Withdraw globally? T.R. Fehrenbach in his classic "This Kind of War" wrote "... you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it; pulverize it and wipe it clean of life - but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."
The global reach of US Airpower and Submarines is not new. B-52’s had a global reach since the 1950’s. While the value of this global capability is remarkable it cannot be the foundation of protecting US vital interests anymore that a sniper can be the sole factor on the battlefield.
The global web of military bases, airfields and ports is more critical today than ever and our withdrawal from many beginning in 1990 was a strategic mistake of biblical proportions. Where exactly these should be is debatable but the need cannot be dismissed but by the most historically ignorant and those with no understanding of alliances and human nature. Presence matters in Global politics, law enforcement and human interaction.
We are a nation dependent on trade and global stability. Forward deployed forces are required if for no other reason than the tyranny of distance, our lack of strategic mobility and to signal commitment and ability to interact and coordinate with allied militaries.
I will go one step further and would encourage the home basing of a number of allied warships in US Ports while we base a limited number of US warships in foreign ports.
Our isolationist tendencies are a fantasy of those who neither understand vital US interests, the foundations of US prosperity and our military capabilities.
Deployed MAGTFs are the living embodiment of US commitment, intentions and capabilities. They should not be reduced but expanded. I have suggested four continually deployed MEUs for decades. Ideally there would be six.
Some continuous analysis of our forward based forces always seems prudent. That said, I don't want to follow the USAF doctrine of "virtual presence," which some have correctly called "actual absence." Even at a mico-level, engagement is meaningful. I can remember our small group of military advisors in Thailand in the early 90s having an very meaningful relationship with the Thai military (through training programs and foreign military sales, not to mention personal relationships). Lots of other good arguments for being forward based and having forward presence so let's not throw the baby out with the bath water.
It is this writer’s understanding that the United States has approximately 750 “bases” in 80 countries around the world. A prudent review might be in order. As in how many do we really need? Is there overlap and redundancy beyond necessary to the vital national interests of the USA? Probably so. Like any enterprise review of the business model from time to is a good exercise. That said, we are a sea going nation. The world basically looks to us to provide protection of the SLOC’s and fair enough, though one could argue how about everyone ponying up for the service. It is not cheap. This said, there is no better bang for the buck at the Department of War than the US Marine Corps fully complimented in MEU/MEB/MEF configurations of the MAGTF. It is agile, available and can be task organized. At the current $38 Billion budget number inside the nearly trillion dollar defense budget you would think even Congress would get the joke. Thus while presence is a good thing, the notion that scared the Hell out of the bad actors around the globe after the Iran raid, was/is as the Chairman of the JCS mentioned in one of his briefing sessions last week, Iran isn’t the only place we are looking at….have said it before and bears repeating, the ARG/MEU sailing over the horizon is a jack in the box full of tricks or treats situation depending. This as the SecDef and SecNav look at the current viability of Corps ought to be in the forefront of their thinking and assessments. One can hope they look at FD and its static nature particularly after last week and ask General Smitj “just what the Hell were you thinking?”
**one other note: for what it's worth, the Department of the Army used to be the Department of the War before NSA of '47. Department of Navy was separate from Department of War.
Since 2019 the Corps’ leaders have been adrift. Prior to their assuming key billets the Marine Corps had a functioning combat development process that had proven itself for more than a quarter century. When Marines identified operational problems or shortcomings from across the Corps other Marines offered potential ideas for correcting these deficiencies. Usually, a discourse of some length followed in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette and in the schoolhouses at Quantico. Eventually officers at MCCDC drafted an operating concept, which in turn had to withstand close analytical scrutiny before being evaluated in exercises and tested in wargames. All the battlefield functions were considered across emerging doctrine, organizational changes, training requirements, identification of material (weapons and equipment) requirements, leader development (PME), personnel requirements, and the need for new or modified facilities (maintenance buildings, barracks, ranges, classrooms, etc.) and logistics. This, of course is the generally well-known DOTMLPF-L.
The 38th commandant deliberately walked away from the combat development process and he and a small cadre of retired officers came up with Force Design 2030 and its supporting concepts, EABO and SIF. In their circumvention of the formal process they missed considering vital elements, probably none more egregious that logistics supportability. Then the commandant took the unprecedented step of divesting weapons and equipment before replacements were on hand, his ill-fated “divest to invest.”
Experienced officers, active duty and retired, quickly realized the danger of his approach and sought to have him pause and do things right. I know of no senior officer who wanted to talk with the 38th commandant who was not afforded that opportunity. I talked with him for more than three hours in October 2020. All I know who had the same opportunity reported he listened but did not hear. More meetings followed with retired four-stars (26 of 32 telling him he had placed the Corps on the wrong track. Two’s age and loss of cognition made them unable to comment and four simply remained quiet.). The 38th commandant was adamant that he would change nothing.
