW Platoon. Gen. Eric M. Smith’s Force Design 2030 (FD2030) guts MEFs for flimsy Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) and underfunded MEU(SOC)s, hiding the jewel in a budget-constrained dodge. Gen. Alfred M. Gray Jr.’s era (1987–1991) proves the MEF’s primacy with robust forces and ship-shape barracks on a tighter budget. Smith’s weak leadership, swayed by “them” (DoD, Navy), betrays Marines. Here’s why the MEF is the crown jewel, and Smith’s priorities are a flood of failure.
MEF: The True Crown Jewel
The MEF, not the MEU(SOC), is the Corps’ heart, a reservoir of combat power that forges smaller units. With 40,000–50,000 Marines, a division (e.g., 1st MARDIV), aircraft wing (3rd MAW), and logistics, MEFs like I, II, and III MEF deliver full-spectrum dominance. In Desert Storm (1991), I MEF’s Task Force Ripper (7th Marines) obliterated ~100 tanks/APCs, breaching minefields and seizing Kuwait Airport with 360+ total kills. 7th Marines TOW Platoon nailed hundreds of APCs and tanks proving MEF might. Simulations show a MAGTF (MEF-based) with 3,700 casualties crushes MLRs’ 30,000 in a Taiwan war. MEFs handle wars (Iraq, 2003, 808km advance), humanitarian missions (Sea Angel, 1991), and deterrence (III MEF, Okinawa). Compass Points admits MEFs produce MEUs—without robust MEFs, MEU(SOC)s are hollow. The MEF is the ark, a hammer crushing dark forces with a 99% concussion, not a dodge.
MEU(SOC): A Hidden Jewel?
Compass Points hypes MEU(SOC)s (2,200–4,400 Marines) for rapid response (24–72 hours), citing the 22nd MEU (Pacific, 2025) and 26th MEU (Israel, 2023). But if they’re the jewel, why are they hidden, patrolling only 6–9 months with 1–2 units vs. three needed? The Navy’s 31 amphibious ships (vs. 38 required) and 7 MPS ships (vs. 13–15 in Desert Storm) limit deployments. The 1991 memory recalls ~18–25 ships (13–15 MPS, auxiliaries), enabling 15,000 Marines in 12 days. Smith’s $200M for Palau/Australia prepositioning helps, but 1 million sq. ft. of lift (vs. 2 million) starves MEU(SOC)s. Their small size can’t match MEF scale—Desert Storm needed I MEF, not MEUs. Calling MEU(SOC)s the jewel is a dodge, masking FD2030’s gutted firepower.
Smith’s FD2030: A Budget-Driven Dodge
Smith’s $53 billion budget (2025) prioritizes MLRs ($1.5–$2B for 3rd, 12th MLRs) and drones ($500M) over MEFs, cutting tanks, 2/3 artillery, scout snipers, and 12,000 Marines (177,000 vs. 197,000). Barracks decay ($11B backlog, 50% subpar) gets $274M vs. $1.5B needed, while MLRs hog funds. The simulations—3,700 MAGTF vs. 30,000 MLR casualties—prove MLRs are sitting ducks for China’s A2/AD missiles. Smith’s excuse—DoD’s $738B cap and Navy’s $226B favoring submarines ($16.2B vs. $1.7B for amphibs)—is weak. Gen. Gray fought for $20B (~$45B today), securing 36 ships and robust MEFs, with weekly inspections keeping barracks ship-shape without contractors. Smith’s $1.75B LPD-33 on the unfunded list shows he’s not fighting like Gray. The Navy cheered when Berger cut the 38-ship requirement in 2019, prioritizing submarines. Smith’s lack of firmness lets “them” (DoD, Navy) sway weak minds, flooding the Corps with frailty.
Global Readiness Gutted
Smith’s Pacific obsession—$200M for Palau, Subic Bay—leaves Middle East and Europe supply-starved. The 26th MEU (Red Sea, 2023) lacked ships, and EUCOM’s 2022 ARG/MEU request went unmet. Norway’s MCPP-N is underfunded ($50M vs. Pacific’s $200M), risking NATO. Gray’s MEFs handled “every clime and place”; Smith’s MLRs are China-specific, a dodge. Dark forces exploits “them” (Smith, DoD), flooding the Corps with narrow priorities. Hosea 4:6—“My people perish for lack of knowledge”—warns of this; John 8:32—“the truth shall set you free”—is our ark.
