“But the Navy’s sea-control task is hugely eased if, like the island of Malta during World War II, the Marine Corps is able to establish and defend key maritime terrain on which are emplaced fires-complexes capable of engaging ships and aircraft 500 or more miles away.”
Not really sure the SEIGE of Malta, stated in the above article, is a good example of easing the Navy’s huge sea-control task, nor is it a good justification of FD2030 EABO operations. The operations and campaigns to control Malta took 2 years, 5 months, 1 week and 2 days (11 June 1940 – 20 November 1942) and did not contribute to SLOC control until after Rommel’s North Africa victories.
Initially, British pre-war planning dubbed Malta as indefensible. However, all the strategic twists and turns of the Battle for the Mediterranean did made Malta a “popup” target (not a strategic target) for both the Allies and Axis.
Mussolini had a pre-war invasion plan to seize Malta. He did not invade Malta because he “expected Francoist Spain to join the Axis and capture Gibraltar, which would close the Mediterranean to the British from the west.” When Spain did not close Gibraltar, he used his air force to neutralized and isolate Malta. His Africa campaign was the focus of his military efforts and forces. In addition, the Italian mainland and Sicily airfields, plus the German occupation of Greece and Crete over shadowed the strategic importance of Malta.
In retrospect, Mussolini missed the opportunity to invade Malta, splitting the Mediterranean Sea in two. However, after the Fall of France (neutralizing the French Mediterranean Fleet) and the British Fleet moving to Alexandra to protect the higher priority Suez Canal, the strategic value that Malta provided the Allies was significantly minimized. In addition, the Italian Navy would sortie against the British Fleet in March 1941, not to neutralize Malta, but to control the SLOC and intercept the relief convoys to Greece. The Italian Navy was defeated in the Battle of Matapan and efforts to destroy the relief convoys to Greece was a failure.
An interesting objective of the Italian air campaign was to bomb the Malta population into submission. Italy’s efforts to isolation Malta by blockade with 54,000 sea mines was partly successful as the mines proved, in British words, “troubling”.
At the time, the British could not afford another defeat especially in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In order to prevent another public affairs fiasco and loss of moral, they did station anti-aircraft units and moved to complete the island’s airfield.
After the Italian Army’s North African defeat, Rommel arrived in February 1941 to organize and lead his famed North Africa Campaigns. Rommel’s concerning issue were replacements and sustainment for his Africa Corps.
Rommel strongly suspected that his sustainment conveys were being sunk because of intelligence leaks. He was correct because Churchill was passing the German convoy schedules from breaking the Ultra Enigma code to his theater commanders. I might add, at great risk the Germans might determine the British had broken the code.
With the help of Ultra, aircraft stationed on Malta did contribute to losses of German supplies after costly sustainment convoy operations like Operation Pedestal.
Operation Pedestal (August 1942)
• Merchant Ships Lost: 9 out of 14 sunk.
• Naval Losses:
o 1 aircraft carrier (HMS Eagle)
o 2 light cruisers
o 1 destroyer
• Casualties: Over 500 sailors and airmen killed.
• Survivors: Only 5 merchant ships reached Malta, including the tanker SS Ohio, which was severely damaged but delivered crucial fuel2.
Other Convoy Losses
• Operation Harpoon (June 1942): 4 out of 6 merchant ships sunk.
• Operation Vigorous (June 1942): Entire convoy forced to turn back due to Axis attacks.
“In August 1942, Malta's strike forces had contributed to the Axis' difficulties in trying to force an advance into Egypt. In that month, 33% of supplies and 41% of fuel were lost.” Erwin Rommel left North Africa in March 1943, shortly after the failed German counter offensive at the Battle of Kasserine Pass.
The Allied Invaded French North Africa, Operation Torch, in November of 1942, using three amphibious Task Forces, two in the Western Mediterranean Sea, and one on the Atlantic Ocean side of Africa. We should note all three were out of Malta aircraft support range.
Next, on to the Invasion of Sicily. If Malta was occupied by the Axis forces they would have been easily neutralized before the invasion of Sicily, just like the island of Pantelleria. This island was invaded and occupied by the Allies on June 11, 1943, during Operation Corkscrew. Pantelleria is an island west of Malta with an Italian garrison of 12,000 Italian soldiers with well entrenched pillboxes and 21 gun batteries.