Now his successor and supporter, the 39th commandant, is reaping the rewards of the 38th commandant’s malpractice. True believers and, unfortunately, not a few sycophants can utter nonsense like the Corps is on a “campaign of learning” or it is a “righteous journey” as they try to justify the fact the Force Design 2030 house of cards is starting to come apart. The 38th commandant and now the 39th commandant have through their actions created an existential threat to our Corps. No thinking Marine officer would implement an operating concept before thoroughly vetting it; yet the 38th commandant did. Other than the discipline, courage, dedication, and exceptional professionalism of Marines in the ranks the Corps will have little to celebrate during its 250 Birthday on 10 November.
“The Corps’ leaders are adrift”? That’s hard to square with reality.
Congress continues to fund and praise Force Design priorities. Combatant Commanders are requesting the very capabilities it delivers. The Navy and joint force are integrating with Marine units in ways that reflect the exact vision laid out by the 38th and 39th Commandants.
That’s not drift—that’s alignment.
On the other hand, critics respond with op-eds, anecdotes, and private recollections. But there are no policy reversals, no legislative pushback, no institutional shift. Just silence—where it actually matters.
Your own small band of readers are even starting to question your lack of traction. . . Can you blame them? After five years, there’s still nothing to show for all the noise.
FD a house of cards collapsing? Please. The only thing collapsing is your echo chamber.
1. Well, let's be serious. Congress is led to what the Service's want. No politician ever got thrown out of office for giving the USMC what it asked for, regardless of the turn out. That may seem like a cheap shot, but I am saying "the onus has always been on the service, so you can't claim it both ways".
2. What Combatant Commanders are asking for 'capabilities it delivers'? Of those are those capabilities concurrent with Force Design, or pre-existing / agnostic of Force Design? Are they asking for the capabilities, or taking anything they can get from a deck of 40 cards?
3. "Critics respond with..." "but there are no policy reversals or legislative pushback..." Ok. To be fair, everyone loves to use the business sector. Here we go...Madoff was great, until he wasn't despite clear evidence that what he provided was suspect. Enron was the 'The smartest guys in the room', until they got caught in outright fraud. Lehman Brothers was seen as financial geniuses unable to fail until their last CEO lead them into a disastrous strategy that caused the firm to collapse when the tide went out. Disney was 100% behind the strategy that broke the IP for the Marvel Universe and the Star Wars brand causing successive financial failures at the box office. Fortunately, they did not divest the theme parks to invest in Disney Plus. It typically is only after the failure that policy reversal and legislative pushback occurs if then.
4. "Navy and Joint Force are integrating with Marine units..." It is an outright fiction that this is new and required the structural changes by Force Design to execute. In fact, I would argue that Navy - Marine integration was better in the late '80s and '90s versus now (even with the better technology of today). I am not talking BLT to Amphibs; I am talking surface vessels to Marine Units ashore.
I appreciate the pushback, and you’re right to raise these questions seriously. But let’s break them down:
1. Congress Always Gives the Services What They Want?
That just doesn’t hold up. The Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been repeatedly scrutinized and rejected by Congress. The Army has been forced to divest legacy systems and restructure its modernization timeline. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps has consistently secured funding for Force Design initiatives—including NMESIS, long-range fires, and MLR standups. That’s not default approval—it’s earned credibility. The Corps isn’t just getting what it wants; it’s making a case that continues to convince Congress, year after year.
2. What Are Combatant Commanders Really Asking For?
They’re asking for both legacy and FD-derived capabilities—MEUs, sensing, maritime strike, SOF integration, and fast-turn ISR. None of those missions are fading. What’s new is the ability to forward-position sensors and fires in denied environments, which is exactly what Force Design enables. The forthcoming NDAA-directed study on Force Design will likely reinforce this demand, not undercut it.
3. “No Policy Reversals” Isn’t a Guarantee of Success?
True—it’s not a guarantee. But it is a signal. The examples cited—Madoff, Enron, Disney—are cases of outright fraud, not transparent, Congress-backed military modernization. Force Design is happening in the open, under constant scrutiny, in repeated joint exercises, and has yet to produce the kind of failure that prompts strategic walk-back. If critics were gaining traction, we’d see hearings, funding pulls, or at minimum a revised guidance document. Instead? We see validation through exercises like Balikatan, and increased joint buy-in.
4. Marine–Navy Integration Isn’t New—but It Is Evolving
No doubt integration existed before. But what we’re seeing now is quantitatively and qualitatively different. Marine sensors are passing target-quality data to surface and subsurface strike platforms in support of distributed maritime ops. TF 61/2, III MEF, and the 31st MEU are working in ways that align with the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept. That’s not routine BLT-to-Amphib—it’s cross-domain targeting and effects coordination that’s come a long way since the 1990s.
⸻
Bottom line: Force Design isn’t perfect—and no one ever claimed it was. But it is moving, integrated, funded, and in demand. Critics have a right to speak—but results, not rhetoric, are what shape the future force. And right now, results are on the side of Force Design.
Okay, I'm going to short form my response by matching the number.
1) Yes, Congress is now kicking the Navy....after years of approving the Navy shipbuilding and maintenance plan. That is a great example. Like I said, they don't attack it until after it is demonstrably broken. Then the scrum piles on instead of pushing.