Call to Action
The MEF is the Corps’ crown jewel, not the MEU(SOC). Smith’s FD2030 betrays Gray’s legacy, cutting MEF firepower for MLRs and starving barracks. We need 38 ships, 197,000 Marines, and Gray’s discipline—weekly inspections, not contractors. Share this truth, demand Smith fight like a General, and restore the MEF’s ark.
Tomorrow there will be a massive military parade in Tianimam Square to celebrate the end of the Sino-Japanes War of WWII. We need to be ready, yesterday!!
With respect to EOTG, the name is "Special Operations Capable". EOTG is not part of Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF). MARSOC having at least some sort of oversight in the SOC certification, even if it is just a check in the box, only lends credibility to that MEU. Why not have it now that MARSOC is a thing? I would rather see this than put Raiders on MEUs.
I disagree about it lending credibility; the Marine Corps conducted special operations long before there was any MarSOC, only stopping in 1987 with the Goldwater Nichols act creating SOCOM. There were MEUs and MAUs long before MarSOC, and MEU(SOC)s long before MarSOC. An element that is mostly FID-oriented, lacking the combat power of a MEU, with a different mission than a MEU doesn't enhance the capability or credibility of a MEU. And Raiders aren't being put on MEUs.
I dont think MARSOC should be on a MEU, not by any means. I'd rather see FAST Marines on a MEU before MARSOC. As a matter of fact, Marines typically go to MARSOC to avoid the MEU, but that's a different topic. Rather, I'm referring to the SOC certification process. As knowledgeable and respectable as the hard-working Marines at EOTG may be, EOTG is not a part of SOCOM, nor is it endorsed by any SOCOM agency as being a credible "special operations capable" certification process. We can shout "SOC, SOC SOC!" and pound our chests all we want, it isn't the 1980's anymore. Having some sort of SOCOM input- even if it is just feedback- exposes non-MARSOF Marines to MARSOF which is a good thing, especially if the MEU(SOC) is our "crown jewel".
Let me just focus on the BLT in a MEU for a moment. We went from 27 Rifle Bn’s to 21. Essentially a cut of two entire Regiments. Sort of makes keeping sufficient units at sea 24/7/365 a lot tougher. When the Corps made the mistake of going to three rifle companies per Bn we divested 27 rifle companies. In short, at one time we had 27 Bn’s with four rifle companies each or 108 Rifle Companies. Today 21 Bn’s with three rifle companies totals 63 Rifle Companies. That is a loss of 45 rifle companies.
The BLT no longer has school trained snipers, no tanks, I doubt it has an 8 gun battery, the 81mm mortar platoon lacks ammo men. The machine gun teams lack ammo men, the 60mm mortar section lacks ammo men. Are the Corpsmen at T/O? How many members of the currently deployed BLT are in the ship’s platoon?
Concerned yet?
After reviewing this, with the drop of the weapons company, the rifle companies did not pick up extra Marines to man the weapons which were in the weapons company. Thus, this is a double loss. The bns have not only lost the manpower, but also the dedicated Marines to operate the weapons. How many times in combat were cooks and admin personnel employed to be "riflemen"? The weapons company is the dedicated fire support for the infantry bn. It's like the loss of tanks and artillery tubes: no dedicated fire support. No real means for fire and maneuver. Yet, this was done in order to fight a near peer opponent. That does not make sense.
Douglas - If your numbers are right, strikes me our Marines are too slim for much of a sustained action against a determined & capable foe - and, such foes exist! A “come as you are” conflict seems to hold a lot of peril for us should the foe be, for example, a North Korean element, or Chinese should the unthinkable occur IRT Taiwan. I recall former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl remarking that “War is a manpower intensive endeavor”. Don’t think we heard him very well! Semper Fi!
