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Travis Hord's avatar

While I don’t agree on many of the points, it’s good to share dialogue and understand perspectives to better inform future capabilities and how we integrate them - much like what I've shared here before.

-The lesson to learn here is about the martial use of robotics in all domains. A capabilities centric approach to integration enables a family of robotic systems to enhance the combined arms effect of every formation. Attempting to link a platform to a level of war misses the value proposition and portends a rigid approach to integrating.

*Actions are strategic, not platforms*

-The reason we’re seeing aerial robotics proliferate in this conflict is because neither side has achieved air dominance. The obverse of that is in the below thread ⬇️

Why nations with mature air forces are playing catch up to employ aerial robotics: https://lnkd.in/eyFXj47t

-The biggest threat in not integrating small aerial systems in the method you fight is you also lack methods and capabilities to contend with those threats. Where our doctrine is predicated on levels of air dominance and sea control, threat actors are quickly figuring out methods to disrupt operations and present staggering cost offsets to contend with the asymmetric capabilities (ie. Red Sea).

For me, robotics integration to enhance effectiveness of formations operating in all domains is additive. Unfortunately, our nation made an independent Air Force in the ugliest way imaginable. The independent drone service for Ukr is being born of innovation by necessity and relatively free of the cultural biases and road blocks we have today. There’s a reason Marines don’t want to break the MAGTF up -responsive organic air.

Today aerial robotics can be organic to ground formations -giving commanders better options while saving the sorties of crewed platform to tasks of greater operational relevance. I don’t see a downside here.

Look forward to feedback and thanks again for sharing.

LtCol T.L. Hord

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Bob Whitener's avatar

Gen. Zinni^s ^One Trick Pony^ article applies to the tactical, operational and strategic irrelevance of FD 2030. It doesn^t take much reading beyond ^The Last Stand of Fox Company^ to understand that the strategic relevance of the MLR strung out on inner island rings doesn^t exist, and to further understand the MLR tactical and operational relevance, when facing Chinese PLAN hoards of people and things, also does not exist in a Taiwan invasion scenario.

What does exist tactically, operationally and strategically is the ARG/MEU that can become the MEB or MEF. These MAGTF levels will need to incorporate drone employment, as well as the means to counter them. But just as the longbow did not end ground combat, the arrival of the swarming drone threat will not end the need for a combined arms force to be trained and equipped to close with and destroy an enemy.

The capability of a MAGTF combined arms force trained and equipped to close wiith and destroy an enemy, has tactical, operational and strategic relevance. It is not a One Trick Pony.

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