“From 8 May to 11 June 1943, 5,285 bombing sorties were flown by Allied fighter-bombers, medium and heavy bombers, dropping 6,202 long tons (6,302 t) of bombs on the island.” One hour before the British 1st Division landed the Italian garrison surrendered.
Churchill stated that Malta was important as an unsinkable aircraft carrier. The same can be said of almost any WW2 Pacific island with an airfield. Malta did hurt Rommel’s supply lines but did not prevent his Kasserine Pass offensive. The Battle for the Mediterranean was won after a number of British and US offensive land, naval and air campaigns that secured the SLOC. In my opinion Malta did not ease the naval task of securing the SLOC and is a bad example for a Pacific EABO operation. S/F
Missiles are themselves high performance drones, and yet there is little suggestion that missiles will supercede the core branches of the armed services. In the 1950's there was a broad camp of adherents that espoused all missile warfare was the future, and yet the war in Vietnam and dozens of other wars demonstrated that that was premature and a strategy for failure.
In the Ukraine the distances involved over a relatively stagnant combat zone has seen a wide variety of what I call hobby shop drone weapons, but this theater is hardly representative of warfare around the world and over prolonged eras of time. Moreover, a very high percentage of these drones do not succeed in meeting their end purpose for a wide range of reasons.
Although many would disagree, the principal platform that has been rendered obsolete by the efficacy of drones has been the attack helicopter, a platform that I have viewed for a long time as both vulnerable and excessively expensive.
In the end, it is properly trained and supported (Marine) infantry that take the ground.
The Russians have this wired for sound because they realize that in the 21st century, drones are a permutation of the artillery fires and coordinate & synchronize appropriately.
If you mean by “permutation” a sequential change, I agree. We’ve used defensive artillery fire and air bursts in too many situations to think that drones can accomplish those same things for the hours required to eliminate the threat. Who the hell knows what Berger was thinking when he eliminated tanks and engineering assets.
How many MEUs are afloat now? The 31st MEU is forward deployed not afloat.
When was the last time a Combatant Commander asked the Corps to provide a MEU for either contingency ops or something as simple as humanitarian assistance operations?
When was the last time the Corps was mentioned in public releases about providing security and combat power to WESTPAC. In prepared statements earlier this year, Adm. Paparo failed to mention any use of SIFs, NAMs, MLRs, because they’re a figment of HQMCs imagination. But he did mention the use of the Army’s multi-domain units. He also failed to mention any planned use of a MEU or a MEB, because they’re no MEUs afloat in WESTPAC, no way for a forward deployed MEU to be lifted to a needed location, and no mention of MEB because there’s only one squadron of MPS ships close to WESTPAC, but has no way of linking up with an engaged MEU or with follow on forces.
The Corps only survives if the combatant commanders see us as adding combat power to their commands, not an albatross around their necks, a cut off SIF/MLR that has expended all their basic load of NAMs, can only forage (haha!) for food, and is a convenient unit for PRC target practice.
Please explain to this forum how SIFs/MLRs fit into the Corps’s legal Title X mission? You can’t because it doesn’t.
West Coast will have two heal to toe MEUs out soon.
And yes there is a ships crisis that started when General Conway allowed the Navy to drop from 38 to 32 ships. CMC Smith is fixing that. You should back him.
Ummmm. . Combatant Commanders routinely ask for MEUs.
Actually, SIFs and MLRs fit squarely within the Marine Corps’ Title 10 mission—because Title 10 doesn’t prescribe a structure, it prescribes a purpose. The law directs the Marine Corps to be “organized, trained, and equipped for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” That’s the foundation.
SIFs and MLRs were developed specifically to operate inside contested maritime spaces—forward, persistent, and able to support sea denial, reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance, and long-range fires. These aren’t arbitrary units—they are purpose-built to support naval campaigns, especially in a fight against a peer adversary in a place like the First Island Chain.
You base Admiral Paparo’s view of the Marine Corps on his latest testimony? That’s it? Ok. You should see his OPLAN for the region. USMC is vital.
Just because you want it to be true does not make it true.
Don’t go putting the Navy’s ship building and maintenance problem on General Conway. All Commandant’s, going back to Goldwater-Nichols 1986 (when we established the Regional Combatant Commanders), have stressed the need for maintaining amphibious capabilities for the Combatant Commanders. When the Navy limited MEUs to three amphibious ships vs four, the US Marine Corps was very clear that the Navy was accepting considerable “RISK” to amphibious operations. Building and maintaining amphibious ships is the US Navy’s responsibility and problem.