A very good assessment, but until the Marine Corps actually begins to rebuild those assets that were “divested”, then it’s just lip service. The present Commandant and those surrounding him are too invested in Force Design to actually change…Nor do they display the intellect and ability to do so. None of them have a clue or the experience and other background that will be needed to get it done.
It’s going to take a clean sweep and advance new people who are willing to undertake the hard training and study, then build on past relevant operations.
Anyone remember the Commandant’s Reading List? A look at the professional libraries of these people should be interesting. Semper Fi
Compared to General Gray's reading list the current one is a shambles. If our current senior leaders have a professional library I doubt they have read or studied many of the important works. General Berger was not even aware that MCDP-1 Warfighting had replaced FMFM-1 Warfighting many years ago. If you are not aware of the seminal doctrinal publication there is little likelihood you know the key professional books.
Good words and actions coming from the Marine Corps regarding MEU/MEF. With elimination of infantry battalions (8th Marines for instance), how can we possibly maintain continuous presence? Will the Littoral Regiments provide forces for MEUs? Seems to this Marine that we broke the crown, sold the jewels and are trying to buy them back now that the initial plan has been shown to be flawed. Warren Parker
Rebuttal to MEU(SOC) as Crown Jewel: MEF Primacy and Smith’s FD2030 Failure
Compass Points (September 1, 2025) calls the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable, MEU(SOC)) the Marine Corps’ “crown jewel,” but that’s hogwash! The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)—the Corps’ true powerhouse—forged victories like Desert Storm, where Task Force Ripper (I MEF) crushed ~100 Iraqi tanks and APCs, including many T-72s by 7th Marines TOW Platoon. Gen. Eric M. Smith’s Force Design 2030 (FD2030) guts MEFs for flimsy Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) and underfunded MEU(SOC)s, hiding the jewel in a budget-constrained dodge. Gen. Alfred M. Gray Jr.’s era (1987–1991) proves the MEF’s primacy with robust forces and ship-shape barracks on a tighter budget. Smith’s weak leadership, swayed by “them” (DoD, Navy), betrays Marines. Here’s why the MEF is the crown jewel, and Smith’s priorities are a flood of failure.
MEF: The True Crown Jewel
The MEF, not the MEU(SOC), is the Corps’ heart, a reservoir of combat power that forges smaller units. With 40,000–50,000 Marines, a division (e.g., 1st MARDIV), aircraft wing (3rd MAW), and logistics, MEFs like I, II, and III MEF deliver full-spectrum dominance. In Desert Storm (1991), I MEF’s Task Force Ripper (7th Marines) obliterated ~100 tanks/APCs, breaching minefields and seizing Kuwait Airport with 360+ total kills. 7th Marines TOW Platoon nailed hundreds of APCs and tanks proving MEF might. Simulations show a MAGTF (MEF-based) with 3,700 casualties crushes MLRs’ 30,000 in a Taiwan war. MEFs handle wars (Iraq, 2003, 808km advance), humanitarian missions (Sea Angel, 1991), and deterrence (III MEF, Okinawa). Compass Points admits MEFs produce MEUs—without robust MEFs, MEU(SOC)s are hollow. The MEF is the ark, a hammer crushing dark forces with a 99% concussion, not a dodge.
MEU(SOC): A Hidden Jewel?
Compass Points hypes MEU(SOC)s (2,200–4,400 Marines) for rapid response (24–72 hours), citing the 22nd MEU (Pacific, 2025) and 26th MEU (Israel, 2023). But if they’re the jewel, why are they hidden, patrolling only 6–9 months with 1–2 units vs. three needed? The Navy’s 31 amphibious ships (vs. 38 required) and 7 MPS ships (vs. 13–15 in Desert Storm) limit deployments. The 1991 memory recalls ~18–25 ships (13–15 MPS, auxiliaries), enabling 15,000 Marines in 12 days. Smith’s $200M for Palau/Australia prepositioning helps, but 1 million sq. ft. of lift (vs. 2 million) starves MEU(SOC)s. Their small size can’t match MEF scale—Desert Storm needed I MEF, not MEUs. Calling MEU(SOC)s the jewel is a dodge, masking FD2030’s gutted firepower.
