I hope all Compass point readers noticed that budget documents indicate the first production models of the NMESIS are not scheduled to come off the production line until April 2026. It will take more months to fully equip and train operators in the 3rd MLR. When that is accomplished the regiment will have a system that is not stealthy despite the 38th CMC's claims otherwise, has a limited range (115 miles), is subsonic, and with a warhead unlikely to sink a naval combatant. Furthermore, the leaders of the Corps have yet to figure out how they will provide logistics to keep this system in the fight or how it will maneuver the Stand-i Forces armed with the system. For this the 38th CMC gave up the Corps ability to fulfill its Congressionally mandated role as an air-ground combined arms force, its focus on the corps-level MEF (39th CMC advertises MEUs as the "jewel of the Corps"), and its persistent forward presence. I see this as professional malpractice on the part of the Corps' senior leaders.
When I read about the “deployment” of the NMESIS missiles, I yawned.” I still don’t see how “it’s a Force Multiplier!
In my humble and unlearned opinion, deployment of NMESIS missiles by the Corps in a potential conflict against China is misguided and will more than likely prove ineffective.
and other integrated missile defense networks, are specifically designed to neutralize incoming missile threats, reducing the tactical advantage of NMESIS.
Second, China’s vast geography and decentralized command-and-control infrastructure make it challenging to identify high-value targets that could justify the missile’s use.
Additionally, the reliance on a missile-based strategy located close to China in a static position (if other countries in the first island chain allow their deployment) risks escalating tensions, rather than deterring Chinese adventurism.
Finally, such an approach neglects the strategic importance of cyber, electronic warfare, and other asymmetric methods that are more suited to countering China’s strengths, making the use of NMESIS missiles both impractical and strategically shortsighted. The Marine Corps would be better suited, and would serve our nation more capably, by returning all three MEFs to their MAGTF concept…add to the MAGTFs, don’t neuter them, this is the only way to keep the Marine Corps viable in any future conflict and keep them as a deterrence against potential bad actors.
Let the Air Force, Navy, and Army handle missile defense; they are quite capable and already have such systems in place!
I might be mistaken, but I think the new PrSM missile fired from the HIMARs will make the NMESIS system irrelevant. I would also tend to believe that a MEU with HIMARS would be more effective than a NMESIS and its SIF.
On a side note, todays USNI News Brief, had an article: "Poor Material Condition of Navy Amphib Fleet Prevents Marine Deployments...." We all knew this, but its more info in writing.
Randy, you are not mistaken. The PrSM has more than double the range of the NSN, can hit a moving martime target, and can be fired from existing HIMARS launchers. The Marines could have simply bought this missile and used the existing force structure to task organize for the mission. The SIF concept would still be logistically unsupportable but the Anti-Ship missile capability would be far better than the NSM. Here's the ugly secret - - the Anti-Ship missile was never the main consideration. The ill-conceived and unsupportable SIF concept (sense and make sense) was always the raison d'etre. The professional incompetence that gave us this fiasco and perpetuates it is mind boggling.
The first launchers arrived. But, no missiles. So, capability remains at zero. When the missiles do arrive, and assume you can identify a target and a firing solution, the missile cannot sink a ship. This is just plain delusional theater.
Food For Thought: This episode we’re in may have been included Albert Camus’ “Theatre of the Absurd”, had he lived it. On an associated note, I seem to recall that, post WW I & into the early - to - mid 20’s, the Corps separated a good number of officers who could not get on with the idea of the coming of Amphibious Warfare - a concept beyond their comprehension. I am leaning in that direction now … I have held off saying it out loud, but there it is … maybe it is time for those whose beliefs and actions have put in a shape to NOT BE ABLE TO ANSWER THE CALL should a COCOM need us, to bid the Corps adieu. If we cannot do that - meet that national requirement - then why is a Corps of Marines needed? Marines have been more than human bunting at gala events in Washington - the country expects more of us than that.
You Tube Binkov’s Battleground “Fortress Guam:How/Why is US Military turning the Island into a Pacific bastion.” Compare this Pacific single fortification to FD and its destruction of Our once Mighty Global 911 Force.
CFrog … Damn fine piece of history. It brought the first burst of laughter I’ve had today … and, I remember those days, as well … and, at Camp Schwab at that!!! That said, those were days in which we had numbers, but, the force was hollow, very hollow. Semper Fi, matey!