Remember the Service is responsible to organize, equip and train. Professional knowledge, execution and training for operational amphibious warfare is also the US Navy’s responsibility. In my opinion, the US Navy has ignored that responsibility and it is a problem. Without a steady flow of MEUs, I don’t feel the US Navy is reaching an acceptable level of amphibious training.
I remember when the CNO came to Quantico to speak to my Amphibious Warfare Class (1981). After telling the class the importance of Amphibious Operations, during Q&A, a Marine Captain (student) stood up and asked the CNO: If amphibious operations are so important, why does our AWS Class have a full complement of US Army Captains (15+), a full complement of US Air Force Captains (15+); 20+ foreign students and one Naval Officer who was a Naval Reserve Pharmacist? We won the game of “Stump the Stars” that day.
Last I looked, the US Navy Flag Officer is always in charge of an amphibious landing. We usually call that Navy Officer the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The CATF (US Navy) is in control of the amphibious operation, especially during the ship-to-shore movement. As the situation stabilizes and C&C facilities are established ashore, the CLF (US Marine Corps) gradually assumes control of operations, including aviation and logistics support.
The amphibious doctrine of CATF and CLF is the same doctrine Eisenhower used in the WW2 Normandy Landings.
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay was the overall Allied Naval Commander for Operation Neptune (the naval component of Operation Overlord). He coordinated the entire amphibious assault.
Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk served as the CATF for the U.S. Navy forces supporting the American sector.
Rear Admiral Philip Vian commanded British naval forces at Sword Beach, and Rear Admiral William G. Tennant commanded at Gold Beach.
Commodore Cyril E. Douglas-Pennant was responsible for Juno Beach, supporting Canadian forces.
There is one exception to the CATF/CLF doctrine and that is the Afghanistan TF58 Operation where General Mattis maintain control of the Naval TF.
Now let’s do some math. General Neller (Commandant 2015-2019) identified the need for 50 amphibious ships based on the Combatant Commanders requirements. If we stick to the “risky” 3 amphibs per MEU requirement and the one MEU on float and two tied to the dock for maintenance that equals 9 amphibs to keep an operational MEU in a Combatant Commanders AOR. If 50 amphibs were available with these requirements, we could have an operational MEU in 5 Combatant Commanders AOR (with leftovers).
Amphibious ship building and maintenance is the US Navy responsibility as is amphibious operations. The ship building and maintenance problem belongs to the US Navy, and the US Marine Corps should not be the “seagull” in this matter. The Joint Force Combatant Commander should be in this role of “sitting on the beach and squawking” like a seagull.
Wouldn't this have been easier if they had just formed a separate Battalion in each FMF (Lant/Pac) to handle all the SIF things. They used to have a Force Recon in each.
cfrog adds: The notable thing about the development of modern drones is that they have roughly mirrored the path of manned combat aviation. We are at the stage where Drones are often used as Aerial Observer (AO) for fires and as Forward Air Controller Airborne (FAC A) for other drones being used as direct attack. For the low level environment, this means the ground unit has it's own hip pocket air force to fill the gap between the unit and larger manned / unmanned aircraft capable of delivering heavier munitions. In some aspects, it's not far off having a section of Cobras in your hip pocket working from a Battle Position near the ground unit, except the ground unit always owns at least some of the sUAS/FPVs. Imagine running FiST packages and SEAD missions where a whole swath of the air capability is on hand/in pocket for the commander without having to manage launch / time on station. For the larger units, designating DS of larger air support to the ME wouldn't mean necessarily denying any air support to supporting efforts, since they would have some capability organically. The potential for exploiting tempo is...nice.
Bad example!
“But the Navy’s sea-control task is hugely eased if, like the island of Malta during World War II, the Marine Corps is able to establish and defend key maritime terrain on which are emplaced fires-complexes capable of engaging ships and aircraft 500 or more miles away.”
Recently this article was posted on CP in support of FD2030. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Malta_(World_War_II)
Not really sure the SEIGE of Malta, stated in the above article, is a good example of easing the Navy’s huge sea-control task, nor is it a good justification of FD2030 EABO operations. The operations and campaigns to control Malta took 2 years, 5 months, 1 week and 2 days (11 June 1940 – 20 November 1942) and did not contribute to SLOC control until after Rommel’s North Africa victories.