2) We've been doing forward positioned sensors and fires in denied environments for years. I started my service in the premier community that did that. That is simply not a new thing, despite what the FD marketing claims. Reinvigorating some aspects of it, especially the joint C^2(keeping it simple even though technically it's C5ISRT, or C-C5ISRT) where it had dried on the vine isn't a bad thing. Better / reinvigorated Joint Fires with some current digital technology is a good thing also. Just don't sell my Chevy back to me and tell me it's a brand new Cadillac with the all new 'User Interface Guidance Mechanism' that looks just like a steering wheel. Add to that, I bet the Combatant Commanders, especially IndoPacom, will take anything they can get however they can get it at this point. They are stuck with a 40 card deck in the Casino. That's why I think Adm Paparo mentioned NMESIS in his April testimony along with Typhon. He was throwing a bone. But nowhere did he specifically mention Force Design driven changes .
3) Disney is not a case of outright fraud; it was sheer mismanagement and bad policy. Compare Ford, Chevy, and Toyotas' EV policy over the last 15 years. Toyota had an arguably better strategy with it's hybrid focus, while Ford and Chevy chased internally popular, marketing driven BEV strategies. Only when these did not pan out have they started to reverse the trend. Likewise, Porsche dipped into EVs in a Porsche way, without divesting significant and relevant aspects of their legacy business. And by the way, what did Balikatan validate? (Patrolling and comms / ISR? Offloading a NMESIS on an Island? It's important to have shore based units and ships talk to each other and allow for Joint Fires across the spectrum?)
4) Keep saying "Navy - Marine Integration isn't new"....that doesn't make it true. yes, technology enhances the capability....but this isn't new. And I stated we weren't talking the FD canard of 'old guys think BLT to Amphib is Joint integration'. None of this required the drastic changes of FD to improve.
Results: sure....remains to be seen. Yes, FD is popular in the House. All the staffers' who've read 'Kill Chain' and 'The Inheritance' clearly think it's great. However, that's not validation. The Pentomic Army was approved, before it was disapproved. And this is all easy when the logistics are fairy dusted in future tech hand waving. I do know that in the past 5 years, the USMC has had to concede there were crises that, although in it's wheelhouse, it could not respond. The USMC is currently structured around key capabilities it cannot field (the NMESIS structure is a key one....I don't really like that structure, but having it operationally fielded and functional would be better than not). There hasn't been a test of 'Force Design', just a 'campaign of learning' and a few exercises that look to have been heavily structured in favor of only positive FD spin (Looking at you MLREX25 with no info release other than 'MLR win / 7th Mar lose').
What Combatant Commanders are asking for FD units? I think they would prefer an Army Multi-Domain TF. Sensing units could be acquired from FO's or ANGLICO. In my opinion, I think you could get more capabilities out of a traditional MEU than you could out of a MLR.
As is the case with all weapons, countermeasures eventually catch up. Today we can fly a B-2 on a 37 hour round trip and not be seen as we stealth into the target zone, but you simply cannot base your long term strategic plans on that because tomorrow it could be no longer viable. Like buying stocks, you need a diversified portfolio to protect against an unforseen downturn. Everyone thought the Battleship would reign supreme, then Pearl Harbor happened.
Calls to abandon U.S. bases in the Middle East in favor of relying solely on long-range strike capabilities like the B-2 bomber ignore a fundamental truth of deterrence: presence matters. Bombers and missiles can hit targets from afar, but they cannot reassure allies, gather critical on-the-ground intelligence, or build the daily partnerships that prevent conflicts from escalating in the first place. When we give up forward positions, we create vacuums that our adversaries, whether it is Iran, Russia, or China, will quickly exploit to expand their influence, intimidate our partners, and undermine regional stability.
Boots on the ground remain the clearest signal to both our allies and our adversaries that the United States is committed to security and stability in the region. A forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit or a Special Operations team in the region is not simply a tactical asset but a strategic message: we are present, watching, and capable of rapid response. It is easy to advocate for a “stand-off” military posture from afar, but history repeatedly shows that deterrence fades when adversaries believe we lack the will or the means to act decisively. By maintaining bases and a forward presence, we force adversaries to think twice before moving against our interests or those of our allies, ensuring that peace is preserved not by rhetoric alone, but by credible, visible readiness.
First, we need to review US strategic interests. These might include dealing within our own borders. They might also include supporting and strengthening our own hemisphere. Both have been neglected and are becoming increasingly frayed. And there may be legitimate US interests elsewhere but the case needs to be made. Like Ukraine, Libya and Syria, we too often create disaster.
To the point of the article, bombing from Missouri is hardly an appropriate response to all situations. Among other things, I would not expect the B2 to perform as well over a defended target.
