While I don’t agree on many of the points, it’s good to share dialogue and understand perspectives to better inform future capabilities and how we integrate them - much like what I've shared here before.
-The lesson to learn here is about the martial use of robotics in all domains. A capabilities centric approach to integration enables a family of robotic systems to enhance the combined arms effect of every formation. Attempting to link a platform to a level of war misses the value proposition and portends a rigid approach to integrating.
*Actions are strategic, not platforms*
-The reason we’re seeing aerial robotics proliferate in this conflict is because neither side has achieved air dominance. The obverse of that is in the below thread ⬇️
Why nations with mature air forces are playing catch up to employ aerial robotics: https://lnkd.in/eyFXj47t
-The biggest threat in not integrating small aerial systems in the method you fight is you also lack methods and capabilities to contend with those threats. Where our doctrine is predicated on levels of air dominance and sea control, threat actors are quickly figuring out methods to disrupt operations and present staggering cost offsets to contend with the asymmetric capabilities (ie. Red Sea).
For me, robotics integration to enhance effectiveness of formations operating in all domains is additive. Unfortunately, our nation made an independent Air Force in the ugliest way imaginable. The independent drone service for Ukr is being born of innovation by necessity and relatively free of the cultural biases and road blocks we have today. There’s a reason Marines don’t want to break the MAGTF up -responsive organic air.
Today aerial robotics can be organic to ground formations -giving commanders better options while saving the sorties of crewed platform to tasks of greater operational relevance. I don’t see a downside here.
Look forward to feedback and thanks again for sharing.
Gen. Zinni^s ^One Trick Pony^ article applies to the tactical, operational and strategic irrelevance of FD 2030. It doesn^t take much reading beyond ^The Last Stand of Fox Company^ to understand that the strategic relevance of the MLR strung out on inner island rings doesn^t exist, and to further understand the MLR tactical and operational relevance, when facing Chinese PLAN hoards of people and things, also does not exist in a Taiwan invasion scenario.
What does exist tactically, operationally and strategically is the ARG/MEU that can become the MEB or MEF. These MAGTF levels will need to incorporate drone employment, as well as the means to counter them. But just as the longbow did not end ground combat, the arrival of the swarming drone threat will not end the need for a combined arms force to be trained and equipped to close with and destroy an enemy.
The capability of a MAGTF combined arms force trained and equipped to close wiith and destroy an enemy, has tactical, operational and strategic relevance. It is not a One Trick Pony.
Everyone has made great points regarding the use of drones. The Ukrainians and Russians seem to be using drones as if they are artillery rounds. So many questions on the usage of drones. Are drones an air asset or ground asset? They will probably not win a battle by themselves. But they will be an important asset.
How they will be used is the important question. During the Second World War, the Germans and French each had tanks, but each country used them differently. Drones should be used in a way which will enhance the MAGTF.
It is time for specificity, agreed to definitions, common terminology and details. Just saying “Drones” doesn’t mean anything. It is like saying “planes” or “ships”. It was just as bad with “IED’s”. It is time for groupings based on payload, range, pilot operated, reconnaissance, speed, altitude, single use, multiple use etc.
DoD has gotten increasingly sloppy over the past thirty years making up new terms, phrases, buzz words, slang and terminology that does not illuminate. Gross lack of discipline.
Great article! I like the concept of not putting all your eggs in one basket. Let's get back to a strong MAGTF and enhance it with drones. We need more tools! GySgt Gerdau
Re Aircraft vs “Drones”IDF. February 20, 2024 | Breaking Defense
Israeli Air Force struck 31,000 targets in four months of war
New government numbers show roughly 228 targets struck by airstrikes every day of the conflict, significantly more than any previous IDF effort.
Seth J. Frantzman | Adjunct Fellow
(JACK GUEZ/AFP via Getty Images)
The Israeli Air Force has struck 31,000 targets on multiple fronts since the Oct. 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas, according to new data released by the IDF.