Initially, British pre-war planning dubbed Malta as indefensible. However, all the strategic twists and turns of the Battle for the Mediterranean did made Malta a “popup” target (not a strategic target) for both the Allies and Axis.
Mussolini had a pre-war invasion plan to seize Malta. He did not invade Malta because he “expected Francoist Spain to join the Axis and capture Gibraltar, which would close the Mediterranean to the British from the west.” When Spain did not close Gibraltar, he used his air force to neutralized and isolate Malta. His Africa campaign was the focus of his military efforts and forces. In addition, the Italian mainland and Sicily airfields, plus the German occupation of Greece and Crete over shadowed the strategic importance of Malta.
In retrospect, Mussolini missed the opportunity to invade Malta, splitting the Mediterranean Sea in two. However, after the Fall of France (neutralizing the French Mediterranean Fleet) and the British Fleet moving to Alexandra to protect the higher priority Suez Canal, the strategic value that Malta provided the Allies was significantly minimized. In addition, the Italian Navy would sortie against the British Fleet in March 1941, not to neutralize Malta, but to control the SLOC and intercept the relief convoys to Greece. The Italian Navy was defeated in the Battle of Matapan and efforts to destroy the relief convoys to Greece was a failure.
An interesting objective of the Italian air campaign was to bomb the Malta population into submission. Italy’s efforts to isolation Malta by blockade with 54,000 sea mines was partly successful as the mines proved, in British words, “troubling”.
At the time, the British could not afford another defeat especially in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In order to prevent another public affairs fiasco and loss of moral, they did station anti-aircraft units and moved to complete the island’s airfield.
After the Italian Army’s North African defeat, Rommel arrived in February 1941 to organize and lead his famed North Africa Campaigns. Rommel’s concerning issue were replacements and sustainment for his Africa Corps.
Rommel strongly suspected that his sustainment conveys were being sunk because of intelligence leaks. He was correct because Churchill was passing the German convoy schedules from breaking the Ultra Enigma code to his theater commanders. I might add, at great risk the Germans might determine the British had broken the code.
With the help of Ultra, aircraft stationed on Malta did contribute to losses of German supplies after costly sustainment convoy operations like Operation Pedestal.
Operation Pedestal (August 1942)
• Merchant Ships Lost: 9 out of 14 sunk.
• Naval Losses:
o 1 aircraft carrier (HMS Eagle)
o 2 light cruisers
o 1 destroyer
• Casualties: Over 500 sailors and airmen killed.
• Survivors: Only 5 merchant ships reached Malta, including the tanker SS Ohio, which was severely damaged but delivered crucial fuel2.
Other Convoy Losses
• Operation Harpoon (June 1942): 4 out of 6 merchant ships sunk.
• Operation Vigorous (June 1942): Entire convoy forced to turn back due to Axis attacks.
“In August 1942, Malta's strike forces had contributed to the Axis' difficulties in trying to force an advance into Egypt. In that month, 33% of supplies and 41% of fuel were lost.” Erwin Rommel left North Africa in March 1943, shortly after the failed German counter offensive at the Battle of Kasserine Pass.
The Allied Invaded French North Africa, Operation Torch, in November of 1942, using three amphibious Task Forces, two in the Western Mediterranean Sea, and one on the Atlantic Ocean side of Africa. We should note all three were out of Malta aircraft support range.
Next, on to the Invasion of Sicily. If Malta was occupied by the Axis forces they would have been easily neutralized before the invasion of Sicily, just like the island of Pantelleria. This island was invaded and occupied by the Allies on June 11, 1943, during Operation Corkscrew. Pantelleria is an island west of Malta with an Italian garrison of 12,000 Italian soldiers with well entrenched pillboxes and 21 gun batteries.
“From 8 May to 11 June 1943, 5,285 bombing sorties were flown by Allied fighter-bombers, medium and heavy bombers, dropping 6,202 long tons (6,302 t) of bombs on the island.” One hour before the British 1st Division landed the Italian garrison surrendered.