One can imagine the current state of the Marine Corps being presented to the graduating class of 2026 at Harvard Business School, or Wharton or Kellog. Professor Postlethwaite presents the case study to the class. A storied brand nearing its 250th year in operation has fallen on hard times. Starting about 20 years ago a series of events globally conspired to threaten the brand MC CO. A series of CEO’s searched for ways to make the brand seem more “relevant” and modernized to meet a growing competitor’s perceived threat. The last CEO and current one, have taken on a modernization scheme, and in order to finance the effort they have sold off major operating groups that were quite profitable and integral to the success of the company. They are now running short on cash. (A business fails when it runs out of cash to operate.)They want to go to the Investment Bankers on Wall Street but the word is out MC Company is toast, they are low on cash, they can’t raise any new debt, and they violated a rule, if you want our money show us that the first one works….At the moment they have nothing to show for their efforts other than some Potemkin pieces of equipment that really look good but actually don’t work, they don’t do anything. so they don’t have the first one built, let alone that “it works.” The current CEO is left with going to the Venture Capital thugs in Silicon Valley or attempting to rebuild from within. Overwhelmed, he has vacillated on how best to bring his new vision and business model to fruition but can’t seem to find the right pitch to get the cash he needs. To further complicate matters, there are several members of the Board of Directors who have been asked to resign but won’t and there is clear discord, internally at the company and outside it. It’s a bun fight that doesn’t look good to investors. The share holders are getting nervous. The share price long term value has always been a bargain, even Warren Buffet owns some of the stock. But Warren is signaling he may have had enough.
Okay class of 2026. What do you do now, You have been called in to right the ship, and put if back on a profitable course.
"Prescient" means having or showing knowledge of events before they occur, often implying foresight or intuitive understanding. It describes someone or something that seems to predict or anticipate future outcomes accurately. Force Design enthusiast exhibit an infinite amount of arrogance, hubris and a false belief that only they can accurately predict the future. They believe in the Prescient Power of “the Fictitious TAROT CARDS OF WAR.
More Grok: “T.R. Fehrenbach, in *This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War*, provides profound insights into the nature of warfare, emphasizing the enduring necessity of ground forces, the importance of preparedness, and the challenges of limited conflicts in democratic societies. His quotes reflect a clear-eyed view of war’s demands and realities, drawn from his analysis of the Korean War.
Fehrenbach underscores the critical role of ground troops, stating, “You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it… but if you desire to defend it… you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.” He similarly notes that controlling territories requires boots on the ground, as “this can be done only as Alexander the Great did it, on the ground.” He stresses preparedness, warning, “A nation that does not prepare for all the forms of war should then renounce the use of war… To fail to prepare soldiers and citizens for limited, bloody ground action… is folly verging on the criminal.”
He also critiques misjudgments in war, observing, “To make a war, sometimes it is necessary that everyone guess wrong,” and advocates approaching conflict “with sadness, with regret, but also with ferocity.” Fehrenbach highlights the reluctance of democratic societies to engage in limited wars, noting that citizen-soldiers are often more willing to die in “holocaust, the big war” than in smaller conflicts. Finally, he honors the soldier’s resolve, describing them as “the stuff of which legions are made,” willing to fight and die without complaint, a constant from Rome to modern America. These quotes encapsulate Fehrenbach’s belief in the gritty, human essence of warfare and the moral and strategic imperatives of readiness.”
Claiming the Corps is backing off Force Design because of the adjustments outlined by General Van Riper in yesterday’s comments is wishful thinking at best. Retaining a CH-53K squadron, preserving the 4th Marines, or deciding not to cut certain airframes isn’t retreat—it’s refinement. FD2030 was never static; it’s an adaptive campaign grounded in threat, experimentation, and operational reality.
The Commandant calls it a righteous journey, and that’s exactly what it is. The Corps is evolving with intent—not scrambling to recover. Chowder II taking credit for these moves is laughable. They’re not steering change—they’re watching from the bleachers.
While critics write essays and op-eds, Marines are fielding FPV drones, deploying precision fires, competing in the Pacific, and preparing for the fight ahead. The Corps isn’t reversing. It’s accelerating.
Speaking of FPV drones—here’s the SECNAV at Quantico, watching Marines employ them in live-fire training. While some talk, others build.
The other day, in another post, you claimed the folks here were wanting the Marine Corps to fail. I personally take the biggest offense to that notion. I was 27 when I joined the Corps. The Corps literally saved me and gave me purpose in life. The Corps was the only ones willing to take a chance on me after all the bridges I had burned.
To say I want the Corps to fail is a slap in the face.
Withdraw globally? T.R. Fehrenbach in his classic "This Kind of War" wrote "... you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it; pulverize it and wipe it clean of life - but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."
The global reach of US Airpower and Submarines is not new. B-52’s had a global reach since the 1950’s. While the value of this global capability is remarkable it cannot be the foundation of protecting US vital interests anymore that a sniper can be the sole factor on the battlefield.
The global web of military bases, airfields and ports is more critical today than ever and our withdrawal from many beginning in 1990 was a strategic mistake of biblical proportions. Where exactly these should be is debatable but the need cannot be dismissed but by the most historically ignorant and those with no understanding of alliances and human nature. Presence matters in Global politics, law enforcement and human interaction.