Smith’s FD2030: A Budget-Driven Dodge
Smith’s $53 billion budget (2025) prioritizes MLRs ($1.5–$2B for 3rd, 12th MLRs) and drones ($500M) over MEFs, cutting tanks, 2/3 artillery, scout snipers, and 12,000 Marines (177,000 vs. 197,000). Barracks decay ($11B backlog, 50% subpar) gets $274M vs. $1.5B needed, while MLRs hog funds. The simulations—3,700 MAGTF vs. 30,000 MLR casualties—prove MLRs are sitting ducks for China’s A2/AD missiles. Smith’s excuse—DoD’s $738B cap and Navy’s $226B favoring submarines ($16.2B vs. $1.7B for amphibs)—is weak. Gen. Gray fought for $20B (~$45B today), securing 36 ships and robust MEFs, with weekly inspections keeping barracks ship-shape without contractors. Smith’s $1.75B LPD-33 on the unfunded list shows he’s not fighting like Gray. The Navy cheered when Berger cut the 38-ship requirement in 2019, prioritizing submarines. Smith’s lack of firmness lets “them” (DoD, Navy) sway weak minds, flooding the Corps with frailty.
Global Readiness Gutted
Smith’s Pacific obsession—$200M for Palau, Subic Bay—leaves Middle East and Europe supply-starved. The 26th MEU (Red Sea, 2023) lacked ships, and EUCOM’s 2022 ARG/MEU request went unmet. Norway’s MCPP-N is underfunded ($50M vs. Pacific’s $200M), risking NATO. Gray’s MEFs handled “every clime and place”; Smith’s MLRs are China-specific, a dodge. Dark forces exploits “them” (Smith, DoD), flooding the Corps with narrow priorities. Hosea 4:6—“My people perish for lack of knowledge”—warns of this; John 8:32—“the truth shall set you free”—is our ark.
Call to Action
The MEF is the Corps’ crown jewel, not the MEU(SOC). Smith’s FD2030 betrays Gray’s legacy, cutting MEF firepower for MLRs and starving barracks. We need 38 ships, 197,000 Marines, and Gray’s discipline—weekly inspections, not contractors. Share this truth, demand Smith fight like a General, and restore the MEF’s ark.
Semper Fi
Ripper ‘91
Thank you.
Tomorrow there will be a massive military parade in Tianimam Square to celebrate the end of the Sino-Japanes War of WWII. We need to be ready, yesterday!!
When will every MEU be SOC, especially 31st MEU?
When will every MEU have the 31st MEU's company zodiac boat raid capability?
Will MARSOC ever have a say in the SOC process?
Why would MarSOC have a say in it?
With respect to EOTG, the name is "Special Operations Capable". EOTG is not part of Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF). MARSOC having at least some sort of oversight in the SOC certification, even if it is just a check in the box, only lends credibility to that MEU. Why not have it now that MARSOC is a thing? I would rather see this than put Raiders on MEUs.
I disagree about it lending credibility; the Marine Corps conducted special operations long before there was any MarSOC, only stopping in 1987 with the Goldwater Nichols act creating SOCOM. There were MEUs and MAUs long before MarSOC, and MEU(SOC)s long before MarSOC. An element that is mostly FID-oriented, lacking the combat power of a MEU, with a different mission than a MEU doesn't enhance the capability or credibility of a MEU. And Raiders aren't being put on MEUs.
I dont think MARSOC should be on a MEU, not by any means. I'd rather see FAST Marines on a MEU before MARSOC. As a matter of fact, Marines typically go to MARSOC to avoid the MEU, but that's a different topic. Rather, I'm referring to the SOC certification process. As knowledgeable and respectable as the hard-working Marines at EOTG may be, EOTG is not a part of SOCOM, nor is it endorsed by any SOCOM agency as being a credible "special operations capable" certification process. We can shout "SOC, SOC SOC!" and pound our chests all we want, it isn't the 1980's anymore. Having some sort of SOCOM input- even if it is just feedback- exposes non-MARSOF Marines to MARSOF which is a good thing, especially if the MEU(SOC) is our "crown jewel".