The report, which covers everything from unmanned strikes to close-air support efforts by manned jets, gives the clearest picture of the amount of firepower Israel has brought to its efforts to root out Hamas — an average of roughly 228 targets struck every day of the conflict. (The IDF doesn’t define what it means by a “target,” so it is possible that the number of munitions used is actually larger if each target involved multiple weapons.”) Artillery strikes, which have also been part of the IDF response, are not accounted for in this report, which is just focused on air-launched weapons.
This conflict has been Israel’s most intense in recent memory by any measure. The number of targets struck by the Air Force in the first four months are more than twice as many, on a daily average, than those struck in 2014 during fifty days of war. In the eleven-day conflict in May 2021, Israel struck around 1,500 targets, again a significantly lower per-day average.
According to the report, 29,000 of the targets were in Gaza, hardly a surprise given the focus of Israel’s efforts. The IDF spent the first few weeks of the war in October shaping the battlefield with airstrikes, usually hundreds each night. On Nov. 12 the IDF said it had struck 15,000 targets in Gaza, meaning almost half the strikes of the entire conflict occurred in the first five weeks; the large number of targets generated in the early days of the war was credited to use of new technology, including AI, as well as strike cells at IDF southern command and close coordination with ground forces.
The northern front, where Israel has faced thousands of rocket attacks by Hezbollah, as well as drone and ATGM attacks, has also seen daily Israeli air force operations, although the sheer volume is less, with the report claiming 1,100 strikes were carried out in the north. Notably, an Israeli release on Jan. 14 claimed 750 targets the IDF said had been struck, meaning in the last five weeks the strikes in Lebanon have increased by 68 percent.
Israel Defense Minister Yoav Gallant highlighted the air force role in the north and has sought to deter Hezbollah from further attacks, noting the airplanes noses are “pointed” north.
In addition thirty airstrikes were carried out in the West Bank. Prior to the escalation in fighting that occurred in early 2023 in the West Bank, Israel did not carry out airstrikes in that region for two decades.
The report provides some more granularity on what kind of strikes were called for. In Gaza, warplanes and UAVs were called upon to carry out 7,000 “lightning strikes,” a term meaning forces in the field called in the strikes in response to an immediate threat or urgent request.
The air force has said this war has seen strikes carried out in close proximity to infantry and armored units, up to eighty meters from troops. Back on Nov. 6, the IDF said F-35s had carried out airstrikes as close as 200 meters from troops. Since then, this precision, and willingness to use it so close to friendly forces, has improved. The air force specified the closest strike was carried out on Nov. 18 to eliminate an anti-tank missile threat against the 401st armored brigade.
The air strikes have mostly been carried out by Israeli war planes, such as F-35s and F-16s. In addition, the IDF operates armed UAVs, such as the Hermes 450 Zik, and also uses Apache helicopters.
The Gaza Health Ministry has claimed that more than 29,000 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli strikes since the war began, while the Israeli government has claimed 10,000 Hamas militants.
BAE Systems to build new M777 howitzer structures for US Army
By Jen Judson
Thursday, Jan 4
Ukrainian artillerymen fire an M777 howitzer toward Russian positions on the front line of eastern Ukraine on Nov. 23, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of the country. (Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images)
WASHINGTON — BAE Systems will build M777 lightweight howitzer structures for the U.S. Army, which could lead to the firm restarting the weapon’s production line, according to the U.K.-based business.
The deal is limited to $50 million and “allows BAE Systems to start delivering on the howitzer program, while finalizing the details of the contract and its total value with the customer,” the company said in a Jan. 4 statement. The contract “presents optimum conditions for a likely restart of the M777 production.”
While I don’t agree on many of the points, it’s good to share dialogue and understand perspectives to better inform future capabilities and how we integrate them - much like what I've shared here before.