We are a nation dependent on trade and global stability. Forward deployed forces are required if for no other reason than the tyranny of distance, our lack of strategic mobility and to signal commitment and ability to interact and coordinate with allied militaries.
I will go one step further and would encourage the home basing of a number of allied warships in US Ports while we base a limited number of US warships in foreign ports.
Our isolationist tendencies are a fantasy of those who neither understand vital US interests, the foundations of US prosperity and our military capabilities.
Deployed MAGTFs are the living embodiment of US commitment, intentions and capabilities. They should not be reduced but expanded. I have suggested four continually deployed MEUs for decades. Ideally there would be six.
Some continuous analysis of our forward based forces always seems prudent. That said, I don't want to follow the USAF doctrine of "virtual presence," which some have correctly called "actual absence." Even at a mico-level, engagement is meaningful. I can remember our small group of military advisors in Thailand in the early 90s having an very meaningful relationship with the Thai military (through training programs and foreign military sales, not to mention personal relationships). Lots of other good arguments for being forward based and having forward presence so let's not throw the baby out with the bath water.
""virtual presence," which some have correctly called "actual absence."" - Sir, you win the internet today.
It is this writer’s understanding that the United States has approximately 750 “bases” in 80 countries around the world. A prudent review might be in order. As in how many do we really need? Is there overlap and redundancy beyond necessary to the vital national interests of the USA? Probably so. Like any enterprise review of the business model from time to is a good exercise. That said, we are a sea going nation. The world basically looks to us to provide protection of the SLOC’s and fair enough, though one could argue how about everyone ponying up for the service. It is not cheap. This said, there is no better bang for the buck at the Department of War than the US Marine Corps fully complimented in MEU/MEB/MEF configurations of the MAGTF. It is agile, available and can be task organized. At the current $38 Billion budget number inside the nearly trillion dollar defense budget you would think even Congress would get the joke. Thus while presence is a good thing, the notion that scared the Hell out of the bad actors around the globe after the Iran raid, was/is as the Chairman of the JCS mentioned in one of his briefing sessions last week, Iran isn’t the only place we are looking at….have said it before and bears repeating, the ARG/MEU sailing over the horizon is a jack in the box full of tricks or treats situation depending. This as the SecDef and SecNav look at the current viability of Corps ought to be in the forefront of their thinking and assessments. One can hope they look at FD and its static nature particularly after last week and ask General Smitj “just what the Hell were you thinking?”
Didn't we have this debate after Kosovo ('99)? Colonel A. L. Hinen, USAF, wrote a very good article about this. His conclusion:
"That brings us back to the original question: Can war be won with airpower alone? This air
power advocate says no. Operation Allied Force did not affirm Douhet’s basic idea that air
power is both "a necessary and sufficient condition for victory." There is ample evidence to
support the premise that one cannot win without "command of the air"—that is a given—but air
power alone will not bring victory.
It is more important to understand that air power is like any other instrument of statecraft.
Instead of asking if air power alone can win the battle, the important questions are: how can it
contribute to successful diplomacy and under what circumstances are its contributions most
effective? In the final analysis, air power advocates would be better served if they studied
Clausewitz rather than debate the relevancy of Douhet’s central beliefs!" - Col. A. L. Hinen, USAF (https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/hinen.pdf)
**one other note: for what it's worth, the Department of the Army used to be the Department of the War before NSA of '47. Department of Navy was separate from Department of War.
Since 2019 the Corps’ leaders have been adrift. Prior to their assuming key billets the Marine Corps had a functioning combat development process that had proven itself for more than a quarter century. When Marines identified operational problems or shortcomings from across the Corps other Marines offered potential ideas for correcting these deficiencies. Usually, a discourse of some length followed in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette and in the schoolhouses at Quantico. Eventually officers at MCCDC drafted an operating concept, which in turn had to withstand close analytical scrutiny before being evaluated in exercises and tested in wargames. All the battlefield functions were considered across emerging doctrine, organizational changes, training requirements, identification of material (weapons and equipment) requirements, leader development (PME), personnel requirements, and the need for new or modified facilities (maintenance buildings, barracks, ranges, classrooms, etc.) and logistics. This, of course is the generally well-known DOTMLPF-L.
The 38th commandant deliberately walked away from the combat development process and he and a small cadre of retired officers came up with Force Design 2030 and its supporting concepts, EABO and SIF. In their circumvention of the formal process they missed considering vital elements, probably none more egregious that logistics supportability. Then the commandant took the unprecedented step of divesting weapons and equipment before replacements were on hand, his ill-fated “divest to invest.”
Experienced officers, active duty and retired, quickly realized the danger of his approach and sought to have him pause and do things right. I know of no senior officer who wanted to talk with the 38th commandant who was not afforded that opportunity. I talked with him for more than three hours in October 2020. All I know who had the same opportunity reported he listened but did not hear. More meetings followed with retired four-stars (26 of 32 telling him he had placed the Corps on the wrong track. Two’s age and loss of cognition made them unable to comment and four simply remained quiet.). The 38th commandant was adamant that he would change nothing.