Churchill stated that Malta was important as an unsinkable aircraft carrier. The same can be said of almost any WW2 Pacific island with an airfield. Malta did hurt Rommel’s supply lines but did not prevent his Kasserine Pass offensive. The Battle for the Mediterranean was won after a number of British and US offensive land, naval and air campaigns that secured the SLOC. In my opinion Malta did not ease the naval task of securing the SLOC and is a bad example for a Pacific EABO operation. S/F
Missiles are themselves high performance drones, and yet there is little suggestion that missiles will supercede the core branches of the armed services. In the 1950's there was a broad camp of adherents that espoused all missile warfare was the future, and yet the war in Vietnam and dozens of other wars demonstrated that that was premature and a strategy for failure.
In the Ukraine the distances involved over a relatively stagnant combat zone has seen a wide variety of what I call hobby shop drone weapons, but this theater is hardly representative of warfare around the world and over prolonged eras of time. Moreover, a very high percentage of these drones do not succeed in meeting their end purpose for a wide range of reasons.
Although many would disagree, the principal platform that has been rendered obsolete by the efficacy of drones has been the attack helicopter, a platform that I have viewed for a long time as both vulnerable and excessively expensive.
In the end, it is properly trained and supported (Marine) infantry that take the ground.
I agree, it’s only boots on the ground that has always been the required end state.
The Russians have this wired for sound because they realize that in the 21st century, drones are a permutation of the artillery fires and coordinate & synchronize appropriately.
If you mean by “permutation” a sequential change, I agree. We’ve used defensive artillery fire and air bursts in too many situations to think that drones can accomplish those same things for the hours required to eliminate the threat. Who the hell knows what Berger was thinking when he eliminated tanks and engineering assets.
I don't think I mean sequential so much as another component in the artillery quiver of indirect ground to ground indirect fire assets.
Berger murdered the Corps.
Please expand on this.
How? How has the USMC lost relevancy as it relates to current National Strategic Guidance? How is the Corps less relevant to our Operational Plans?
Madness.
How many MEUs are afloat now? The 31st MEU is forward deployed not afloat.
When was the last time a Combatant Commander asked the Corps to provide a MEU for either contingency ops or something as simple as humanitarian assistance operations?
When was the last time the Corps was mentioned in public releases about providing security and combat power to WESTPAC. In prepared statements earlier this year, Adm. Paparo failed to mention any use of SIFs, NAMs, MLRs, because they’re a figment of HQMCs imagination. But he did mention the use of the Army’s multi-domain units. He also failed to mention any planned use of a MEU or a MEB, because they’re no MEUs afloat in WESTPAC, no way for a forward deployed MEU to be lifted to a needed location, and no mention of MEB because there’s only one squadron of MPS ships close to WESTPAC, but has no way of linking up with an engaged MEU or with follow on forces.
The Corps only survives if the combatant commanders see us as adding combat power to their commands, not an albatross around their necks, a cut off SIF/MLR that has expended all their basic load of NAMs, can only forage (haha!) for food, and is a convenient unit for PRC target practice.
Please explain to this forum how SIFs/MLRs fit into the Corps’s legal Title X mission? You can’t because it doesn’t.
The 31st MEU is afloat and actively competing. You can google that right now. https://sldinfo.com/2025/06/u-s-marines-in-iron-fist-2025-strengthening-pacific-partnerships-through-bilateral-amphibious-operations/
22d MEU is working up. Headed out soon. https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/4217515/beyond-the-horizon-jump-20-extends-the-22nd-meus-maritime-dominance/
West Coast will have two heal to toe MEUs out soon.
And yes there is a ships crisis that started when General Conway allowed the Navy to drop from 38 to 32 ships. CMC Smith is fixing that. You should back him.
Ummmm. . Combatant Commanders routinely ask for MEUs.
Combatant Commands Made Clear Their Demand
General Smith noted that the geographic Combatant Commanders are “asking for … 5.5 [MEUs], and we can only deliver 1.0 right now”, highlighting a clear demand for more continuous MEU deployments. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/1/amphib-availability-biggest-challenge-to-marine-corps-north-star?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Actually, SIFs and MLRs fit squarely within the Marine Corps’ Title 10 mission—because Title 10 doesn’t prescribe a structure, it prescribes a purpose. The law directs the Marine Corps to be “organized, trained, and equipped for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” That’s the foundation.
SIFs and MLRs were developed specifically to operate inside contested maritime spaces—forward, persistent, and able to support sea denial, reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance, and long-range fires. These aren’t arbitrary units—they are purpose-built to support naval campaigns, especially in a fight against a peer adversary in a place like the First Island Chain.