-The lesson to learn here is about the martial use of robotics in all domains. A capabilities centric approach to integration enables a family of robotic systems to enhance the combined arms effect of every formation. Attempting to link a platform to a level of war misses the value proposition and portends a rigid approach to integrating.
*Actions are strategic, not platforms*
-The reason we’re seeing aerial robotics proliferate in this conflict is because neither side has achieved air dominance. The obverse of that is in the below thread ⬇️
Why nations with mature air forces are playing catch up to employ aerial robotics: https://lnkd.in/eyFXj47t
-The biggest threat in not integrating small aerial systems in the method you fight is you also lack methods and capabilities to contend with those threats. Where our doctrine is predicated on levels of air dominance and sea control, threat actors are quickly figuring out methods to disrupt operations and present staggering cost offsets to contend with the asymmetric capabilities (ie. Red Sea).
For me, robotics integration to enhance effectiveness of formations operating in all domains is additive. Unfortunately, our nation made an independent Air Force in the ugliest way imaginable. The independent drone service for Ukr is being born of innovation by necessity and relatively free of the cultural biases and road blocks we have today. There’s a reason Marines don’t want to break the MAGTF up -responsive organic air.
Today aerial robotics can be organic to ground formations -giving commanders better options while saving the sorties of crewed platform to tasks of greater operational relevance. I don’t see a downside here.
Look forward to feedback and thanks again for sharing.
LtCol T.L. Hord
Colonel Hord, Keep writing; I'm learning! PKVR
Ends+Ways+Means= Strategy Platforms ie drones, arty, ew, etc etc are means…we are back to the inescapable 3 legged stool.
Gen. Zinni^s ^One Trick Pony^ article applies to the tactical, operational and strategic irrelevance of FD 2030. It doesn^t take much reading beyond ^The Last Stand of Fox Company^ to understand that the strategic relevance of the MLR strung out on inner island rings doesn^t exist, and to further understand the MLR tactical and operational relevance, when facing Chinese PLAN hoards of people and things, also does not exist in a Taiwan invasion scenario.
What does exist tactically, operationally and strategically is the ARG/MEU that can become the MEB or MEF. These MAGTF levels will need to incorporate drone employment, as well as the means to counter them. But just as the longbow did not end ground combat, the arrival of the swarming drone threat will not end the need for a combined arms force to be trained and equipped to close with and destroy an enemy.
The capability of a MAGTF combined arms force trained and equipped to close wiith and destroy an enemy, has tactical, operational and strategic relevance. It is not a One Trick Pony.
I agree with Travis H., great comment and great research. My favorite saying: Want a new idea, read an old book.
Everyone has made great points regarding the use of drones. The Ukrainians and Russians seem to be using drones as if they are artillery rounds. So many questions on the usage of drones. Are drones an air asset or ground asset? They will probably not win a battle by themselves. But they will be an important asset.
How they will be used is the important question. During the Second World War, the Germans and French each had tanks, but each country used them differently. Drones should be used in a way which will enhance the MAGTF.
It is time for specificity, agreed to definitions, common terminology and details. Just saying “Drones” doesn’t mean anything. It is like saying “planes” or “ships”. It was just as bad with “IED’s”. It is time for groupings based on payload, range, pilot operated, reconnaissance, speed, altitude, single use, multiple use etc.
DoD has gotten increasingly sloppy over the past thirty years making up new terms, phrases, buzz words, slang and terminology that does not illuminate. Gross lack of discipline.
Great article! I like the concept of not putting all your eggs in one basket. Let's get back to a strong MAGTF and enhance it with drones. We need more tools! GySgt Gerdau
Re Aircraft vs “Drones”IDF. February 20, 2024 | Breaking Defense
Israeli Air Force struck 31,000 targets in four months of war
New government numbers show roughly 228 targets struck by airstrikes every day of the conflict, significantly more than any previous IDF effort.