Now his successor and supporter, the 39th commandant, is reaping the rewards of the 38th commandant’s malpractice. True believers and, unfortunately, not a few sycophants can utter nonsense like the Corps is on a “campaign of learning” or it is a “righteous journey” as they try to justify the fact the Force Design 2030 house of cards is starting to come apart. The 38th commandant and now the 39th commandant have through their actions created an existential threat to our Corps. No thinking Marine officer would implement an operating concept before thoroughly vetting it; yet the 38th commandant did. Other than the discipline, courage, dedication, and exceptional professionalism of Marines in the ranks the Corps will have little to celebrate during its 250 Birthday on 10 November.
“The Corps’ leaders are adrift”? That’s hard to square with reality.
Congress continues to fund and praise Force Design priorities. Combatant Commanders are requesting the very capabilities it delivers. The Navy and joint force are integrating with Marine units in ways that reflect the exact vision laid out by the 38th and 39th Commandants.
That’s not drift—that’s alignment.
On the other hand, critics respond with op-eds, anecdotes, and private recollections. But there are no policy reversals, no legislative pushback, no institutional shift. Just silence—where it actually matters.
Your own small band of readers are even starting to question your lack of traction. . . Can you blame them? After five years, there’s still nothing to show for all the noise.
FD a house of cards collapsing? Please. The only thing collapsing is your echo chamber.
1. Well, let's be serious. Congress is led to what the Service's want. No politician ever got thrown out of office for giving the USMC what it asked for, regardless of the turn out. That may seem like a cheap shot, but I am saying "the onus has always been on the service, so you can't claim it both ways".
2. What Combatant Commanders are asking for 'capabilities it delivers'? Of those are those capabilities concurrent with Force Design, or pre-existing / agnostic of Force Design? Are they asking for the capabilities, or taking anything they can get from a deck of 40 cards?
3. "Critics respond with..." "but there are no policy reversals or legislative pushback..." Ok. To be fair, everyone loves to use the business sector. Here we go...Madoff was great, until he wasn't despite clear evidence that what he provided was suspect. Enron was the 'The smartest guys in the room', until they got caught in outright fraud. Lehman Brothers was seen as financial geniuses unable to fail until their last CEO lead them into a disastrous strategy that caused the firm to collapse when the tide went out. Disney was 100% behind the strategy that broke the IP for the Marvel Universe and the Star Wars brand causing successive financial failures at the box office. Fortunately, they did not divest the theme parks to invest in Disney Plus. It typically is only after the failure that policy reversal and legislative pushback occurs if then.
4. "Navy and Joint Force are integrating with Marine units..." It is an outright fiction that this is new and required the structural changes by Force Design to execute. In fact, I would argue that Navy - Marine integration was better in the late '80s and '90s versus now (even with the better technology of today). I am not talking BLT to Amphibs; I am talking surface vessels to Marine Units ashore.
I appreciate the pushback, and you’re right to raise these questions seriously. But let’s break them down:
1. Congress Always Gives the Services What They Want?
That just doesn’t hold up. The Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been repeatedly scrutinized and rejected by Congress. The Army has been forced to divest legacy systems and restructure its modernization timeline. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps has consistently secured funding for Force Design initiatives—including NMESIS, long-range fires, and MLR standups. That’s not default approval—it’s earned credibility. The Corps isn’t just getting what it wants; it’s making a case that continues to convince Congress, year after year.
2. What Are Combatant Commanders Really Asking For?
They’re asking for both legacy and FD-derived capabilities—MEUs, sensing, maritime strike, SOF integration, and fast-turn ISR. None of those missions are fading. What’s new is the ability to forward-position sensors and fires in denied environments, which is exactly what Force Design enables. The forthcoming NDAA-directed study on Force Design will likely reinforce this demand, not undercut it.
3. “No Policy Reversals” Isn’t a Guarantee of Success?
True—it’s not a guarantee. But it is a signal. The examples cited—Madoff, Enron, Disney—are cases of outright fraud, not transparent, Congress-backed military modernization. Force Design is happening in the open, under constant scrutiny, in repeated joint exercises, and has yet to produce the kind of failure that prompts strategic walk-back. If critics were gaining traction, we’d see hearings, funding pulls, or at minimum a revised guidance document. Instead? We see validation through exercises like Balikatan, and increased joint buy-in.
4. Marine–Navy Integration Isn’t New—but It Is Evolving
No doubt integration existed before. But what we’re seeing now is quantitatively and qualitatively different. Marine sensors are passing target-quality data to surface and subsurface strike platforms in support of distributed maritime ops. TF 61/2, III MEF, and the 31st MEU are working in ways that align with the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept. That’s not routine BLT-to-Amphib—it’s cross-domain targeting and effects coordination that’s come a long way since the 1990s.
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Bottom line: Force Design isn’t perfect—and no one ever claimed it was. But it is moving, integrated, funded, and in demand. Critics have a right to speak—but results, not rhetoric, are what shape the future force. And right now, results are on the side of Force Design.