I hope all Compass point readers noticed that budget documents indicate the first production models of the NMESIS are not scheduled to come off the production line until April 2026. It will take more months to fully equip and train operators in the 3rd MLR. When that is accomplished the regiment will have a system that is not stealthy despite the 38th CMC's claims otherwise, has a limited range (115 miles), is subsonic, and with a warhead unlikely to sink a naval combatant. Furthermore, the leaders of the Corps have yet to figure out how they will provide logistics to keep this system in the fight or how it will maneuver the Stand-i Forces armed with the system. For this the 38th CMC gave up the Corps ability to fulfill its Congressionally mandated role as an air-ground combined arms force, its focus on the corps-level MEF (39th CMC advertises MEUs as the "jewel of the Corps"), and its persistent forward presence. I see this as professional malpractice on the part of the Corps' senior leaders.
When I read about the “deployment” of the NMESIS missiles, I yawned.” I still don’t see how “it’s a Force Multiplier!
In my humble and unlearned opinion, deployment of NMESIS missiles by the Corps in a potential conflict against China is misguided and will more than likely prove ineffective.
First, China’s robust and highly advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9 - https://www.army-technology.com/projects/hong-qi-9-hq-9-air-defence-missile-system/
and other integrated missile defense networks, are specifically designed to neutralize incoming missile threats, reducing the tactical advantage of NMESIS.
Second, China’s vast geography and decentralized command-and-control infrastructure make it challenging to identify high-value targets that could justify the missile’s use.
Additionally, the reliance on a missile-based strategy located close to China in a static position (if other countries in the first island chain allow their deployment) risks escalating tensions, rather than deterring Chinese adventurism.
Finally, such an approach neglects the strategic importance of cyber, electronic warfare, and other asymmetric methods that are more suited to countering China’s strengths, making the use of NMESIS missiles both impractical and strategically shortsighted. The Marine Corps would be better suited, and would serve our nation more capably, by returning all three MEFs to their MAGTF concept…add to the MAGTFs, don’t neuter them, this is the only way to keep the Marine Corps viable in any future conflict and keep them as a deterrence against potential bad actors.
Let the Air Force, Navy, and Army handle missile defense; they are quite capable and already have such systems in place!
I might be mistaken, but I think the new PrSM missile fired from the HIMARs will make the NMESIS system irrelevant. I would also tend to believe that a MEU with HIMARS would be more effective than a NMESIS and its SIF.
On a side note, todays USNI News Brief, had an article: "Poor Material Condition of Navy Amphib Fleet Prevents Marine Deployments...." We all knew this, but its more info in writing.
Randy, you are not mistaken. The PrSM has more than double the range of the NSN, can hit a moving martime target, and can be fired from existing HIMARS launchers. The Marines could have simply bought this missile and used the existing force structure to task organize for the mission. The SIF concept would still be logistically unsupportable but the Anti-Ship missile capability would be far better than the NSM. Here's the ugly secret - - the Anti-Ship missile was never the main consideration. The ill-conceived and unsupportable SIF concept (sense and make sense) was always the raison d'etre. The professional incompetence that gave us this fiasco and perpetuates it is mind boggling.
The first launchers arrived. But, no missiles. So, capability remains at zero. When the missiles do arrive, and assume you can identify a target and a firing solution, the missile cannot sink a ship. This is just plain delusional theater.
Food For Thought: This episode we’re in may have been included Albert Camus’ “Theatre of the Absurd”, had he lived it. On an associated note, I seem to recall that, post WW I & into the early - to - mid 20’s, the Corps separated a good number of officers who could not get on with the idea of the coming of Amphibious Warfare - a concept beyond their comprehension. I am leaning in that direction now … I have held off saying it out loud, but there it is … maybe it is time for those whose beliefs and actions have put in a shape to NOT BE ABLE TO ANSWER THE CALL should a COCOM need us, to bid the Corps adieu. If we cannot do that - meet that national requirement - then why is a Corps of Marines needed? Marines have been more than human bunting at gala events in Washington - the country expects more of us than that.
You Tube Binkov’s Battleground “Fortress Guam:How/Why is US Military turning the Island into a Pacific bastion.” Compare this Pacific single fortification to FD and its destruction of Our once Mighty Global 911 Force.
First, here is to hoping that turning the power off and back on gets the system to restart.
Second, for some reason, this Post reminds me of the following, which LCpl cfrog may have witnessed in between brawls at Camp Schwab...
Officer: "And what do you do here, Marine?"
LCpl: "Well sir, somedays all it seems I do is paint rocks, clean shtters, and count the days to my EAS...."
Officer: "Have you considered re-enlisting?"
*(Names left out and story embellished to protect the guilty)
CFrog … Damn fine piece of history. It brought the first burst of laughter I’ve had today … and, I remember those days, as well … and, at Camp Schwab at that!!! That said, those were days in which we had numbers, but, the force was hollow, very hollow. Semper Fi, matey!
Nobody promised a peaceful voyage to 2026. We have to “dance with whom we brung” and what have now.