Seth J. Frantzman | Adjunct Fellow
(JACK GUEZ/AFP via Getty Images)
The Israeli Air Force has struck 31,000 targets on multiple fronts since the Oct. 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas, according to new data released by the IDF.
The report, which covers everything from unmanned strikes to close-air support efforts by manned jets, gives the clearest picture of the amount of firepower Israel has brought to its efforts to root out Hamas — an average of roughly 228 targets struck every day of the conflict. (The IDF doesn’t define what it means by a “target,” so it is possible that the number of munitions used is actually larger if each target involved multiple weapons.”) Artillery strikes, which have also been part of the IDF response, are not accounted for in this report, which is just focused on air-launched weapons.
This conflict has been Israel’s most intense in recent memory by any measure. The number of targets struck by the Air Force in the first four months are more than twice as many, on a daily average, than those struck in 2014 during fifty days of war. In the eleven-day conflict in May 2021, Israel struck around 1,500 targets, again a significantly lower per-day average.
According to the report, 29,000 of the targets were in Gaza, hardly a surprise given the focus of Israel’s efforts. The IDF spent the first few weeks of the war in October shaping the battlefield with airstrikes, usually hundreds each night. On Nov. 12 the IDF said it had struck 15,000 targets in Gaza, meaning almost half the strikes of the entire conflict occurred in the first five weeks; the large number of targets generated in the early days of the war was credited to use of new technology, including AI, as well as strike cells at IDF southern command and close coordination with ground forces.
The northern front, where Israel has faced thousands of rocket attacks by Hezbollah, as well as drone and ATGM attacks, has also seen daily Israeli air force operations, although the sheer volume is less, with the report claiming 1,100 strikes were carried out in the north. Notably, an Israeli release on Jan. 14 claimed 750 targets the IDF said had been struck, meaning in the last five weeks the strikes in Lebanon have increased by 68 percent.
Israel Defense Minister Yoav Gallant highlighted the air force role in the north and has sought to deter Hezbollah from further attacks, noting the airplanes noses are “pointed” north.
In addition thirty airstrikes were carried out in the West Bank. Prior to the escalation in fighting that occurred in early 2023 in the West Bank, Israel did not carry out airstrikes in that region for two decades.
The report provides some more granularity on what kind of strikes were called for. In Gaza, warplanes and UAVs were called upon to carry out 7,000 “lightning strikes,” a term meaning forces in the field called in the strikes in response to an immediate threat or urgent request.
The air force has said this war has seen strikes carried out in close proximity to infantry and armored units, up to eighty meters from troops. Back on Nov. 6, the IDF said F-35s had carried out airstrikes as close as 200 meters from troops. Since then, this precision, and willingness to use it so close to friendly forces, has improved. The air force specified the closest strike was carried out on Nov. 18 to eliminate an anti-tank missile threat against the 401st armored brigade.
The air strikes have mostly been carried out by Israeli war planes, such as F-35s and F-16s. In addition, the IDF operates armed UAVs, such as the Hermes 450 Zik, and also uses Apache helicopters.
The Gaza Health Ministry has claimed that more than 29,000 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli strikes since the war began, while the Israeli government has claimed 10,000 Hamas militants.
Defensive Efforts
The USMC must immediately invest in a mass M777 buy w Ammo!
BAE Systems to build new M777 howitzer structures for US Army
By Jen Judson
Thursday, Jan 4
Ukrainian artillerymen fire an M777 howitzer toward Russian positions on the front line of eastern Ukraine on Nov. 23, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of the country. (Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images)
WASHINGTON — BAE Systems will build M777 lightweight howitzer structures for the U.S. Army, which could lead to the firm restarting the weapon’s production line, according to the U.K.-based business.
The deal is limited to $50 million and “allows BAE Systems to start delivering on the howitzer program, while finalizing the details of the contract and its total value with the customer,” the company said in a Jan. 4 statement. The contract “presents optimum conditions for a likely restart of the M777 production.”
Drones are like airplanes. They do not win wars.