Okay, I'm going to short form my response by matching the number.
1) Yes, Congress is now kicking the Navy....after years of approving the Navy shipbuilding and maintenance plan. That is a great example. Like I said, they don't attack it until after it is demonstrably broken. Then the scrum piles on instead of pushing.
2) We've been doing forward positioned sensors and fires in denied environments for years. I started my service in the premier community that did that. That is simply not a new thing, despite what the FD marketing claims. Reinvigorating some aspects of it, especially the joint C^2(keeping it simple even though technically it's C5ISRT, or C-C5ISRT) where it had dried on the vine isn't a bad thing. Better / reinvigorated Joint Fires with some current digital technology is a good thing also. Just don't sell my Chevy back to me and tell me it's a brand new Cadillac with the all new 'User Interface Guidance Mechanism' that looks just like a steering wheel. Add to that, I bet the Combatant Commanders, especially IndoPacom, will take anything they can get however they can get it at this point. They are stuck with a 40 card deck in the Casino. That's why I think Adm Paparo mentioned NMESIS in his April testimony along with Typhon. He was throwing a bone. But nowhere did he specifically mention Force Design driven changes .
3) Disney is not a case of outright fraud; it was sheer mismanagement and bad policy. Compare Ford, Chevy, and Toyotas' EV policy over the last 15 years. Toyota had an arguably better strategy with it's hybrid focus, while Ford and Chevy chased internally popular, marketing driven BEV strategies. Only when these did not pan out have they started to reverse the trend. Likewise, Porsche dipped into EVs in a Porsche way, without divesting significant and relevant aspects of their legacy business. And by the way, what did Balikatan validate? (Patrolling and comms / ISR? Offloading a NMESIS on an Island? It's important to have shore based units and ships talk to each other and allow for Joint Fires across the spectrum?)
4) Keep saying "Navy - Marine Integration isn't new"....that doesn't make it true. yes, technology enhances the capability....but this isn't new. And I stated we weren't talking the FD canard of 'old guys think BLT to Amphib is Joint integration'. None of this required the drastic changes of FD to improve.
Results: sure....remains to be seen. Yes, FD is popular in the House. All the staffers' who've read 'Kill Chain' and 'The Inheritance' clearly think it's great. However, that's not validation. The Pentomic Army was approved, before it was disapproved. And this is all easy when the logistics are fairy dusted in future tech hand waving. I do know that in the past 5 years, the USMC has had to concede there were crises that, although in it's wheelhouse, it could not respond. The USMC is currently structured around key capabilities it cannot field (the NMESIS structure is a key one....I don't really like that structure, but having it operationally fielded and functional would be better than not). There hasn't been a test of 'Force Design', just a 'campaign of learning' and a few exercises that look to have been heavily structured in favor of only positive FD spin (Looking at you MLREX25 with no info release other than 'MLR win / 7th Mar lose').
Alright, handing the conch back to you.
What Combatant Commanders are asking for FD units? I think they would prefer an Army Multi-Domain TF. Sensing units could be acquired from FO's or ANGLICO. In my opinion, I think you could get more capabilities out of a traditional MEU than you could out of a MLR.
As is the case with all weapons, countermeasures eventually catch up. Today we can fly a B-2 on a 37 hour round trip and not be seen as we stealth into the target zone, but you simply cannot base your long term strategic plans on that because tomorrow it could be no longer viable. Like buying stocks, you need a diversified portfolio to protect against an unforseen downturn. Everyone thought the Battleship would reign supreme, then Pearl Harbor happened.
Calls to abandon U.S. bases in the Middle East in favor of relying solely on long-range strike capabilities like the B-2 bomber ignore a fundamental truth of deterrence: presence matters. Bombers and missiles can hit targets from afar, but they cannot reassure allies, gather critical on-the-ground intelligence, or build the daily partnerships that prevent conflicts from escalating in the first place. When we give up forward positions, we create vacuums that our adversaries, whether it is Iran, Russia, or China, will quickly exploit to expand their influence, intimidate our partners, and undermine regional stability.
Boots on the ground remain the clearest signal to both our allies and our adversaries that the United States is committed to security and stability in the region. A forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit or a Special Operations team in the region is not simply a tactical asset but a strategic message: we are present, watching, and capable of rapid response. It is easy to advocate for a “stand-off” military posture from afar, but history repeatedly shows that deterrence fades when adversaries believe we lack the will or the means to act decisively. By maintaining bases and a forward presence, we force adversaries to think twice before moving against our interests or those of our allies, ensuring that peace is preserved not by rhetoric alone, but by credible, visible readiness.
What we don't need is the Washington Post.
First, we need to review US strategic interests. These might include dealing within our own borders. They might also include supporting and strengthening our own hemisphere. Both have been neglected and are becoming increasingly frayed. And there may be legitimate US interests elsewhere but the case needs to be made. Like Ukraine, Libya and Syria, we too often create disaster.