You base Admiral Paparo’s view of the Marine Corps on his latest testimony? That’s it? Ok. You should see his OPLAN for the region. USMC is vital.
Just because you want it to be true does not make it true.
Whoa there masked man!
Don’t go putting the Navy’s ship building and maintenance problem on General Conway. All Commandant’s, going back to Goldwater-Nichols 1986 (when we established the Regional Combatant Commanders), have stressed the need for maintaining amphibious capabilities for the Combatant Commanders. When the Navy limited MEUs to three amphibious ships vs four, the US Marine Corps was very clear that the Navy was accepting considerable “RISK” to amphibious operations. Building and maintaining amphibious ships is the US Navy’s responsibility and problem.
Remember the Service is responsible to organize, equip and train. Professional knowledge, execution and training for operational amphibious warfare is also the US Navy’s responsibility. In my opinion, the US Navy has ignored that responsibility and it is a problem. Without a steady flow of MEUs, I don’t feel the US Navy is reaching an acceptable level of amphibious training.
I remember when the CNO came to Quantico to speak to my Amphibious Warfare Class (1981). After telling the class the importance of Amphibious Operations, during Q&A, a Marine Captain (student) stood up and asked the CNO: If amphibious operations are so important, why does our AWS Class have a full complement of US Army Captains (15+), a full complement of US Air Force Captains (15+); 20+ foreign students and one Naval Officer who was a Naval Reserve Pharmacist? We won the game of “Stump the Stars” that day.
Last I looked, the US Navy Flag Officer is always in charge of an amphibious landing. We usually call that Navy Officer the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The CATF (US Navy) is in control of the amphibious operation, especially during the ship-to-shore movement. As the situation stabilizes and C&C facilities are established ashore, the CLF (US Marine Corps) gradually assumes control of operations, including aviation and logistics support.
The amphibious doctrine of CATF and CLF is the same doctrine Eisenhower used in the WW2 Normandy Landings.
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay was the overall Allied Naval Commander for Operation Neptune (the naval component of Operation Overlord). He coordinated the entire amphibious assault.
Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk served as the CATF for the U.S. Navy forces supporting the American sector.
Rear Admiral Philip Vian commanded British naval forces at Sword Beach, and Rear Admiral William G. Tennant commanded at Gold Beach.
Commodore Cyril E. Douglas-Pennant was responsible for Juno Beach, supporting Canadian forces.
There is one exception to the CATF/CLF doctrine and that is the Afghanistan TF58 Operation where General Mattis maintain control of the Naval TF.
Now let’s do some math. General Neller (Commandant 2015-2019) identified the need for 50 amphibious ships based on the Combatant Commanders requirements. If we stick to the “risky” 3 amphibs per MEU requirement and the one MEU on float and two tied to the dock for maintenance that equals 9 amphibs to keep an operational MEU in a Combatant Commanders AOR. If 50 amphibs were available with these requirements, we could have an operational MEU in 5 Combatant Commanders AOR (with leftovers).
Amphibious ship building and maintenance is the US Navy responsibility as is amphibious operations. The ship building and maintenance problem belongs to the US Navy, and the US Marine Corps should not be the “seagull” in this matter. The Joint Force Combatant Commander should be in this role of “sitting on the beach and squawking” like a seagull.
Wouldn't this have been easier if they had just formed a separate Battalion in each FMF (Lant/Pac) to handle all the SIF things. They used to have a Force Recon in each.
cfrog adds: The notable thing about the development of modern drones is that they have roughly mirrored the path of manned combat aviation. We are at the stage where Drones are often used as Aerial Observer (AO) for fires and as Forward Air Controller Airborne (FAC A) for other drones being used as direct attack. For the low level environment, this means the ground unit has it's own hip pocket air force to fill the gap between the unit and larger manned / unmanned aircraft capable of delivering heavier munitions. In some aspects, it's not far off having a section of Cobras in your hip pocket working from a Battle Position near the ground unit, except the ground unit always owns at least some of the sUAS/FPVs. Imagine running FiST packages and SEAD missions where a whole swath of the air capability is on hand/in pocket for the commander without having to manage launch / time on station. For the larger units, designating DS of larger air support to the ME wouldn't mean necessarily denying any air support to supporting efforts, since they would have some capability organically. The potential for exploiting tempo is...nice.