To the point of the article, bombing from Missouri is hardly an appropriate response to all situations. Among other things, I would not expect the B2 to perform as well over a defended target.
Are we now a Hollow force (historically speaking) searching for a mini-mission?
Most Americans want us in the fight.
Great comments here-Rob, good quote.
One can imagine the current state of the Marine Corps being presented to the graduating class of 2026 at Harvard Business School, or Wharton or Kellog. Professor Postlethwaite presents the case study to the class. A storied brand nearing its 250th year in operation has fallen on hard times. Starting about 20 years ago a series of events globally conspired to threaten the brand MC CO. A series of CEO’s searched for ways to make the brand seem more “relevant” and modernized to meet a growing competitor’s perceived threat. The last CEO and current one, have taken on a modernization scheme, and in order to finance the effort they have sold off major operating groups that were quite profitable and integral to the success of the company. They are now running short on cash. (A business fails when it runs out of cash to operate.)They want to go to the Investment Bankers on Wall Street but the word is out MC Company is toast, they are low on cash, they can’t raise any new debt, and they violated a rule, if you want our money show us that the first one works….At the moment they have nothing to show for their efforts other than some Potemkin pieces of equipment that really look good but actually don’t work, they don’t do anything. so they don’t have the first one built, let alone that “it works.” The current CEO is left with going to the Venture Capital thugs in Silicon Valley or attempting to rebuild from within. Overwhelmed, he has vacillated on how best to bring his new vision and business model to fruition but can’t seem to find the right pitch to get the cash he needs. To further complicate matters, there are several members of the Board of Directors who have been asked to resign but won’t and there is clear discord, internally at the company and outside it. It’s a bun fight that doesn’t look good to investors. The share holders are getting nervous. The share price long term value has always been a bargain, even Warren Buffet owns some of the stock. But Warren is signaling he may have had enough.
Okay class of 2026. What do you do now, You have been called in to right the ship, and put if back on a profitable course.
"Prescient" means having or showing knowledge of events before they occur, often implying foresight or intuitive understanding. It describes someone or something that seems to predict or anticipate future outcomes accurately. Force Design enthusiast exhibit an infinite amount of arrogance, hubris and a false belief that only they can accurately predict the future. They believe in the Prescient Power of “the Fictitious TAROT CARDS OF WAR.
More Grok: “T.R. Fehrenbach, in *This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War*, provides profound insights into the nature of warfare, emphasizing the enduring necessity of ground forces, the importance of preparedness, and the challenges of limited conflicts in democratic societies. His quotes reflect a clear-eyed view of war’s demands and realities, drawn from his analysis of the Korean War.
Fehrenbach underscores the critical role of ground troops, stating, “You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it… but if you desire to defend it… you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.” He similarly notes that controlling territories requires boots on the ground, as “this can be done only as Alexander the Great did it, on the ground.” He stresses preparedness, warning, “A nation that does not prepare for all the forms of war should then renounce the use of war… To fail to prepare soldiers and citizens for limited, bloody ground action… is folly verging on the criminal.”
He also critiques misjudgments in war, observing, “To make a war, sometimes it is necessary that everyone guess wrong,” and advocates approaching conflict “with sadness, with regret, but also with ferocity.” Fehrenbach highlights the reluctance of democratic societies to engage in limited wars, noting that citizen-soldiers are often more willing to die in “holocaust, the big war” than in smaller conflicts. Finally, he honors the soldier’s resolve, describing them as “the stuff of which legions are made,” willing to fight and die without complaint, a constant from Rome to modern America. These quotes encapsulate Fehrenbach’s belief in the gritty, human essence of warfare and the moral and strategic imperatives of readiness.”
Claiming the Corps is backing off Force Design because of the adjustments outlined by General Van Riper in yesterday’s comments is wishful thinking at best. Retaining a CH-53K squadron, preserving the 4th Marines, or deciding not to cut certain airframes isn’t retreat—it’s refinement. FD2030 was never static; it’s an adaptive campaign grounded in threat, experimentation, and operational reality.
The Commandant calls it a righteous journey, and that’s exactly what it is. The Corps is evolving with intent—not scrambling to recover. Chowder II taking credit for these moves is laughable. They’re not steering change—they’re watching from the bleachers.
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/08/in-new-guidance-top-marine-says-righteous-force-design-will-guide-the-money/
While critics write essays and op-eds, Marines are fielding FPV drones, deploying precision fires, competing in the Pacific, and preparing for the fight ahead. The Corps isn’t reversing. It’s accelerating.
Speaking of FPV drones—here’s the SECNAV at Quantico, watching Marines employ them in live-fire training. While some talk, others build.
https://x.com/secnav/status/1938961967491989649?s=42
The other day, in another post, you claimed the folks here were wanting the Marine Corps to fail. I personally take the biggest offense to that notion. I was 27 when I joined the Corps. The Corps literally saved me and gave me purpose in life. The Corps was the only ones willing to take a chance on me after all the bridges I had burned.
To say I want the Corps to fail is a slap in the face.